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ABSTRACT

This dissertation traces the emergence between World War I and World War II of a stateskeptical, court-centered, and content-neutral model of civil liberties in America. It argues that
the new understanding drew from competing traditions of progressive reformism and
conservative legalism. The American Civil Liberties Union reformulated those competing
traditions, primarily through efforts to resist the cooptation and coercion of the working class by
the capitalist state. More broadly, the dissertation suggests that the interwar civil liberties
movement was an important architect of the post-New Deal constitutional order, which paired
congressional regulation of the economy with judicial enforcement of state neutrality in the
democratic decision-making process.
The ACLU’s initial theory of civil liberties derived from the principles of labor
voluntarism. Its central commitment was to a “right of agitation,” bound up with the rights to
picket, organize, and strike. In the early 1920s, however, economic prosperity and the resulting
decline in industrial conflict opened space for the organization to venture into new fields and
form new partnerships without reassessing its underlying commitment to radical laborite ideals.
Although ACLU lawyers were initially skeptical of rights-based litigation, which they associated
with the substantive due process decisions of the Lochner era, their successes in such areas as
academic freedom and sex education attracted conservative proponents of individual rights and
helped to rehabilitate the judiciary as a forum for progressive reform.
Over the course of the 1930s, a broad range of actors sought to define and mobilize civil
liberties claims, including the La Follette Civil Liberties Committee, the American Bar
Association’s Committee on the Bill of Rights, and the Civil Liberties Unit within the
iii

Department of Justice. The ACLU clashed with its labor and administration allies over New
Deal labor legislation, the judiciary reorganization plan, and “employer free speech.”
Conservatives, in turn, adopted the ACLU’s civil liberties rhetoric in support of their own
agenda. By the late 1930s, the ACLU had traded in its open endorsement of radical social
change for a politically neutral commitment to the Bill of Rights, embraced by the legal
establishment and enforced by the federal courts.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1945, the American Civil Liberties Union issued a statement defining the category of
rights to which the organization was dedicated. 1 Civil liberties, it explained, were “guarantees to
citizens” pertaining primarily, though not exclusively, to their relationship with government.
They were essential to “democratic procedures” and flowed from the precepts of “a political
democracy in which ultimate power rests in the people, and in which minority rights are as
essential as majority rule.” They derived from the federal Bill of Rights and its state
counterparts, and they encompassed the “freedom from governmental interference with citizens’
liberties, of protection of those liberties where necessary by government itself, and of the
equality of all citizens in the exercise of rights.” According to the ACLU, the state had a role to
play in providing and protecting a forum for public debate, but it was never justified in curtailing
disfavored views, “however radical or reactionary.” 2
The ACLU’s postwar vision of civil liberties was colored by international events,
organizational politics, and a quarter-century of steady gains in the courts and in public opinion.
More than anything, however, it was shaped by federal labor policy. When the ACLU was
founded in the aftermath of the First World War, it declared itself an adjunct of the radical labor
movement. Its defense of free speech was motivated by a deep-seated distrust of state power,

1

It is often difficult to distinguish the institutional voice of the ACLU from that of its various constituents. Where
possible, I designate the particular speaker or group of speakers.
2
Civil Liberty: A Statement Defining the Position of the American Civil Liberties Union (New York: ACLU, 1945).

1

stemming from decades of hostile government policy. 3 That concern persisted until the early
New Deal. As ACLU co-founder Roger Baldwin recalled decades later, the organization’s
leaders were concerned that the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt would bleed
into a “centralized Fascist state,” but the National Labor Relations Board convinced them
otherwise. They had feared that the NLRB would decline to protect the rights of labor, but in
practice “it served as one of the most impressive landmark agencies in civil liberties and
industrial peace.” 4
The ACLU’s acceptance of central state authority went hand in hand with a new and
lasting deference to the federal courts. During the 1920s, faced with the federal judiciary’s
eagerness to protect property rights against encroachment by state and federal legislation, the
ACLU had been reluctant to invite judicial intervention on behalf of individual rights. By the
1940s, the organization’s “battleground [was] chiefly in the courts.” 5 Its volunteer attorneys had
carried “scores of civil liberties issues” to the United States Supreme Court, “where decisions in
case after case [had] firmly established the interpretations of the Bill of Rights which the Union
supports.” 6 Over the following decades, the ACLU would continue to pursue such non-judicial
methods as lobbying, grass-roots organizing, and cooperation with administrative agencies. At
3

“Free speech” and “civil liberties” are not synonymous. Rather, free speech is a subset or component of a broader
category captured by the latter term. Although both ideas were in flux during this period, free speech was more
stable and entailed, at the minimum, a commitment to public discussion of lawful political decisions.
4
Roger Baldwin, introduction to American Civil Liberties Union Annual Reports, vol. 1 (New York: Arno Press and
the New York Times, 1970), iii; American Civil Liberties Union, Eternal Vigilance!: The Story of Civil Liberty,
1937–1938 (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1938), 25–26 (“Only those familiar with the violations of
labor’s rights can appreciate the enormous change which has taken place in industrial conflict since the Supreme
Court’s decisions in the spring of 1937 sustaining the National Labor Relations Act. . . . The National Labor
Relations Act is in substance a civil liberties document.”).
5
American Civil Liberties Union, Presenting the American Civil Liberties Union, Inc., November 1941 (New York:
American Civil Liberties Union, 1941).
6
American Civil Liberties Union, Presenting the American Civil Liberties Union, April 1947 (New York: American
Civil Liberties Union, 1947), 5.
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times, when the courts seemed unusually unfriendly to civil liberties claims, it would emphasize
legislation or education. Still, the organization’s mature view was unmistakable: “the whole
courts system, top to bottom, federal and state, is the proper and natural ally of citizen’s rights,
and for the ACLU, with its appeal to law, it is the essential forum.” 7
The ACLU’s twin commitments to a robust federal government and to strong federal
courts reflected a distinctly modern approach to civil liberties. The ACLU, like the liberalism of
which its “card-carrying members” were emblematic, had come to accept as necessary and
desirable the New Deal expansion of central state authority over vast swaths of social and
economic relations. The rights it championed—expressive freedom, but also sexual autonomy,
personal privacy, and procedural protections for criminal defendants—were articulated not in
opposition to state power, but as its natural complements. In the ACLU’s conception, these
protections were crucial because they ensured that democratic government would reflect the
diversity of human viewpoints and experiences, making the legitimate exercise of federal power
possible.
By conventional accounts, the new arrangement—judicial deference to state economic
policy coupled with strong safeguards against government interference as that policy was
formulated and enacted—was heralded by the Supreme Court’s fourth footnote of Carolene
Products. This dissertation suggests that the theory of government embedded in footnote four
was not a spontaneous solution by federal judges struggling to balance political will against
minority rights. Nor was it, as some have suggested, primarily a response to fears stemming

7

Baldwin, “Introduction,” xii.
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from the rise of totalitarianism in Europe. 8 Rather, it was the articulation of two decades of
negotiations between state-centered progressive reformism (with its attendant distrust of the
Constitution and the courts) on the one hand, and conservative legalism (friendly to both industry
and individual autonomy) on the other. Crucially, the compromise approach was brokered by the
ACLU in its effort to resist the cooptation and coercion of the working class by the capitalist
state.
In short, the dissertation argues that the ACLU—guided by the lessons and ambitions, if
not always the tenets, of the radical labor movement—was an unsung architect of the post-New
Deal constitutional order. 9 Its early theory of civil liberties derived from the principles of labor
voluntarism, and during the 1920s, its rejection of state intervention in the context of labor
disputes paradoxically allied it to conservative proponents of individual rights. 10 For the most
part, representatives of the early ACLU defended labor radicals and political dissenters by
reference to constitutional rights because rights-based litigation proved effective. They believed
in “agitation,” not individual liberty. Over time, however, many (though not all) internalized
their commitment to free speech as an abstract value; their insistence in public communications

8

E.g., Edward Purcell, The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1973); Richard Primus, The American Language of Rights (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1999); William Edward Nelson, The Legalist Reformation: Law, Politics, and Ideology
in New York, 1920–1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).
9
While legal histories, as well as constitutional law casebooks, have largely ignored the ACLU’s role in these
developments, the ACLU’s public literature and institutional history has claimed a foundational role for the
organization in the rise of modern American governance, albeit in a celebratory mode. See, e.g., American Civil
Liberties Union, “ACLU History,” Web. 1 February 2011 <http://www.aclu.org/aclu-history> (“The advancement
of civil liberties over the past century represents one of the most significant developments in American history, and
the ACLU has been integral to this process.”).
10
On the conservative civil libertarian tradition, see Kenneth I. Kersch, Constructing Civil Liberties: Discontinuities
in the Development of American Constitutional Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); David
Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individual Rights against Progressive Reform (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, in press). Although conservative jurists occasionally upheld the contractual rights of minorities, they
rarely if ever defended the rights of workers to organize or picket or the rights of radicals to promote their ideas.
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that their defense of radicals’ right to speak did not imply agreement with their underlying views
rang increasingly true. As early as October 1928, Arthur Garfield Hays, general counsel for the
ACLU and a committed civil libertarian, argued that radicalism was ill-advised and that “the
solution of our economic problems must be accomplished by education and law, not by
revolution.” 11 Though for a time they remained fellow travelers, the leadership of the ACLU
clashed with their radical allies. Over the course of the 1930s, they unhooked their leftist
ambition for substantive equality from the freedom to espouse it. By the late New Deal, the
ACLU had traded in its open endorsement of radical social change for a politically neutral
commitment to the Bill of Rights.
The narrative that unfolds in these pages is not the one that I expected to find. Today, the
ACLU’s Web page recounts that “the ACLU was founded to defend and secure [constitutional]
rights and to extend them to people who have been excluded from their protection—Native
Americans and other people of color; lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and transgender people;
women; mental patients; prisoners; people with disabilities; and the poor.” 12 When I came to the
project, I was searching for the voices of women, of immigrants, of African Americans, of the
disenfranchised. All were there. But in their conversations with and on behalf of the ACLU,
they did not advocate for their rights as individuals, or even (at first) of minorities. A year after
the ACLU was founded, its statement on lynching neatly summed up the organization’s
approach: “We publish the pamphlet in the belief that only by frankly recognizing the economic
11

Advertisement for Ford Hall Forum, n.d., in Covel, Betsy B., ed., Women’s Studies Manuscript Collections from
the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College, Series 3: Sexuality, Sex Education, and Reproductive Rights, Part B:
Papers of Mary Ware Dennett and the Voluntary Parenthood League (Bethesda: University Publications of
America, 1994) (hereafter Dennett Papers), reel 22, file 477.
12
American Civil Liberties Union, “Guardians of Freedom,” Web. 1 February 2011
<http://www.aclu.org/guardians-freedom>.
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basis of lynching can we even begin to solve the problem. . . . Its solution is obviously bound up
with the cause of exploited labor—white and black alike. And that solution will become possible
only as the black and white workers of the South both achieve the right to meet, speak freely,
organize and strike.” 13 During the 1920s and 1930s, the ACLU fought the deportation of aliens
and the suppression of religious fringe groups. It defended the advocacy of birth control and of
racially integrated public school. But its primary goal was always to secure labor’s rights.
The American Civil Liberties Union is at the heart of this story. But this project is not a
history of the ACLU; it is a history through the ACLU. Between World War I and World War II,
no organization or individual was as instrumental in shaping contemporary understandings of
civil liberties. The ACLU was deeply connected to the foundational social movements of the
interwar period, and it was involved in virtually every important free speech case in the federal
courts between its founding in 1920 and the Second World War. 14 According to Roger Baldwin,
the ACLU was the first American organization to incorporate the phrase “civil liberties” into its
title, thereby bringing it “into a wider public vocabulary.” 15 Indeed, when conservative lawyers
sought to reclaim civil liberties as an “American value” in the late 1930s, they acknowledged

13

William Pickens, Lynching and Debt Slavery (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1921), 1. See also
Roger Baldwin, Memorandum on the South as Observed in a Trip in May and June 1920, in American Civil
Liberties Union Records, The Roger Baldwin Years, 1917–1950, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Public Policy
Papers, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. (hereafter ACLU Papers), reel 23, vol. 166, p. 5 (“The race issue at
bottom is the labor issue, and the master class of the south knows it.”).
14
Many of the connections were fostered through Baldwin’s role as organizer and administrator of the American
Fund for Public Service, or Garland Fund. See generally Gloria Garrett Samson, The American Fund for Public
Service: Charles Garland and Radical Philanthropy, 1922-1941 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996).
15
Baldwin, “Introduction,” iii. According to Baldwin, the incorporation of “civil liberties” into the title of the
AUAM’s Civil Liberties Bureau in 1917 was borrowed from “a British war-time Council for Civil Liberties whose
leaders we knew.” Ibid., viii. After the war, that organization was disbanded. A new National Council for Civil
Liberties was organized in 1934. On the British civil liberties movement during and between the world wars, see K.
D. Ewing and C. A. Gearty, The Struggle for Civil Liberties: Political Freedom and the Rule of Law in Britain,
1914–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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their own absence from the field for the previous decades, and they attributed it to the dominant
influence of the ACLU. 16
Almost all of the significant figures in the interwar effort to define and promote civil
liberties were affiliated, in some capacity, with the ACLU. Between 1920 and 1940, the ACLU’s
governing bodies—its National Committee and, after incorporation, its National and Executive
Boards—resembled a who’s who list of influential public figures. 17 They included
representatives of the radical and mainstream labor movements (for example, James H. Maurer,
Powers Hapgood, Andrew Furuseth, and Rose Schneiderman), the NAACP (James Weldon
Johnson, Charles Hamilton Houston, and future Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall), and
major religious denominations (John Haynes Holmes, Rev. John A. Ryan, Rabbi Abba Hillel
Silver). They attracted distinguished activists and reformers (Jane Addams, Hellen Keller, and
Amos Pinchot), well known lawyers (Clarence Darrow and Dorothy Kenyon), and prominent
publishers, writers, and intellectuals (B. W. Huebsch, Pearl Buck, Heywood Broun, John Dos
Passos, and Upton Sinclair). They boasted high-level government officials (Frank P. Walsh and
Lloyd K. Garrison), as well as eminent former and future federal judges (Charles F. Amidon,
George W. Anderson, and Felix Frankfurter). Politically, they brought together leading
Socialists (including Morris Hillquit, Norman Thomas, and Eugene V. Debs), Communists
16

Grenville Clark, “Conservatism and Civil Liberty,” Address at Annual Meeting of the Nassau County Bar
Association, 11 June 1938, in Arthur T. Vanderbilt Political, Professional, and Judicial Papers, Wesleyan University
Collection on Legal Change, Middletown, Conn. (hereafter Vanderbilt Papers), box 127, folder Civil Liberties;
“Freedom of Speech: Whose Concern?” New Northwest (Portland, Oregon), 14 March 1919, ACLU Papers, reel 5,
vol. 41 (“The defense of free speech has become in this country almost a monopoly of the radicals. The conservative
classes, with a few honorable exceptions in congress and in the press, have put away the ancient American faith in
freedom. . . . The conservative leaders of the American bar, men like Root and Hughes and Parker, have discreetly
remained out of sight.”).
17
Its state and local affiliates also featured a distinguished leadership. See generally Judy Kutulas, The American
Civil Liberties Union and the Making of Modern Liberalism, 1930-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2006).
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(William Z. Foster), liberal Republicans (Jeanette Rankin), and even, for a time, a segregationist
Southern Democrat (Thomas W. Hardwick). Many others who never joined the organization
turned to it for legal representation or closely allied with it in pursuit of common goals.
In addition, the vast majority of the important theorists—legal, social, and political—who
thought and wrote about free speech and its relationship to American democracy were connected
with the organization. Ernst Freund and Harold Laski were founding members of the National
Committee, and John Dewey and Alexander Meiklejohn both subsequently joined. Charles
Beard participated in ACLU-sponsored special projects. Zechariah Chafee declined to sit on the
National Committee because he believed it would compromise his perceived scholarly
objectivity, but he made donations, worked closely with the ACLU leadership, and guided the
activities of the Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts. 18
The ACLU’s allies and constituents during the interwar years had more disagreements
than commonalities, and they arrived at civil liberties advocacy from widely divergent paths.
Most, however, took up the cause during or immediately after World War I. 19 In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the threat to democratic progress had taken the form of
“individual rights”; invoking them, courts repeatedly (albeit infrequently, relative to their
dockets) undermined government efforts to temper economic injustice. During the war,
conversely, “the state” was aligned with the majority in suppressing unpopular views. This new
lineup encouraged a new way of thinking about rights. Prior critics of monopoly capitalism had
18

Zechariah Chafee to Roger Baldwin, 17 January 1929, ACLU Papers, reel 63, vol. 360; Donald L. Smith,
Zechariah Chafee, Jr.: Defender of Liberty and Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 9.
19
The ACLU’s own publications consistently cited World War I as the impetus for the leadership’s interest in civil
liberties. E.g., Osmond K. Fraenkel, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties (New York: American Civil Liberties
Union, 1949), 20 (“The most important issues in modern civil liberties grew out of the First World War. Then for
the first time the Court was called upon to consider the meaning of freedom of speech and of the press.”).
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framed American politics as a pitched battle between corporations and constitutional
conservatism on the one hand and the will of the people on the other. Wartime reformers, faced
with the failings of democratic majorities and government officials, were forced to reassess their
political understandings. Some turned more radical, emphasizing false consciousness, the
insidious influence of the industrial lobby, and administrative capture. Others clung to their
confidence in progressive governance but called upon legislators and administrators to provide
space for dissent. Still others adopted a liberal ideal remarkably similar to that of the Lochner
Court, albeit toward different ends, reimagining the Constitution as a guarantor of individual
rights as against the authoritarian excesses of the state. 20 All were disillusioned by the
government’s failure to uphold democratic values. The mobilization of state actors and offices in
the service of domestic repression taught them just how fickle and oppressive administrative
governance can be.
The most familiar strain of interwar civil libertarianism was the progressive version
espoused by civil liberties theoreticians (including Zechariah Chafee, Felix Frankfurter, John
Dewey, and Alexander Meilkejohn) and by a few sympathetic jurists (most famously Judge
Learned Hand and Justices Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes). To varying degrees,
these figures emphasized the capacity of free speech to inform democratic decision-making or to
flush out political truth. Although they harbored serious reservations about the underlying
beliefs of the wartime dissenters, they regarded civil liberties as fundamental to the rule of law.
During the 1920s, they appreciated the dangers of excessive emphasis on the public interest,
20

Early civil libertarians imagined rights against popular pressures (for example, mob violence) and private actors
(most notably employers) as well as state power. On the importance of mob violence to the World War I civil
liberties movement, see Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern
American Citizen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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majority will, and administrative consensus. Moreover, they knew that social science solutions
were only ever as good as the research and theory on which they relied, and they understood that
accepted methods were always evolving and incomplete. They acknowledged the coercive
power of the state—even, or particularly, a popularly elected one—to reinforce dominant
narratives.
Most, however, accepted the administrative state as an abiding feature of modernity.
Some fretted about “bigness” in government as an analog to the industrial consolidation of
wealth, but they never made a concerted effort to turn the tide of central state growth. 21 Instead,
they sought to introduce protections for inadequately represented groups into the exercise of
federal power (though not, primarily, through the courts 22). The prewar progressives had
celebrated bureaucrats for their insulation from political will, but it had since become evident
that neutrality was illusory—industrial interests had consistently managed to assert their
influence—and ill-advised. Their interwar counterparts instead called for accountability to a
broad range of public voices. They sought to ensure that the state, despite and because of its

21

ACLU attorney Morris Ernst’s 1940 book Too Big was planned in conversation with Louis Brandeis and was
intended as an update to the well-known volume of the latter’s assembled works, The Curse of Bigness (1934),
which was edited by another influential ACLU lawyer, Osmond Fraenkel. Morris Ernst, Too Big (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1940); Louis Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness: Miscellaneous Papers of Louis D. Brandeis, edited by
Osmond K. Fraenkel (New York: Viking Press, 1934). Ernst’s friends and colleagues within the New Deal
administration were skeptical of his critique of bigness, including, most notably, Jerome Frank, who took him to task
for undervaluing New Deal efficiency and for celebrating states’ rights, among other positions. Jerome Frank to
Morris Ernst, 25 September 1939, in Morris Leopold Ernst Papers, 1888–1976, Harry Ransom Humanities Research
Center, University of Texas at Austin (hereafter Ernst Papers), box 10, folder 4. On the other hand, Ernst’s distrust
of the new, vast bureaucracy was shared by many former Progressives, including John Dewey and Zechariah
Chafee—and, of course, by Brandeis. See Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy of
Civil Libertarianism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 81, 135.
22
For example, Zechariah Chafee sought to persuade Congress and the people that free speech served the public
interest but, like many of his Progressive colleagues, questioned the authority of the courts to override explicit
legislative policy prohibiting speech. In his later years, however, Chafee came to doubt whether Congress was as
capable as the courts were of safeguarding individual liberties. Jonathan Prude, “Portrait of a Civil Libertarian: The
Faith and Fear of Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,” Journal of American History 60 (1973): 652–54.

10

unprecedented reach, would be responsive to new ideas and interests: accessible, mutable, and
open to democratic change.
Like their prewar precursors, the progressive civil libertarians imagined a theory of rights
that facilitated tolerance and diversity not because of the inherent autonomy and dignity of
individuals, but because entrenched government interests stifle difference and progress.
Zechariah Chafee explained in his seminal work on civil liberties that “the rights and powers of
the Constitution . . . are largely means of protecting important individual and social interests.”
The crucial part, he explained, was finding the balance between the two. 23 The solution to the
growth of central state authority was not to reverse it, as conservatives and anarchists both
claimed. On the contrary, it was the necessity and permanence of the wartime expansion of
administrative authority that made a broader commitment to civil liberties important. 24 As
British civil libertarian Norman Angell observed, “The need of individuality in thought increases
in direct ratio to the increasing complexity of our social arrangements. The very fact that we do
need more and more unity of ACTION—regimentation, regulation—in order to make a large
population with many needs possible at all, is the reason mainly which makes it so important to
preserve variety and freedom of individual thought.” 25 The surrender to government of authority
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over the minutiae of daily life made the open and ongoing discussion of social priorities
imperative.
The ACLU made liberal use of such arguments, whose most prominent proponents
collaborated actively with the organization in authoring pamphlets and drafting legal briefs. 26 In
fact, an ACLU-commissioned treatise on civil liberties reflected in 1928 that the courts of the
United States had only recently abandoned their outmoded reliance on “natural rights” for the
“modern idea that grants liberty to men . . . for the sake of the state.” 27 For the ACLU’s core
leadership, however, the most important lesson of the government’s wartime policy was not
about pluralism or public welfare. In the wake of the Bolshevik revolution, Roger Baldwin,
Norman Thomas, Albert DeSilver, Walter Nelles, and the other members of the ACLU inner
circle believed that the downfall of the American economic system was imminent, and desirable,
in America. Although they too began as progressive reformers, they sympathized with the
radicals imprisoned under the 1917 Espionage Act and had come to share the views of the
dissenters. For them, the relevant civil liberty was the “right of agitation,” which encompassed
the rights to picket, boycott, and strike. In their new vision, which grew out of the radical labor
movement, the state was a tool of capital and inherently inimical to the public good.
The project for the interwar ACLU was to link the right of agitation to the American
constitutional tradition, both normatively and doctrinally. And in that venture, the ACLU parted
company from progressives and turned, ironically, to the counter-majoritarian tradition its
26
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founders had most despised. The organization took up such quintessentially progressive ventures
as academic freedom, but it sought to infuse them with the authority of anti-state individualism.
In the process, it reached out to conservatives, particularly lawyers, for whom individual rights
were the umbrella category from which Lochner-era autonomy derived. And while few
conservatives articulated civil libertarian arguments explicitly during this period, ACLU lawyers
were borrowing their language and learning their tactics. 28 In so doing, they achieved
remarkable success where the progressives had long failed, in the most inhospitable of forums:
the federal courts.
As the New Deal unfolded, however, the broad-based civil liberties coalition began to
break down. During the 1920s, when there was no realistic possibility of state protection for
labor’s rights, anti-state radicals, moderate socialists, progressive reformers and conservative
lawyers could all sit comfortably in the same tent. In the 1930s, the prospect of state-centered
reform forced civil liberties advocates within and outside the ACLU to take sides. Progressive
reformers and organized labor went one way; conservative legalists the other. The ACLU’s core
leadership—still hostile to the capitalist system but still fearful of state power—was reluctant to
choose. Progressives dismissed what John Dewey derisively called “the individualist and
laissez-faire conception of civil liberties,” but the ACLU’s leftists were not so sure. 29 Although
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they rejected the “right to contract,” their insistence that civil liberties were pre-political checks
on a coercive state was not so different from the Right’s—a kinship that their critics within the
New Deal and the organized labor movement were quick to point out. In fact, the ACLU board
initially opposed New Deal labor legislation, including the National Labor Relations Act.
Eventually, the organization accepted and even celebrated state control in the economic sphere.
It also accepted a role for government in promoting public debate and in ensuring that the
channels of communication would remain open. But when it came to the content of speech, it
steadfastly opposed government intervention—even when muting privileged voices or
amplifying those of the disenfranchised promised to serve the interests of organized labor.
For their part, conservative groups proved just as adaptive as the early ACLU. Over the
course of two decades, the ACLU had helped to move the courts from the defense of property to
the defense of “personal rights.” Its lawyers cast free speech as a right against excessive
administrative intrusion into private behavior and choices 30—a framing that was compatible with
conservative reliance on individual rights. They also rehabilitated the federal courts as a vehicle
for securing individual justice and minority rights against the improper exercise of state power.
In the face of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s judiciary reorganization plan, conservative groups,
including the American Bar Association and even the American Liberty League, touted the
ACLU-sponsored civil liberties victories of the early 1930s as evidence of the necessity for
judicial review. With the “constitutional revolution,” the transition was complete. Corporate
lawyers exchanged the discredited rhetoric of Lochner-era due process for the very language that
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the ACLU had supplied. Henceforth, the dominant conservative tactic would be to influence
legislation rather than ask courts to overturn it. The ACLU had succeeded in making civil
liberties a neutral commitment, not an adjunct of economic rights. In the process, it had made
free speech a powerful tool for the Right.
Looking backward from 1940, Constance L. Todd, a radical journalist who was married
for two decades to the ACLU’s early representative and press correspondent in Washington,
D.C., reflected nostalgically on the organization’s origins: “Twenty years ago,” she wrote to
Baldwin, “you . . . showed such diabolical ingenuity in devising an organization which would
compel (and I use the word advisedly) the comfortable intelligent to work for socialism in the
name of Consistency and the Bill of Rights.” According to Todd, the genius of the ACLU was its
eclecticism, its ability to entertain competing theories while committing to none. “You
obviously enjoyed practicing and demonstrating your skill as a tight-rope walker, balancing on
two ropes and drawing together strange bedfellows,” she recalled. “In actuality it worked for us,
and against them; though before 1914, the Bill of Rights had worked for them and against us.” 31
And yet, in Todd’s view, the ACLU’s success was also its downfall. The machinery of
the New Deal state had sought to preserve labor’s rights at the expense of employers’ liberties.
“For the first time,” presented with that trade-off, Baldwin had been forced to “choose between
two sets of colleagues.” 32 With Baldwin still at the helm, the ACLU had attained respectability,
and it had disavowed its radical past. To Todd, who had once counted Baldwin as a close friend
as well as a political ally, the new direction was a betrayal of the organization’s underlying
ideals. Baldwin’s response was characteristically cryptic: “I am not aware of any change
31
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whatever,” he told Todd. “Your arguments are not a bit impressive, for they are all based upon
the assumption that somehow or other I have changed my ‘spots.’” 33

* * * * *

This dissertation endeavors to contribute to historical scholarship on civil liberties, the
labor movement, and court-based constitutionalism, as well as theoretical discussion of the
meaning and purpose of free speech. First, it addresses the origins of the distinctively legal
conception of civil liberties in America. Despite a longstanding assumption that the early civil
liberties movement was antagonistic to the courts, no historian has explained the interwar turn to
the judicial forum. 34 By examining how and why civil liberties advocates settled upon their
litigation strategy, the dissertation demonstrates that protecting civil liberties need not have
become a constitutional project. In the years after World War I, most proponents of free speech
were hostile to Lochner-era legalism and preferred to pursue free speech through other channels;
when they did bring their cases to court, they made common law and statutory claims. By the
mid-1930s, the free speech fight was squarely on judicial terrain, and civil liberties were
thoroughly constitutionalized.
Understanding this transformation casts light on the broader embrace of legalism in midtwentieth century political culture. During World War I, efforts to preserve civil liberties
through litigation were resoundingly unsuccessful. Over the course of the 1920s, however, a
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combination of labor quiescence, popular indifference, and judicial successes made reliance on
judicially enforceable rights, especially constitutional ones, increasingly appealing. Civil
liberties lawyers—ACLU attorneys, but also firm lawyers on behalf of corporate clients, as well
as the ABA—were instrumental in this transition. Whereas many free speech advocates
remained deeply skeptical of constitutional litigation and its language of rights, the lawyers
forcefully, if sometimes reluctantly, adopted a court-based and constitutional approach that
would shortly become the signature of the civil liberties movement. 35 They selected test cases
carefully, working in areas where public opinion was favorable, such as academic freedom and
sex education. In contrast to their initial defense of anarchists and communists, these cases
pushed courts toward a more libertarian stance without triggering public outrage.
Second, the dissertation highlights the historical specificity of the content-neutral
conception of free speech. Even the most nuanced histories have assumed that “civil liberties”
inevitably entailed the freedom to voice unpopular views, and they have measured the successes
of advocacy groups, including the ACLU, by their adherence to that vision. 36 Civil liberties,
however, is a dynamic concept. It was during the 1920s and 1930s, decades largely neglected by
historians of free speech, 37 that the modern understanding of civil liberties took shape. In 1917,
35
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few Americans would have agreed upon the meaning of the term, much less endorsed free
speech for dissenters. By 1940, most Americans believed that individuals were entitled to
engage in any expression that did not jeopardize the immediate health or safety of others. 38 The
popularization of civil liberties over the course of the 1920s and 1930s—their transformation in
just two decades into a defining feature of American democracy—was a remarkable
achievement. But it was not a revolution plotted out in advance by libertarian theorists. In fact, it
was a function of tactics and institutional maneuvering as much as politics and ideology.
Beginning with World War I, civil libertarians slowly divorced the free speech rights they
advocated from the underlying political views of the speakers they defended. They also began to
articulate a distinction between “civil liberties” and other social causes they deemed worthy, like
“civil rights” and “labor rights.” In formulating their theory of free speech, they reacted to
government accusations of radicalism and Soviet collaboration; the success of rights-based
litigation and the corresponding failure of both direct action and of legislative and regulatory
efforts; the professionalization of civil liberties advocacy; and the rise of totalitarianism abroad
and administrative governance at home, among other factors. The state-skeptical, contentneutral concept of civil liberties (and, by extension, a distinctively American devotion to free
speech absolutism) developed piecemeal, and as late as 1940 important government actors
retained a very different understanding of the term. By teasing out the many early approaches,
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the dissertation emphasizes the accidents, inconsistencies, and idiosyncrasies through which the
contending meanings of civil liberties were winnowed down.
Finally, and most important, the dissertation introduces labor radicalism as a
determinative factor in the formulation of popular and judicial understandings of civil liberties
during the first half of the twentieth century. Labor historians have acknowledged the use of
civil liberties rhetoric as a tool, particularly in the context of the IWW’s prewar free speech
fights, 39 the 1910s and 1920s boycott and picket cases, 40 and the 1930s Senate Civil Liberties
Committee. 41 They have assumed, however, that “free speech” was a pre-existing category and
that labor leaders simply used it as they found it.
Meanwhile, historians of civil liberties have largely accepted the ACLU’s explanation of
its disproportionate involvement in the defense of radicals, proffered since the organization’s
founding: repression primarily affected anarchists, socialists, and Communists, and so those were
the constituencies whom the ACLU was most likely to serve. 42 Accounts of the prewar free
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speech movement have richly documented the relationship between radicals and civil liberties
during the early twentieth century, but they have not connected the “radical libertarian” tradition
to the modern civil liberties movement. 43 Histories of the ACLU have acknowledged the
founders’ radicalism but have dismissed it as youthful flirtation—an impetus for involvement in
civil liberties work, perhaps, but extraneous to the process through which civil liberties were
defined. 44 Conservative legal and political theorists have emphasized the ACLU’s leftist roots to
discredit its “neutrality” even while they have accepted the organization’s mature concept of
civil liberties as the appropriate and inevitable understanding. 45 On the whole, historians have
not examined the role of class conflict in the ACLU’s selection of test-cases, choice of allies, and
ideological commitments.
The records of the interwar civil liberties movement suggest that organized labor was
more than a client or beneficiary of its services. During the 1920s and 1930s, the ACLU
leadership regarded civil liberties as an instrument of working class power, indeed, as a gateway
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to the general strike. It brought that understanding to the seminal civil liberties cases of the
1920s (not only such obvious candidates as Gitlow v. New York and Whitney v. California, but
also controversies over compulsory public schooling and evolution, including Pierce v. Society
of Sisters and Scopes v. Tennessee 46). Labor radicalism guided the organization’s approach to
litigation and its connection with the progressive and legal establishments through which the
values of civil liberties were promoted and institutionalized. During the 1930s, even as civil
liberties advocacy moved from the fringes to the mainstream, the principal actors within the
ACLU retained a state-skeptical relationship to state power, indelibly stamped with the
experiences and disappointments of the previous half-century. Persuaded by two decades of civil
liberties advocacy on behalf of silenced workers, the Roosevelt administration introduced
protections for labor’s rights and sought to correct power imbalances in the marketplace of ideas.
In the end, however, it was the ACLU’s vision of state neutrality that prevailed.
Bringing labor back into the history of civil liberties in America helps explain an
apparent discrepancy between free speech theory and its implementation in the courts. The
progressive theory of civil liberties, whether premised on truth seeking or on the integrity of
democratic processes, was the one expressed in the foundational free speech dissents of the
1920s. Since that time, it has been the leading model in law schools and political science
departments, where scholars have long advocated public regulation designed to increase the
quality and range of public debate. And yet, while judges have dutifully echoed the progressive
rationales, they have consistently refused to restrict hateful and abusive speech, even where it
degrades the quality of conversation and discourages broad participation. They have also
46
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declined to curb dominating or repetitious speech, despite its tendency to drown out the
“competition.” They have studiously disregarded the tendency of state neutrality to perpetuate
existing power disparities and forestall social change. 47
Revisiting the interwar period from the perspective of civil liberties advocacy reveals that
the progressive understanding—though it found adherents within the New Deal administration as
well as the ACLU—remained a marginal view among free speech practitioners, radical and
conservative. At the same time, the vision of free speech espoused in 1940 by both the ACLU
leadership and the ABA was a substantial departure from the atomistic individualism of
substantive due process. Both groups came to believe that government should secure a forum for
public debate—that it should actively promote speech, not merely tolerate it. They urged the
state to prosecute hecklers and to open up street corners, meeting halls, and radio bandwidth for
political discussion. In the end, their goal was not to preserve individual autonomy; they
imagined a state that was nonpartisan as opposed to laissez-faire. But they were determined to
ensure government neutrality in the contest between workers and industry over public opinion
and public policy. That contest, in 1940, both labor and capital believed that they could win.
Exploring the tensions among the various actors agitating for free speech in this early
period reveals the hidden costs of the state-skeptical, content-neutral notion of civil liberties that
47
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remains dominant today. The reformers-turned-radicals who ran the interwar movement
imagined civil liberties as a backdoor approach to a just society. They reluctantly defended the
speech of racists and reactionaries, but they regarded substantive equality as part and parcel of
the civil liberties agenda. Moreover, they feared oppression by corporations and private citizens
just as much as government censorship. For a variety of reasons—some institutional and
strategic, others political and theoretical—the leaders of the civil liberties movement disclaimed
these early ambitions by the eve of World War II. The champions of neutrality were not
heedless of the consequences. They understood that unrestrained expression could undermine
such competing ideals as civil, political, and economic rights, and they urged careful
consideration in difficult cases. In the end, however, they trusted that in the absence of state
coercion, the principles of justice would prevail. Whatever its benefits, the new approach
supplanted an open commitment to economic security and social equality, within and outside the
civil liberties movement. 48

* * * * *

The dissertation is divided into six chapters. The first two focus on World War I and the
Red Scare and introduce the characters and concepts that drive the larger story. Chapter 1
reviews the various prewar efforts to defend free speech and describes the dominant political and
intellectual climate at the outbreak of war, including the progressive ambivalence toward civil
liberties claims. It also reconstructs the central engagements of the ACLU leadership during the
48
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two years prior to the organization’s founding, when it operated as the National Civil Liberties
Bureau (first as an arm of the American Union Against Militarism, and beginning in 1918 as an
independent body). The founders of the ACLU were concerned not only with government
repression, but also with the suppression of speech by non-state entities and individuals,
including employers. In some cases, they sought to use government affirmatively to restrain
private interference with expression. Limited successes coupled with concerns about majoritarian
abuses and unchecked bureaucratic authority shook their confidence in state solutions. At the
same time, however, judicial hostility to labor, manifest in anti-labor convictions under the
Espionage Act as well as older methods like labor injunctions, made the courts an unlikely venue
for social change.
Chapter 2 explores the origins of what the ACLU called a “right of agitation” against
entrenched industrial interests, bound up with the rights to picket, organize, and strike. The
impetus for the new approach was the NCLB’s involvement with the wartime prosecution and
conviction of the IWW leadership. By the end of the IWW trial, the NCLB leadership was
thoroughly disillusioned with progressive reform and had come to share the IWW’s belief that
the state inevitably served the interests of capital. When the ACLU was founded in 1920, it
declared itself to be a frank advocate of the labor cause, and it adopted direct action as its
principal mechanism for protecting civil liberties.
Chapter 3 traces the development of the ACLU’s agenda during a period when industrial
conflict and direct government involvement in labor relations were at an ebb. In the early 1920s,
economic prosperity and the resulting decline in industrial conflict opened space for the
organization to venture into new fields and form new partnerships without reassessing its
24

underlying commitment to radical ideals. The ACLU’s first new project was academic freedom.
Although its initial focus was the defense of radical teachers and educational institutions (in
particular, the Rand School of Social Science), progressive support for academic freedom pushed
the ACLU toward a more general program. By subsequently expanding its agenda to include
“non-political” speech—first sex education, followed by artistic freedom and birth control—the
ACLU shed much of its radical stigma and attracted significant popular support for civil
liberties. In such cases as the Scopes trial, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and United States v.
Dennett, the ACLU invoked anti-state claims of individual rights on behalf of, and sometimes
even in contravention of, progressive ends. In the process, it began to rehabilitate the judiciary
as a tool for protecting non-economic rights. This program helped the organization to build a
broad alliance in favor of civil liberties, although fundamental tensions among the various
contingents remained unresolved.
The last three chapters take up the New Deal. Chapter 4 examines the ACLU’s attitude
toward seminal New Deal labor policy, including the National Labor Relations Act, and its
enforcement in the federal courts. The ACLU divided over the Wagner Act because its radical
leadership considered it a dangerous extension of federal authority (many voiced standard
Communist arguments about the path to fascism; some would have countenanced state authority
in a proletarian state). Within a year of its passage, the left within the ACLU, as outside it, had
rallied behind the NLRB. Nonetheless, doubts about administrative authority, fueled by the
ACLU’s extension into nonpolitical fields as well as a decade of hostile labor policy, persisted.
Meanwhile, the Senate’s Civil Liberties Committee, organized by Robert La Follette, envisioned
civil liberties as substantive labor rights, now secured by (not against) the state and codified as
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federal law. President Roosevelt’s judiciary reorganization plan was also divisive. This time,
however, the left and labor lined up behind Roosevelt, while the liberals worried about the effect
of a weakened judiciary on recent civil liberties gains. Many within the ACLU felt that an
independent court was necessary to protect minority rights from majority power, and the ACLU
Board ultimately chose not to take a position on the issue. At the same time, conservative groups
ranging from the American Bar Association to the American Liberty League seized upon the
Supreme Court’s new civil liberties decisions as a justification for judicial review.
Chapter 5 describes an episode that served as a testing ground for the competing
understandings of civil liberties on the eve of the Second World War. In the late 1930s, Mayor
Frank Hague’s tyrannical suppression of CIO meetings in Jersey City prompted civil liberties
advocates from across the political spectrum to act on their convictions and, in the process, to
build their constituencies. In 1938, the ACLU and CIO sued in federal court to enjoin Hague’s
repressive practices. For the ACLU, Mayor Hague’s policies were equally menacing whether
they targeted Nazi sympathizers or the CIO. For the CIO, by contrast, the relevant right was
labor’s right to organize. In 1938, the ABA formed a Committee on the Bill of Rights and,
working with the ACLU, filed amicus briefs on behalf of free speech in the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court. A few months later, citing circumstances in Jersey City, Frank Murphy
organized a Civil Liberties Division within the Department of Justice to facilitate the active
prosecution of civil liberties violations by local officials. The Supreme Court’s speechprotective decision in Hague v. CIO enjoyed near universal support.
The final chapter describes the collapse of the short-lived consensus in Hague. In the
run-up to the 1940 purge of communists from its board, the ACLU split over an NLRB order
26

prohibiting the Ford Motor Company from distributing literature hostile to organized labor. In
the end, the advocates of “employer free speech” won out. Although the board squarely
condemned Ford’s unlawful labor practices, it joined the ABA and industry in advocating the
unrestricted right of employers to disseminate their anti-union views. When the ACLU’s former
labor allies charged that it had turned against them, Roger Baldwin insisted that the best
protection for workers was a strong union, not the state. Publicly, the leaders of the ACLU
denied concern for labor’s substantive goals, repudiating two decades of explicit statements to
the contrary. Although they privately hoped that labor would prevail in the marketplace of ideas,
they championed a value-neutral Bill of Rights.
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CHAPTER 1: PRECEDENTS IN THE FREE SPEECH FIGHT

When the Civil Liberties Bureau of the American Union Against Militarism opened shop
in 1917, it was venturing onto a lonely field. As factories retooled for war production and troops
readied for combat overseas, free speech had few outspoken advocates. Many progressives
dismissed dissent as self-indulgent; whatever their individual views concerning militarism, they
insisted, citizens were duty-bound to conform to the outcome of majoritarian consensus. Ruleof-law conservatives who might have been moved by appeals to fundamental American liberties
were consumed with patriotic fervor. As the Department of Justice would conclude over the
course of the following year, the abstract defense of free speech, while not strictly treasonous,
was a backhanded assault on the state.
Historians have generally regarded the First World War as the central impetus for the
modern civil liberties movement. 1 Before it, there was no general commitment to civil liberties
under federal constitutional law. Although free speech was regularly touted as a central feature
of American democracy, it was subject to significant limitations in the courtroom and in popular
understandings. 2 State constitutions often protected personal liberties, but enforcement was a
matter of local discretion, and there was little tolerance for expression that threatened polite
society, let alone the security of the state. For most Americans, the right to speak freely was
conditioned on the speaker’s civilized conduct and compliance with social norms.
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In the conventional understanding, World War I generated a new and potentially
powerful alliance between progressives and liberal lawyers on behalf of expressive freedom.
Although their defense of free speech produced few concrete gains during the war, it laid the
groundwork for the emergence of a true civil liberties commitment after the armistice.
Disillusioned by the failure of the war to make the world safe for democracy and distressed by
the unprecedented extent of the postwar repression, they reinvented free speech as a means of
advancing the public interest and defusing social conflict. For the first time, the argument goes,
scholars, judges, and public officials imagined a marketplace of ideas, where theories and
thinkers would battle it out and the best one would be the last to remain standing.
This conventional story is only partly true. It is certainly the case that legal claims to free
speech premised on the First Amendment rarely succeeded in the federal courts in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. During that period, some lawyers defended radical expression in
a language that mobilized the Constitution and that resembled, anachronistically, the
understanding of civil liberties that emerged after World War I, but these efforts made little
headway in the courts. 3 It is also undeniable that the war and the ensuing Red Scare prompted
reevaluation of the importance of free speech. Organization and advocacy on behalf of civil
liberties were in shambles at the close of the war, but as the wartime exigencies dissipated and
repression continued, many Americans within and outside the political and legal establishments
began to espouse greater tolerance for dissent and stronger adherence to the rule of law.
What most of these figures demanded in the realm of free speech was, however, little
more than a return to normalcy. The proponents of free speech during and immediately after the
war were borrowing from tropes and tactics developed by progressives over the previous two
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decades. To be sure, they readjusted the rank of expressive freedom in the hierarchy of
progressive values; the specter of mob violence and mass hysteria had emphasized the high toll
of enforced uniformity on public wellbeing. Moreover, a substantial number of the interwar civil
liberties advocates—including some very important ones, like Oliver Wendell Holmes—came to
recognize free speech as indispensible to democratic progress only after the war. Finally, many
were motivated by new concerns, including the rapid expansion of the administrative state.
Nonetheless, the dominant theories of civil liberties in 1920 were not new in any significant way.
The ACLU’s vision of civil liberties was an exception. During World War I, its
precursor, the National Civil Liberties Bureau (NCLB), actively defended radical dissenters. For
approximately six months, between the summer of 1917 and the following January, the
leadership of that organization tested the full panoply of prewar civil libertarian arguments in
defense of dissenting speech. Under the conditions of war, the individualist rhetoric of
anarchists and free-lovers, the classical liberal language of individual rights, and the progressive
commitment to robust public discussion of social problems were all inadequate to disrupt the
forces of repression. In the progressive calculus, free speech was valuable only insofar as it
served the broader public welfare—and during wartime, immediate national interests seemed to
outweigh theoretical considerations. Government officials were unreceptive to outmoded
notions of natural rights and too preoccupied with wartime economic production to risk its
disruption by radical labor. The federal courts, though ostensibly committed to individual
autonomy, were too protective of private property and too deferential to military necessity to
countenance agitation. And the emerging civil liberties advocates were themselves uneasy about
their path. As veteran progressive reformers, they resented the judiciary’s intervention with the
products of democratic consensus; as advocates of radical labor, they confronted the majoritarian
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distaste for the unpredictable and the unknown. At the end of the war, the NCLB was still
formally intact, but its co-founder was in prison and its wartime policies had proven almost
entirely ineffectual.
When they founded the ACLU in 1920, the veterans of the NCLB would seek out new
solutions for protecting unpopular minorities, consistent with their underlying objective of
fundamental social change. They would formulate a theory of civil liberties that melded
progressive confidence in deliberative democracy with labor radicals’ skepticism toward the
machinery of the state. Ultimately, their efforts would render free speech a fundamental
American value, respected by government actors and upheld in the courts. In 1917, however, all
that was in the future. The wartime agenda of the NCLB was not the beginning of a new era in
civil liberties advocacy. It was the end of the old.

The AUAM
In the fall of 1914, as Europe reverberated with the clamor of artillery fire, a group of
self-described progressives in New York City gathered informally to discuss strategies for
keeping America out of war. Although they came to few definite conclusions, they sensed a
need for an organization uniting the various forces opposed to American military intervention
abroad. Known initially as the Henry Street Group, the new body went by a variety of names
over the coming years, but its best known, the American Union Against Militarism, reflected its
underlying objective: to “guard against militarism” and to “build toward world federation.” 4
In 1915, despite early assurances that he would avoid military engagement, President
Woodrow Wilson embraced the mounting demand for preparedness. In December, as Wilson’s
4
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proposal for a federal militia was debated in Congress, the Henry Street Group convened a
national conference. Out of that meeting, the “Anti-Preparedness Committee” was born. In the
spring of 1916, the APC became the AUAM. And within a year, it was a sprawling organization
with branch offices throughout the United States and fifteen hundred active members. 5
The makeup of the group was uncontroversial. Its principal constituency was social
workers, but it also included academics, clergy members, writers, and newspaper editors.
Notable members included Lillian Wald, director of New York’s Henry Street Settlement House;
Paul Kellogg, editor of a social work periodical called the Survey; Jane Addams, founder of Hull
House in Chicago; Rabbi Stephen Wise; Unitarian minister John Haynes Holmes; Oswald
Garrison Villard, publisher of the New York Evening Post and The Nation; and Crystal Eastman,
a leader of the Woman’s Peace Party and future co-founder of the NCLB. The organization’s
message, while by no means universally endorsed, was a respectable one, and it attracted
considerable support within and outside government. 6
For the next year, the AUAM generated popular enthusiasm for the anti-preparedness
cause. Mass meetings throughout the country drew huge crowds. Organizers lambasted
preparedness but were careful not to criticize the President. 7 Moreover, the AUAM exercised
considerable influence with both the Administration and Congress. Jane Addams (officially on
behalf of the Woman’s Peace Party) was invited to address the House Committee on Military
Affairs, and Wilson received an AUAM delegation and assured it that preparedness would keep
the country out of war. In June, Wilson signed the National Defense Act. Although it provided
for a significant expansion of the National Guard, it was limited in scope, and the AUAM was
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gratified that it did not authorize conscription. Meanwhile, diplomatic developments were
promising. In May 1916, Germany pledged to provide adequate warning before attacking
merchant and passenger vessels. By the summer of 1916, the AUAM was satisfied with its
successes and considered its work largely accomplished. 8
All that changed with Germany’s decision in February 1917 to reinstate its policy of
unrestricted submarine warfare on vessels carrying supplies to its enemy, Britain. Within a
matter of days, the AUAM’s earlier gains were all but irrelevant. The nation was marching
swiftly toward war, and the AUAM was powerless to stop it. Indeed, many within the AUAM
had no interest in doing so.
Over the ensuing weeks, the members of the AUAM scrambled desperately and
divisively to redefine their position. Some, like Rabbi Stephen Wise and Oswald Garrison
Villard, thought the change of circumstances warranted reconsideration of the desirability of war.
Others, though horrified at the new German policy, were resolutely against a military solution.
Norman Thomas, the Presbyterian minister who would go on to lead the Socialist Party,
proposed a possible strategy. Falling back on a time-worn progressive tactic, he urged the
AUAM to organize a campaign for a “war referendum” in order to persuade government officials
that ordinary Americans continued to oppose intervention. As with the suffrage and Prohibition
movements, the “combination of agitation with direction” would arouse the people to action. 9
The AUAM adopted the suggestion, apparently unconcerned that popular support might be
mobilized in favor of nationalist militancy. Later that month, the executive committee discussed
the agenda for its upcoming meeting with President Wilson. In addition to soliciting his support
for a national referendum, the AUAM delegation would fight another losing battle: they would
8
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seek to persuade him that conscription was a threat to the national interest. 10 These efforts were
fruitless. War was declared on April 6, 1917, and conscription was established six weeks later.
One month before the impending declaration of war, the AUAM board recruited a new
member. Roger Baldwin, at that time a prominent St. Louis reformer, quickly assumed a leading
role in framing the organization’s wartime policy. By June, the AUAM was ready to announce
its “war time program.” Its second objective, “a just and lasting peace,” was the organization’s
standard fare. It involved working toward a clear statement of America’s peace terms, demand
for publication of international agreements, and laying the foundation for “world federation” at
the end of the war. Baldwin, however, had a different and more immediate program in mind. His
project, developed in cooperation with Crystal Eastman, fell under the heading “work against
militarism.” It entailed opposition to the permanent establishment of conscription, legal advice to
conscientious objectors, and, most important, the maintenance of “civil liberty in war time.” 11

Liberty in the Progressive Era
The decision to reorganize as a civil liberties bureau was not an obvious one for the
AUAM. The problem lay not so much in conservative opposition, though government hawks
and self-styled patriotic groups did indeed regard the strategy as a cover for subversive activity. 12
Rather, the central obstacle was an internal one. At the outset of World War I, the defense of
dissenters had few progressive champions. Even progressive lawyers subjected civil liberties to a
demanding balancing test. Roscoe Pound, the architect of sociological jurisprudence, declared
10
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that “in jurisprudence . . . the whole doctrine of natural rights has been definitively
abandoned” 13; free speech warranted protection only to the extent that it promoted the public
welfare. 14 To a coalition of progressive reformers, endorsing a right to wartime dissent risked a
costly miscalculation of public benefits and harms.
Between the turn of the century and the outbreak of World War I, Americans who
regarded themselves as progressives were an odd assortment. Their agenda encompassed such
far-ranging projects as tenement housing laws, food and water safety, municipal ownership of
public utilities, the income tax, women’s suffrage, eugenics, and prohibition. And the
differences among them on these and many other issues were sufficiently fundamental to render
the label “progressive” confusing, if not meaningless. 15 Despite their many disagreements,
however, the progressives shared a distinct lack of enthusiasm for federal courts and for
constitutional rights-based claims, which together had operated to defeat many of the most
important progressive initiatives. Indeed, the rejection of the autonomous individual was one of
the few threads unifying progressive thought. 16
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In its place, the progressives championed the common good. Under peacetime
conditions, most progressives favored robust public discussion. After all, the progressive era had
witnessed a rapid transformation of social, scientific, and cultural values. Many widely accepted
theories in the 1910s had been marginal, if not repressed, a few decades earlier. Social progress
was fundamentally dependent on the formulation and expression of new ideas. Leon Whipple,
in a 1927 history of civil liberties commissioned by the ACLU, identified a new interest in free
speech during the progressive period, arising “partly out of a new realization of its essential
value in our complex industrial age; partly out of the common experiences of the social
reformers; partly because of the increased number of cases in which liberty was sacrificed to the
interests of powerful conservative groups.” 17
When war was declared, however, their broad commitment to social welfare and their
corresponding support for President Wilson led many progressives to condemn dissent—or at
least to support the authority of a majoritarian government to quash it. 18 Joseph Byers, the
General Secretary of the American Prison Association, was typical: “It would be a good thing for
all of us if we emphasized a little more our duties as citizens and were less concerned about
insisting upon our ‘rights,’” he wrote to Baldwin. “Personally, I am perfectly willing to have the
Government suspend whatever may be necessary of my own civil rights during the period of the
17
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war, if it will help win the war, and I have no fear whatever but that when Germany and her
Allies have been licked to a frazzle that I shall be restored to the full enjoyment of all the civil
rights I am capable of appreciating.” 19
For the AUAM leadership and many other progressives, aversion to rights-based
individualism was fundamentally bound up with the struggle between labor and capital. Classical
legal thinkers and, more to the point, judges, had defended private property by reference to
natural rights. This abstraction had led modern society astray. In reality, the progressives
argued, the allocation of wealth was founded on shared social norms; property was private only
because the community had seen fit to make it that way. 20 The notion that property owners
enjoyed a negative right to use their wealth without regard to the public welfare was repugnant to
progressive ideology. On the contrary, defensible economic rights, like a living wage, facilitated
greater participation in democratic society. 21 In support of labor unions, Herbert Croly
characteristically argued that the social web of industrial organization would turn individual
workers into “enlightened, competent, and loyal citizens of an industrial commonwealth.” 22
The widespread desire to moderate the class struggle and promote social harmony was a
central motivation for progressive reform. 23 By 1900, the free labor ideology that had dominated
American political thought for much of the nineteenth century was broken. In an era of
industrialization, the notion that workers could parlay their surplus wages into independent
capitalist ventures was hopelessly anachronistic. Nor were political movements like populism a
credible alternative; the establishment was too powerful and the middle class too numerous to
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permit displacement of the dominant institutions and parties. Class antagonism was an
inescapable reality, however, and the labor vote was a force to be taken seriously. The solution
embraced by the legislative and executive branches at the end of the tumultuous 1890s was
incremental adjustments to the existing capitalist system. The Industrial Commission, created in
1898 and comprising congressional and executive appointees, issued a report in 1902 that largely
set the agenda for labor reform in the Progressive Era: the enactment of state laws dictating
tolerable labor conditions, the curtailment of labor injunctions, the elimination of yellow-dog
contracts, and the federal regulation of railroad work. 24
With respect to the first item on the agenda, progressivism was a substantial success. The
years before the First World War were witness to a remarkable explosion of protective labor
legislation at the state and, in some cases, federal level. Fueled by workplace tragedies like the
Monongah Mining disaster and the Triangle Shirtwaist fire, progressive coalitions pushed
through workplace safety laws affecting factories, railroads, mines, and other industries;
minimum wage and maximum hour laws; employers’ liability and workers compensation
reforms; elimination or regulation of convict labor; public ownership of utilities; restrictions on
child labor; and laws regulating company stores and private employment agencies.
Progress was more equivocal when it came to collective bargaining—which, to the
members of the AUAM and other labor sympathizers, was the only tenable foundation for
industrial peace. The Anthracite Coal Strike Commission, convened by Theodore Roosevelt to
mediate a strike orchestrated by the United Mine Workers, made modest concessions to labor in
the form of increased wages and shorter hours, as well as a mechanism for arbitrating worker
grievances. But it did not require employers to recognize unions, much less the closed shop. And
24
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Roosevelt’s cooperation was conditioned on the unions’ good behavior. Only peaceful picketers
who respected private property were deemed deserving of federal help. In short, Roosevelt
acknowledged that the prevailing labor conditions were unsustainable even as he inveighed
against class-consciousness. When he mobilized the state to mitigate the worst abuses, his goal
was to preserve the sanctity of private property and, in large measure, the existing allocation of
wealth. 25
Under Wilson, however, the tables began to turn. In the run-up to war, administrative
support for labor was stronger than it had ever been. Wilson opposed interference with the
issuance of labor injunctions, and the 1914 Clayton Act, which he signed, was more symbolic
than substantive. 26 Still, his many pro-labor appointees ensured union representation in
policymaking and in the resolution of particular labor disputes. Most notably, the majority report
of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations, issued in the summer of 1915,
wholeheartedly endorsed labor’s position on controversial issues. The Commission, initiated
under Taft but executed under Wilson, included representatives of capital and the public in
addition to labor. Its overall composition, however, skewed left; it was chaired by the pro-labor
attorney Frank P. Walsh, and its two years of hearings were far friendlier to labor than industry.
Each camp issued its own findings, but the majority report was strongly pro-labor and called for
“drastic” changes in the allocation of wealth and federal protection of unions’ right to collective
bargaining as well as federal provisions for social insurance. Walsh boasted that it was “more
25
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radical than any report upon industrial subjects ever made by any government agency.” 27 Among
those who provided testimony were ACLU co-founder Crystal Eastman, who appeared in her
capacity as an executive board member of the Congressional Union for Woman’s Suffrage. 28 She
considered the vote to be an essential tool in the labor struggle, but she told the Commission that
women “must raise their wages as men have raised their wages, by organization.” 29
The modest improvements for labor enacted by state legislatures and negotiated at the
federal level by the Wilson Administration ameliorated the conditions of American workers.
Even some unions were persuaded that federal intervention on behalf of labor was worth
pursuing. Although the American Federation of Labor publicly championed “voluntarism”—the
notion that labor activity should and did take place outside the realm of state power 30—labor
historians have demonstrated that Samuel Gompers and his cohort used government adeptly
when it suited their agenda. 31 Despite fears that protective labor laws and state intervention in
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labor disputes would undermine union power, 32 the AFL cultivated deep ties with President
Wilson and the Democratic Party. 33
One branch of government, however, consistently stood in the way of reform: again and
again, labor’s most significant gains were undercut by the judiciary. And the justification for
judicial action was a theory of individual rights based on the sanctity of private property. The
most notorious example, and a powerful progressive rallying cry, was the Supreme Court’s
decision in Lochner v. New York, which invalidated a New York maximum-hours law because it
interfered with an implicit constitutional “right to free contract.” 34 Pet progressive projects like
the minimum wage, the eight-hour day, and workers compensation all died at judicial hands. 35
But the invalidation of state legislative protections was neither the most pervasive judicial
device nor the most damaging to the labor cause. In the decades before World War I, employers
(and organizations of employers, such as the National Association of Manufacturers) justified
their open shop policies by reference to individual rights; closed shops, they argued, abridged
workers’ freedom by conditioning employment on their obligation to join the union. Moreover,
they argued that yellow-dog contracts prohibiting workers from joining unions protected
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individual rights by linking workers’ duties to those which they had voluntarily assumed. Courts
agreed on both fronts.
By the early 1890s, the federal courts had decisively established their willingness and
authority to suppress “coercive” labor practices—particularly the right of workers to conduct
boycotts or to dissuade strike-breakers—through use of the labor injunction. During the first
decades of the twentieth century, the pursuit of labor injunctions became the first line of defense
for beleaguered employers. 36 Although some judges exercised restraint, even expressed union
sympathies, most were quick to comply with employers’ requests, often issuing ex parte
restraining orders unsupported by evidence of illegal behavior. Meanwhile, in Gompers v. Buck’s
Stove, 37 the United States Supreme Court held the boycott to be an enjoinable offense under the
Sherman Act. This ruling came just three years after the Court struck down the Erdman Act’s
prohibition on yellow-dog contracts as a constitutional infringement on workers’ freedom of
contract under the Fifth Amendment, 38 a holding that it applied to state anti-yellow-dog laws in
1915. 39
President Taft’s judicial appointments, including five to the Supreme Court, ensured that
the judiciary would not be swayed by rising public antipathy. Indeed, in the spring of 1917, the
Supreme Court extended its anti-labor reasoning. In Hitchman Coal v. Mitchell, a six-justice
majority upheld an injunction against the UMW for attempting to recruit non-union workers. 40
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Those workers had signed yellow-dog contracts consistently with “the constitutional right of
personal liberty and private property,” and any effort to organize them was consequently
unlawful. For labor, this judicial invocation of workers’ autonomy in support of the yellow-dog
contract was infuriating. As labor lawyer (and future ACLU member) Clarence Darrow told the
Commission on Industrial Relations: “They talk about the inalienable right of a man to work; he
has no such right; no one has a right to work, and the man who stands for the open shop does not
care for anybody’s rights to work, except the nonunion man, and they only care for him because
they can use him. If a man has a constitutional right to work he ought to have some legal way of
getting work.” 41
The Supreme Court’s obstinacy on these issues, and its broader hostility to public
regulation, threatened to undermine the progressive reform agenda—and so progressives railed
against the judicial construction of the autonomous individual. 42 The freedom of a single worker
to bargain for the conditions of his (or, increasingly, her 43) labor was an obvious fiction in the
context of modern labor conditions. Collective bargaining restored a measure of reality, as well
as social consciousness, to the field of labor relations. By resting on merely formal rights, by
contrast, classical legalism exacerbated social tensions. 44 The problem with the Lochner-era
judiciary was its tendency to “exaggerate private right at the expense of public interest,” 45
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without taking social circumstances into account. The progressives believed that “the strong
social interest in the moral and social life of the individual” outweighed the cost to autonomy of
an aggressively interventionist judicial system. 46
These developments were a central presence in the lives and careers of the members of
the AUAM. Most were actively involved in some aspect of improving workers’ lives. Jane
Addams, of course, worked tirelessly to relieve class injustice through legislation, social work,
and occasionally union activity. Lillian Wald (along with Addams) helped to found the
Women’s Trade Union League, which sought to increase women’s participation in organized
labor. Florence Kelley founded the anti-sweatshop National Consumers’ League and assisted in
drafting the influential “Brandeis Brief” in Muller v. Oregon, one of the few Supreme Court
decisions to uphold a protective labor law (setting maximum hours for women workers). The list
went on and on. All were attentive to the advantages of state cooperation and the pitfalls of
judicial intervention. Probably, all were skeptical of individual rights.
The experiences of Crystal Eastman, the organization’s executive secretary, are
illustrative. A reformist by upbringing, Eastman was trained as a lawyer but unable, as a woman,
to find work as a practicing attorney. Instead, she devoted her early career to sociological
research. She had studied political economy at Columbia before switching to law, and between
1908 and 1910 she applied both sets of skills in her evaluation of industrial accidents in New
York. 47 Her analysis as secretary of the Wainwright Commission, which was created by the
New York legislature to study the law of workplace accidents, guided that state’s legislative
effort to replace outmoded tort rules of employers’ liability with a new no-fault compensatory
system. As she feared, however, the high court of New York struck down the workers’
46
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compensation law she helped craft, calling it a violation of employers’ property rights. 48
Although the decision was countered by a state constitutional amendment, the legal defeat was a
powerful lesson.
For Eastman and her colleagues, the decision to resist militarism by invoking judicial
review of regulatory power was a strange turn of events—one that warrants considerably more
attention than the historical scholarship has afforded it. The majority of the organization
regarded the state as an ally in the struggle to achieve industrial harmony, and prior to America’s
entry into the war, they extended their optimism to their fight against militarism as well. Within
a matter of months, however, the civil liberties bureau was the most visible face of the AUAM.
Who were the actors responsible for its creation? How did they conceive the idea, and what did
they intend would fall within its sweep? The story, predictably, is one of conflict and confusion.
And it begins long before the war.

Free Speech before the War
Whatever the framers of the First Amendment intended to accomplish when they forbade
Congress from “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble,” 49 judicial interpretation of those words prior to World War I was
consistently tepid. The contrast with the expansive protection for liberty of contract and the
sanctity of private property, allegedly enshrined within the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, was particularly stark. When the Supreme Court deemed boycotts
unlawful under the Sherman Act in Gompers v. Buck’s Stove, it rejected the AFL’s argument that
48
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its list of unfriendly employers was protected by the Constitution, reasoning that it was speech in
furtherance of an illegal purpose and therefore outside the First Amendment’s purview. 50
Labor, however, was not the only casualty of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence. Beginning with the infamous 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts, which punished
language that was “false, scandalous, or malicious,” the federal courts had more or less steered
clear of controversies over free speech. 51 Over the following decades, many southern states
prohibited speech likely to incite slaves to insurrection, and the mounting national crisis only
exacerbated repressive tendencies. Abraham Lincoln declined to advocate a sedition act during
the Civil War, but he was complicit in the arrest of political dissidents. One such arrest nearly
cost him reelection and prompted him to issue a public statement on the matter. Wartime speech
is permissible, he explained, if it is merely critical of the government; but a speaker may be
arrested for “laboring . . . to prevent the raising of troops; to encourage desertions from the army;
and to leave the Rebellion without an adequate military force to suppress it.” 52
While the worst repression almost invariably came at times of war, 53 the regulation of
expression was a routine affair in nineteenth century America. Although many state
constitutions protected free speech, state law and city ordinances made frequent interventions. 54
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Few prewar cases examined free speech issues in detail, but courts periodically considered
whether crimes and torts violated the First Amendment or its state constitutional analogs. On all
but a few occasions they rejected such claims out of hand.
Restrictions existed on the federal level as well. The Comstock Act of 1873 prohibited
distribution of obscene materials—broadly defined to include not only pornography, but also
medical, scientific, and social literature pertaining to birth control, free love, and sexually
transmitted diseases—through the interstate mail. 55 An 1876 statute precluded financial
contributions by federal employees to political campaigns, and the Alien Immigration Act of
1903 provided for the exclusion of political radicals. In addition, legislation intended for
relatively narrow purposes often took on broader meaning in the hands of the Department of
Justice. For instance, the Roosevelt Administration used obscenity laws to exclude antiAmerican literature from the mail.
Meanwhile, before the 1910s, consideration of civil liberties within the legal academy
was sparse. Thomas Cooley 56 and Ernst Freund 57 touched upon the topic, but neither engaged in
sustained discussion. 58 For the most part, prewar scholarship focused on Blackstone’s account
of the common law, noting that restraints on expression helped precipitate the American
Revolution and debating whether the First Amendment had therefore extended protections for
free speech.
Although groups occasionally organized to defend free speech against governmental
incursions—sometimes to protect business interests and occasionally on ideological grounds—
regulation, see Donna I. Dennis, “Obscenity Regulation, New York City, and the Creation of American Erotica,
1820–1880” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2005).
55
See Chapter 4.
56
Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the
States of the American Union (Boston: Little, Brown: 1868).
57
Ernst Freund, The Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Rights (Chicago: Callaghan, 1904).
58
Barzun, “Politics or Principle?”; Rabban, Forgotten Years, 177–210.

47

none made much headway in the courts. One, however, attracted considerable attention. The
Free Speech League, founded in 1902 and nurtured for twenty years by Theodore Schroeder,
never won a significant judicial victory. But it generated significant support for free speech at
the level of local policy, and it made many progressives question whether a trump on legislative
enactments—in the form of the First Amendment—might, under certain circumstances, be made
to serve desirable ends.
The Free Speech League came together in reaction to the suppression of dissent in the
colonies acquired during the Spanish-American War, along with the increased targeting of
anarchist speech in the wake of President William McKinley’s assassination in 1901. 59 The
founders of the League and its principal beneficiaries were radicals, but the organization
garnered mainstream approval as well. What was distinctive about the Free Speech League was
its commitment to defending all speech, regardless of viewpoint or subject matter. 60 “By
freedom of speech,” Schroeder explained, “I do not mean the right to agree with the majority, but
the right to say with impunity anything and everything which any one chooses to say, and to
speak it with impunity so long as no actual material injury results to any one, and when it results
then to punish only for the contribution to that material injury and not for the mere speech as
such.” 61 Although much of its work took place in the courts, the League used every strategy at
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its disposal, including publicity for legal and other disputes, academic and professional
advocacy, mass meetings and demonstrations, and correspondence with government officials. 62
Inspired by the individualist rhetoric of philosophical anarchism, freethought, radical
abolitionism, and the women’s movement, the Free Speech League celebrated individual
autonomy and regarded it as the appropriate foundation for civil liberties claims. 63 Like the
National Defense Association before it, 64 the Free Speech League devoted considerable
resources to the defense of “obscene” literature. The League’s commitment to personal freedom
was a perfect complement to the bohemian culture of early-twentieth century Manhattan. Its
frequent and noteworthy clients included Emma Goldman and Margaret Sanger, for whom free
speech was not just a platform for legal reform and social change, but a way of life. 65 Free love,
birth control, and radical politics were all part of the same civil liberties package.
Much of the League’s energy, however, was consumed by defending the Industrial
Workers of the World (IWW)—which, in the first two decades of the twentieth century, was
engaged in a series of highly publicized “free speech fights.” The IWW sought to organize
unskilled workers who were neglected by mainstream labor organizations, like the AFL, which
organized workers by craft. The organization’s goal was framed by syndicalist ideology. The
preamble to the IWW Constitution proclaimed a commitment to “abolition of the wage system”;
between the working class and the employing class, it announced, “a struggle must go on until
the workers of the world organize as a class, take possession of the earth and the machinery of
62
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production, and abolish the wage system.” 66 The free speech fights grew out of efforts to attract
members to the “One Big Union” through public speaking and literature distribution. Municipal
efforts to shut the IWW out led to widespread arrests and prosecutions, and the “Wobblies”
defended their recruitment campaigns on First Amendment grounds. The Free Speech League
was an indispensible ally in formulating a strategy for challenging IWW prosecutions in the
courtroom and for promoting tolerance at the level of official enforcement and public opinion.
The League’s services were not universally popular within the IWW. Despite their
patriotic rhetoric, most Wobblies regarded the courts as unalloyed tools of capital and scoffed at
the notion of constitutional protection for disempowered minorities. 67 Still, soapbox recruitment
in urban centers was a crucial tool for the IWW. They saw the city employment agencies, or
“sharks,” as the central obstacle to organizing migratory workers. By connecting workers to
short-term jobs, these agencies ensured a steady supply of transient labor; if the IWW could
succeed in breaking them, they could force employers to solicit labor through IWW hiring halls
instead. The architects of the free speech fights hoped that their rare courtroom successes would
open space for soliciting members on street corners, outside of the watchful gaze of employers.
Failing that, the partiality of local government and judges would expose American constitutional
liberties as fraudulent, generating sympathy and attracting adherents indirectly to their cause. 68
In practice, the free speech fights met with mixed success. In Spokane, the first target,
IWW organizing efforts prompted the city council to enact an ordinance that prohibited street
speaking by the IWW and other “revolutionists.” The Wobblies resolved to continue speaking in
66
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a peaceable and orderly fashion (despite violent harassment from local spectators as well as the
police), unless the ordinance was made applicable to all organizations on a non-discriminatory
basis. Often they read aloud from the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution. What
followed was a wave of arrests that flooded the city’s jails, consuming substantial time and
resources on the part of law enforcement, the courts, and the correctional system.
Reinforcements—most notably, founding ACLU board member Elizabeth Gurley Flynn—
flooded in from around the country. Eventually, when the struggle had all but exhausted
everyone involved, negotiations with the city produced a significant IWW victory. The
organization was given access to indoor meeting places and the freedom to sell its newspaper,
the Industrial Worker, on the city streets. It also achieved its substantive goal, reform of the
employment agency system, in Spokane and much of the Northwest. 69 Perhaps most important,
the idealism, perseverance, and resolute non-violence of the Wobbly speakers generated
sympathy for the IWW cause.
The outcomes of subsequent fights were, however, more equivocal. In Fresno, after
months of passively withstanding torture from mobs on the street and from prison guards, the
IWW secured release of all its jailed members and authorization of its right to speak on the city
streets. 70 Increasingly, however, these formal victories seemed inadequate to the task of
organizing the workers. The notorious San Diego fight of 1912, which initially garnered support
from a range of organizations, led to horrific police and vigilante violence against IWW
participants, with little concrete gain. Public opinion, on the whole, was stacked against the
IWW. The Free Speech League was heavily involved in the San Diego fight and provided
financial and organizational support. Gilbert Roe and Emma Goldman visited the site of
69
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conflict, and Schroeder corresponded with local attorneys and coordinated efforts to establish a
local branch of the league. These interventions may have tempered popular hostility to the
IWW, but their influence was limited. Many commentators celebrated the fundamental
American values enshrined in the Bill of Rights but carved out radical agitation from the
intended scope of the First Amendment. 71
The IWW leadership was never content with its modest achievements in the realm of free
speech. Rather, it interpreted its successful battles as an indication of what true struggle could
achieve. As the IWW organ Solidarity proclaimed with respect to the Spokane fight: “By use of
its weakest weapon—passive resistance—labor forced civic authorities to recognize a power
equal to the state.” Given that success, the organization ought to consider what would happen
“when an industrially organized working class stands forth prepared to seize, operate, and
control the machinery of production and distribution.” 72 The free speech fights were an exercise
in direct action, and a prelude to the true struggle for industrial democracy. Over time, many
Wobblies rejected the fights as even an interim strategy. 73 Indeed, many eschewed the use of the
courts altogether. As one syndicalist publication put it at mid-decade: “The law strike is crude,
uncouth, and primitive. As a means to an end for stiffening the ranks of militant labor it has
about run its course. What is the law strike? A law strike is a defense of labor in a capitalist
court, a case wherein Labor has hired counsel to defend prisoners accused of labor ‘crimes.’ . . .
When Labor shall have strongly organized on an industrial basis, free from parliamentary law,
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legal claptrap, judicial fakery, and capitalistic confidence methods there will be no need of hiring
lawyers.” 74
Whatever their effect on the labor struggle, the free speech fights were instrumental in
generating broader interest in civil liberties. Efforts on behalf of the IWW by the Free Speech
League resonated with progressive intellectuals. 75 Although courts upheld the constitutionality
of restrictive ordinances, they sometimes reversed convictions as discriminatory in their
application, unsupported by the evidence, or inconsistent with statutory intent. 76 In consultation
with the League, New York City Police Commissioner Arthur Woods openly defended free
speech rights in public places; he instructed police officers to protect speakers from unruly
crowds and to prohibit only incitement of immediate violence. 77 Similarly, Attorney General
George Wickersham resisted encouragement from local law enforcement and President Taft to
prosecute the IWW under federal law. 78 Socialists generally supported the IWW’s free speech
claims, though they increasingly condemned the organization’s tactics. 79 And progressive
officials, activists, and academics began to mobilize for free speech. The free speech fights
prompted Edward Ross, president of the American Sociological Society, to organize the
Society’s 1914 annual meeting on the subject of “Freedom of Communication.” Ross situated
free speech within the progressive commitment to public welfare, lamenting that the suppression
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of labor advocacy “depriv[ed] the weak of the chief weapon by which they may achieve common
economic action.” 80
Significantly, the free speech fights figured prominently in the proceedings of the
Commission on Industrial Relations. Woods told the Commission that his efforts to protect free
speech for IWW organizers in New York City had drastically reduced conflict there. 81 Darrow
(who had argued a Supreme Court case on behalf of the Free Speech League in 1903),
Schroeder, 82 and many others testified about the importance of free speech to the broader success
of the labor movement. All of these free speech advocates insisted that the courts were stacked
against labor. All questioned whether constitutional interpretation was the best means of
protecting civil liberties. Gilbert Roe thought the Supreme Court had gotten the basic
constitutional balance wrong, and he advocated “changes in personnel.” 83 He was skeptical that
courts ought to be “passing upon the validity of statutes at all,” but he reasoned that “if they are
going to declare statutes unconstitutional that relate to property when they are in conflict with the
Constitution, it would seem that they ought to apply the same principle to statutes which invade
personal rights,” by which he meant those constitutional rights protecting privacy, bodily
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integrity, and expressive freedom. 84 Even Schroeder advocated the “recall of all judges, and the
recall of all judicial decisions on constitutional questions.” 85 He worried, however, that
legislation invariably served the interests of property. He offered no concrete mechanism for
achieving social justice but believed the first step was “freedom of speech, for [Bill] Haywood
and the rest, to defend their dreams.” 86
The Commission was persuaded that civil liberties warranted further protection. Its
members did not condone the IWW’s tactics, of course. Harris Weinstock, one of the
Commission’s employer representatives, was appointed to investigate the Free Speech Fights. He
concluded that the Wobbly initiative was deceptive and dangerous, aimed at overwhelming the
machinery of justice and only incidentally concerned with First Amendment rights. A staff
investigator noted that IWW organizers (like their Communist counterparts of the next decade)
were inconsistent in their defense of free speech and broke up meetings of religious groups with
whom they disagreed. 87 Nonetheless, the Commission was univocal in denouncing vigilantism,
particularly in contrast to the passive and nonviolent resistance exercised by the IWW.
Moreover, the Commission’s staff was greatly troubled by the brutality of state and local law
enforcement in suppressing strikers as well as soapbox speakers. Accordingly, it advised against

84

Ibid., 10474.
Testimony of Theodore Schroeder, 27 May 1915, in CIR Final Report, vol. 11, 10845. He continued, “If the
people are credited with the right to make constitutions they should be allowed to say what they mean after being
framed.” Ibid. Asked what was responsible for the “two distinct mental attitudes of the judges, with reference to
property right and free speech,” Schroeder fell back on judges’ unconscious psychology. Most judges, he explained,
have an aversion “to the criticism that comes from them that are down and out.” At the same time, they are
predisposed to promote the interests of the rich, with whom they identify. They interpret the constitution in
accordance with their emotional sympathies. Interestingly, Schroeder felt this tendency would only be exacerbated
in the case of Progressive judges, who were themselves subject to suspicion and would therefore worry that deciding
a case in favor of a radical defendant would cast aspersion on their own motivations and beliefs. Ibid., 10851.
86
Ibid., 10850. Bill Haywood was head of the IWW.
87
Rabban, Forgotten Years, 106–07.
85

55

police discretion in enforcing free speech and called for greater protection of First Amendment
rights. 88
Integrating these various concerns, the Commission’s final report devoted a section to
free speech. The suppression of public speaking, it declared, was “one of the greatest sources of
social unrest.” 89 Police interference with such important “personal rights,” even when exercised
in good faith, “strikes at the very foundation of Government.” 90 The Commission’s reasoning
succinctly laid out the progressive case for free speech: “[I]t is the lesson of history that attempts
to suppress ideas result[] only in their more rapid propagation. Not only should every barrier to
the freedom of speech be removed, as long as it is kept within the bounds of decency and as long
as the penalties for libel can be invoked, but every reasonable opportunity should be afforded for
the expression of ideas and the public criticism of social institutions.”91 The report then
recommended measures, modeled in large part on Woods’s experiences in New York City, to
discourage violence and promote police impartiality. Characteristically, most were designed to
encourage good governance. Whereas the Commission sought to cabin the detrimental exercise
of administrative discretion, most of the mechanisms it specified were advisory and regulatory—
for example, congressional legislation prohibiting the transportation of armed gunmen and nonpersonal weapons across state lines, the regulation of private detective agencies, and enactment
by the states of a uniform code governing the militia, limiting military detainment, and ensuring
that a proclamation by a Governor of martial law would have no effect on constitutional
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guarantees. 92 In response to concerns about the effects of street speaking on congestion and
commerce, the Commission urged states and municipalities to open up the schools and other
public buildings for lectures and public meetings. 93
The bolder suggestions fell under the heading “Causes of Industrial Unrest.” In that
section, the commissioners stated their deep conviction, based on the evidence submitted to
them, that that workers had been “denied justice in the enactment, adjudication, and
administration of law.” 94 Not only had the courts proven far more sympathetic to employers than
to labor in the resolution of particular disputes, but they had construed the sections of the
Constitution designed to protect “human rights” and “perverted [them] to protect property rights
only,” often in contravention of state statutes specifically drafted to protect workers. 95
Meanwhile, they had interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate only property rights,
not personal rights, and had thereby rendered workers helpless against encroachment by the
states. To eradicate the “evils” of the situation and to introduce “justice and liberty” in their
place—and, in the process, to avert the “grave danger that, if the workers assert their collective
power and secure the control of government by the massing of their numbers, the scales may
swing equally far in the other direction” 96—the Commission recommended decisive action.
“Personal rights must be recognized as supreme and of unalterable ascendency over property
rights,” the report concluded. The proposed solution? “That Congress forthwith initiate an
amendment to the Constitution providing in specific terms for the protection of the personal
rights of every person in the United States from encroachment by the Federal and State
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Governments and by private individuals, associations, and corporations.” 97 Presumably, this
constitutional right would have been protected outside the courts, as the Commission urged
Congress by statute or constitutional amendment to withdraw the judicial power to declare
legislative acts unconstitutional.
The Commission’s report reflected a sincere commitment to free speech within the left of
the progressive establishment. Perhaps, if the First World War had not intruded, the new
indulgence of unpopular viewpoints might have picked up momentum. As it happened, the
perceived need for patriotic uniformity quelled the prewar awakening of pluralistic tolerance.
Still, the free speech fights brought civil liberties into the purview of some progressives’
consciousness. At the outbreak of war, when dissenters were faced with aggressive state and
private repression, they had a vocabulary to draw on.
If the IWW supplied a rallying point for free speech, it was the Free Speech League that
provided the model for civil liberties advocacy. League lawyers were the first to espouse a
generalized defense of free speech based on First Amendment values. 98 Schroeder was careful to
maintain a theoretical and organizational distance between the League and the groups it
represented, in order to prevent it from becoming “the tail of the kite of some other
propagandist.” He explained, “Every time that it creates in the public mind the impression of
being subordinate to the interests of the IWW’s or of anti-Catholic agitators; of Free Thinkers; or
of Socialists, then, it is impairing its efficiency in subsequent activities.” 99 Its abstract embrace
of individual freedom gave the League credibility when it defended unpopular causes like labor
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radicalism—which, at the time, was less reputable than free love. 100 Schroeder denounced those
New York bohemians who supported the League’s position on obscenity but countenanced the
censorship of Anarchist literature. “Herein they are more reactionary than the conservatives who
framed our charters of liberty and those of us who still rely upon constitutions,” he explained,
“because these documents recognize no such exception to our guaranteed freedom of speech and
press.” 101 By the beginning of the war, the Free Speech League, as an organization, was on the
decline. 102 Schroeder had always been the glue that held it together, and he was increasingly
drawn to other interests. Nonetheless, many of the League’s most prominent members and
allies, including Gilbert Roe, Harry Weinberger, and Schroeder, supplied the fledgling NCLB
with crucial materials and assistance.
Roger Baldwin would later recall that the IWW wrote a crucial “chapter in the history of
American liberties.” Between 1908 and 1918, he reflected, “the little minority of the working
class represented in the IWW blazed the trail . . . for free speech which the entire American
working class must in some fashion follow.” 103 In 1917, as Baldwin and the AUAM leadership
were casting about for a solution to the wartime repression of radical dissenters, the free speech
fights were at the forefront of their minds.

The Bureau for the Protection of Conscientious Objectors
When Roger Nash Baldwin arrived in New York City in March 1917, Crystal Eastman
was taking a hiatus from the AUAM. She was convalescing after a difficult pregnancy that led
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to chronic kidney disease, and she was unable to keep up with her organizational duties.
Baldwin seemed an ideal substitute. Like Eastman’s, his early career involved domestic policy;
he had run a settlement house and worked to reform the St. Louis criminal courts, and he had
advocated a social science approach to legal problems.
Baldwin was born in 1884 to an affluent family of New England reformers. After an
uneventful and rather indulgent childhood in Wellesley, Massachusetts, he matriculated at
Harvard, where he excelled socially if not academically. After graduation, he met with his
father’s attorney to solicit some career advice. The future Supreme Court justice and prominent
progressive, Louis Brandeis, encouraged the young Baldwin to pursue public service. He also
urged him to start his career where Brandeis had started his own: in St. Louis, Missouri.
Baldwin heeded Brandeis’s recommendation. For the next ten years he devoted himself
to progressive reform in St. Louis. He was invited to establish a department of sociology at
Washington University, despite never having taken a course in the new discipline (he did enroll
in a summer course after graduating and before moving to St. Louis), and he built a strong
foundation before resigning from that position in the summer of 1909. At the same time, he
headed a settlement house founded by the St. Louis Ethical Society. He quickly became active
in municipal reforms, and he helped establish the St. Louis Committee for Social Service Among
Colored People, the city’s first interracial organization. 104 In 1907, he became the first chief
probation officer for the juvenile court of St. Louis, and he was a founder and secretary of the
National Probation Officers Association. He soon became an authority on juvenile justice and
authored a famous textbook on the subject. 105 Within a few years, he was heavily involved in
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the Council of Social Agencies and the Civic League, which he would later head. He helped
write Missouri’s first civil service regulations, became legal guardian of two orphan boys, and
beginning in 1910 served as president of the State Conference for Social Welfare. He became
friendly with the prominent national social workers who would attract him to the AUAM, like
Jane Addams, Paul Kellogg, and Lillian Wald. He was, in short, the consummate progressive:
committed to the existing political and economic systems but determined to help them run as
fairly and smoothly as possible.
During his time in St. Louis, two matters stand out as a prelude to Baldwin’s future
career. In 1909, Baldwin began a lifetime correspondence with Emma Goldman, who had met
Baldwin during speaking engagements in St. Louis. Baldwin declined Goldman’s first request of
him—to secure the Ethical Society’s Self-Cultural Hall for a public address—because he thought
it would alienate donors. The following year, however, he assisted in finding a venue for her
after Washington University denied her access to campus. Baldwin was dismissive of socialists
and labor leaders, but anarchism piqued his interest. Years later, he explained that he was
sympathetic to “their goal of a society with a minimum of compulsion, a maximum of individual
freedom and of voluntary association, and the abolition of exploitation and poverty.” 106
Equally important, Baldwin’s involvement in a campaign to revise St. Louis’s city charter
taught him the pitfalls of progressive reform. The new charter, passed in 1914 due largely to
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Baldwin’s activities for the Civic League, instituted the initiative, referendum and recall, as well
as municipal ownership of public utilities and a smaller city council. Soon after it was enacted,
voters introduced an initiative to mandate segregated housing. Despite Baldwin’s best efforts,
working in conjunction with the NAACP, the measure passed by overwhelming margins.
For the first time, Baldwin was wrestling with the basic tension between majoritarian
democracy and minority rights that would dominate the rest of his professional life. On behalf of
the Civic League, he participated in a federal test case challenging the constitutionality of the
ordinance. The district court granted a temporary injunction and made it permanent after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Buchanan v. Warley, 107 which invalidated a Louisville, Kentucky
ordinance on constitutional grounds. Ironically, the basis for the decision was the very provision
that progressive reformers so despised—the ordinance, held the unanimous Court (including the
newly appointed Justice Brandeis), was a violation of the seller’s Fourteenth Amendment right to
dispose of his private property in a manner of his choosing. 108 Baldwin was clearly troubled by
this turn of events, and he assured local citizens that “in the long run the control of legislation by
the whole people is best for all of us, white and colored.” He confidently concluded that “a vote
of the people” would produce the right result “on almost any other question but one involving
race prejudice.” 109 As he would shortly discover, however, popular majorities were liable to get
it wrong far more often than that.
By mid-decade, Baldwin had begun to flirt with a more radical approach to social ills. He
was reading the Masses, and he was sufficiently impressed by interactions with visiting
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Wobblies to spearhead a new project to open municipal lodging and a soup kitchen in St.
Louis. 110 When the Report of the Commission on Industrial Relations came out in 1915, Baldwin
wrote to Frank Walsh, whom he had befriended through his work on juvenile justice. He told
Walsh that the report would “do more to educate public opinion to the truth of existing
conditions than any other one document in existence.” 111 He was especially impressed by the
testimony of Theodore Schroeder with respect to the suppression of workers’ speech.
His new awareness of industrial conflict predisposed Baldwin to the anti-militarism of the
AUAM. Like many of its members, he was persuaded that economic interests were largely
responsible for the war. Without the profit motive, American industry would be far less invested
in militarism.112 Significantly, one of the AUAM’s first initiatives was a call for public
ownership of munitions factories. The government, it reasoned, would be less prone to economic
incentives than the capitalists.
As the death toll in Europe steadily rose, the cost of capitalistic greed seemed to Baldwin
increasingly unjustifiable. The leaders of the AUAM first approached Baldwin in 1915, when
they invited him to become the organization’s secretary. Although he rejected the offer, he did
take charge of the local St. Louis branch. As war loomed closer, however, Baldwin rightly
sensed that local reform work would surrender the stage to national activity. When he received a
telegram in March 1917 asking him to take over Eastman’s duties, he packed his bags and left
for New York. 113
Baldwin arrived at the AUAM when the organization’s mission was most in flux. When
it became clear that a draft was inevitable, he organized efforts to persuade President Wilson to
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include a provision for conscientious objectors in the Selective Service Act. Norman Thomas
wrote an article, which was representative of the AUAM’s position, explaining that objectors
ought to be classified according to their attitudes toward service—that is, whether a given
objector was willing to provide non-combatant service or no service at all—rather than by
motivation, be it religious, economic, or anything else. 114 Thomas met with Newton D. Baker,
Wilson’s secretary of war, who courteously requested a memorandum explaining the AUAM’s
position. 115 Baldwin followed up with a defense of those objectors, like Socialists and German
Americans, who were not unequivocally opposed to violence but were unwilling to serve in the
present war.
In the end, at Baker’s urging, the Selective Service Act included an exemption from
combatant service for clergy and for members of well-recognized religious sects, like the
Mennonites, opposed to participation in war. When it came to so-called “political objectors,”
Baker would not budge, though he promised the AUAM administrative moderation. 116 Congress
overwhelmingly rejected amendments proposed by Wisconsin Senator Robert LaFollette and
Colorado Representative Edward Keating to broaden the class of objectors. While the bills were
in conference, Baldwin tried again, citing British legislation that made the distinction he
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recommended. His efforts, however, were unsuccessful, and on May 18 Congress easily passed
the Wilson administration’s proposed bill. 117
The next day, Baldwin convened a conference of pacifists to present his proposal for a
“Bureau for Conscientious Objectors.” With their wholehearted support, he organized the new
Bureau within the AUAM and agreed to serve as its director. Its board attracted radical pacifists
like Quaker activist L. Hollingsworth Wood, Norman Thomas, socialist union organizer Joseph
D. Cannon, and Scott Nearing, a radical economist and activist who would shortly join the
Socialist Party and found the People’s Council of America for Democracy and Peace. Baldwin
also recruited Quaker attorney Edmund Evans, social worker Alice Lewisohn, and Oswald
Garrison Villard. The new bureau resolved to do whatever possible to assist inductees whose
anti-war commitments prevented them from registering for the draft.
Although there was significant enthusiasm for the new bureau, some of the most
established AUAM members, including Lillian Wald and Paul Kellogg, objected to the extension
of the organization’s activity. Lewisohn supported the endeavor but thought it better to establish
an independent body, formally distinct from the AUAM. The social workers’ concerns about the
organization’s good will and respectability were well founded. Within a few days, one AUAM
member announced that the organization’s popularity had “hit bedrock.” 118 On June 4 a majority
of the directing committee voted to endorse Baldwin’s Bureau. The vote, however, did not settle
the matter, and Wald and Kellogg were considering whether to resign from the organization they
had founded.
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The loss of Wald and Kellogg was bound to be a significant blow to the AUAM, and
Eastman was determined to prevent it. In a letter to the board, she recounted the concerns Wald
and Kellogg had conveyed to her and did her best to address them. Wald felt that the Bureau’s
new ventures “must inevitably lead to a radical change in the policy of the Union” and would
jeopardize the AUAM’s friendly relationship with the administration. In fact, she thought it
consigned the AUAM to “drift into being a party of opposition to the government.” 119 Eastman
responded that the bureau’s position was liberal, not “extreme radical,” and that the President’s
appointments to the War Department betokened a commitment to prudent enforcement of the
Conscription Act. 120 Her own progressive confidence convinced her that administrative
insulation and bureaucratic expertise would lead to the just execution of the law; she believed
that the bureau could in fact serve to help the President execute his plan of lenience and
deference to individual conscience. 121 Meanwhile, Kellogg worried that “an aggressive policy
against prosecution of the war” was incompatible with “an aggressive policy for settling it
through negotiation and organizing the world for democracy.” 122 Eastman acknowledged that a
campaign against all recruitment would undermine the Union’s influence but denied that
assistance to conscientious objectors was inconsistent with support for the administration’s goals.
Indeed, she countered that Republican opposition to the administration was more obstructionist
than the AUAM’s own policy. The Bureau’s ambition, she concluded, was the same as
Kellogg’s: “to enlist the rank and file of the people, who make for progressivism the country
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over, in a movement for a civil solution of this world-wide conflict and fire them with a vision of
the beginnings of the U.S. of the World.” 123
Despite her strong support for the defense of conscientious objectors, Eastman
acknowledged that if public identification of that work with the AUAM were too complete, the
Union might lose its efficacy as an organization “to lead the liberal sentiment for peace.” She
therefore proposed a structural reorganization, “making one legal bureau for the maintenance of
fundamental rights in war time—free press, free speech, freedom of assembly, and liberty of
conscience.” 124 Eastman’s plan entailed a change in nomenclature. Rather than a Conscientious
Objectors’ Bureau, which suggested opposition to the administration’s war policy, she suggested
a “Bureau for the Maintenance of Civil Liberties.” The reorganization also involved a shift in
the bureau’s emphasis: the new bureau would protect conscientious objectors, but it would
situate that project within a broader and more established commitment to civil liberties. This
move temporarily appeased the dissenters, and the new bureau was formally announced on July
2, 1917.
It is worth pausing to consider why Wald and Kellogg objected to the organization’s
defense of conscientious objectors. At first blush, the new policy would appear to flow directly
from the AUAM’s opposition to war. For committed progressives, however, the purported right
to withhold service to one’s country at wartime was dubious. In defending objectors, the AUAM
embraced a concept of “liberty of conscience”—and conscience, they insisted, “is nothing if it is
not individual”—as an “Anglo-Saxon tradition for which our ancestors fought and died.” 125 For
the progressives, however, democratic citizenship was a collective endeavor, and society could
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not afford to countenance the selfish exercise of individual rights. As theologian Samuel Zane
Batten explained matters, “True liberty means the voluntary sacrifice of self for the common
life.” 126 This outlook made conscientious objection to war a difficult proposition to defend. The
best the AUAM could do was to counsel compliance with the law. Over the opposition of
several members, it advised objectors to register and to specify their grounds for requesting
exemption. “Obedience to law, to the utmost limit of conscience,” it concluded somewhat
equivocally, “is the basis of good citizenship.” 127 The bureau also claimed that “liberty of
conscience” was a means toward “social progress,” but it never had much luck in explaining
how. 128
Although the AUAM’s efforts on behalf of conscientious objectors were a core element
of the organization’s activity throughout the war, their feasibility was limited from the outset. At
first, Baldwin hoped to convince the War Department to construe the conscientious objector
clause to include political objectors, and he had reason to believe that War Department officials
might be receptive to his advice. Baldwin told Frederick Keppel—a past dean of Columbia
College, unofficial adviser to the Secretary of War, and friend of L. Hollingsworth Wood’s 129—
that the Conscientious Objectors’ Bureau would consult with the Department on all matters.
Keppel, for his part, assured Baldwin that the Department appreciated the AUAM’s “spirit of
cooperation.” 130 And Baker himself acknowledged Baldwin’s “thoughtful consideration” and
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promised to give weight to his suggestions when formulating the Department’s policy. 131 By
fall, however, it seemed clear that no official accommodation would be made. 132 Although
Baker’s September instructions to camp commanders did not explicitly distinguish between
religious and nonreligious objectors—for the time being, all were to be segregated and put to
work—Baker was adamant that recognition of so-called political objectors would be unlawful
and unwise.
What was left for the AUAM was to see that individual cantonments treated objectors
humanely. Baker’s policy left immense discretion to the camp commanders, some of whom
were torturing objectors and allowing other inductees to beat them. Baldwin positioned the
Bureau as a watchdog group that would communicate with objectors and report abusive
treatment to the War Department. In this endeavor too he was eventually stymied. Still, despite
early assurances to the contrary, Baldwin proved markedly unwilling to challenge the War
Department head on.
A September letter to Felix Frankfurter, then special assistant to the Secretary of War,
captures Baldwin’s basic strategy. 133 Baldwin emphasized the enthusiasm for cooperation on the
part of the Civil Liberties Bureau and his own fear that “the rumors that are coming from the
cantonments [would] give rise to an unfortunate propaganda from several points in the country.”
In other words, the NCLB would not itself generate publicity on behalf of the objectors, nor
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would it openly criticize the camps for known abuses. 134 Rather, Baldwin raised the specter of
damaging propaganda as an incentive to temper abuses and formulate a more generous policy.
The War Department, in turn, agreed to monitor enforcement of the policy and ensure its liberal
execution. 135 Baldwin believed his approach would yield results. “We are getting much more
liberal treatment from the War Department,” he wrote, “than we could possibly expect by
throwing the issue into the public press, and into the hands of the patriotic organizations who are
anxious to shoot or export all the objectors.” 136
This plan was not uniformly popular with Baldwin’s allies. In fact, the threat of imminent
agitation was real, and Baldwin was constantly holding his more radical correspondents at bay.
In the same September letter, he told Frankfurter: “I have been putting off all inquirers with my
confident assertion that the War Department had the matter well in hand, and would doubtless
arrive at some conclusion in a few days. We cannot hold out against that pressure very much
longer.” 137 Impending loss of control became a permanent state of affairs. Baldwin knew that
cruel punishments, including manacling and solitary confinement, were rampant in the
cantonments. 138 Matters worsened when reports emerged that the army was court-martialing
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political objectors and meting out excessive sentences. 139 Baker did not condone the practice but
continued to dodge Baldwin’s requests for investigation and clarification. 140
By March 1918, with no evident resolution in sight, Baldwin’s decision to tolerate the
situation quietly seemed naïve, if not hypocritical. Lenetta Cooper of the American Liberty
Defense League, based in Chicago, had complied with Baldwin’s earlier requests to refrain from
publicity. Now she accused his organization of failure and, worse, of abandoning its
constituency. After ten months of work, the conscientious objector was “still considered a
slacker by practically every one.” 141 She reminded Baldwin that her own group had wanted “to
appeal to the people to demand a liberal solution of the problem”; he had begged them not to act,
claiming that publicity would precipitate a broad-based attack on pacifists by the press and
would undercut their aims. 142 Cooper acknowledged that popular mobilization would have been
slow and open criticism of Baker futile, but she felt that behind-the-scenes negotiations stood no
chance of success without broad popular support. Even then, Baldwin stood his ground: “I have
felt right along that in the uncertainty of a definite policy by the government, the best thing we
could do was just to bide our time, and make the whole issue clear when the government’s policy
is announced. That I understand from advices received today will be in the very near future.” 143
Sure enough, less than two weeks later President Wilson issued an executive order
permitting objectors to elect non-combatant service. For a moment, Baldwin felt vindicated. 144
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The new policy, however, proved subject to widespread abuse, and Baldwin’s initial enthusiasm
quickly soured. 145 Despite a series of clarifying orders from Baker, objectors who refused noncombatant service out of absolutist convictions were worse off than before. 146 A Board of
Inquiry appointed by Baker to examine the sincerity of objectors, though initially promising,
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dealings with Baldwin and his organization (by then known as the National Civil Liberties
Bureau) became a liability for the War Department. 148 Military officials were critical of the
NCLB’s attitude toward conscientious objectors, and the office of military intelligence launched
an investigation. Although the NCLB’s activity was eventually deemed lawful, War Department
officials severed their ties with the group. 149
Even then, Baldwin sought desperately to salvage the relationship. In correspondence
with Keppel, he emphasized that the NCLB was “acting wholly within the letter of the law and
within the spirit of the Secretary’s policy.” 150 He professed the organization’s willingness “to
discontinue any practices” that the War Department deemed objectionable. 151 Shut out of the
inner circles of the War Department, Baldwin grew increasingly frustrated. To the last, he
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assured the War Department that he stood ready “now, as at any time, to discontinue efforts
which the Secretary of War may not think to be helpful”—lest the breakdown in communication
“throw the whole matter into the field of public controversy and . . . undo much of the quiet and
effective work toward a satisfactory solution.” 152
In the end, however, the NCLB’s demands with respect to conscientious objectors
deviated too fundamentally from the government’s position. Baker was committed to the fair
and humane treatment of prisoners in the military and elsewhere, and he was genuinely
concerned by reports of discrepancies and injustices in the execution of War Department policies
by individual commanders. The NCLB quickly picked up on these cues, and the repressive
potential of administrative discretion would become a central theme of the civil liberties
campaign. More than anything else, though, the organization’s leadership objected to the War
Department’s failure to recognize those objectors who might “take part in some wars, as for
example social revolutions.” 153 Conscience, they explained in a September 1918 letter, is a
purely individual matter. Whether the political objectors were correct was irrelevant; the
important point was that they were sincere. Recognition of “the value of the individual” was
what differentiated American democracy from the “Prussian doctrine of the total subordination
of the individual to the state.” 154 Keppel, answering for the War Department, was dismissive.
“To admit such an exemption as that for which you contend,” he argued, “would be to admit the
right of every man to set himself up as judge of the wisdom of our Government in engaging in
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the present war; it would be to acknowledge that the Selective Service Law is binding upon the
drafted man only so far as he sees fit to object it.” Such a theory was incompatible with
progressive values. “What your proposal comes to,” Keppel concluded, “is the negation of law,
of authority, of government when the individual is prepared to assert that these collide with his
conscience.” 155 Any concession to such arguments, Keppel insisted, would jeopardize the “safety
of the State.” 156
The Bureau’s particular concern for political objectors bears emphasis. Given the
Bureau’s origins in the AUAM, the existing scholarship on civil liberties has assumed that its
primary motivation was pacifist. That is true in a sense. The goal of the Conscientious
Objectors’ Bureau was to provide support for individuals who were deeply opposed to war. But
religious objectors, who were expressly exempted under the Conscription Act, were of secondary
concern. From the outset, the Bureau’s constituency was a radical one: those objectors who were
motivated by class sentiments to resist a capitalist war. Labor radicalism was not an accident or
byproduct of the wartime experience. It was the underlying purpose of the Union’s wartime
activity.

The Civil Liberties Bureau
The Civil Liberties Bureau was more than a continuation of the Conscientious Objectors’
Bureau. It was a change in tack. In defending the rights of conscientious objectors, the AUAM
had celebrated individual conscience, a negative right against state coercion. Its reasoning
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sounded more like that of the Free Speech League than of the early ACLU. In fact, it would be
decades before the ACLU so directly took up the banner of personal freedom. Free speech, as
the AUAM would discover over the wartime years, was more easily reconcilable than
conscientious objection to the progressive tropes of public welfare and social responsibility.
Although there was no national clamoring for free speech in July 1917, moderates within
the AUAM were right to regard the new body as more palatable than the Bureau for
Conscientious Objectors that preceded it. As the free speech fights and the Commission on
Industrial Relations had proven, there was a space for progressive discussion about the desirable
parameters of free speech. Baldwin sought to recruit pro-war attorneys and supporters who
would buttress the Bureau’s credibility. 157 One AUAM member thought it would be treasonous
to maintain opposition to war once the majority, through its representatives in Congress, had
spoken. “As units of democracy we are bound by the national decision,” he explained to Baldwin
in the dominant progressive fashion. 158 Baldwin responded that the best engine of peace was the
“tremendous growth of the liberal and radical movement among the peoples of all the
country.” 159 And to facilitate this new flowering of radical sentiment, “it is necessary that public
discussion should be unfettered.” In an August letter to the New York Tribune, the Bureau
assured readers that “in a war for democracy there is no more patriotic duty than to keep
democracy alive at home.” 160 The best way to promote the public interest was to foster open
discussion even for those with whom one disagreed. 161
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No doubt part of the impetus for the AUAM’s approach was the congressional and public
debate over the Espionage Act, passed on June 15. Adopted at Wilson’s prompting, the statute
made it unlawful to interfere with the recruitment of troops or to disclose information damaging
to the military effort. Violations of the Act were punishable by twenty years’ imprisonment and
a fine of ten thousand dollars. A broad interpretation of the statute’s prohibitions led to two
thousand prosecutions, over a thousand convictions, and the banning of one hundred publications
from the mails. 162
The vast majority of prosecutions arose under title 1, section 3—a section, ironically, that
garnered little attention during debate over the bill because its repressive applications were not
readily apparent. 163 In assessing whether targeted speech violated the Espionage Act, judges
applied the common law “bad tendency” test, according to which speech was punishable if it
tended to produce unlawful consequences, such as draft evasion. Because actors intend the
natural and usual consequences of their acts, reasoned the courts, speech is punishable if it tends
to incite illegal action. Nearly all anti-government speech was thus prone to prosecution,
regardless of whether the speaker advocated illegal conduct, on the theory that an inductee was
more likely to evade the draft if he believed the war to be unjust. Meanwhile, in the hysteria of
World War I the jury system was no help to defendants. The only way for jurors to prove their
loyalty was to convict. 164 Defendants were sentenced to prison for an immense range of
offenses, from expressing sympathy for the Kaiser to stray remarks about the inadequacies of the
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war effort. Most of the notable wartime defendants—including Charles Schenck, 165 Jacob
Abrams, 166 and Eugene V. Debs 167—were indicted under this section.
It was the postal provision of the Espionage Act, however, that first provoked progressive
criticism. That section declared nonmailable any communication that violated the Act or
advocated resistance to any law of the United States. The post office was given unilateral
authority to determine which materials qualified, and Postmaster General Albert Burleson, along
with the department’s solicitor, William H. Lamar, proved willing and enthusiastic censors. 168
Their determinations forced many leftist and antiwar publications to shut down.
More than any other wartime law, the postal censorship provision of the Espionage Act—
supplemented in October by the Trading with the Enemy Act, which gave the President and the
postmaster even more censorship power—raised the specter of administrative discretion as a
threat to democratic values. 169 When Baldwin asked Gilbert Roe whether the statute was likely
to have a “direct bearing” upon the rights of free speech, press, and assemblage, 170 Roe replied
that the nonmailability provision “establishe[d] a censorship of the worst kind.” So much power
in the hands of unaccountable bureaucrats, he feared, would be disastrous for American
freedoms. 171 This view was shared by many figures with closer ties to the administration. Frank
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Walsh, no stranger to administrative power, decried the postmaster’s “ultra-bureaucratic method”
for restricting the circulation of adverse views. 172 Postal censorship was not the only
development to push the limits of progressive confidence in bureaucratic expertise. World War I
precipitated an unprecedented expansion of national power, and the dark side of state-building
would be the leitmotif of the NCLB’s wartime civil liberties program. Most progressives
accepted that the intricacies of modern life made administrative expansion necessary, even
desirable—but the NCLB could plausibly argue that new growth required new accountability.
In the months after passage of the Espionage act, the Department of Justice and the
federal courts would adopt an expansive interpretation of its scope. While the bill was under
consideration, however, some members of Congress expressed considerable awareness of the
bill’s implications for free speech. 173 The limits they suggested, on the whole, were policyoriented rather than constitutional, but they evinced discomfort with the dangers of censorship
and administration discretion. 174 When the Act was passed without addressing those concerns,
an organization committed to ensuring maximum freedom within the scope of the law may have
seemed both essential and popularly defensible.
More concretely, the organization of the CLB was almost certainly influenced by
discussions between Baldwin and Harry Weinberger, an attorney who worked closely with the
Free Speech League and would soon represent the defendant in Abrams v. United States. 175
Weinberger was a single-taxer as well as a radical individualist who opposed all state
interference with personal liberties. He had fought against compulsory vaccination in the early
172

Quoted in Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 59.
Congress defeated or amended several particularly pernicious provisions—including a section that would have
given the president tremendous powers of censorship—despite Wilson’s pleas.
174
Geoffrey R. Stone, “The Origins of the Bad Tendency Test: Free Speech in Wartime,” Supreme Court Review
(2002): 411–53; Rabban, Forgotten Years, 250–55.
175
Richard Polenberg, Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, the Supreme Court, and Free Speech (New York: Viking,
1987), 75–78.
173

78

1910s, and he considered the Supreme Court’s decision upholding the practice to be on a par
with Dred Scott. 176 He was a stalwart opponent of the draft on grounds of individual conscience.
When Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman were indicted under the Selective Service Act in
June, he agreed to defend them. He argued unsuccessfully that conscription constituted
involuntary servitude under the 13th Amendment and that the provision for religious exemption
was an unconstitutional infringement on religious liberty.
At the outbreak of the war, Weinberger had sensed a need for a new organization to
protect civil liberties. In April 1917, he shared with Roger Baldwin his idea for an American
Legal Defense League that would “fight all cases in the United States where free speech, free
press or the right peaceably to assemble or to petition the government is invaded.” 177 Baldwin
had already expressed interest in civil liberties. On April 14, less than two weeks after the
declaration of war, he had begun soliciting prominent signatories to a request for an official
statement of Wilson’s “views on free speech, free press and assemblage during the war.” 178 But
he had no concrete program for vindicating those freedoms. Weinberger suggested that the
AUAM could assist him with his plan for a civil liberties organization by referring cases to him
through its local branches, and he proposed a constitutional test case of the Conscription Act in
the event of its passage. He also offered his opinions on the constitutional status of dissenting
speech for inclusion in an AUAM pamphlet. Weinberger advised Baldwin that open
disagreement with government and military practices, including the publication and distribution
of pamphlets on the war, was protected by the First Amendment, and he was adamant that “any
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Espionage Bill Congress may pass cannot repeal the United States Constitution.” 179 By May, he
was outraged at the Administration’s efforts to quash public opposition to military bills and
concluded “that we must re-educate the people, that they have the right to discuss and the right to
oppose conscription and ask for its repeal.” 180 Advocacy of a change in law, he insisted, could
not qualify as treasonable or seditious. 181
At first, Baldwin was supportive of Weinberger’s organizational ambitions. A pamphlet
issued in May by the Bureau’s short-lived Committee on Constitutional Rights did precisely
what Weinberger advised. It declared that “constitutional rights are being seriously invaded
throughout the United States under pressure of war,” blaming the abuse on “petty officials who
would compel conformity.” 182 And it referred victims of this unconstitutional abuse to the
American Legal Defense League. 183 In a move he would repeat often during his ACLU career,
however, Baldwin subsequently maneuvered to protect and expand his own organization’s turf.
At a May 11 meeting, Weinberger agreed that all cases involving conscientious objectors would
be left to the Conscientious Objectors’ Bureau—a course that seemed advisable since much of
Weinberger’s advisory committee was interested only in the rights of speech, press, and
assembly. But Baldwin also secured a commitment that the American Legal Defense League
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would leave any legal test of the Conscription or Espionage Act to the AUAM. 184 In June, he
went further. He acknowledged in a letter that Weinberger “must have felt in the uncertainty of
the past few weeks, that the American Union was very poorly standing by you and the American
Legal Defense League.” 185 Blaming the AUAM’s internal debate for the change in policy and
circumstances, he reneged on an earlier promise of financial assistance. More important, he told
Weinberger: “We have decided now to take hold of the work of organizing legal defense
throughout the country under a bureau of the Union, and including conscientious objectors.” 186
The new Civil Liberties Bureau swallowed the American Legal Defense League’s entire
program. Its goal, according to the press release announcing its formation, was to unite the
various groups and individuals committed to maintaining “constitutional liberties” in wartime
against government interference. 187 In a second edition of the pamphlet on constitutional rights,
published in July, all references to the American Legal Defense League were gone. 188
To be sure, the Civil Liberties Bureau did not entirely abandon the AUAM’s standard
tactics. When the CLB was first announced, Baldwin emphasized that the board expected to
cooperate closely with federal officials in preserving constitutional freedom. Throughout the
war, it would cultivate relationships with public officials and lean heavily on well-connected
members—most notably John Nevin Sayre, the brother of President Wilson’s son-in-law. 189 The
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CLB’s first major initiative was characteristic of this approach. In mid-July, the CLB organized
an emergency conference to address the Post Office’s suppression of seventeen radical
publications. 190 Once the attendees had reached consensus that immediate action against the
Espionage Act was necessary, it was an easy matter to settle on a plan of action. The participants
voted unanimously to send a delegation of lawyers, including Clarence Darrow and Frank
Walsh, to discuss the matter with the President, the Postmaster General, and the Department of
Justice. Burleson, however, rebuffed their overtures; indeed, he refused even to issue guidelines
or explanations of his censorship criteria. If the publishers disagreed with his decisions, he said,
they could take up the matter in court. 191
That, of course, is precisely what the CLB resolved to do. Over the coming months, the
new bureau would try its hand at lobbying, propaganda, and grass-roots organizing in addition to
negotiation. Its initial focus, however, would be constitutional litigation, just as Weinberger had
proposed. In this endeavor, the CLB drew heavily on the experiences of the Free Speech
League. Weinberger’s plans for an independent wartime civil liberties body were themselves
modeled on the older organization. In addition, Theodore Schroeder sent background materials
on free speech to the Bureau’s Lawyers Advisory Council early on. 192 He also provided Baldwin
with a complete set of the League’s published pamphlets. 193 Gilbert Roe was actively involved
in the new organization and provided frequent legal advice. Drawing on these resources,
Baldwin formulated a plan of action. The new bureau would operate nationally as a
190
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clearinghouse for information and legal aid, providing assistance and legal representation to
those individuals whose constitutional rights were violated. Indeed, when the Civil Liberties
Bureau took its name, it was invoking a tradition of legal aid bureaus, including the Bureau of
Legal Defense with which it worked closely during the war. Baldwin envisioned the CLB as a
means of helping dissenters to “get their legal rights before the courts.” 194
The choice to operate through the courts may seem a curious one for an organization
steeped in a legal culture dominated by labor injunctions and Lochner-era constitutionalism. In
later years, the ACLU would achieve real successes in the courts, and despite its continuing
distrust of judicial power, it would embrace legalism as a strategy. In fact, in the late 1920s and
early 1930s, the ACLU coached labor lawyers to ignore ideological reservations and secure antiemployer injunctions whenever possible. During World War I, however, the CLB’s relationship
to the courts was murky. There is no evidence that Baldwin or anyone else within the CLB
struggled philosophically with the question at this stage. Baldwin knew through his experience
with the St. Louis housing ordinance that courts would occasionally act against repressive
legislation. Moreover, the Free Speech League had unabashedly pursued constitutional litigation
as a check on repressive state action. Although it had rarely won its cases, the wartime
prosecutions were better candidates; picketing and boycotts could be dismissed as conduct rather
than expression, but state and federal statutes during World War I clearly abridged public
discussion of controversial issues. The decision of the CLB leadership to try its hand in the
courts, it seems, was a simple matter of strategy.
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A few successful court challenges in the summer of 1917 encouraged pursuit of the legal
program, and by September, Baldwin was urging local correspondents to challenge offensive
ordinances through litigation. 195 By November, the organization reported that its 120
cooperating attorneys were assisting in an average 125 cases per week throughout the United
States. 196 At that time, a number of important prosecutions under the Espionage and Trading
with the Enemy Acts were coming to the organization’s attention as a result of the “activity of
government agents,” and its staff was helping to facilitate “test cases under the new legislation
which must be carried to the higher courts for final decision on constitutional points.” 197 Cases
were proliferating at every level, from local to federal, and under local ordinances and state laws
in addition to federal legislation. The bureau was supplying legal and financial aid to needy
defendants, as well as to local defense committees incapable of funding the “local fight for
constitutional liberties.” Attorneys provided legal references and assisted in drafting briefs.
Finally, the group was handling trial publicity to “show up miscarriage of justice.” 198 Although
the CLB operated primarily to redress repression after the fact, its long-term hope was to
discourage unlawful interference in the first place by reminding officials that their actions were
being scrutinized by a national body. 199 The overarching purpose of the Civil Liberties Bureau
was to “make sure that bureaucratic officials and mob-minded judges shall not, out of sheer war
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passion, trample upon the rights of free speech, free press and public assembly during wartime.” 200

The National Civil Liberties Bureau
Whatever its early achievements in the courts, the new bureau failed to accomplish its
original purpose: smoothing over differences within the organization. Although its program was
meant to be respectable, announcement of the Civil Liberties Bureau triggered immediate public
condemnation. A July 4 editorial in the New York Times declared that a line must be drawn
between “liberty” and “license,” and “just where it shall be drawn is and must be determined, in
countries properly called free, by public sentiment as formally expressed by majorities through
their voluntarily chosen representatives.” It lambasted the “little group of malcontents who for
present purposes have chosen to call themselves ‘The National Civil Liberties Bureau,’” whose
task, it claimed, was to gain “for themselves immunity from the application of laws to which
good citizens willingly submit as essential to the national existence and welfare.” 201
To make matters worse, the majority of the NCLB leadership openly supported radical
causes. In August, the board voted to send delegates to a conference organized by the People’s
Council, a radical anti-war group to which many AUAM board members belonged. The
People’s Council was regarded as dangerous by President Wilson. Even the liberals within the
administration, like Frank Walsh, thought it threatened national interests. 202 Lilian Wald worried
that the decision to participate in the conference would destroy the AUAM’s reputation and
undermine its broader program. The AUAM had “stood before the public as a group of
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reflective liberals,” she said. In cooperating with the People’s Council, it was embracing
“impulsive radicalism.” 203 Nonetheless, the board voted to hold its course. 204
Wald was not the only AUAM board member recommending a more conservative
approach. Oswald Garrison Villard felt that the Administration’s conscription policy had
accommodated the Union’s legitimate requests, and he wanted the organization to withdraw all
objectionable materials from the mail, disband its Publicity Department and Washington office,
and retreat from public view. 205 H. R. Mussey thought the current radical policy unwise and
unlikely to hasten international peace, and he intended to leave the AUAM if the Civil Liberties
Bureau continued to dominate its program. 206
By late summer, Wald was determined to resign. Although she professed a strong desire
to hold the organization together, she thought the “cleavage” in the board insurmountable. 207 In a
desperate bid to keep her, Eastman recommended severing the Civil Liberties Bureau from the
larger AUAM. 208 The radicals, she urged, should “leave the more conservative minority to
continue the work of the organization.” 209 And after a long and painful debate, the Board voted
to implement her proposal. Formal separation was recorded in the AUAM’s minutes on
September 28. 210 Wald left anyway, and after the split, the AUAM was more or less a shell
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organization. In October, it changed its name to the American Union for a Democratic Peace.
Shortly thereafter, it suspended operations. 211
For the newly independent Civil Liberties Bureau, on the other hand, the path forward
was clear. Thomas told Eastman that the sort of liberal organization advocated by Villard and
Wald would “have to originate, if at all, with those who have not been so deeply tarred with
uncompromising pacifism as all our present members.” 212 The new group would serve the
public best by continuing to focus on civil liberties, a specialization that distinguished it from the
People’s Council. He believed that the preservation of civil liberties was essential to “reasonable
social progress” and argued that there was no other organization poised to take over the fight. 213
The rest of the board agreed, and on October 17 the National Civil Liberties Bureau was
announced. Publicly, the board attributed the split to the rapid expansion of civil liberties work
and the need for an independent supervisory committee. 214 A statement to AUAM members
insisted that the work of the new organization would be “exactly the same.” 215 The NCLB was
committed to the “maintenance in war time of the rights of free press, free speech, peaceful
assembly, liberty of conscience, and freedom from unlawful search and seizure.” 216 Despite
reports that the organization was under federal investigation, and notwithstanding the pending
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investigation of Civil Liberties Bureau pamphlets held up in the mail, the NCLB would work to
preserve constitutional rights through government channels. “The War Department [was]
evidently doing its best under the present law,” and the new organization, like the Civil Liberties
Bureau before it, would publicly support the administration. 217
Still, the description of the NCLB’s activity hinted at its future direction. Unencumbered
by its conservative constituents, the organization was finally free to focus on the issue to which
its board was most strongly committed: the “cause of labor.” 218 Since the summer, supporters of
the Civil Liberties Bureau had alerted the board to the suppression of the labor movement in the
name of patriotism. Socialist lawyer Arthur LeSueur, who agreed to serve as a cooperating
attorney for the Bureau, noted the “apparently concerted attack” against labor organizations in
the west. “Wherever there is any protest or rebellion on the part of wage workers,” he explained,
“the organization is immediately attacked on the ground that it is in conspiracy with the German
Government in some traitorous enterprise, or is in league with German spies.” 219 Austin Lewis,
also a socialist lawyer and labor activist, told Baldwin he supported the war but opposed the “use
of the war for class purposes,” to “put down labor organizations and to endeavor to destroy the
right of peaceable economic agitation.” 220 These were the sorts of concerns that that the NCLB
board, drawing on personal experience with the Commission on Industrial Relations and other
prewar gains, thought the administration might be persuaded to address.
Baldwin was a savvy organizer, and he was careful to differentiate the NCLB from more
frankly radical groups. In October, he wrote Scott Nearing to propose a division of
responsibilities between the NCLB and the People’s Council. Baldwin’s organization would
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leave mass meetings and demonstration to the latter group. Instead, it would work “through
legal bureaus for the handling of individual cases, through personal work with government
departments, through special test cases, and through such quiet pressure as it can exert from time
to time through its scattered membership.” 221 The People’s Council, in turn, would refer all
appropriate cases to the NCLB. Steering clear of propaganda would insulate the NCLB. Other
agencies were responsible for mobilizing the masses; the NCLB would protect their right to do
so. “Our main job,” he insisted, “is to help keep people’s mouths open, and their printing presses
free.” 222
The NCLB’s role as a legal bureau gave it cover. As Baldwin emphasized in a
recruitment letter to John S. Codman, an attorney and prominent Boston businessman who
supported Wilson’s war policies, lawyers well understood the tendency in the public imagination
to conflate the defense of unpopular litigants with approval of their illegal conduct. 223 The
NCLB’s advocacy of the right to dissent, he insisted, did not imply agreement with the messages
voiced by the speakers whom it defended. 224 Indeed, Baldwin was anxious to attract members
who supported the war effort to make the group’s claim to neutrality more credible. 225 When
Adolph Germer, executive secretary of the Socialist Party, wrote Baldwin in December to solicit
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financial assistance in employing a Washington representative to monitor federal legislation in
advance of the coming congressional election, Baldwin declined. To begin with, the NCLB’s
existing representative, Laurence Todd, was “a very capable man, a radical, and correspondent
for a large number of liberal and radical papers, particularly those of the Non-Partisan League.”
More important, Baldwin told Germer that while “the committee [was] in entire sympathy” with
the lobbying program of the Socialist Party, the NCLB was a legal defense organization and did
not engage in active propaganda. 226 The sole purpose of the organization, Baldwin insisted, was
to “maintain[] established constitutional rights.” 227
In reality, however, the NCLB’s leaders were heavily invested in labor agitation as a
substantive good, not merely as an abstract right. As Baldwin explained to a potential donor, the
organization had not “taken over the work of the National Labor Defense Council by any
means,” but attacks on labor constituted the bulk of its work. 228 The “underlying purpose” of the
drive to maintain constitutional rights was to preserve a voice for minorities in the “processes of
progress,” in which “labor of course must in the future play the biggest part.” 229
In that effort, however, the NCLB was soon right back where it started. For all its early
enthusiasm about constitutional litigation, the bureau had little success in the courts. One of its
first major initiatives was a constitutional challenge to the Draft Act. In October, Baldwin
invited Walter Nelles, the law partner of a former Harvard classmate, to become the
organization’s counsel. Nelles had read about the Civil Liberties Bureau the day it was reported
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in the New York Times, and he immediately wrote to offer his services. 230 He took charge of the
Draft Act challenge, and he was adamant that the NCLB center its objection on liberty of
conscience, not on the less controversial argument that Congress lacked power to raise a draft
and compel service abroad. 231 When the case came before the Supreme Court, Nelles filed an
amicus brief arguing that the First Amendment’s protection of religious freedom encompassed
all conscientious objectors, regardless of whether they were members of religious sects or
organizations opposed to the war. He criticized the prevailing assumption, espoused by Elihu
Root, that constitutional protections were subordinate to claims of necessity during times of
national crisis. 232 Nelles’s work proved to be a liability for recruitment as well as a failure in the
Supreme Court 233—which, despite its frequent invocation of individual rights in past cases,
stressed the broad scope of federal government power. 234
The Draft Act challenge, like the NCLB’s broader defense of conscientious objectors,
rested on a claim to individual conscience that many potential supporters considered spurious
and antisocial. By contrast, postal censorship troubled mainstream liberals, lawyers, and
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politicians, including even President Wilson235—and while the administration proved unwilling
to abdicate its censorship authority, there was a reasonable chance that the courts would
constrain the worst abuses. In the end, however, the NCLB’s participation in the Espionage Act
cases was also unavailing. Perhaps its best known effort in this regard was its defense of The
Masses, a leftist political magazine edited by Max Eastman, Crystal Eastman’s brother. The
suppression of The Masses had helped guide the AUAM’s leaders toward civil liberties work
when the Espionage Act was first passed, and they were heavily invested in the litigation. The
CLB organized a defense fund, and Gilbert Roe agreed to represent the publication and its staff.
Civil liberties advocates were elated in late July when Judge Learned Hand famously decided, as
a matter of statutory interpretation, that the suppression of The Masses based on its antiwar
editorials and political cartoons exceeded the authority of the Espionage Act. But on November
2, the Second Circuit reversed Hand’s decision. Throughout the country, other courts followed
suit. 236 The Masses, deprived of its second-class mailing privileges, had no choice but to close
its doors. 237
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With the radical press largely out of business and many radical leaders in jail, the futility
of constitutional litigation was unmistakable. NCLB attorneys and affiliates would continue to
intervene in appropriate cases throughout and after the war, but it was clear that radical and antiwar defendants would rarely prevail in court. Nor was the Department of Justice likely to alter
its course, despite persistent NCLB pressure. Increasingly, the broad-based prosecution and
conviction of left-wing leaders and organizers threatened the future of the radical and anti-war
movements—which, to Crystal Eastman and others within the NCLB, were one and the same. 238
The most plausible remaining strategy was the mobilization of public opinion. Vivid
NCLB accounts of lawless brutality and vigilante justice—often committed with official
encouragement—were troubling to many progressives. In October, a vicious attack on the
AUAM’s own Herbert S. Bigelow, a pacifist minister and outspoken opponent of “big
business,” 239 attracted outraged moderates to the organization. 240 Capitalizing on this
condemnation as well as lingering concerns about Postmaster Burleson, the organization decided
to convene a “mass meeting” in defense of “American Liberties in War Time.” 241 Its central
purpose was to demonstrate why public protest had become necessary. To manifest a broad
consensus on the issue, the organizers wanted to assemble a sponsoring committee whose
members would be split evenly among pacifists, militarists, and people who regarded the war as
necessary but deplorable. To that end, they solicited participation from a wide range of groups
238
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and individuals, but aside from the radicals, most declined. 242 A few accepted at first, expressing
concern about mobs and vigilantism, and then backed out for lack of a critical mass. 243 Many
invoked the prominent progressive sentiment that “the world will not be safe for free speech until
it is safe for democracy.” 244
In the end, as moderate invitees had feared, the meeting was attended and its agenda
dominated by pacifists and radicals. Denied the use of Carnegie Hall, Baldwin opted instead,
appropriately enough, to hold the conference at the Liberty Theatre. 245 The theater was filled to
capacity. Speakers included Herbert Bigelow, muckraker and revolutionary enthusiast Lincoln
Steffens, leftist minister Harry Ward, and Socialists James Maurer and Norman Thomas. 246
Much of the discussion focused on the capitalist underpinnings of the war. The central theme
was the unjustified attack on radicalism and the labor movement under the pretext of
disloyalty. 247
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The NCLB was not invested in presenting the repression of labor as a novel departure or
in suggesting that its own efforts were innovative or unprecedented. 248 On the contrary, for the
NCLB, the suppression of speech in wartime was simply a new manifestation of a wellestablished pattern. Industry was using all the tools at its disposal to quash the radical labor
movement, and the government, whether wittingly or not, was playing into its hands. Thus one
announcement for the meeting stressed the “charge that business interests are disloyally using
patriotism to intimidate labor and radical movements.” 249 Many of the NCLB’s supporters in this
endeavor had been promoting the same message for years. Indeed several, including Clarence
Darrow and Gilbert Roe, had testified publicly to that effect before the Commission on Industrial
Relations. Wartime abuses of personal liberties were worse in degree than their prewar analogs.
Such methods of repression as postal censorship were more centralized and consequently more
threatening. But the basic objectives of the repressors remained the same: to shield the status
quo from the insidious effects of radical organizing and expression. The Conference on Liberties
in Wartime, in exposing this secret agenda, was an extension of prewar efforts to protect labor’s
rights and to preserve American democracy. Tellingly, the proposed remedy for the mounting
violations of civil liberties was to bring them to the attention of Congress.
The resolution adopted by the committee and submitted to Congress for consideration
charged that violations of constitutional liberty were hindering rather than promoting the war
effort and “menace[d] the whole future of democratic institutions and individual liberties after
the war.” Mob violence had received the sanction of many public leaders. The espionage act was
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being manipulated, “in the face of the declared intent of Congress,” to quash dissent and to
“check radical and labor movements.” Post office censorship was destroying the free press. And
“exploiting business interests” were deliberately crushing labor “while robbing the consumer and
piling up huge war profits.” These abuses, according to the resolution, were a matter of common
knowledge. But it remained unclear precisely which interests were propelling them, and toward
what end. “The war has only brought to a sharp focus tendencies hostile to our democratic
institutions which have long been evident in the case of such minority groups as the Negro and
other races in our national life, as well as many radical and labor movements,” it concluded. In
order better to understand that broader repressive trend, the conference committee requested that
“an immediate Congressional inquiry be made into the actual facts of these violations of
constitutional right, mob violence and censorship, and particularly the efforts to use the war as a
means to crush labor.” 250 It was asking, in short, for a wartime equivalent of the Commission on
Industrial Relations.
There was, of course, no realistic prospect of congressional action on this resolution
during the war. The press dismissed it as a radical attempt to undermine the war effort. But the
conference served a more important function for the NCLB: it marked the organization’s reentry
into the realm of popular agitation and propaganda. As Lenetta Cooper advised Baldwin with
respect to his correspondence with the War Department over its treatment of conscientious
objectors, government negotiations worked best when buttressed by popular support. 251 By
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March, Baldwin was “thoroughly disgusted with the folks at Washington who have given us
such hearty assurances.” Those assurances, he complained, did not translate into tolerant policy,
and “the indictments go on merrily.” 252 Baldwin thought it time to take a more public stand.
In the weeks after the conference, Baldwin exchanged letters with Arnold Peterson,
National Secretary of the Socialist Labor Party of America. Peterson told Baldwin that although
his party approved the “spirit” of the resolution, it did not believe “that the sending of resolutions
protesting against outrages committed by the authorities” was worthwhile. Instead, it was
committed to reaching out to the working class in an endeavor “to get that class industrially and
politically organized.” The only way to protect working class rights was to effectuate working
class power. 253 In later years, Baldwin would often make the same claim. As he told Peterson,
he agreed “about the main line of approach into the solution of the problem of liberty,” and his
primary goal was “working class and radical organization.” Nonetheless, there would need to be
“a lot of fighting along the way,” and in the course of the struggle, he would use “any existing
agency or means” to accomplish the larger objective. 254 He hoped that other groups—to which,
in some cases, he contributed and belonged—would continue to fight the crucial battles. The
NCLB would endeavor to protect their right to continue their work, unmolested by the state and
without incurring public condemnation. “The United States Congress isn’t a bad tool for
purposes of agitation and publicity which is necessary to keep the iron hot.” 255 Nor, for that
matter, were the courts.
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Baldwin’s distinguishing characteristic as an administrator was his willingness to adopt
whatever means he thought most likely to accomplish his overarching program. Between World
War I and the New Deal, that program was the preservation of labor’s right to organize, en route
to a general redistribution of economic resources and political power. Perhaps more than
anything it was Baldwin’s flexibility that made the NCLB, and later the ACLU, so much more
successful than the organizations whose rights it defended. Baldwin was always keenly aware of
the prevailing political climate, and he was willing and able to adapt to changing times.
Moreover, he learned from his failures and capitalized on his successes. For the duration of the
war, Baldwin would be honing his skills—building his credibility in radical circles while
studying the limits of liberal tolerance. By early 1918, it was clear what constituency the new
organization would primarily serve. The urgent and unresolved question for the NCLB board
was a strategic one: how best to protect that constituency from persecution and prosecution in a
time of national crisis.
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CHAPTER 2: WORLD WAR I AND THE RIGHT OF AGITATION

At two o’clock central time on the afternoon of September 5, 1917, hundreds of United
States marshals and their deputies, together with agents of the Department of Justice, descended
simultaneously on forty-seven IWW halls and offices and the residences of IWW leaders
throughout the country. Federal officers seized five tons of documents—including literature,
mailing lists, and financial records—as well as artwork, furniture, and even wastebaskets.
The materials and documents confiscated in the September raid served as the basis for the
federal conspiracy prosecution of the IWW leadership. The Department of Justice secured
indictments in areas of significant IWW activity, including Sacramento, Kansas City, and the
organization’s headquarters in Chicago. The Chicago conspiracy trial, whose defendants
included IWW head “Big Bill” Haywood, was the first and most celebrated. It lasted nearly nine
months from indictment to verdict. Its 166 defendants—a number that declined steadily due to
dozens of dismissals for insufficient evidence—were marched each day from the Cook County
jail to the federal courthouse, enduring verbal abuse and physical violence along the way. 1 The
record, purported at the time to be the largest ever filed, contained 33,000 typewritten pages and
10 million words. 2 The proceedings were billed by the prosecution and defendants alike as the
most expansive and most important labor trial in United States history.
The government’s theory in the Chicago trial was that the IWW, by counseling its
members not to serve in the military and by organizing strikes in crucial war industries, had
conspired to undermine America’s war effort. For the defendants, however, these supposed
efforts to obstruct recruitment and war production were beside the point. Flush with the
1
2
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optimism of labor’s newfound wartime strength, they embraced the opportunity to state their
case publicly, once and for all. In their testimony and in their defense bulletins, the beleaguered
Wobblies described the suffering of transient and migratory workers. They recounted the living
conditions in the mines and the lumber camps: the inadequate food and water, the lack of access
to bathing facilities, the hard straw-covered bunks on which they were expected to sleep. They
explained the mechanisms used to suppress labor organization, from the rustling card system to
lynching. The stated goal of the IWW’s defense was to put the industrial system on trial.
The IWW trial might seem an unusual episode through which to tell the history of civil
liberties during wartime. It was not, after all, a case about “free speech” as we would recognize
the term today. The liberties at issue—the rights of workers to petition, protest, and strike—were
cast in terms of equality rather than autonomy. And the NCLB, though deeply involved in
publicity for the case, did not so much as file a brief in court. The lawyer for the IWW, himself a
member of the organization, did raise a First Amendment argument. But neither the district
court nor the Court of Appeals entertained it seriously. The IWW trial produced no noteworthy
doctrinal precedent on which to base future free speech claims; indeed, the Supreme Court
denied the defendants’ petition for certiorari, and the appellate court considered itself bound by
more notable wartime decisions.
What the IWW case did do was to precipitate a major reconsideration of strategy by the
labor sympathizers who would lead the modern free speech movement. The IWW case was
important because it led to the ACLU’s definitive break with the Wilson administration and its
loss of confidence in its ability to work within, rather than against, the existing machinery of the
state. 3 When it first arose, the NCLB treated the case as a new permutation of the great free
3
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speech fights the IWW had pioneered a decade earlier. It cast the Wobblies as patriotic citizens
and called on the government to observe rule of law and uphold fundamental American
principles. In past labor struggles, when local law enforcement rushed to the assistance of
beleaguered employers, the federal government had shown restraint. Wilson’s wartime
administration included many officials who had endorsed the findings of the Commission on
Industrial Relations, with its robust support for labor’s free speech. Now, the capitalists had
introduced a new twist: they had accused the IWW of fighting for the Kaiser in exchange for
German gold. And so the NCLB leadership set out to prove that the IWW was a labor
organization, pure and simple—that its enemy was capitalist exploitation, not the United States.
They believed that once they made their case, they could persuade administration officials to stay
out. In historical memory, the hysteria of the First World War bleeds into the Red Scare of 1919
and 1920. It is difficult to fathom that the prosecution of radicals might have triggered concern
among the same progressives who accepted the suppression of anti-war propaganda as a social
necessity. But such was the situation in 1917, when the NCLB was born. 4
This time, however, it was the federal government that had initiated charges. The radical
labor movement was deemed a threat to war production as well as national unity, and its sacrifice
was justified in the public interest. In a climate of jingoistic war frenzy marked by public
hostility, mob violence, and police brutality against dissenters, the NCLB was naïve to expect a
continuation of the reasonably sympathetic public reception that labor’s prewar confrontations
with the law had engendered. As events unfolded, support for the IWW brought down the wrath
context of the broader agenda or future program of the ACLU, nor does he emphasize the influence of the IWW’s
activities and beliefs on the NCLB’s evolving theory of free speech. His discussion of the trial itself, including the
legal arguments raised, is minimal. One of the defendants published an account of the trial shortly after the verdict
was returned. Harrison George, The IWW Trial: Story of the Greatest Trial in Labor’s History by One of the
Defendants (Chicago: Industrial Workers of the World, 1918).
4
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mainstream consciousness more deeply than in this era.”).
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of the war department and led to spying on the NCLB by the Department of Justice and by
United States Military Intelligence. 5 The conviction of the IWW defendants emphasized the
limits of progressivism as a basis for free speech. It also strengthened existing connections
between the radical labor movement and the NCLB leadership. Eventually, it generated a new
and radical model of civil liberties—a “right of agitation”—premised neither on individual
autonomy nor on the discursive production of truth, but on the frank mobilization of workingclass power.

The IWW and the War
Of the many government abridgments of labor’s right to organize over the course of the
First World War, the most troubling to the NCLB was the Chicago IWW trial. Many labor
leaders, including Eugene V. Debs, were prosecuted and convicted under the Espionage Act for
purported anti-war activity. The IWW indictments, however, were particularly egregious.
Citing evidence of the usual radical antagonism toward capitalist war, the government was
threatening to send the entire organizational leadership to jail.
By the time the IWW indictments were pending, the Free Speech League had disbanded,
and the IWW was more interested in using the trial as a forum for educating the masses than in
expanding constitutional liberties. Still, the defense committee reached out broadly to socialists
and liberals sympathetic to its cause, and the NCLB proved particularly receptive. It was clear to
the NCLB that the goal of the prosecution was to destroy the IWW. The colossal trial was widely
followed, and the eventual convictions of Big Bill Haywood and many of the organization’s
other leaders precipitated the decline of the IWW as a major force in the American labor
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movement. In January 1918, the NCLB could declare without undue hyperbole that “the
government’s indictments against the Industrial Workers of the World constitute what is
probably the most important labor case in history.” 6
The government had its reasons for targeting the IWW. The wartime economy produced
a temporary shift in the balance of power between workers and employers. Increased domestic
production in the face of a sharp reduction in immigration from Europe meant that
unemployment plummeted. And yet, though workers were in short supply, their wages did not
rise in step with their employers’ profit margins. Samuel Gompers and other labor leaders
pledged that their unions would not strike while the United States was at war, but they were
unable to enforce their promises on the ground. On the contrary, the early months of the war
witnessed a steep rise in union organizing and a wave of strikes across all industries. Employers,
in turn, brutally shut down organizing efforts by unions determined to reap their share of wartime
economic profits.
It was during this moment that the IWW formulated its own wartime labor policy. Unlike
its more conservative counterparts, the IWW leadership explicitly called for an escalation of the
class war while the Great War waged abroad. IWW recruitment skyrocketed during the spring
and summer of 1917. Strikes in war industries like logging and copper mining were responsible
for precipitous drops in production and seemingly threatened the prosecution of the war. 7
Industry was incensed at the IWW’s successes, and local United States Attorneys, who
were hostile to organized labor in general and to the IWW in particular, relayed to their superiors
the demands of industrial leaders for a federal crackdown. Some went so far as to advocate
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military detention of recalcitrant agitators. 8 At first, Attorney General Thomas Gregory
considered the strikes legal and had no plan to file charges. 9 Unlike the career employees in the
Department of Justice, Gregory showed a measure of restraint in filing Espionage Act cases; he
felt that many U.S. Attorneys had unduly succumbed to local pressures, and he instituted a policy
requiring all cases under the act to be cleared in Washington before filing. By late summer,
however, the situation had worsened in western states, largely as a result of violent resistance to
IWW strikes by western mine owners—and increasingly, some form of federal intervention
appeared advisable. State and local police launched their own investigations in an effort to
uncover evidence of espionage and disloyalty. Some states enacted criminal syndicalism laws,
which made IWW ideology illegal on its own terms. But state law enforcement was unable to
break the strikes, and state militias were federalized in the summer of 1917. Meanwhile,
vigilante violence was rampant, and IWW pleas for federal protection were curtly dismissed. 10
Loyalty leagues and similar groups comprising off-duty soldiers and angry citizens stormed
IWW headquarters, and mobs beat, tarred and feathered, and deported unwanted Wobblies.
The best known example of the last phenomenon was the July deportation of twelve
hundred miners from Bisbee, Arizona. In Bisbee, the county sheriff’s department, the mayor, the
city council, the local mine operator, and executives of other area businesses formulated a plan
for ridding the town of its IWW problem. The sheriff deputized two thousand townspeople, who
rounded up twelve hundred alleged Wobblies (supposedly Mexicans, German agents, and
subversives 11), packed them into cattle cars supplied by the El Paso and Southwestern Railroad,
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and shipped them out of state. Many had families who were stranded in Bisbee without support.
A significant portion had never belonged to the IWW, and some were members of the AFL—
though the ordeal increased the IWW’s share. The deportees were housed in an army camp in
New Mexico, where they received minimal rations. Requests for federal assistance—including
an offer to return to work if the federal government assumed operation of the mines—were
consistently rejected. Most of the deportees eventually gave up their efforts to return to Bisbee,
though A.S. Embree, who would serve as secretary of the defense committee, returned home to
his wife and children only to be imprisoned by the local authorities. 12
The Bisbee affair was sufficiently flagrant to generate concern among moderate groups.
Labor Department mediators and the AFL demanded federal action against the ringleaders, and
the Justice Department reluctantly filed charges on the theory that deportation of men legally
registered for the draft violated the Conscription Act. The district court, predictably, dismissed
the indictments. In a decision eventually affirmed by the Supreme Court, it held that the Draft
Act did not require registrants to remain within their state of residence, and the deportation of the
victims across state lines was otherwise insufficient to implicate federally cognizable rights; the
unlawful behavior of the vigilantes fell within the jurisdiction of state law (which, as a matter of
politics, meant there was no case at all). 13 It would be two decades before the federal
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government, at the strong urging of the ACLU, would seek to remedy this federalism loophole,
which served so often to immunize employers and their collaborators from prosecution. 14
Employers’ associations and state governments were more successful than the IWW in
soliciting federal assistance. In July, western governors appealed directly to the President’s
Council on National Defense, which was responsible for regulating the national wartime
economy. 15 Federal troops were dispatched to IWW strongholds like Washington, Oregon, and
Arizona to ward off disturbances in wartime production; despite orders to remain neutral in local
conflicts, they generally served employers’ interests. They did so, notably, with substantial
support from the AFL leadership, which believed (wrongly, it turned out) that restraint of the
IWW would facilitate competing efforts by the AFL to organize the same workers. 16 Gompers’s
vocal call for the suppression of the IWW and other labor radicals helped to spur the ensuing
witch hunt. Federal prosecution emerged as a more moderate solution to the IWW problem than
active military suppression.
In July 1917, the Department of Justice distributed a circular to all of its attorneys in
which it laid the groundwork for legal action against the IWW. The circular urged its recipients
to collect evidence against the IWW, including its income stream, its publications, and
descriptions of its leaders. At roughly the same time, on the orders of President Wilson, a federal
judge initiated an investigation designed to assemble evidence to support an indictment. Justice
agents monitored every IWW move, scouring all of its published circulars and trailing Haywood
and other office holders in their daily business. In early September, the department launched
raids in every city where the IWW had an office. 17 They constituted, according to the New York
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Times, the “biggest round-up ever made by the Secret Service forces.” 18 The government went
on to indict 166 labor leaders, some of whom were not actually members of the IWW, on over
one thousand counts. 19 According to the indictment, the IWW defendants had conspired to
violate the Espionage Act, the Conscription Act, and other federal laws. The organizational
leadership, inexplicably confident that a jury trial would vindicate them, counseled the
defendants to turn themselves in.
When the IWW prosecution was first announced, it was justified by rumors that the
organization was fighting for the enemy in exchange for “German gold.” In August 1917,
Arizona Senator Henry Ashurst announced on the Senate floor that IWW stood for “Imperial
Wilhelm’s Warriors.” 20 Incredibly, despite the organization’s outspoken opposition to war,
administration officials seem to have believed the allegations that the IWW was working for the
Germans. It quickly became evident, however, that the charges of espionage and treason were
baseless. Nor had the IWW officially counseled resistance of the draft once the Conscription Act
was passed. Certainly, it had been staunchly opposed to intervention in the prewar years. As
late as March 24, 1917, it explicitly contrasted its own declaration against war with the AFL’s
pledge to serve the country with patriotic fervor in case of American entry into the conflict.
Even after April, IWW publications implicitly criticized conscription, and some of the
organization’s most militant organizers went further, advising members to claim exemption on
their registration cards based on opposition to war (the same procedure that the NCLB
recommended to political objectors). But the organization itself walked a careful line, leaving
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the decision to individual members. Ninety-five percent of Wobblies who were eligible for the
draft chose to register. 21
Caution on this score by the IWW leadership did not, however, insulate the organization
from public hostility, nor from prosecution under the Espionage Act. The NCLB, which
immediately offered its assistance in the IWW defense, was quick to explain why. “The
government is attacking primarily not the war-time activities of the organization, but the
organization per se,” it explained. 22 The Department of Justice seemingly agreed. Within days
of the raid, one United States attorney conveyed to Gregory his understanding that the purpose of
the department’s operation was “very largely to put the IWW out of business.” 23
The IWW indictments, in this respect, were much like the other Espionage Act
prosecutions challenged by the NCLB during the war. The IWW threatened the interests of the
industrialists on whom the federal government relied for successful prosecution of the war. The
administration was hesitant to quash the radical labor movement outright. But on the pretext of
military necessity, the Department of Justice was threatening to prosecute it out of existence. In
its November call for contributions, the NCLB articulated the concern at the core of the IWW
case and of its own broader agenda during the war years and afterwards. “In this prosecution,” it
declared, “is involved the whole question of the right of agitation by a radical labor body.” 24
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The NCLB never defined this so-called right of agitation precisely, but the ACLU
espoused it regularly until the Second World War. It was clearly much broader than the
conventional understanding among progressives of free speech or free press, which was
premised on ensuring robust public conversation as a prerequisite for democratic deliberation
and decisionmaking. Later proponents of free speech, like the Communist Party, claimed a right
to advocate revolutionary violence. For the IWW, however, speech was not a means of
promoting its program; it was its program. In a nutshell, the right of agitation was a right to
improve the situation of labor by any available non-violent means. 25 Organizing workers,
protesting employer abuses, and dissuading strike-breakers were fundamental weapons in the
labor struggle. In the words of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, the prosecution of the IWW for
participation in the labor struggle “involved the right to strike, organize, and publish the labor
press.” Like the NCLB, Flynn regarded the IWW prosecutions as a labor case rather than a war
case and emphasized that the “war atmosphere [was] being exploited by large capital and the
press to create bitter prejudice against radical and militant labor unions.” She continued, “It is a
fundamental and epoch-making trial of labor, its struggles and aspirations.” 26
After the war, Roger Baldwin would frankly declare the right of agitation to be a natural
right, “prior to and independent of constitutions.” 27 Like his allies in the radical labor
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movement, he would come to believe that “causes get that natural right in proportion to their
power to take and hold it.” 28 In other words, he would understand power as a prerequisite for
freedom, rather than the other way around. For the time being, however, the NCLB was more
cautious in its rhetoric, if not in its underlying beliefs. Even while it invoked the right of
agitation, the NCLB emphasized to its contributors that the IWW deserved a fair trial. It
requested assistance in bringing the IWW’s case to the public as a matter of “law and public
policy, and of course as protagonists only of American constitutional rights.” 29
In short, Baldwin and the NCLB were speaking in two voices. To their radical labor
allies, they promised the substantive rights crucial to organizing marginalized workers, that is,
rights against interference with organizing, picketing, and boycotting. To the progressives in
power, they spoke in conventional reformist terms. Free speech was just the sort of incremental
adjustment in the system that would quell widespread social conflict.
As with the conscientious objectors, the first recourse of the NCLB leadership was to
connections within the administration. By contrast with early optimism about judicial vindication
of freedom of press in the postal censorship cases, the likelihood of success in the courts for the
IWW was markedly dim, and the NCLB hoped that trial could be avoided. Its goal was a
“dismissal outright of the IWW cases, so that the whole matter might be turned over to the
Department of Labor as an administrative problem.” 30 This may seem an ironic ambition for a
civil liberties group organized to combat the abuses of administrative discretion through recourse
to the courts, but Baldwin agreed with the attorney for the IWW that “the problems presented by
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this situation [were] diplomatic and administrative rather than judicial.” 31 He asked sympathetic
insiders to correct common misapprehensions about the IWW and to discourage prosecution. 32
He argued that conviction would only exacerbate labor unrest in the United States by arousing
greater enmity toward government and employers. 33
This position met with mixed success in the administration. Many of Wilson’s
advisors—including Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson, a former Secretary-Treasurer of the
UMW—were generally supportive of organized labor. But pro-unionism did not necessarily
translate into sympathy for labor radicalism, and other members of the administration, such as
Postmaster General Burleson, were openly hostile. President Wilson was reluctant to take a
strong stand. In August 1917, largely in response to the Bisbee deportations, he had appointed a
Mediation Commission to evaluate the wartime labor situation and to formulate
recommendations when particular disputes jeopardized the war effort. The Commission was
chaired by William B. Wilson and included two labor representatives, both AFL, and two
moderate employers. Its secretary, Felix Frankfurter, was initially skeptical of the AFL’s
dominance. In the course of his investigations, however, he came to agree with Gompers that the
best path to industrial peace was to mandate employer negotiation with AFL unions while
officially repudiating radical alternatives like the IWW. 34 Although the Commission’s report on
the Arizona copper strike absolved the strikers of intent to undermine the war effort and instead
traced labor unrest to poor working conditions and low wages, its broader condemnation of
31
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radical tactics undercut the organization’s standing in negotiations over the indictment. 35 Baker,
Secretary Wilson, George Creel, and Colonel House were all disposed to dismiss the
prosecution, but none was willing to take a firm stand. 36 In late February, Baldwin appealed
directly to President Wilson, stressing again the propriety of an administrative resolution of labor
conflict. 37 Wilson, however, had concluded that the IWW was “worthy of being suppressed.” 38
As late as March 1918, Baldwin sensed a “disposition of the Department of Justice not to
try this case,” and Vanderveer expected the charges to be dismissed. 39 If there was hesitation,
however, it was not at the level of administration policy. In fact, the government was turning
ever more surely away from the NCLB’s proposed course. In May, President Wilson endorsed
the “Sedition Act” amendments to the Espionage Act, which explicitly authorized the censorship
that had been sanctioned under the existing act as a matter of statutory interpretation. The
measure, pushed by western senators, was based on a Montana statute targeting the IWW. 40 The
NCLB cautioned against the increased censorship authority that the bill conferred on the
Postmaster General, explaining that “[s]uch arbitrary power in the hands of a single appointed
officer has never before existed in the history of this republic, nor of any other nation under a
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democratic constitution.” 41 A handful of senators voiced concerns about suppression of speech
in general and bureaucratic censorship in particular, though none actually advocated or desired
free speech for radicals. Republicans saw the act as a potential vulnerability for the Wilson
administration, and Theodore Roosevelt openly attacked the administration for its silencing of
opposition views. 42 In the Senate, Joseph France proposed amending the measure to protect the
right of individuals to “publish or speak what is true, with good motives, and for justifiable
ends.” 43 Although the France amendment received considerable congressional support,
Attorney General Gregory opposed it, and it was overwhelmingly voted down. 44 The original
bill passed handily in both houses of Congress, and on May 16, President Wilson signed it into
law. The implications of the act for the future of IWW organizing were clear. It forbade all
“disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United
States,” the Constitution, the armed forces, and the American flag. More pointedly, it expressly
prohibited advocacy of “any curtailment of production in this country” of anything “necessary
. . . to the prosecution of the war.” 45 The act also approved the post office’s practice of refusing
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to deliver mail to and from the IWW, a policy that made it virtually impossible for the defense
team to raise funds and generate public support. 46 In fact, Senator William King of Utah
specifically justified the provision as a measure to prevent Haywood and the IWW from
receiving contributions by mail. 47
In June, Montana Senator Thomas Walsh introduced a bill that would have explicitly
prohibited the brand of labor radicalism espoused by the IWW and was expressly designed to
“outlaw the entire organization.” 48 Haywood wired Baldwin for assistance in defeating the
measure. He believed that even if the IWW leadership was lucky enough to escape conviction
under the existing war statutes, there was no way the organization could withstand the proposed
bill, which even criminalized speech advocating threats of injury to property as a means of
bringing about economic change. Baldwin recognized that the bill’s language would sweep in
labor activity far less radical than the IWW’s, and he fought desperately for its defeat. The
NCLB’s Washington correspondent, Laurence Todd, told Baldwin that the bill likely would pass
without a roll call. There was no sign of opposition “from any quarter,” and the Department of
Labor was keeping quiet. 49 Even Senator Borah, who often had spoken out for civil liberties, had
voiced support for the measure. He invoked it as justification for his opposition to the press
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censorship provision of the Sedition Act, explaining that if the Walsh bill were passed, “there
will not be any IWW organization left to send mail.” 50 The measure passed the Senate but
encountered more difficulty in the House due to opposition from a single representative, Meyer
London of New York. By the end of July, the bill had stalled due to the Wilson administration’s
lack of support. 51 The administration had decided to leave the question of the IWW’s survival to
the courts.

Legal Strategy and Publicity Campaign
While the NCLB’s Washington insiders were endeavoring to persuade administration
officials to drop the indictments, the IWW was working on its backup plan. In the early fall,
Chicago headquarters organized a general defense committee, which began preparations for the
defense. In November, the general executive board ceased publication of Solidarity and
introduced in its place the Defense News Bulletin, which reported on developments in the case. 52
IWW counsel George Vanderveer, who had defended the organization in earlier highprofile cases, agreed to handle the case. Vanderveer was not a universally popular choice. In
December, Lenetta Cooper of the Chicago-based American Liberty Defense League wrote to
Baldwin that many at IWW headquarters were “much dissatisfied with Vanderveer” and wanted
to recruit Clarence Darrow and Frank P. Walsh in his place. 53 In January, the NCLB convened a
conference to discuss the pending case. It invited Felix Frankfurter to attend as a “representative
of the Administration, officially present to hear what is said,” since the situation was too critical
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“not to have all of the cooperation possible to prevent blunders which might be embarrassing.” 54
The meeting, however, was a disappointment. Darrow and Walsh, around whose participation it
was organized, failed to show up. Baldwin felt that it would be impossible to proceed without
them and adjourned the deliberations. As he explained to Walsh, “We all felt that it is
imperative that this greatest labor case in our history should be handled by you two gentlemen.
There are no other lawyers in the country who can make the fight effectively. You can put the
whole industrial system on trial.” 55
Baldwin’s ambitions on this front were thwarted, however. Darrow was preoccupied
with other legal matters and unable to travel to Washington. For his part, Walsh was
sympathetic to the IWW and opposed the prosecutions, but he was serving an important
moderating influence within the administration and was unwilling to jeopardize that role by
public participation in the case. 56 The IWW’s Jack Law told Baldwin in mid-January that Walsh
had offered his “unqualified support and endorsement” but that it was “utterly impossible for
Frank P. to get in the case.” 57 Walsh vouched for Vanderveer, however, which was enough to
satisfy the dissenters.
With the composition of the defense team settled, the IWW and NCLB both turned to
legal strategy. Much of the early debate centered on the blanket indictment of the IWW
defendants. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn was indicted for her translation of Emile Pouget’s classic
tract on sabotage, and she solicited the NCLB’s assistance in contesting the government’s theory
that an author could be held accountable for a pamphlet written before the illegal conduct alleged
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had taken place. 58 Along with Carlo Tresca, Arturo Giovannitti, and Joseph Ettor, who were
indicted on similar charges, she moved for severance of her case, and she urged the other
defendants to demand their own separate trials. In a conspiracy case, the prosecution was
obligated to connect each defendant with the conspiracy charged. 59 In Flynn’s view, the
government would be unable to maintain a case against each of the individual defendants on
each count and would be forced to drop many of the charges. 60 She also believed that the
government would drop all of the indictments if the defendants would renounce their militancy
for the duration of the war. 61 By contrast, a mass trial would all but guarantee conviction. 62
Unlike most of her co-defendants, Flynn was willing to disavow continued support for
the IWW or its ideology to avoid prosecution. Flynn was still actively involved in the IWW as
late as August, when she wrote to Solidarity that she remained a member and had “never stated
otherwise anywhere.” 63 After the September 28 indictments, however, she severed her ties with
the organization and pledged her patriotic loyalty in a letter to President Wilson. Even then, the
Department of Justice did not officially dismiss the indictment against her until March, assuring
that she would not publicly criticize the department’s proceedings against the other defendants.
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Under the circumstances, it is unsurprising that the IWW leadership was unwilling to heed
Flynn’s advice, despite the NCLB’s endorsement of its legal premise. 64
The IWW defense committee was working toward a more sweeping vindication of the
organization. The indictment against the IWW contained five counts. The first alleged a
conspiracy to hinder the production and transportation of war supplies by means of violent
strikes, and the second a conspiracy to impede the constitutional and statutory right to execute
various contracts. 65 The third and forth counts charged specific interference with the Selective
Service Act and the Espionage Act, respectively. And the fifth count alleged that the defendants
had conspired to use the mails to cheat and defraud employers, by encouraging employees to
provide their employers with inefficient service. During the arraignment proceedings in
December 1917, Vanderveer argued unsuccessfully that the evidence on which the government’s
case was premised had been seized unlawfully, in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments
to the United States Constitution.66 He subsequently filed and lost a motion to quash the
indictments, in which he argued that acts cited by the government as evidence of conspiracy
were the ordinary engagements of a labor organization and were directed at profiteering
employers, not the government. 67
While the legal team waited for the government to process evidence and assemble its
case, IWW headquarters focused on raising defense funds and generating publicity. In that
respect, they relied heavily on the assistance of the NCLB. Although the IWW continued to
64
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solicit its own contributions, its defense bulletins, requests for donations, and even checks were
routinely held for months by the post office. Moreover, IWW publications were closely
monitored, and the organization’s offices were subject to periodic raids, during which materials,
stamps, and mailing lists were routinely seized.
The NCLB was in a better position to organize defense efforts, because its own
communications, though not immune to postal meddling, were less subject to interference. It
housed a member of the IWW’s General Defense Committee in the New York office, 68 and in
response to IWW requests, it raised funds for bail and other defense costs, such as the
transportation of witnesses. 69 The NCLB was well equipped to enlist the support of respectable
liberals. The fundraising committee that it organized was chaired by John A. Fitch, an editor of
the Survey who taught labor relations at the New York School of Social Work. Baldwin also
secured the assistance of John Graham Brooks, a Unitarian minister and labor scholar who had
written extensively about the IWW. 70 In March, the general defense committee complained that
financial support from the New York area, a mere ten percent of total funds raised, had been
insufficient in view of the region’s great wealth. 71 According to E.S. Rose, “the necessity for
these things has never been brought concretely and forcibly to the true liberal mediums of the
population in this region. It has reached them through mediums that have been colored by other
interests, or that have been too feeble to express the extremity, not only of our own situation, but
68
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of the principles of human rights and liberty.” 72 The NCLB had proven adept at arousing public
sentiment, but less effective in its financial appeals. Rose asked Baldwin to arrange a meeting
with influential liberals at a private reception, and he requested letters of introduction to potential
donors. Baldwin dutifully complied with both requests. 73
In the spring, the NCLB arranged for a call for funds to be printed in The New Republic.
The advertisement opened with a general appeal to procedural fairness, a technique that would
serve the organization well in the interwar years. “Never mind what you think about the IWW,”
it proclaimed, “they are at least entitled to a fair trial and an open-minded hearing.” 74 An early
draft would have accused the government of foul play in its prosecution of the case; it reported
that the Department of Justice had twice raided defense committee offices and had interfered
with their fundraising efforts. But reaction to this more contentious claim was decidedly
negative. J. G. Phelps Stokes, on the brink of leaving his wife as well as the Socialist Party,
thought that references to official misconduct would convey to the public “the impression that it
was drawn in a spirit distinctly hostile to the war policy of our Government.” 75 Roscoe Pound,
though agreeing that the IWW leadership was entitled to a fair trial, considered it unseemly to
raise such issues as a means of pressuring judicial tribunals. 76 The New Republic voiced a
similar reaction, and it agreed to take the advertisement only if the passage about “interference
by officials” was deleted. 77 The NCLB complied, and the revised version instead emphasized the
need for “liberal financial support” from those Americans who believed in the “right of a fair
72
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trial” for all parties, even the IWW. 78 In its amended form, the advertisement bore the signatures
of John Dewey, Thorsten Veblen, Charles Beard, and Helen Keller, among other prominent
individuals. 79 Even then, the Department of Justice threatened to revoke The New Republic’s
second-class mailing privileges if the advertisement were reprinted. 80
In addition to its fundraising efforts, the NCLB coordinated publicity during the trial.
That was not a task for which the organization had volunteered, but Haywood had failed to make
his own publicity arrangements. 81 Baldwin anticipated that the commercial press would issue
distorted reports of the trial, and he considered it imperative to communicate a “fair
interpretation of the facts.” 82 He saw the publicity campaign as an opportunity “to get across the
American public the real issues of our present labor struggle and to put the burden of guilt where
it belongs, on the shoulders of private capital exploiting the workers.” 83 To that end, he agreed to
assemble a committee of reporters in New York and Washington who would produce balanced
accounts of the proceedings. 84 Baldwin advised Haywood that the NCLB lacked the funds to hire
a fulltime publicist for the trial, but that he would personally arrange to send a reporter to
Chicago to set up a system for distribution of “truthful and accurate” accounts of the trial and to
coordinate publicity from afar. 85 He selected Paul Hanna for the job, a reporter who came highly
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recommended by Socialist journalist Robert Bruere, who was assisting Baldwin with the
publicity effort.
When Hanna arrived in Chicago in early April, he discovered precisely the situation that
Baldwin had expected. Newspaper reports of the trial, which was then in the jury selection
phase, were “generally frivolous, largely malicious, totally ignorant and usually inaccurate.”
More important, they evinced no understanding of the “vital social and economic issues
involved.” 86 All in all, there was no hope for balanced coverage from the commercial press.
Reliance on the IWW’s daily report to labor papers would be equally misguided, as those reports
were reaching only sympathetic audiences and were in any case liable to be intercepted in the
mail. Hanna, however, offered an alternative avenue for broad publicity: he advised Baldwin to
encourage supporters throughout the country to submit individual letters to the editor. Hanna
recognized that this sort of letter-writing campaign was an untested technique, but he thought it
had tremendous potential for mobilization of local communities. 87 A reporter based in Chicago
would produce a brief correction of every significant misrepresentation of the trial that appeared
in print and send it to correspondents in towns throughout the country with instructions to
forward it, over their own signatures, to their newspapers. Readers would rethink their
preconceptions, and newspaper editors would learn to review news agencies’ accounts more
critically before reprinting them. “The front door to fair publicity on the IWW trials is shut and
locked,” Hanna advised Baldwin, “but the side door stands wide open.” Hanna considered his
plan to be “a sure means of entry by this side door,” and Baldwin, with Haywood’s approval and
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the resources of the NCLB, adopted it in toto. 88 Judging by press reaction to the defendants’
eventual conviction, however, its actual effect was minimal. 89
In its fundraising and publicity efforts, the NCLB was honing techniques it had
developed during its AUAM days and used to good effect in earlier Espionage Act cases. What
was distinctive about the NCLB’s involvement in the IWW case was a project at the heart of its
service to the IWW: its preparation of a pamphlet, The Truth about the IWW, intended to dispel
misconceptions about the organization’s goals. The NCLB’s objective was to demonstrate that
allegations of anti-war activity by the IWW were “part of an organized campaign by warprofiteers and employing interests to use the war to crush this labor organization.” 90 Much of the
pamphlet consisted of corrective quotations by academics and government officials addressing
“widespread misrepresentations” of the organization in the commercial press. Its contributors
included John Graham Brooks, Robert W. Bruere, George P. West, John A. Fitch, and Professor
Carlton H. Parker, who was a labor economist as well as a labor representative for the
Department of War. 91
88
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Citing sociological evidence, the NCLB sought to establish that the radicalism of the
IWW was a response to the brutalities of industrial capitalism. Carlton Parker explained that
migratory laborers had “lost the conventional relationship to women and child life, lost its voting
franchise, lost its habit of common comfort or dignity, and gradually become consciously a
social class with fewer legal or social rights than are conventionally ascribed to Americans.” 92
Moreover, the NCLB argued that IWW organizing tactics were no different from those of the
AFL. The only thing that differentiated the IWW from other labor unions was its revolutionary
rhetoric—its determination to claim for labor the power to dictate the terms of production. 93
And the NCLB’s justification of the organization’s revolutionary beliefs came sufficiently close
to an endorsement to prompt a judge to condemn it for “teach[ing] the doctrine of sabotage and
industrial terrorism.” 94 In fact, when the NCLB issued its pamphlet in May, the government
moved almost immediately to suppress it. The Post Office declared it nonmailable, and the
Department of Justice advised express companies not to deliver it. 95
Divorcing support for a speaker’s right to espouse radical doctrine from the underlying
content of the protected expression would become the hallmark of the ACLU’s free speech
program. Certainly in its advertisement for The New Republic and in other communications to
liberals and progressives, the NCLB emphasized that one could oppose prosecutorial abuses
without endorsing the program or conduct of the defendants. During World War I, however, the
NCLB had not yet wholly embraced this distinction. In The Truth about the IWW, the NCLB did
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indeed, without distinguishing between speech and conduct, it accepted the “full propriety of the
government in suppressing ruthlessly any interference by the IWW with the war preparation.”
Nor did it even suggest that the government was running afoul of the First Amendment by
targeting the IWW’s advocacy of revolution. The NCLB was arguing that in prosecuting the
IWW for opposition to the war effort, the government was wrong. 96 On the contrary, if there
was a constitutional guarantee at stake in the government’s treatment of the IWW, it was not the
liberty to speak, but rather “equality before the law.” 97 In short, what the NCLB opposed in the
IWW case was not the suppression of disfavored speech, but the suppression “of the normal
economic protest-activities of the IWW.” The government’s position was objectionable because
it sought to attack the “symptom” of industrial oppression rather than the disease. 98
In the spring of 1918, just as relations were souring between Baldwin and the War
Department on the matter of conscientious objectors, the NCLB staked its reputation on a robust,
substantive defense of an organization that was almost universally reviled. By late March, the
NCLB had agreed to raise bail for Bill Haywood. It had convened half a dozen conferences to
generate support and publicity for the IWW’s cause. It had pushed for a dismissal in
negotiations with administration officials. And it had provided legal assistance in preparing the
defense. Finally, it was circulating The Truth about the IWW to every individual, group, and
public official conceivably interested in the case. 99 As Baldwin told a potential donor, “I doubt
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whether anything more can be done to aid the IWW from the outside than has been done by this
committee. We have risked the whole organization on it, for we realize that our motives and our
work are both open to the most serious misinterpretation.” 100 In doing all this, the NCLB spoke
the language of constitutional liberties. But its true goal was more ambitious. As Baldwin freely
admitted, “a fair trial for these men [was] of the greatest public necessity to the industrial future
of America.” 101 Baldwin’s commitment was not limited to the Chicago trial. By late spring, the
IWW was under assault on multiple fronts. With little left to lose, he told Vanderveer that the
NCLB would provide general support in any case “where the issues of the right of agitation are
involved.” 102

The IWW Trial
The twelve jurors who were responsible for “decid[ing] the fate” of the defendants and
with it “the future of American Labor organizations” were sworn in on May 1, 1918. 103 That the
trial began on “International Labor Day” was not lost on the defendants, who considered it an
auspicious sign. 104 Indeed, when the proceedings finally began, the defendants were cautiously
optimistic. After sitting in their jail cells for months of quiet anticipation, they were excited at
the opportunity to state their case publicly at last. The trial, in their view, was the “most
monumental” in the history of the international labor movement, and it involved not only the
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rights of the IWW, but the general “right of workingmen to organize and strike.” 105 They hoped
that their performance in the courtroom would “work great changes, not only in public opinion,
but the general understanding of Labor Unionism and the great issues at stake.” And they were
confident that “the more the workers of this nation find out about us the more they will like the
One Big Union and the things it stands for.” 106
The presiding judge, Kenesaw Mountain Landis, 107 was a known conservative, but he
had established a reputation for fairness after a grueling and contentious month of jury
selection. 108 Over the government’s vociferous objections, Landis had allowed Vanderveer to
question prospective jurors about their economic views, including their opinions on social
revolution. He had conceded a theoretical right to change the existing system through direct
industrial action, “if you can get enough people together to put it over,” 109 and he had dismissed
for cause those panel members who admitted that bias against the IWW in news accounts
predisposed them toward conviction. During the course of the trial, Landis regularly overruled
the government’s objections to evidence about industrial unrest, blocked attempts to call
witnesses without adequate notice to the defense, 110 chastised reporters for their
misrepresentations of witnesses’ testimony, 111 and rebuked the prosecution for attempting to
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filter evidence. 112 Most important, he openly conceded his belief that industry was guilty of
“hoggish and unconscionable profiteering.” 113
The legal team for the government was dominated by special prosecutors. The United
States attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, Charles Clyne, handled the early voir dire.
He was outmatched by Vanderveer, however, and he soon ceded his role to Frank Nebeker, a
former district attorney turned corporate lawyer who was a member of the Democratic National
Committee. Paul Hanna considered him a “cool and resourceful fighter, seemingly fearless,” and
“much superior” to Clyne. 114 Baldwin thought he was an “honest lawyer,” but “narrow in the
extreme, utterly without social vision, and with a thoroughly capitalistic” point of view. 115 The
department also enlisted the help of Claude Porter, 116 a skilled government lawyer for the
District of Iowa, and William C. Fitts, Assistant Attorney General of the United States and
former Attorney General of the State of Alabama. 117 For the defense, Vanderveer was assisted
by W. B. Cleary, an Arizona attorney who had been deported along with Bisbee strikers; Otto
Christensen, a Chicago Socialist; and Caroline Lowe, a Socialist organizer and veteran of the
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IWW’s free speech fights, who enrolled in law school at the age of forty and had recently been
admitted to the bar.
The case for the prosecution unfolded through the testimony of 150 witnesses over the
course of seven weeks. 118 It focused on the IWW’s allegedly unlawful methods, particularly
sabotage, and its opposition to government policies, including conscription. The government
had spent months combing through the mass of evidence seized in the raids. Despite its best
efforts, it had been unable to substantiate the popular allegations that Germany had been
financing the IWW. On the contrary, the government accountant who had inspected the IWW’s
financial records testified on cross-examination that he had been unable to trace any funds to
anyone other than usual IWW donors.119 Moreover, only one defendant eligible for the draft had
failed to register. 120 Furloughed soldiers testified that they had maintained their IWW
memberships until and even after they were drafted and had never been criticized by the
organization for their military service. 121 If the IWW leadership had wanted to halt production in
crucial industries, Haywood and other witnesses claimed, it could easily have done so. That the
war effort was proceeding smoothly was evidence that interference had never been the
organization’s aim. 122
On the other hand, the government’s review of the evidence had uncovered letters,
bulletins, and official publications expressing dissatisfaction with government policies and
counseling conduct disruptive of the war effort. The government introduced evidence that the
IWW had urged men to “fight for their jobs and class,” that they had organized strikes in war
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industries, and that they had advocated general strikes and revolution. Although the organization
had been careful in its official communications, many of its leaders and members had expressed
strong opposition to capitalist war, and some had even proposed sabotage within the armed
forces. 123 IWW strikers in Butte, Montana had carried a banner reading, “Down with War.” 124
Haywood himself admitted that the IWW had always been “opposed to war,” and that he “would
have the war stopped today, if it were in [his] power to do it.” 125 When pressed, he affirmed his
belief that “industrial unionism is anti-military propaganda.” 126 He seemingly conceded that
although the IWW had not issued a direct statement urging its members to resist the draft, the
logical result of proper industrial education would be a stance against participation. Finally, as
David Karsner put it in his draft letter for the NCLB, it was hard to dispute that “the IWW [had]
taken an advantage of the war situation” to improve its bargaining situation—though as Karsner
noted, the Federal Trade Commission had proven that “the packers, the copper kings, and the
lumber barons” had not hesitated to “reap their profits while the world wallows in blood.” 127
The prosecution also devoted considerable attention to the IWW’s use of sabotage,
ostensibly to hamper preparation for the war. According to the government, it was accepted
IWW practice to drive spikes into logs, blow up threshing machines, place bombs on haystacks,
remove machine parts, cut belts, steal freight cars, and destroy food in mills and warehouses. 128
But there was no evidence to substantiate these charges in the criminal records of individual
members, and the department was unable to locate witnesses who could testify to actual
destructive acts. In the end, the government relied primarily on “the seditious and disloyal
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character and teachings of the organization.” 129 It quoted extensively in the courtroom from
IWW poetry and songs, which, according to Vanderveer, merely reflected the organization’s
utopian spirit. 130
According to the defense, the IWW practiced only non-violent sabotage. 131 Expert
witnesses testified that fires in threshing machines were the result of electrical shorts, not foul
play. 132 Government forest supervisors confirmed that the IWW had not started the rash of forest
fires that had recently ravaged the West, but rather had been the most effective force in fighting
them, despite long hours and low pay. 133 A prosecution witness admitted on cross-examination
that in his two months as a Montana sheriff during the IWW lumber strikes, he had witnessed no
violence or destruction of property whatsoever. 134 One IWW organizer explained that sabotage,
in practice, simply meant holding back on the job; an employer could not expect ten dollars
worth of work for two dollars pay. 135 Ralph Chaplin, the editor of Solidarity, agreed. Sabotage,
he insisted, meant “good pay or bum work.” 136
For Vanderveer, non-violent sabotage was simply one facet of the IWW’s larger strategy
for shifting the balance of power in labor relations. Vanderveer’s theory of the defense was
precisely the same as the one espoused by the NCLB in its pamphlet. The IWW’s strikes and
organizing campaigns in the summer of 1917 were not intended to thwart the war effort, he
129
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argued. They were legitimate responses to workers’ grievances against oppressive employers,
and they were crucial weapons in a class struggle that was both inevitable and desirable. As
Vanderveer told Baldwin in April, “the economic defense” would have great “propaganda value”
and, in addition, was “peculiarly effective in court.” 137
According to the defense it was the brutal suppression of the IWW, not hostility toward
America’s war aims, that had jumpstarted recruitment in the early months of the war. To prove
that claim, the defense introduced evidence of the violent anti-IWW episodes of the previous
summer, over the government’s objections. Witnesses recounted the horrific story of the
Speculator Mine fire that cost 178 lives and precipitated the IWW’s strike in Butte, Montana,
which the government alleged was an effort to cripple the wartime production of copper. One
defendant had visited the morgue in the wake of the fire; he recounted “that the fingers of some
of the corpses were worn to the second joint, with the bone protruding, as the result of the men
clawing at the bulkheads.” 138 More than a thousand of the striking miners had been deported,
including members of the AFL. 139 Witnesses and perpetrators described the Bisbee deportations,
the mounted machine guns trained on the men—many of whom owned Liberty Bonds, and
hundreds of whom were registered for the draft—who were forced into automobiles and loaded
into cattle cars covered in inches of manure. The testimony of one defendant, Big Jim
Thompson, was a rendition of his stump speech in lumber camps and on street corners. 140 It
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“moved the witness to tears, as well as Vanderveer, several jurors, numerous defendants and
several spectators.” 141
In late July, the government finally halted the flood of heart-wrenching testimony in the
only way it could. It admitted that “evil social and economic conditions” had obtained in the
northwestern lumber camps, in Butte, and in Arizona. 142 As for the persecution of the IWW,
Nebeker argued it was a consequence rather than a cause of the organization’s militancy. He
asked the jury to ponder what kind of conduct could be so “exasperating” that “in practically
every state in this union, these fellows get into trouble.” 143 Notably, Nebeker cited the IWW’s
free speech fights as an example of this phenomenon. By overwhelming the municipal court
systems and forcing their release, Nebeker argued, the IWW were asking for extralegal justice—
though he was quick to note that he was “simply speaking from human nature” and that
vigilantes had no “right” to act as they did. 144
In the end, Judge Landis allowed the defense to present a robust picture of the abuses that
the IWW had suffered at the hands of employers. 145 One evidentiary dispute, however, stood out
as particularly contentious and especially important. Vanderveer’s broad ambition, as he and
Baldwin had been proclaiming for months, was to put the entire industrial system on trial. In
furtherance of that goal, he sought to introduce into evidence the report of the Commission on
Industrial Relations. The report documented the terrible injustices of the existing industrial
system, and Vanderveer claimed that it amounted to government affirmation of the IWW’s
141
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complaints. It was a banner of respectability in the effort to secure labor’s rights, and it was
among the organization’s most successful recruitment and organizing tools. In short, it was the
“Bible of the IWW.” 146 After a lengthy and heated argument, Judge Landis decided that the
report was irrelevant, and he refused to admit it into evidence. 147 Later, however, he qualified
his ruling. The IWW had published a compendium of the report in pamphlet form, to distribute
to its members and supporters. In its abbreviated version, Landis agreed to let it in. 148
In his opening statement, Vanderveer recited the report’s most salient findings. Seventynine percent of working families were unable to support themselves, he said. The working
people, sixty-five percent of America’s population, owned less than five percent of the nation’s
wealth. The wealthiest two percent owned two-thirds of the country’s real and personal
property. 149 Large corporations were earning monopoly profits. Industry was trampling on
workers’ health as well as public safety. These conditions were unjust, but they were not
irremediable. The goal of the IWW was to counter the concentration of industrial strength
through organization of the workers. 150 The capitalists understood the danger that a powerful
workers’ movement posed, and it was doing everything possible to shut it down.
Nebeker denounced the report as blatantly partisan, a “forum for cranks and fanatics,”
and he was desperate to keep it out of the trial. According to Nebeker, “general industrial
conditions in this country [were] not involved in this case at all.” The appropriate venues for
redressing unjust conditions, he insisted, were the legislatures and the courts. Workers had no
business taking matters into their own hands, particularly in a time of national emergency. 151 In
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Nebeker’s view (albeit one he backed away from in his closing argument), even a “folded arm
strike” was unlawful during wartime. 152
To Vanderveer, Nebeker’s objection was symptomatic of a deeper misapprehension of
syndicalist ideology and of the IWW’s goals. 153 The organization was not “aimed at the
government,” he explained, but rather at exploitation. 154 Existing wages and working conditions
were determined by “the organized efforts of employers against the organized or unorganized
employees.” 155 Although Vanderveer understood that the legal system structured and regulated
economic exchange, he emphasized that there was no law setting wages at any particular level.
On the contrary, such a law would be struck down as unconstitutional. 156 After all, the courts’
view was precisely the one that Nebeker had stressed in his own opening statement: that the
“wage system” was a matter of negotiation between contending parties, a product of that
“fundamental right,” both natural and constitutional, “of all men to contract with each other.” 157
Employers appropriated the profits that belonged to the workers because they had the economic
power to do so.
Nebeker believed the IWW wanted to “do away with” that system, but the reality was
quite the opposite. Just as there was “no law which gives the right to exploit,” there was “no law
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which stays a man in his effort to prevent it.” The IWW hoped to counter exploitation by the
only means possible: industrial organization. Workers and capitalists were locked in simple
power struggle, and there was no middle ground. If the workers through organization cut
employers’ profits low enough, the profit system would fall. On the other hand, if employers “cut
our wages low enough, then our morals and our civilization will topple and fall.” 158 In this
conflict, labor’s most effective tool was “direct action,” the IWW’s signature method. For
example, workers might “bring the strike to the job” by laying down their tools after eight hours
of labor. 159 They might refuse to carry too heavy a load. 160 They would use precisely the
techniques that the government denounced as unlawful sabotage. The IWW was not opposed to
democratic processes, Vanderveer clarified. 161 In fact, it “believe[ed] so completely and
absolutely in our form of government, that it want[ed] to extend it to industry.” 162 But there was
no reason to resort to political action to accomplish something non-political. 163
There is, of course, no way of knowing what the jury made of Vanderveer’s arguments
about the injustices of American capitalism—whether they considered and rejected them, or
disregarded them altogether. In his closing argument, Nebeker flatly declared that “the industrial
system of this country is not on trial.” 164 He condemned war profiteering, and he acknowledged
that there were people in the United States who were “living on less than they need for
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wholesome lives.” These circumstances, however, were “no legal justification” for the attitude
of the IWW. The IWW had practiced sabotage, and its militancy ran afoul of the law. 165
Nebeker insisted that the government had no desire to criticize any “honest” and “patriotic” labor
organization (implicitly, the AFL). 166 He conceded that many members of the IWW were
sincere and hard-working, including the soldiers who had testified on the organization’s behalf.
But these rank-and-file members did not understand the true purposes of the organization. The
defendants, with their “soft hands and hard faces,” 167 were of a different breed. In concluding,
Nebeker explained that during the past twenty-five years a “remarkable change has taken place
along the lines of progressive legislation for the purposes of equalizing these unequal
conditions.” 168 Refusing to acknowledge the capacity of American political institutions to solve
inequalities of wealth was in Nebeker’s estimation a declaration that American institutions were
a “failure”—a charge that he trusted the jury would not make.
Judge Landis’s instructions to the jury were accepted by both parties as essentially fair.
Landis clarified that the defendants were not on trial for having committed sabotage, except
insofar as its practices were part of a conspiracy to undermine the war effort. 169 On the other
hand, he echoed Nebeker’s insistence that neither “lawful organized labor” nor “our industrial
society” were on trial. Landis accepted Vanderveer’s argument that workers were entitled to
aggregate their power as a means of improving bargaining position in their negotiations with
employers. He even agreed that the rights of workers to organize were “as broad and as
complete in time of war as they are in time of peace.” 170 If the sole objective of the IWW had
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been to secure better labor conditions and higher wages, then they were not guilty of the crimes
charged—subject to the qualification that individuals are responsible for the natural and
necessary consequences of their acts. Landis concluded that there was insufficient evidence to
support the government’s fifth count, conspiracy to violate the postal laws, and he removed it
from the jury’s consideration. 171 The rest he submitted to the jury with “no expression of opinion
as to the ultimate question of guilt[].” 172
Inexplicably, Vanderveer declined to make a closing argument. 173 Reporters, observers,
and historians have debated whether he was overconfident, defeatist, or simply convinced that
the evidence would speak for itself. Certainly, many of the defendants expected to be acquitted.
Throughout the summer, the radical press had reported that the IWW had the stronger case, and
courtroom spectators agreed. 174 If Vanderveer found the principles of IWW ideology so
convincing that he believed a wartime jury could be persuaded to embrace them, the swift and
unanimous verdict taught him otherwise.
On August 17, 1918, the jury in the Chicago trial returned a verdict of guilty on all counts
and as to all defendants, after half an hour of deliberation. As Vanderveer noted in his
unsuccessful motion for a new trial, that amounted to five seconds of consideration per
verdict. 175 To the defendants, the jury’s decision was “a shock, a thunderbolt from a clear
sky.” 176 Haywood tried to dismiss the judgment as a conviction of individuals rather than the
IWW as a whole, but it was clear that much more was at stake. 177 Baldwin told Haywood that
the verdict was a “surprise to every one of us, though in war time we may expect to have just
171
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such results.” 178 Juries in earlier Espionage Act cases had convicted defendants far less reviled
on evidence far less damning.
Despite their disappointment, the defendants pronounced the trial fair. 179 Judge Landis,
they admitted, had “proved himself to be impartial in all respects.” 180 Haywood thought that he
had been “absolutely square throughout the whole trial.” 181 Nonetheless, he considered the
verdict a great mistake, “one of the greatest blunders ever committed in a court of justice.” The
IWW had acted lawfully and morally, he insisted, and on his release, he would continue to
advocate and uphold the “principles, aims and purposes of the Industrial Workers of the
World.” 182
For all of Landis’s fairness during trial, the sentences he handed down were harsh.
Haywood received the legal maximum of twenty years in prison, as did fourteen others in the
organization’s highest leadership. Thirty-three received ten-year terms. All told, ninety-three of
the defendants were bound for Leavenworth, in what constituted the largest single arrival of
prisoners in its history. 183 In his remarks at the sentencing hearing, Landis expressed his belief
that the jury’s judgment was correct. He cited internal documents and IWW publications as well
as letters by Haywood and other IWW leaders professing opposition to the conscription laws.
He noted that two local branches had gone so far as to advocate a general strike to undermine
enforcement of the draft. 184 Notwithstanding the IWW’s stated justifications for its strikes, the
jury had been justified in inferring that they were “directly and necessarily calculated” to
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obstruct both the production of war equipment and registration for the draft. In fact, “the jury
could not have done anything else on this evidence but find a verdict of guilty.” 185
Nebeker, of course, celebrated the government’s successful resolution of “America’s
greatest criminal case.” 186 In the wake of the trial, he advised the Department of Labor to devote
more attention to the problem of migratory and foreign workers—to treat them in a “sympathetic
way, to the end that they will feel no need for such an organization as the IWW.” Once that task
was accomplished, he said, state and national governments “should pass such laws as are
necessary to prohibit revolutionary movements of all kinds.” The wartime legislation had
enabled the government to secure a conviction, but existing laws were “wholly insufficient as a
means of dealing with such an organization as the IWW during times of peace.” 187 The
overwhelmingly positive public reaction to the verdict suggests that many Americans agreed. 188
Not one AFL affiliate publicly denounced the convictions. 189
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Vanderveer made many of the same arguments that he
had made throughout the proceedings and in his motion for a new trial. 190 First, he claimed that
the evidence failed to bear out the charge that the members of the IWW had conspired to obstruct
the war effort or the draft. Many of the defendants were never connected to the conspiracy
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except by unsupported allegations of membership in the organization. 191 Some of the defendants
were opposed to war in general, and the war in Germany, along with conscription, in particular.
But many had never mentioned the war or conscription in any of their correspondence. And the
organization’s own position was, at worst, ambivalent. Some of its leaders believed that
opposition was justified, but others disagreed, and the official correspondence tended to leave the
decision to individual conscience.
Vanderveer also argued that the convictions were constitutionally flawed. Among other
theories, he suggested that the government’s confiscation of IWW belongings during the raids
and the subsequent introduction of the confiscated documents into evidence violated the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution.192 According to Vanderveer, the
warrants issued before the September 1917 raids were invalid—indeed, he wrote, their invalidity
would “scarcely be disputed by the Government”—because they failed to recite facts
establishing probable cause for a search and did not describe the articles to be seized. 193 In its
brief, the government chastised the defendants for attempting “to escape the legal consequences
of criminal activities because some of the evidence which admittedly showed their guilt was
obtained by means which they resent.” 194 Vanderveer thought those were “strange words by
which to characterize the conduct of men seeking the preservation of their most fundamental
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constitutional liberties,” 195 but when the IWW’s appeal was decided in 1920, they aptly reflected
the legal and political landscape. The court accepted Vanderveer’s assessment of the warrants
but concluded that each defendant was seeking the return of property that had never been in his
individual possession and to which, consequently, he had no right. It rejected Vanderveer’s
theory that an unlawful invasion of the privacy of one of the defendants was a constitutional
breach available to all, finding that the IWW was not a partnership, but a voluntary association,
and that the defendants had been indicted as individuals, not as members of the organization. 196
In 1923, the American Law Reports would cite the Haywood case for the rule that “an unlawful
search and seizure of property of a voluntary association does not make the evidence found
inadmissible against individual members of the association.” 197
Vanderveer raised a final argument during trial and on appeal, but it received no serious
consideration from the courts. He argued that the defendants’ conviction was unconstitutional
because the only basis for a finding of illegal activity was the speeches, literature, and private
correspondence articulating the IWW’s position on militarism and conscription. Put simply, if
the defendants had a right to express disapproval of the war, then their speech and writing could
not be counted as illegal activity in support of the indictment. 198 On that theory, Vanderveer had
requested an instruction to the jury on “the right of free speech as defined in the First
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Amendment.” 199 According to Vanderveer, what the government alleged in the third and fourth
counts of the indictment was “a conspiracy to abuse the rights of free speech, free press and free
assemblage,” and there was no way for the jury to determine whether the communications
ascribed to the defendants exceeded those rights unless they were instructed on the nature of the
First Amendment. 200 Judge Landis, however, submitted no instruction regarding free speech at
all. In his view, free speech was not an issue in the case. “When the country is at peace it is a
legal right of free speech to oppose going to war and to oppose even preparation for war,” Landis
explained, “but when once war is declared, this right ceases.” Similarly, after the declaration of
war and before passage of the Conscription Act, “it was the legal right of free speech to oppose
the adaption of the compulsory military service law.” Once the law was passed, however, free
speech was an illegitimate basis for continuing to resist it. 201
In its decision, the Seventh Circuit did not mention the First Amendment or free speech.
The closest it came was to consider and reject Vanderveer’s claim that the conviction was
improperly based on literature produced before American entry into the war. Some of the
correspondence and publications, the court explained, evinced a purpose to oppose the war and
the draft even in the event that legislation was passed, and they were therefore admissible as
evidence of criminal intent. Moreover, the defendants had continued to circulate some of the
unlawful materials once war was declared. That the expressions of opinion contained in the
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documents might have been protected under the First Amendment evidently fell in the category
of claims “of trivial consequence,” not sufficiently plausible to warrant express consideration. 202
The court did reverse the defendants’ convictions under the first and second counts, but
its ruling was based on the redundancy of the charges and the inapplicability of the peacetime
federal criminal code, not the sufficiency of the evidence or the constitutional grounds that
Vanderveer had proposed. 203 Still, that the court affirmed only the convictions under the wartime
legislation was significant. The court specifically rejected the theory that the IWW, by
organizing strikes against producers with whom the government expected to contract, violated
sections of the penal code prohibiting conspiracies to hinder the execution of United States laws
or to interfere with the exercise of rights or privileges guaranteed to citizens. Such an
interpretation might have rendered all peacetime strikes illegal under federal law, even during
peacetime, a position that the court was unwilling to endorse. The court explained: “Defendants’
202
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force was exerted only against producers in various localities. Defendants thereby may have
violated local laws. With that we have nothing to do. Federal crimes exist only by virtue of
federal statutes; and the lawmakers owe the duty to citizens and subjects of making unmistakably
clear those acts for the commission of which the citizen or subject may lose his life or liberty.” 204
Notwithstanding this concession, the defense team regarded the appeal as a defeat. The
defendants would remain in prison. The IWW, with the help of the NCLB, would have to pursue
non-judicial channels in their attempt to get them out.
Over the coming years, the NCLB would work to ameliorate the situation of the IWW
defendants in whatever way it could. Its efforts began in September 1918, with an open letter to
the president. 205 By the fall, it was clear that direct appeals to the merits of labor radicalism
would not persuade the administration or the American public that the IWW prisoners were
worthy of executive clemency. The NCLB therefore stressed irregularities in the investigation
and prosecution of the case, with particular emphasis on administrative abuses. This was not a
new strategy. In a July 1918 Bulletin, the IWW accused the government of “deliberately
conniving to prevent men from having a fair and impartial trial” by shutting down the
organization’s newsletters, seizing IWW mail, and preventing fundraising and organizing
events. 206 The NCLB’s involvement, however, brought a measure of authority to these charges.
Of course, the civil liberties group had been emphasizing the American commitment to judicial
fairness ever since the indictments were filed in September 1917. But its previous statements
were careful not to antagonize the NCLB’s would be allies in the administration. In The New
Republic advertisement, for example, cautious supporters had convinced Baldwin to omit
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allegations of government misconduct. The revised approach, by contrast, was to accuse the
Department of Justice of deliberate and lawless interference with the IWW’s defense.
The letter to Wilson emphasized that federal agents had continued to raid the national and
local offices of the IWW long after the initial warrant had expired. They had seized typewriters,
stationery, cash, and other implements that were obviously irrelevant to the indictments—and
were never introduced at trial—but were clearly necessary to the defense. They had arrested but
failed to prosecute members of IWW defense committees throughout the country. On
government orders, defense news literature was returned undelivered by express companies to
committee headquarters. 207 First-class mail from the general defense committee was almost
always held at Chicago, and registered letters, many containing checks, were held, opened,
officially re-sealed and delivered only months later. Judge Landis had censured justice agents for
intimidating defense witnesses. Even outside attempts to aid the defense were targeted. The
Department of Justice had warned The New Republic that re-running the NCLB’s advertisement
would subject the publication to criminal investigation, and it had forbidden circulation of the
NCLB’s pamphlet without ever declaring it non-mailable. These methods were “unparalleled in
modern criminal prosecutions” and were “obviously open to the suspicions of being conducted
not so much to obtain evidence as to embarrass the defense.” 208
The Wilson administration did not acknowledge the NCLB’s letter. In fact, the
government’s campaign against the IWW only intensified after the Chicago conviction, even
while the Department of Justice chose not to pursue other cases under the Espionage Act. 209 In
Sacramento, twenty members of the IWW arrested in the September raids, along with a second
207
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contingent arrested at the urging of local enforcement, 210 were forced to wait in jail while the
Department of Justice focused on the Chicago trial. The defendants spent over a year in prison,
during which time several died of the flu. Despite the utter paucity of evidence against them,
they were indicted in February 1918 on the same charges filed in Chicago. Unlike their Chicago
counterparts, they fully expected a conviction, and all but three chose to underscore the injustice
of the American legal system by making no defense in court. All were convicted by a jury in
under an hour. 211 Another trial took place in Wichita, Kansas, where twenty-seven Wobblies
arrested in a federal raid had languished in jail for more than two years while indictments were
periodically filed and then quashed on technicalities. During this time, the NCLB fought
publicly against the horrendous conditions at the Wichita jail. After persistent urging, the
Department of Justice agreed to inspect the jail and eventually ordered the prisoners transferred.
The defendants finally went to trial in December 1919, and twenty-six were convicted. 212 Like
the Chicago case, the Sacramento and Wichita verdicts were unsuccessfully appealed. 213
Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied in all cases. The estimated cost of litigating the
210
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three federal conspiracy cases to conclusion was $225,000, “a larger sum than ha[d] ever been
spent by a labor organization in defending itself in a criminal trial.” 214 To the end, the NCLB
assisted in raising funds. 215
While these trials were pending, the NCLB pursued its final strategy for helping the
beleaguered IWW: it mounted a national amnesty campaign on behalf not only of the IWW
prisoners, but of all prisoners convicted under the Espionage and Sedition Acts. At first, the
organization was optimistic about the prospects for amnesty at the end of the war. 216 It
emphasized that the Department of Justice had targeted only radical labor groups, and that there
was no evidence of any actual spy convicted under the wartime laws. Several respected liberals
were urging better treatment for “political prisoners,” 217 and a proposal for amnesty for courtmartialed prisoners attracted broad-based support. 218 The NCLB hoped to translate this sentiment
into a movement for the Espionage Act prisoners’ release. But there was little public enthusiasm
for the NCLB’s position. The NCLB’s efforts to create amnesty committees in local
communities were denounced as unpatriotic, and its attempted mass meetings were sparsely
attended. 219

214

Press Release (undated), ACLU Papers, reel 25, vol. 181.
Advertisement for the Nation (signed by John Graham Brooks, Ernst Freund, Percy Stickney Grant, Florence
Kelley, Henry Mussey, Thorstein Veblen, and Harry Ward), ACLU Papers, reel 25, vol. 181 (raising funds for a
challenge in the Supreme Court, focusing on the illegality of the search warrants); ACLU Press Release, 8 March
1921, reel 25, vol. 181 (announcing a drive for funds to appeal “the greatest free speech trial of the war”).
216
Citing Thomas Jefferson’s general amnesty for those convicted under the sedition law of 1798, “a statute far less
drastic than the Espionage Act,” the NCLB anticipated favorable public response to a postwar amnesty. “Liberties
Bureau Takes Issue with Gregory” (clipping), ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 43.
217
E.g., Upton Sinclair to Newton Baker, October 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 6, vol. 50 (asking for “enlightened
humanity” in treatment of those prisoners who were in jail for “carrying on propaganda against the draft or against
our participation in the war” and whose opposition was “openly and honestly expressed, . . . based upon religious or
humanitarian grounds”).
218
Senator Borah and other progressive senators urged general amnesty for those convicted during the war by courtmartial, based on arbitrariness in sentencing. Clipping, New York Call, 28 January 1919, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol.
41.
219
Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 109–18.
215

148

President Wilson was favorably disposed toward a partial amnesty but consistently
deferred to his advisors, who were staunchly opposed. 220 Attorney General Thomas Gregory
insisted that none of the prisoners had been convicted for merely expressing their opinions. 221 To
Gregory, the Espionage Act defendants were not political prisoners, but criminals and traitors
who deserved to be in jail. When the NCLB issued a pamphlet, “Why Should There Be an
Amnesty,” he dismissed its arguments as “entirely fallacious.” 222 A. Mitchell Palmer, who
replaced Gregory as Attorney General in March 1919, held similar views. Both men were
willing to consider leniency in particular cases, and each recommended about fifty
commutations, but both counseled against further action. The advent of the Red Scare only
exacerbated matters. In the summer of 1919, Wilson communicated his intention to pardon “all
American citizens in prison or under arrest on account of anything they have said in speech or in
print concerning their personal opinions.” Palmer was adamant that no such cases existed. He
told the press that “no men were in prison because of their expression of views on social,
economic or political questions, including the war,” and he persuaded Wilson to resist mounting
pressure for the release of Eugene V. Debs, among other prisoners. 223 Within the Department of
Justice, amnesty for convicted socialists—though not the IWW—was gaining support. Palmer,
however, would not capitulate even on the most obviously political of prisoners. In fact, he was
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initiating new Espionage Act prosecutions for, among other things, the distribution of amnesty
literature, and he was publicly advocating a peacetime sedition law. 224
All told, the amnesty campaign would drag on for fifteen years. In 1921, President
Warren G. Harding met with an ACLU delegation and commuted the sentences of Debs and
twenty-four others, including six members of the IWW. 225 But in the face of threats of
vigilantism by the American Legion and so-called patriotic societies, 226 exacerbated by mounting
industrial unrest, Harding refused to do more. Internal disagreement among the IWW prisoners,
many of whom refused to file individual petitions, made action on their behalf even more
difficult. 227 So did the decisions of several of the defendants, including Bill Haywood, to jump
bail when the Supreme Court declined their request for certiorari—an action that Baldwin
condemned, to the disappointment of his more radical allies. 228 For the rest of the decade, ACLU
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representatives, along with the Joint Amnesty Committee that the organization helped create,
exerted quiet pressure on Washington, securing the release of a few prisoners at a time. 229 Only
in 1933, when Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a blanket Christmas amnesty, were the wartime
prisoners finally vindicated and their citizenship and voting rights restored.

Beyond Free Speech
In February 1918, an IWW publicity agent wrote to Roger Baldwin that “every right that
is supposedly guaranteed by the American Constitution to even the humblest citizen or sojourner
in the land has been completely taken away in instance after instance either by the Federal
officials themselves or by the various local official and unofficial thugs with the tacit or open
connivance and encouragement of those Federal officials.” 230 By the end of the Chicago IWW
trial, those complaints appeared to be well founded. In Chicago, as in other wartime trials under
the Espionage Act, conviction was all but inevitable. The great lessons of the IWW trial were,
first, that “civil rights hardly exist for the IWW,” and second, that the perceived deprivation of
justice in the courtroom was a powerful mobilizing force. 231
Baldwin decried the verdict, but he was adamant that the end of the trial did not mean the
“end [of] the radical labor movement in America.” The IWW, he said, would only grow stronger
“as the forces making for a new world after the war gather for ultimate economic freedom.” 232
The outrage generated by the perceived injustice of the American legal system would unify an
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otherwise divided and disorganized constituency. As Amos Pinchot commented in the wake of
Debs v. United States, 233 the Supreme Court’s decisions upholding the conviction of labor
leaders only confirmed the judicial tendency to “protect the old order.” Its contortion of the First
Amendment, he claimed, was an effort by the Court “to show that in war times and class-war
times it can do its bit.” 234 The solution for the persecution of the radical labor movement was
“not to be found in written constitutions,” but in the will of the people and in just economic
relations free from the machinery of the state. 235
For leftist critics of the Espionage Act prosecutions, the judiciary was no more
responsible for suppressing radical agitation than the Wilson administration was. The First
World War represented a significant expansion of federal power that affected the daily life of
average citizens in unprecedented ways, but the NCLB’s labor allies were already familiar with
the coercive potential of federal power. As witness after witness recounted in the IWW trial,
unions had regularly experienced the crushing power of the state in the form of compulsory
arbitration, military intervention, and labor injunctions. That these forces were aligned against
them contributed to the perceived equivalence of all forms of federal authority. For the
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progressives, “the state” and “the courts” were vastly different creatures. For the radical labor
movement, they were faces of the same beast. 236 Moderate labor unions affiliated with the AFL
benefited from state policy during the war, and for the time being, the IWW was in the minority
in its wholesale condemnation of the state.
It had a staunch ally, however, in the NCLB. At the Chicago trial, Vanderveer’s
exchange with Nebeker over direct versus political action (and the corresponding relevance of
the Report of the Commission of Industrial Relations) exerted a strong influence on the NCLB
leadership. In fact, the organization was so convinced of the inadequacy of political channels
that it published the entire exchange in pamphlet form. 237 For Baldwin, the most appealing of
the IWW’s methods was the free speech fight. As he reflected years after the war: “Far more
effective is this direct action of open conflict than all the legal maneuvers in the courts to get
rights that no government willingly grants. Power wins rights—the power of determination,
backed by willingness to suffer jail or violence to get them.” 238
Tellingly, the IWW trial coincided with the termination of the War Department’s
cooperative posture toward the NCLB on the issue of conscientious objectors. Colonel R. H. Van
Deman, chief of the Intelligence Section of the War College in Washington, D.C., had initiated
an investigation of Baldwin in December 1917, and by the spring, the NCLB was being closely
monitored. 239 Keppel told Baldwin in late February that many of Newton Baker’s “military
associates” believed that the NCLB’s activities were verging on “direct conflict with the
236

Testimony of William Haywood, 10 August 1918, IWW Papers, box 117, folder 3, a14h (noting that “all of the
work that courts do is political”). It is telling that as conservative unions like the AFL began to receive assistance
from the state, they also minimized the importance of civil liberties. On the other hand, when the NLRB favored the
CIO during the New Deal, the AFL emphasized the importance of free speech and individual rights.
237
National Civil Liberties Bureau, The Meaning of “Industrial Action,” from the Discussion at the Chicago IWW
Trial Between Judge Landis, Mr. Nebeker for the Government, and Mr. Vanderveer for the Defense (New York:
National Civil Liberties Bureau, August 1918), in ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 43.
238
Roger Baldwin, “Free Speech Fights of the IWW,” in Twenty-Five Years of Industrial Unionism (Chicago:
Industrial Workers of the World, 1930).
239
Cottrell, Roger Nash Baldwin, 66–67.

153

government.” 240 In response, Baldwin wrote to Major Nicholas Biddle, an intelligence officer,
and—attaching all of the organization’s printed materials, as well as its mailing list—requested
that an inquiry be made into the NCLB’s activity to clear the organization’s name. 241 Baldwin
insisted that the NCLB was not doing anything to embarrass the government’s recruitment effort,
and he wrote Van Deman directly with a promise to cease all potentially objectionable
activities. 242 Van Deman, however, was unimpressed; he recommended that Baldwin be
prosecuted under the Sedition Act, and Keppel was sufficiently concerned to sever ties with the
NCLB, despite his personal connections to members of the executive board. 243
Other government departments were also gathering information on the NCLB and its
leadership. Over the summer, the Post Office declared fourteen NCLB pamphlets non-mailable,
despite admitting to the Department of Justice that they did not explicitly violate the Espionage
Act. 244 On August 13, after unsuccessful talks with post office officials, Walter Nelles sued in
federal district court for an injunction directing the New York postmaster to mail them. The
Department of Justice considered the NCLB literature legal, but Solicitor General Lamar was
determined to litigate the matter. A few weeks later, after the counsel for the government stated
in court that it did not oppose the NCLB’s application, Judge Augustus Hand ordered the post
office to deliver the pamphlets. 245
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Meanwhile, in late August, government agents began a series of interviews with Baldwin
concerning his opinion of the IWW and the funding of the NCLB’s publicity work in the case. A
few days later, Nicholas Biddle, now a lieutenant colonel in the Office of Military Intelligence,
sent six agents to the NCLB offices to collect evidence for an Espionage Act prosecution. In the
days after the raid, Walter Nelles wrote to the organization’s close associates. He attributed the
operation to complaints from local patriotic societies (whose representatives accompanied the
federal agents during the raid) and from intelligence officers concerned with the organization’s
work on behalf of conscientious objectors, though he felt that “the investigation doubtless has
some relation in point of time to the IWW conviction.” 246 Although there was significant
government support for an indictment, the NCLB’s connections, including John Nevin Sayre,
helped dissuade the Department of Justice from prosecuting. 247
One member of the NCLB leadership, however, was soon to stand trial, albeit on
different charges. By August 1918, Roger Baldwin was disillusioned. He had been confident in
the ability of his new organization to moderate government policies toward pacifists and radicals.
When a year of cooperation with various government agencies definitively failed to yield results,
he was ready to adopt more radical methods. He had, moreover, discovered the potential of
courtroom spectacle as a platform for radical propaganda—even, or particularly, when
conviction seemed certain.
In the summer of 1918, the draft age was raised to forty-five, making Baldwin eligible for
conscription. Baldwin announced his intention to resign as director of the NCLB when the new
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Selective Service Act became effective, so that he would be free to take a “personal stand”
against the draft. 248 He initially intended to refuse to register, but the raid on the NCLB offices
prompted him to delay action until the “critical period” had passed. In mid-September, when he
felt that matters were sufficiently settled with respect to the investigation to permit his departure,
he declined to appear for his physical examination and declared in a written statement that he
would not “perform any service under compulsion regardless of its character.” 249 In October, he
informed the District Attorney and an agent of the Department of Justice that he was refusing to
appear before his local draft board for an examination, and at Baldwin’s request, a government
agent was sent to his apartment to arrest him.
Baldwin was indicted for violation of the Draft Act, albeit only after a judge and several
Assistant United States Attorneys tried earnestly to persuade him to take a more moderate
course. On October 30, 1918, he was tried before Judge Julius Mayer in the Southern District of
New York. In the interim, he had refused bail on ideological grounds, though he had spent his
days at the Department of Justice offices helping them to arrange the NCLB files. 250
In his statement to the court, Baldwin articulated a strong commitment to “individual
freedom,” distinct from arguments about pluralism, democratic decision-making, and the public
interest. 251 Baldwin emphasized that his resistance rested on the precepts of individual
conscience. He asserted a right to abide by his internal beliefs, unconstrained by state power. He
would resist any law, he explained, that attempted to control his “choice of service and ideals.”
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But he was particularly opposed to military conscription because it served the purpose of war, to
which he was unequivocally opposed. 252
Baldwin’s autobiographical narrative, which he prepared in advance and read aloud in the
courtroom, neatly captured the transformation in his thinking. Baldwin began by describing his
upbringing, his education, and his early career as a social worker and progressive reformer in St.
Louis. He claimed to have come to New York to work for the AUAM because he had grown
discouraged by the ineffectiveness of incremental change at the local level and had awakened to
the cause of labor radicalism. For six years, he recounted, “I have felt myself heart and soul with
the world-wide radical movements for industrial and political freedom—wherever and however
expressed—and more and more impatient with reform.” 253 Echoing the claims of the radical
libertarians and anarchists of the prior decade and, more prominently, of John Stuart Mill, he
called for a “social order without any external restraints upon the individual, save through public
opinion and the opinion of friends and neighbors.” Although he was espousing a minority
position, he believed himself to be part of a “great revolt surging up from the people—the
struggle of the masses against the rule of the world.” In short, he declared, he was engaged in a
fight against the “political state itself.” 254
Judge Mayer was impressed by Baldwin’s sincerity of belief, but he believed that his
conduct was misguided. He admonished Baldwin that the republican liberties to which he was
so committed rested on obedience to law. Channeling the prevailing progressive understanding,
he told Baldwin that “the freest discussion” should be permitted and encouraged “in the
processes that lead up to the enactment of a statute” and, once a statute was passed, “as to the
methods of [its] administration.” The democratic process, however, could not countenance
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disregard for duly enacted laws. Acknowledging that Baldwin’s position might someday be
vindicated as the better course, he insisted that “with those possible idealistic and academic
speculations a Court has nothing to do.” 255 Accordingly, he pronounced his sentence: one year
in prison, the maximum provided by law.
Baldwin listened to the Judge with a “friendly smile,” and, when the proceedings were
over, his friends and supporters streamed past him, one by one, shaking his hand and
congratulating him: Scott Nearing, Norman Thomas, Rose Pastor Stokes, Rabbi Judah L.
Magnes, L. Hollingsworth Wood, Albert De Silver, Walter Nelles, William Simpson. In short,
many of the most notable figures of the American left celebrated Baldwin’s position. 256 Over the
coming months, they initiated efforts to secure Baldwin an executive pardon, but Baldwin
insisted that he would leave jail only under a general amnesty. 257 He reiterated his opposition to
state authority and affirmed his commitment to a “social principle more precious . . . than
personal freedom,” namely, the right to follow the dictates of one’s God and conscience. “I
would decline to leave prison as the recipient of a favor obtained by politically influential
friends,” he told Albert DeSilver, “while hundreds of other men drag out long, lifeless days
behind bars for precisely the same convictions that brought me here.” 258
Notwithstanding his somewhat grandiose declaration of his willingness to suffer for his
beliefs, Baldwin did very little suffering over the coming months. After a brief stay in “the
Tombs,” a lower Manhattan jail, Baldwin was transferred to the Essex County Jail in Newark.
He was permitted to retain his books and personal belongings, and he spent most of his time
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reading, writing, conversing with the other inmates, and meeting with his frequent visitors. The
food was palatable, and he purchased supplementary meals. He also paid to have his cell cleaned
and his laundry washed. Baldwin befriended the guards, who left his cell door open at night. He
served meals and assisted in the kitchen; given the opportunity to room in the dormitories with
the kitchen staff, he opted to remain in his cell because of its privacy and authenticity. Most
striking, he secured the warden’s permission to organize a Prisoners’ Welfare League, which
held classes and discussion sessions, procured books from the local library, arranged support for
inmates’ indigent families, and hired an attorney to represent prisoners in appropriate cases. 259
Baldwin’s initiatives angered the Essex County Sherriff, and in May, he was transferred to the
county prison in Caldwell, New Jersey, a work farm designed for short-term prisoners. Rules
were lax, and Baldwin again quickly made friends among the staff and inmates. While Baldwin
was in residence, the warden attended the annual meeting of the National Conference of Social
Work, where Florence Kelley nominated Baldwin to a committee. Given the circumstances, he
lost by a margin of 262 to 216, but he won the warden’s vote. 260
Baldwin was released from Caldwell on July 19, 1919—almost three months early, as a
result of a clerical error. In an interview for the New York Herald-Tribune, he explained that his
time in jail had been “profitable” and that he was “leaving more of a radical than [he] went
in.” 261 He planned to cease all civic participation, including jury duty and the vote. He
explained his intention to join the “revolutionary labor movement,” since the world had “passed
so-called political democracy” by.
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Over the course of the Chicago proceedings Baldwin had made several trips to Chicago
and developed close relationships with Bill Haywood and other IWW leaders. 262 He admired
their philosophy and determination, and he resolved in jail to join the organization himself. Scott
Nearing, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, and Bill Haywood all tried to dissuade him; they thought that
his time and energies could be spent more profitably in convincing liberals and radicals to
support the defense committee. Baldwin, however, was determined to experience the life of an
itinerant worker, and Haywood obligingly sponsored him for membership. He traveled the
country by hopping railroad trains, and he tried his hand at manual labor. After a few months,
satisfied with his new credentials but convinced that he would never rise to prominence in an
organization for unskilled workers, he returned to New York. 263

The ACLU
When restrictive measures like the Espionage and Sedition Acts were debated in
Congress, their advocates and apologists insisted that patriotic consensus was essential to the
country’s military efforts; the end of the war, they promised, would bring with it a complete
restoration of civil liberties. But as the NCLB and other leftist critics had predicted, the
cessation of hostilities abroad failed to stem the nationalist hysteria. 264
The end of the war ushered in a climate of heightened social tensions. The wartime
support for AFL unions, driven largely by labor shortages, had empowered labor to make
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unprecedented demands. The National War Labor Board, chaired by Frank Walsh and William
Howard Taft, did more than any other wartime institution to advance the cause of labor, over the
objections of the five employer representatives on the board (the other five were selected by the
AFL). 265 The NWLB introduced eight-hour days in a variety of industries, as well as wage
increases, protection of union activities, and other advances. Although the recommendations of
the NWLB were ostensibly advisory, President Wilson gave them teeth by seizing or threatening
to seize the operations of uncooperative employers and to administer them through the
government. With official sanction, union membership swelled to unprecedented levels
(growing almost 70 percent, to over 5 million, between 1917 and 1920). 266 By 1919, Samuel
Gompers was “demand[ing] a voice,” at President Wilson’s First Industrial Conference, in the
determination of the conditions under which we will give service . . . not only as supplicants but
by right.” 267 For the first time, industrial democracy of the kind that progressive-era labor
organizers had demanded emerged as a realistic possibility.
The new optimism was, however, short-lived. The labor market expanded rapidly with
the return of soldiers to the civilian workforce and the resumption of immigration. Immigrants,
popularly denounced as the source of radical agitation, were summarily deported. At the same
time, a shortage of civilian goods during the reconversion process led to high inflation and
increased cost of living, fueling both support for and fear of labor radicalism. The taste of power
had emboldened labor, precipitating industrial conflict on a scale previously unimaginable in the
United States. In the face of race riots and thousands of strikes involving four million workers, it
265
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seemed that the labor struggle was on the brink of tearing the country apart. In the spring of
1919, revolutionary anarchists mailed bombs to prominent politicians and government officials.
One of the bombs was meant for A. Mitchell Palmer; another, for Frank Nebeker. 268
The result was the “wholesale denial of civil rights.” 269 The NCLB leadership considered
the coal and steel strikes of 1919 “the greatest demonstrations of working-class power in the
history of the country.” 270 Wilson, however, deployed federal troops to break the steel strike in
September 1919. 271 Even worse, the administration obtained a federal injunction against striking
coal miners in November—a move that the NCLB denounced as a “grave blow at the liberties of
the American workingman, probably without precedent in our history.” 272 In fact, ever since
Republicans had gained control of Congress in 1918, the President had made increasing
concessions to industry. He continued to endorse responsible unionism and demanded a
comprehensive federal reform agenda, but he openly criticized labor radicalism as well as strikes
by public employees. From the vantage point of the civil liberties movement, industry had
mobilized its vast resources and connections to quash labor unrest through a combination of
legislation, administrative action, vigilante lawlessness, injunctions, labor practices and boycotts,
and “judge-made law.”
In addition to suppressing strikes, the Wilson administration did its part to silence those
advocating and organizing the workers. In 1919 and early 1920, Congress debated and almost
passed a peacetime sedition bill. While awaiting express legislative authority for moving against
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perceived radical threats, the Department of Justice acted unilaterally. Between November 1919
and January 1920, the federal government arrested several thousand suspected radicals and
deported hundreds of foreign nationals, including Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, in
the so-called Palmer Raids. In the mainstream press, reaction to the raids was generally
favorable. According to the Washington Post, there was “no time to waste on hairsplitting over
infringement of liberty when the enemy [was] using liberty’s weapons for the assassination of
liberty.” 273 Invoking their new mantra, “liberty is not license,” a broad coalition of politicians
and public figures affirmed their commitment to the American tradition of free speech while
calling for strict government regulation of radical expression—which, they claimed, threatened
to undermine the very system that made civil liberties possible. 274
These peacetime incursions were sufficiently troublesome to prompt a sizeable minority
of progressives and liberal intellectuals to reevaluate their deference to the state regulation of
speech. Respectable outlets such as The Nation warned that the continued repression was
“turning the thoughtful working people of the country into dangerous radicals and extreme direct
actionists”—echoing arguments often invoked during the free speech fights, but largely forgotten
during the war. 275 Indeed, while reminding readers of The Nation’s longstanding opposition to
socialism, an editorial espoused the right of every person “to present for public consideration his
ideas, no matter how erroneous they may appear.” That right, it claimed, was the basis of
democracy; and it was the forces denying it, rather than the Socialists or the IWW, who were the
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“most dangerous enemies of the social order today.” 276 Other former supporters of the
President’s war policy agreed. Even President Wilson, in a 1919 address to the French Society
of Political Science, proclaimed that he had always been “among those who believe that the
greatest freedom of speech was the greatest safety.” 277 In March 1919, the socialist New York
Call ran an article title, “The Liberals Wake Up,” in which it welcomed the news that American
liberals were finally “organizing to aid in the struggle to restore political democracy in the
United States.” 278
Moderate labor groups, whose own activity was significantly threatened for the first time
in a decade, also awakened to the dangers of suppression. In January 1918, Baldwin had
complained that the NCLB’s efforts to attract labor union support were stymied by Gompers’s
refusal to “recognize the attacks that are being made upon personal and minority liberties.” 279 By
the following summer, AFL leaders were attacking state sedition laws and pronouncing free
speech to be the “answer to the Steel Trust,” 280 and at their annual convention, they “insist[ed]
that all restrictions of freedom of speech, press, public assembly, association and travel be
completely removed.” 281 In August 1919, the NCLB published a leaflet with reprints of free
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speech resolutions by dominant labor bodies. 282 The next month, labor activists and sympathizers
from around the country assembled in Chicago for an “American Freedom Convention” to
discuss the maintenance of American civil and political rights. 283 Although the conference was
dominated by socialists and radical unionists, a number of more moderate labor organizations
were represented as well. 284 The group condemned the convictions of Debs, Victor Berger, and
the IWW, among many other radical leaders. It demanded amnesty for political prisoners, the
repeal of anti-sedition legislation, and broad support for free speech and free press. 285 For the
first time, a significant portion of the American labor movement was actively militating for civil
liberties. As the NCLB had cautioned in The Truth about the IWW, “Equality before the law is,
of all our American Constitutional guarantees, the one that the common man holds most
precious, and nothing will so surely solidify otherwise discordant groups of wage workers as the
infringement of this guarantee by the constitutional authorities.” 286
Roger Baldwin and Albert DeSilver both spoke at the American Freedom Convention,
and Baldwin was asked to put together a national amnesty group. 287 The NCLB leadership,
however, sensed a need for the continuation of a New York-based group that could capitalize on
the connections that it had cultivated during the war. A memorandum on the “proposed
reorganization of the work for civil liberty” articulated the motivating impetus for the NCLB’s
Woman’s Trade Union League, Philadelphia, June 1919, ACLU Papers, reel 7, vol. 69 (urging that “all restraints be
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successor: “The industrial struggle is clearly the essential challenge to the cause of civil liberty
today. No association is organized to deal broadly and generally with these issues in the struggle
of labor. Each labor group makes its own unaided fight, without relation to the common
problems they face together. The situation calls for a dramatic campaign of service to labor in the
areas of conflict, by those who see the vital need of freedom of expression for orderly
progress.” 288 Like the IWW, the NCLB had come to claim that rights could be secured only by
“ceaseless agitation and sacrifice,” and that they could be maintained only through “organized
power.” Every measure to suppress free speech was at its heart an attempt to suppress the
“revolt of labor.” The targets of such initiatives were not just radicals, but established trade
unions as well. In the struggle for industrial democracy, “the issues of free speech, free press,
lawful assemblage, and peaceful picketing are everywhere involved.” 289
The architects of the new endeavor no longer believed that quiet negotiations and
political pressure could accomplish significant change. Also absent from the agenda was the
protection of civil liberties by constitutional adjudication. The wartime cases had led to
disillusionment with the legal strategy, driving even Walter Nelles to abandon his commitment to
the courts. 290 The Supreme Court’s wartime speech and labor cases stamped out any hope of
securing new protections for constitutional rights in the short term; juries continued to return
convictions, and “the power of injunctions, backed by a propagandized public opinion
increasingly hostile to all new ideas, assail[ed] civil rights at every point.” 291 The only
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productive potential of litigation was its ability to generate attention for the civil liberties cause.
To that end, the new organization would orchestrate nationwide publicity of noteworthy
struggles and events. More important, the memorandum called for “free speech organizers” to
hold meetings and demonstrations at centers of industrial conflict. These speakers would
provoke arrest under local regulations that conflicted with constitutional principles. There was to
be no detachment between the advocates of civil liberties and the “struggle in the field.” 292 In
this, of course, the veteran NCLB leadership was borrowing directly from the IWW and its free
speech fights.
To implement the proposed agenda, the national committee would need “new personnel
to meet the issues of the industrial struggle,” split evenly among union leaders, activists on
behalf of labor, and liberals interested in both civil liberties and the industrial struggle. Half of
the funding for the organization would be raised from liberal and radical donors; the other half,
given the close identification between the organization and the “struggle of labor,” would come
from labor groups “directly served by the work.” Walter Nelles put the group’s overarching
objective succinctly: “we are frankly partisans of the labor in the present struggle,” he said, and
“our place is in the fight.” 293
In January 1920, the NCLB leadership adopted the proposed program in its entirety. 294
The name of the new organization, the American Civil Liberties Union, was meant to capture its
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transition from “a bureau of legal defense work to a propaganda organization.” 295 As planned,
the ACLU national committee attracted a mix of labor leaders, advocates, and respectable
liberals. Harry Ward chaired the organization and would continue to do so for almost twenty
years. Duncan McDonald, President of the Illinois State Federation of Labor, agreed to serve as a
Vice-chair, along with the anti-war activist and former member of Congress Jeannette Rankin. 296
Baldwin and DeSilver were co-directors. William Foster wrote that the struggle for civil
liberties was so important that he would make an exception to his general policy of belonging
only to trade union organizations.297 Arthur LeSeuer also joined, predicting that “the service
rendered will be a notable and tremendous one, both to the labor movement and the people of the
United States.” 298 Much of the original leadership of the AUAM remained involved, including
Jane Addams, Florence Kelley, Hebert Bigelow, Crystal Eastman, and Norman Thomas. Even
Lillian Wald approved of the reorganization, though she did not join. 299 Other notable members
of the inaugural committee included Harold Laski, Ernst Freund, Clarence Darrow, John Dewey,
Henry Linville, Helen Keller, and Upton Sinclair. 300
Although Baldwin expressed a willingness to include conservatives in pursuit of a “well
balanced committee,” he did not think it likely that they would join. 301 He did, however,
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acknowledge the need to tone down the ACLU’s partisan rhetoric, at least in its official
communications. In the first year of the ACLU’s existence, the more moderate members urged
the leadership to restore the neutral posture cultivated by the NCLB. They noted that radical
rhetoric would alienate many potential supporters “who might have been willing to go along part
way.” 302 Even Scott Nearing felt that the ACLU should maintain neutrality, explaining that “the
moment it takes sides it becomes a propaganda movement and thereby loses the one claim to
support it now has.” 303 In response to these criticisms, various modifications were made to the
ACLU’s publications. In June 1920, the statement of principles was amended to “stat[e] the
social value of the principle of civil liberty at all times, not only when a class is struggling for
expression.” 304
An illuminating debate arose over the ACLU’s defense of speech advocating violence.
Although the majority of the organization believed that revolutionary rhetoric should not be
curtailed even if it endorsed the use of force under some circumstances, there was substantial
disagreement over the details. Baldwin and other absolutists drew a sharp distinction between
speech and conduct and believed that only violence itself could be punished. Norman Thomas
thought a “direct incitement to violence” might justifiably be regulated, but he was adamant
about protecting a speaker who “said that revolutionary objects could not be attained without
group of people to serve the cause of orderly progress is of course self-evident.”). Correspondence between Baldwin
and John Codman is characteristic of Baldwin’s pragmatism on this issue. When Elizabeth Gurley Flynn
complained that Codman had acted as a volunteer guard during the Boston Police Strike, Baldwin asked him for an
explanation. Codman responded that he supported the principle of collective bargaining but was opposed to the
ACLU “becoming a partisan of labor,” and he objected to the inquiry as irrelevant to the ACLU’s purpose, which
was to protect constitutional rights. John Codman to Roger Baldwin, 8 March 1920, ACLU Papers, reel 16, vol.
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violent means.” 305 Zona Gale, on the other hand, was concerned with “extra-constitutional” and
“extra-legal” considerations, and she believed there was no “moral right . . . to violent and
obnoxious speech.” Even if the ACLU were to insist on legal protection for all speech—on the
theory, for example, that the authorities would construe all radical doctrine as implicitly
countenancing force—she wanted the ACLU to condemn the outright espousal of violence,
whether revolutionary or not. 306 Invoking Mahatma Gandhi, she considered the disavowal of
violence to be an appropriate sacrifice of “personal liberty” in the interest of social welfare, no
different in kind from the abridgment of personal freedom effected by Prohibition. 307 Baldwin
disagreed. To him, “political action under representative government . . . [was] the very heart of
violence.” 308 Although he did not say it explicitly, he implied his own active desire for
revolution, violent or not. Gale resigned over the issue, and in the end, the exchange of views
precipitated a considerable modification of the ACLU’s stated position. 309
What emerged from the discussion was the closest the ACLU would come to a theoretical
defense of the right of agitation, loosely modeled on a proposal made by Walter Nelles the
previous year. According to Nelles, modern workers were alienated in their jobs, and “the fervor
and extent of consequent discontent” ultimately would be channeled into productive change.
“When agitation is outlawed,” he reasoned, “the unrest which it might have made a force for
constructive betterment is diverted in bitterness toward retaliation. Sound political changes can
be neither formulated nor effected except in freedom.” 310 The ACLU’s first official report on its
objectives and activities laid out the organization’s “social philosophy” in similar terms. It
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portrayed the 1919 strikes as the high-water mark of working-class agitation. 311 Efforts to
combat industrial power through the farmer-labor campaigns of the 1920 election cycle had
“emphasiz[ed] everywhere the issues of civil liberty,” but they were “buried under the
Republican landslide.” Scattered pockets of resistance persisted, 312 but effective opposition had
become virtually impossible. As a result, industrial conflict of epic proportions loomed on the
horizon. A growing contingent of workers had come to believe in the “the ultimate necessity of
armed resistance.” 313
Against this backdrop, the two major goals of the ACLU were, first, “the reorganization
of our economic and political life,” and second, “the demand for the ‘rights’ of those minorities
and individuals attacked by the forces of reaction.” Legal rights securing the right to agitation
would be freely exercised only “when no class conflict threatens the existing order.” 314 By
protecting the rights of the disenfranchised, “the organized effort for civil liberty” sought to
moderate the inevitable violence ahead. Although many activists on the left believed that the
“reactionary forces in power” would yield only to superior force, concerted advocacy on behalf
of civil liberties would have the effect of “softening the conflict” by weakening the “resistance to
progress.” 315 “We realize,” the pamphlet concluded, “that these standards of civil liberty cannot
be attained as abstract principles or as constitutional guarantees. Economic or political power is
necessary to assert and maintain all ‘rights.’ In the midst of any conflict they are not granted by
the side holding the economic and political power, except as they may be forced by the strength
311
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of the opposition. However, the mere public assertion of the principle of freedom of opinion in
the words or deeds of individuals, or weak minorities, helps win it recognition, and in the long
run makes for tolerance and against resort to violence.” 316 The resolution of class struggle was
inevitable; nothing—including free speech rights—had the power to disrupt it. The protection of
civil liberties, however, could ensure that the rights of labor were secured with minimal
bloodshed. Peaceful agitation might secure economic security for the working class by peaceful
means. The only alternative was violent revolution. The civil liberties championed by the early
ACLU were not legal rights conferred by the state to secure the expression of individual
conscience, nor did they reflect a policy commitment to rational discussion of optimal social
conditions in the marketplace of ideas. Rather, civil liberties were a byproduct of group struggle,
rooted in power and only incidentally inscribed in law.
.
Conclusion
Out of the NCLB’s central engagements in 1917 and 1918 emerged several crucial
features of the ACLU’s developing relationship to rights, constitutionalism, and legal advocacy.
Most obviously, the early leadership was fundamentally devoted to economic redistribution of a
kind more radical than it admitted to liberal members and correspondents. The primary right
advocated by the leaders of the ACLU was a capacious and malleable right to agitation.
Although they invoked the rhetoric of constitutional rights from the outset, their early
correspondence indicates significant ambivalence on this issue. Baldwin, for one, was far from
the committed civil libertarian that he would later become. He stated his attitude in a leaked
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letter often quoted by conservative critics: “We want to also look like patriots in everything we
do. We want to get a lot of good flags, talk a good deal about the Constitution, etc.” 317
Baldwin was willing to deploy any personal connection or political theory that might
prove effective in advancing his goals. His early advocacy of free speech was largely
instrumentalist. But it was not merely instrumentalist. World War I produced in Baldwin a true
and lasting aversion to state power that lent itself to a new breed of civil libertarian thought.
Historians of the ACLU often have dismissed Baldwin’s theoretical ruminations as ill-formed,
inconsistent, and secondary to his true skills as an organizer and administrator. Baldwin’s
radicalism was not, however, a mere youthful flirtation; it was fundamental to the subsequent
course of civil liberties advocacy in the United States.
The NCLB’s efforts to work through state channels—its stubborn pursuit of
administrative intervention, despite its attendant dangers—produced substantial tension within
the organization. Again and again, NCLB supporters sought to convince government officials to
act quietly for their cause, either through opposition to legislative repression or, more commonly,
through liberal interpretation of repressive statutes. They corresponded with low-level
bureaucrats, friends and acquaintances in the President’s cabinet, even Wilson himself. This
tendency flowed directly from the progressive origins of the organization’s leaders. Before the
war, the same actors had habitually relied on regulation to contain and channel the public will. 318
They had supported progressive legislation, but they believed that administrative agencies would
craft optimal solutions to social problems. 319
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All too often, in these early years and after, the NCLB was disappointed. Even when
correspondence remained friendly, government officials rarely acted on NCLB
recommendations, and their assurances were beset with delays and equivocations. By April
1918, Baldwin had come to question whether anything “practical” could be accomplished by
“working on legislation or administrative orders affecting civil and religious liberties.” 320
Although it might help sway public opinion in particular cases, the combination of an intolerant
majority and a government solicitous of its sympathies would almost ensure defeat for radical
causes, and condemnation or worse for radical actors. 321 “The situation at Washington is not one
which lends itself at all to any influences from the outside,” he observed. “The President is in
complete control, wherever he wants to take control. Congress is willing to pass any legislation
demanded by the Executive. Nothing can be expected from it in the way of protecting our
liberties.” 322
Moreover, the Espionage Act convinced the NCLB leadership that administrative
insulation was itself a substantial threat to civil liberties. Although there remained a liberal
contingent within the government, the Department of Justice and the Post Office Department
were all too eager to exercise their discretion in the service of repression. 323 And postal
censorship proved far more damaging than threat of prosecution had ever been. Burleson’s
suppression of the radical and pacifist press shut down a number of radical organizations and
made effective dissent, as well as effective defense work, impossible. This sort of censorship
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was unpredictable and nearly impossible to counteract. “We are not dealing now with law,”
Baldwin lamented shortly after passage of the Espionage Act. “We are dealing with the shifting
policies of autocratic and arbitrary officials.” 324
The most important influences on the early ACLU, however, were the very labor
organizations that they mobilized to protect. Between World War I and the late New Deal, the
ACLU’s skepticism toward state power, driven by its close alliance to the radical labor
movement, would differentiate it from the progressive advocates of civil liberties with whom it
cooperated. Most of its leadership shared the progressive commitment to the public interest as
against the insidious effects of private interests and private “rights,” but the vision of civil
liberties that it espoused was modeled on labor voluntarism, not individual autonomy. It was
positioned against the state, as a right outside the realm of state interference. But it was also
asserted collectively, through group power, in the public interest.
In other words, the ACLU of the interwar period promoted a radical theory of rights that
resisted the very state machinery that its leadership had helped to create and refine. The ACLU
was always adamant that its theory of civil liberties was distinct from the conservative
celebration of individual rights at the heart of Lochner-era jurisprudence. Its state-skepticism did
not evoke concern for private property. Rather, it recognized that groups maintained rights “only
by insisting upon them.” 325 Where the NCLB borrowed methods and arguments from the Free
Speech League, the early ACLU looked to the direct action of the IWW. The ACLU was acutely
aware that the mere absence of state suppression would not ensure equality of opportunity for
dissenters. In organizing publicity on behalf of the IWW, Baldwin and his correspondents were
distressed by the trivial and distorted coverage of the trial by the mainstream press, which was
324
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printing sensationalist accounts of the proceedings. 326 These same reports, they emphasized,
were fomenting public enthusiasm for future prosecutions and coloring the views of jurors in
subsequent trials. ACLU literature stressed that major industrial interests were distributing
broad-based propaganda and backing the mainstream press; the left, they understood, lacked the
resources to compete. The solution they proposed was the assertion of working-class power.
For the late NCLB and early ACLU, non-state repression was undoubtedly a violation of civil
liberties—but its remedy, like its cause, was nongovernmental. Over time, as the ACLU
increasingly adopted a litigation strategy for protecting free speech, this component of the
ACLU’s program would dwindle in importance. In the early 1920s, however, it was the core of
its civil liberties agenda.
By contrast, the progressives recognized the dangers of unmitigated state power, but they
imagined the First Amendment as a guideline for promoting open discussion, not just a check on
state suppression. Indeed, they sought to mobilize state power on behalf of dissenters. As
Professor Zechariah Chafee of Harvard Law School would later observe, “the argument of
Milton and Mill that unrestricted discussion is the best way to ascertain and disseminate truth
loses much of its force if the discussion, even though unhampered by law, will not be thorough.
It may be necessary for the community not to rest content with a negative attitude of hands off
but to adopt in addition positive measures to ensure that argument and counter argument on vital
issues will have full play.” 327 The ACLU would consistently split over progressive measures
designed to increase overall speech. For example, in the 1920s, some members called for the
mandatory allocation of radio airtime to dissenters, while others demanded that the state stay out
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of broadcasting altogether. More pointedly, when Roger Baldwin and the executive board of the
ACLU expressed opposition to New Deal legislation protecting the rights of labor through the
machinery of the state, the membership and national committee pressured them to reconsider.
The ACLU included many committed progressives within its ranks, and one of its major
accomplishments during the 1920s was to build an alliance with the progressive establishment,
with whom it shared many substantive goals. But in its justification of First Amendment
freedoms, the ACLU would cast state power as more oppositional than facilitative.
In fact, on these issues the ACLU’s core leadership often found itself aligned with the
American Bar Association against progressive reformers, a fact that caused Baldwin significant
consternation. As Leon Whipple, the ACLU’s official theoretician, would comment in 1927:
“Libertarians on principle have been few and far between, and have generally belonged to three
queerly mated groups: the Quakers, the Anarchists, and the lawyers.” 328 The first two groups, of
course, were the ACLU’s primary constituencies during World War I. Finding common ground
with the third would be the organization’s central project during the 1920s. In significant ways,
the resonances between its anti-state radicalism and the conservative tradition of state-skeptical
constitutionalism were responsible for the ACLU’s eventual success where progressives
continued to fail, namely, in the courts.
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CHAPTER 3: THE SEX SIDE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES

When the ACLU announced its successful appeal in United States v. Dennett in March
1930, many Americans welcomed the news as a victory for justice. Though few knew it, it was
justice of an uncommonly poetic sort. The case was the ACLU’s first important attack on postal
obscenity censorship, and the Second Circuit’s seminal decision was a significant achievement
for the organization and its client. Newspaper accounts heralded Mary Ware Dennett as the
protagonist. 1 But Dennett’s role in the struggle was quite different from what she and her civil
liberties allies might have predicted. For years, the pioneering birth control activist, a former
secretary of the National Civil Liberties Bureau, had lobbied unsuccessfully for revision of the
postal censorship laws. In the end, it took a criminal prosecution—of Dennett herself—to
mobilize public opinion and effect legal change.
The object of the legal dispute was Dennett’s sex education pamphlet, The Sex Side of
Life: an Explanation for Young People, which was widely regarded as the best available tract on
the subject. 2 Postal authorities declared the pamphlet obscene despite effusive praise by medical
practitioners, religious groups, and government agencies for its frank and objective style. When
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Dennett continued to circulate it by mail in defiance of the postal ban, she was prosecuted for
obscenity. The ACLU came to her defense.
At the time, however, the organization’s leadership was unconcerned with Dennett’s
broader goals. According to a 1928 bulletin, it was ACLU policy to contest obscenity
regulations only when they were “relied upon to punish persons for their political views.” 3 For
most of the executive board, “political views” encompassed the struggle for control of the means
of production, but not of the body or the mind. The early ACLU was not interested in defending
cultural expression. 4
By the late 1920s the organization had moved beyond its initially narrow commitment to
the “right of agitation.” It had defended religious and academic freedom, which it regarded as
strategically and theoretically linked to the protection of political and economic speech.
Nonetheless, most members of the ACLU thought obscenity laws were acceptable, and many in
fact welcomed state regulation in the realm of morality. ACLU board members agreed to
sponsor Dennett’s case because, in their view, The Sex Side of Life was not obscene; it instructed
the youth on an issue of social importance, thereby advancing the public interest in a direct and
familiar way. No one suggested that Dennett should be permitted to publish her pamphlet if it
were shoddily written, much less actually lewd. No one anticipated that United States v. Dennett
would usher in a new era for the ACLU.
Unexpectedly, however, the Dennett litigation unleashed a far more sweeping anticensorship initiative. The heavily publicized conviction, overturned by the Second Circuit on
appeal, generated popular hostility toward the censorship laws and convinced ACLU attorneys
3
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that speech should be protected regardless of its social worth. United States v. Dennett is often
overlooked in histories of free speech—perhaps because it never reached the Supreme Court, or
because it was not decided on First Amendment grounds, or because its implications for the
broader civil liberties movement were not immediately apparent. 5 And yet, Dennett
fundamentally redefined the way that lawyers, judges, and activists understood the category of
civil liberties. 6 It introduced the possibility of a free speech agenda premised on personal
autonomy, a cause that resonated strongly with mainstream Americans, rather than economic
equality, which polarized them.
By the early 1930s, the ACLU was the undisputed leader of the anti-censorship campaign
and an aggressive advocate of artistic freedom and birth control. Indeed, many of its supporters
were reluctant to defend Communists but eager to endorse artistic freedom. With that shift, the
ACLU inched closer toward a new model of civil liberties: one that celebrated individual
expressive freedom over substantive social reform. Thus transformed, the civil liberties
movement finally attracted widespread public support, paving the way for a pluralistic turn in
politics as well as personal morality. The payoff was swift and spectacular. When Dennett was
decided, the ACLU was a fringe group and the civil liberties it defended were often maligned as
5
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un-American. A mere decade later, President Roosevelt would stand before the nation and
declare that the first of the fundamental human freedoms was the freedom of speech. 7 United
States v. Dennett, 8 in the words of ACLU co-counsel and emerging free speech leader Morris
Ernst, was a “test-case of vital importance.” 9

The New Battleground
The strident radicalism of the ACLU’s early rhetoric, like the revolutionary moment that
produced it, was short-lived. During 1920 and 1921, the ACLU’s preferred technique was to
“dramatiz[e] the issues of civil liberty by demonstrations in areas of conflict.” 10 The resulting
“free speech fights” were reminiscent of the techniques employed by the IWW in prior decades.
For two years, the ACLU was on the front lines of the labor struggle, marching, picketing, and
organizing, outside the factory gates and in the Alabama and West Virginia coal fields.
But the looming labor revolution dissipated just as quickly as it had taken shape, and it
was soon evident that social change through “agitation” was a long-term program at best. The
Republicans who came to office in the 1920 election were forthright about their opposition to the
labor policy of their Democratic predecessors, and they were eager to reverse any remaining

7

Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Annual Message to Congress,” Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress, 6
January 1941, Record Group 46, NARA I, Sen. 77A-H1.
8
United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2nd Cir. 1930).
9
Appellant’s Second Circuit Brief, 59, Dennett Papers, reel 23, file 490. This chronology turns on its head the
conventional wisdom that acceptance of free speech in America began with political speech and steadily expanded
toward more personal liberties. See, e.g., Ken I. Kersch, “How Conduct Became Speech and Speech Became
Conduct: A Political Development Case Study in Labor Law and the Freedom of Speech,” University of
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 8 (March 2006): 266 (summarizing dominant narrative: “[W]hereas
free speech protections were largely focused on core political speech in the early twentieth century, they were
expanded to protect other forms of speech, such as (anti) religious (blasphemy), sexual (indecency), artistic,
commercial, and other forms of speech.”). Civil liberties advocacy groups, including the ACLU, did indeed follow
that trajectory. But the public did not. Rather, it was civil libertarians’ successful defense of popular, non-political
causes like the dissemination of scientific and sexual knowledge that paved the way for popular tolerance of political
dissent.
10
ACLU, Fight for Free Speech, 8–9.

181

wartime advances. Meanwhile, the postwar depression undermined labor’s demands for higher
wages and put unions on the defensive. By 1921, union membership had declined by 1.5 million
and the open shop was the rule. The next year, the Harding administration was faced with two
major strikes, and in both cases it threw its support squarely to employers, with devastating
consequences for labor. 11
On the judicial front, the situation was even bleaker. The Supreme Court, under its newly
appointed Chief Justice William Howard Taft, swiftly undercut many of labor’s legislative and
administrative gains. 12 Its 1921 decision in Duplex v. Deering declared secondary boycotts
unlawful under the Clayton Act and authorized the use of injunctions to block them. 13 In Truax
v. Corrigan, it went further, striking down a state anti-injunction law as an unconstitutional
violation of equal protection and due process. 14 Other decisions effectively outlawed picketing
(American Steel Foundries v. Tri-Cities Central Trade Council 15) and made unions subject to
high damages for restraint of interstate commerce (United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal 16).
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Such decisions gave license to the most anti-labor of federal courts to issue sweeping injunctions
against labor activity.
Unions, of course, were not wholly without power during the 1920s. Congressional
Democrats, together with a few influential liberal Republicans, exerted pressure on labor’s
behalf. Although the radical unions fared poorly under a decade of Republican leadership, their
more conservative counterparts like the railroad brotherhoods and the UMW retained
considerable strength. Their strategy—to appease employers in exchange for a share in the
decade’s general economic abundance—seemed the best that labor could muster. The
Republican Party offered up such concessions as high tariffs, immigration restrictions, and a few
modest labor bills, including the Railway Labor Act of 1926, which officially recognized
railroad workers’ right to bargain collectively but not the right to strike. 17 By the mid-1920s,
however, both true government support for labor (for example, of the kind envisioned by the
Non-Partisan League) and mass mobilization through direct action had come to appear hopeless.
From the perspective of the ACLU, the changing labor landscape called for a revised set
of civil liberties commitments. As strikes declined in frequency, so too did the opportunities for
ACLU assistance in the field. The “right of agitation” had been premised on the assumption that
pickets, boycotts, and organizing drives would pave the way to peaceful revolution. By the mid1920s, however, the general strike was a distant specter. Intolerance was “so entrenched” that it
was unnecessary to “lock[] people up to control their heresies.” 18 Ample employment and
reasonable wages had seduced the workers into complacency; they needed reminding that
fleeting material comforts were no substitute for control of the means of production. “Enough of
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our workers can buy second hand cars to ward off class-consciousness,” Baldwin lamented at
mid-decade. “All they need for contentment is the price of gasoline.” 19
The ACLU’s 1925 Annual Report laid out the organization’s new understanding. Despite
a perception of improvement in the civil liberties situation, “intolerance and repression”
remained significant. The decrease in violence of the 1920 variety simply indicated that “no
serious conflict or minority activity has aroused the latent forces of repression.” In other words,
flagrantly oppressive tactics were no longer necessary to quash worker militancy; “widespread
prosperity and the consequent absence of industrial strife” had already accomplished that task.
“The efforts to impose majority dogma by law and intimidation have shifted from the industrial
arena to the field of education,” the report concluded. Education was “the new battle ground.” 20
The ACLU continued to promote the right of agitation, but in place of the picket, its
priorities were to safeguard radical education and to undermine the countervailing attempts by
the state to institutionalize conservative views. The change was an adjustment in emphasis
rather than a wholesale reformulation of the organization’s agenda. Even as strikes raged across
America, the ACLU’s principal activity was publicity—“for ours,” an early report explained, “is
a work of propaganda—getting facts across from our point-of-view.” The ACLU sought to
“educate” Americans through news releases and statements, pamphlets, an information service
distributed to a national network of cooperating speakers and writers, and publicity agents. 21
Still, over the early-to-mid 1920s, disputes over education played an increasingly central role in
the ACLU’s work. The organization continued to defend the few anarchists and Communists
prosecuted under state criminal syndicalism laws. It contested ideologically grounded
19
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immigration laws, and it opposed alien registration and deportation bills. It also engaged with
racial discrimination, especially lynchings. But during the labor lull of the 1920s, it made
primary and secondary education its most visible focus. It was clear to the ACLU’s leadership
that the long-term success of the radical movement entailed protecting not only the tools of labor
radicalism, but also advocacy of and instruction in their use and goals.
Naturally, the ACLU’s first and most consistent target was the suppression of radical
teachings and radical teachers. In fact, freedom for radical teachers had been part of the ACLU’s
agenda since the NCLB days. Leon Whipple was discharged from the University of Virginia
after espousing pacifism and celebrating Russia in a speech at a neighboring women’s college. 22
Even closer to home, Scott Nearing was dismissed first from the University of Pennsylvania and
then the University of Toledo before assisting in the creation of the NCLB. Nearing was also
intimately involved with the Rand School of Social Science, a Socialist institution for the
education of workers, whose lecturers included Franklin H. Giddings, John Spargo, James T.
Shotwell, and Charles A. Beard (who had resigned his own position at Columbia University after
the expulsion of two professors for their purported dissemination of disloyal doctrines). 23 The
Rand School was targeted for state suppression early in the war, and during the postwar Red
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Scare, it was the center of the NCLB’s battle against the Joint Legislative Committee to
Investigate Seditious Activities, or Lusk Committee. 24
The Lusk Committee launched a campaign against the Rand School in June 1919, at the
urging of its counsel, Archibald Stevenson—the same Red hunter who had sought to convince
the Department of Justice to prosecute the NCLB the previous year. Fifty men, most of whom
had been members of the American Protective League, ransacked the school’s facilities in
pursuit of papers and materials; two days later, they returned to search the safe for its financial
records. 25 Although the raids produced minimal evidence (the most sinister finding reported in
the New York Times was “that persons identified with the Rand School had interested themselves
in the defense of William Haywood and other I.W.W. leaders convicted in Chicago”), the
Attorney General of New York compliantly initiated charges to cancel the school’s charter,
cheered on by the press. 26
According to the NCLB, the episode posed a “challenge to all liberal Americans.” In
August, three months before Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States, the
organization prepared a statement by prominent non-Socialists urging the state to cease its attack
on the Rand School. 27 “If its teachings are unsound the surest way to demonstrate that fact is to
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permit them to be heard and observed,” it argued. “The people of New York are capable of
making up their own minds about them.” Such reasoning fit neatly into the progressive model of
free speech that had receded during the War but was re-emerging among liberal lawyers and
academics. 28 In communications with government officials and potential contributors, the NCLB
emphasized the value of political expression as a means both of buttressing democratic
legitimacy and of facilitating “social progress.” It attracted mainstream support by celebrating
(along with Justice Holmes) a marketplace of ideas, 29 or (before Justice Brandeis) the centrality
of open discussion to democratic decision-making. 30 In the NCLB’s assessment, the state had
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little to fear from the Rand School’s propagation of potentially erroneous views. Rather, the “real
danger” was “the immeasurable harm which such coercion of minority opinion does to the
processes of orderly discussion of public affairs.” 31
Although the NCLB issued its statement while the legal proceedings were pending, it was
a general pronouncement on the government’s policy, not the merits of the legal case. By the
same token, when the case eventually collapsed, the Lusk Committee continued to lambast the
Rand School just as vigorously. 32 In fact, the Rand School’s attorney claimed that “it was
apparent from the day the action was begun that the Attorney General never intended to try it.” 33
The Lusk Committee was concerned with public opinion, not law, and it was not deterred by
legal setbacks.
In 1920, the Committee proposed legislation to shut down the Rand School by
prohibiting the state from licensing any private school “where it appears that the instruction
proposed to be given includes the teachings of the doctrine that organized government shall be
overthrown by force, violence or unlawful means.” 34 Had the bill stopped there, it might have
avoided significant controversy. But the so-called Lusk Laws went much further. They also
required public school teachers to demonstrate through external assessment that they were “loyal
and obedient to the government of [New York State] and of the United States.” Any teacher who
an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government.”
31
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had ever advocated change (whether peaceful or violent) in the form of the state or federal
government was to be denied a certificate of fitness. The bill passed, but Governor Al Smith
vetoed it, explaining that it targeted teachers for their thinking, not their teaching, and that its
effect “would be to make the Commissioner of Education the sole and arbitrary dictator of the
personnel of the teaching force of the State in its public schools.” 35
Despite Smith’s denunciation, the legislature passed the bill again in 1921, and Governor
Nathan L. Miller signed it. 36 That fall, an oath was administered to public school teachers
throughout the state, and principals were required to report on the “morality and loyalty” of their
teachers. 37 Often, the assessments were based on opinions by undisclosed informants. Teachers
suspected of disloyalty were not told why. In the spring of 1922, the Commissioner of Education
appointed a five-member Advisory Council, led by Archibald Stevenson, to decide contested
cases in secret meetings.
The anonymous evaluations and closed proceedings proved too much for many New
Yorkers to bear. Newspapers denounced the law and, even more fervently, its administration.
The Buffalo Times declared the law “a reversal of all civilization,” worse than “the barbarism of
darkest Africa.” 38 The Buffalo Evening News decried the “star chamber procedure.” 39 The New
York Evening Post called for repeal of the law, which interfered “with the fundamental rights of
35
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freedom of thought and speech.” 40 Most tellingly, The Nation acknowledged the public’s
“callous indifference to the civil liberties of workers” but hoped that an attack on education
might attract popular outrage; in an atmosphere of fear, hypocrisy, and servility, it explained,
“you cannot make good citizens, to say nothing of honest men and women.” 41 In May 1923, at
the urging of newly re-elected governor Al Smith, the public school law was repealed. 42 So was
the private school licensing law, despite a split decision by New York’s intermediate court
upholding its constitutionality against a due process challenge 43—in a case argued for the Rand
School by Socialist leader and labor lawyer Morris Hillquit, a member of the ACLU’s National
Committee. 44
The fight over the Lusk Laws taught the ACLU that academic freedom, unlike the rights
of anarchist immigrants or radical workers, commanded mainstream support. The lesson was
40
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reinforced by controversy over a second restrictive education law, which was then working its
way up through the federal courts. That law effectively abolished private education in the state of
Oregon, and the surrounding litigation culminated in the Supreme Court’s oft-cited decision in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, which recognized parents’ authority over their children’s education
and disclaimed the “power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
intrusion from public teachers only.” 45 For the ACLU, the Oregon public school law was a
curious initiation into the field of academic freedom. The law was backed by the Ku Klux Klan,
and its purpose was to abolish the Catholic Schools, which were widely regarded as an
impediment to the assimilation of immigrant children. 46 As a rule, neither the Klan nor antiimmigrant sentiment was popular within the ACLU. Still, most of the ACLU leadership
personally opposed parochial education as superstitious and conservative. Moreover, the Oregon
law garnered substantial progressive support, even within the ACLU.
William S. U’Ren, an ACLU National Committee member, was among Oregon’s most
notable progressive reformers and had played a critical role in introducing the initiative, recall,
and referendum to his state’s legislative process. On the issue of the public school law, he
advised the ACLU’s executive committee to “pay no attention,” because it raised no issue of
“civil or religious liberty.” 47 On the contrary, U’Ren approved of the measure because it would
raise the quality of the public school system and mitigate class difference in education. “If every
normal child must go to the district public school through the first eight grades, then every
45
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parent, whether rich or poor, Jew or Gentile, Catholic or Protestant, saint or sinner, will have the
highest possible selfish parental interest in making the best possible school because there is no
other for his or her children,” he explained. The executive committee, however, uniformly
rejected U’Ren’s reasoning, and it pledged its support to opponents of the school law. The
fourteen members to whom Baldwin read U’Ren’s letter “all fe[lt] distinctly that an issue of both
civil and religious liberty [was] involved and that the right to worship according to the dictates of
one’s conscience is certainly involved in the right to send children to schools of your own
choosing, public or private.” 48
Baldwin’s rhetoric notwithstanding, the ACLU did not understand the law’s menace
primarily in terms of the free exercise of religion, or even (as later Supreme Court decisions
would cast it) of individual liberty or family autonomy. As Baldwin told U’Ren: “All the rest of
us here seem perfectly clear on the other side. Perhaps it is because we’ve got a number of
experimental private schools in and near New York which are infinitely more valuable to the
future of education than anything the public schools are doing. Under such a law as you have in
Oregon, they would be wiped out.” 49 When it discussed Pierce v. Society of Sisters publicly, the
ACLU invoked religious freedom and parental rights. In so doing, it made new allies among
conservatives and helped to secure a unanimous decision in the Supreme Court. At bottom,
however, the members of the ACLU’s executive committee opposed compulsory public
schooling because it threatened the future of the Rand School and projects like it. They believed
that control of the curriculum was a more insidious version of the violently repressive machinery
of World War I. 50 Industrial interests were purging radical teachers, dictating lesson plans, and
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prohibiting private alternatives—all to ensure that the public school system would inculcate
children with the values of the dominant capitalist culture. By contrast, radical education, if it
were only sheltered from state suppression, had the potential to awaken the masses.
It is no wonder, then, that the ACLU’s first committee, formed in the fall of 1924 and
chaired by Tufts Professor Clarence R. Skinner, was its Committee on Academic Freedom.
When the organization first addressed the issue of academic freedom as a potential area of
activity in June 1924, it openly acknowledged its concern—namely, “propagandists’ efforts to
distort education in the interest of a particular conception of political and economic thinking,” of
which the Lusk Committee’s effort to shut down the Rand School was the most prominent
example. Such laws, the ACLU insisted, were “special interest” measures to promote
industrialist propaganda and thereby undermine the broader public interest. 51
Over the following summer, the ACLU explored potential avenues of involvement in
academic freedom work. The possibility of a new alliance with the American Association of
University Professors—which had first occupied the field in 1915 with its thoroughly
progressive Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure—was
appealing. Despite the AAUP’s general capitulation to popular hysteria during World War I, 52
progressive academics had formulated a robust defense of freedom in the classroom under
ordinary circumstances. The premise of the AAUP’s Declaration was that academic knowledge
was capable of objective assessment and was properly evaluated by peers within a scholar’s
51
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discipline rather than by lay trustees, who were motivated by politics and ideology. 53 “The claim
to freedom of teaching is made in the interest of the integrity and of the progress of scientific
inquiry,” the Declaration explained, and it was therefore available only to “those who carry on
their work in the temper of the scientific inquirer.” The AAUP was primarily concerned with
ideas expressed in scholarship and in the classroom, not with political activities outside of
academic institutions.54
For a combination of ideological and institutional reasons, 55 the ACLU was most
interested in precisely those issues that the AAUP discounted. “In cases involving freedom of
opinion outside the class room the public interest is peculiarly involved,” an ACLU statement
explained. “In such cases we offer the aid of our legal and publicity services to teachers or
students whose views subject them to attack.” 56 An outside organization like the ACLU could
not properly defend a teacher who used the classroom to disseminate propaganda; “the extent to
which a teacher may legitimately lay before a class his own opinions on controversial questions
is a matter for those engaged in teaching to determine through their own organization.”
Conversely, it was patently the ACLU’s concern to ensure that educational institutions did not
attempt to impede teachers in their exercise of “the common rights of citizens, including the right
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of expressing their views on political and economic issues, in speech or in print.” 57 The ACLU
was also concerned (inspired, presumably, by the energy of the student movement in Europe)
with the right of college students to hear radical speakers and organize radical activities on
campus. In fact, Roger Baldwin told Ernst Freund that he hoped the committee would “prevent[]
further inroads upon the agitation of radical and labor issues in the colleges.” 58 An October press
release reiterated that commitment.59 The new committee would resist “college and school rules
restricting liberal and radical activities,” in addition to preserving teachers’ and students’
“freedom of opinion” outside the classroom. It would also oppose laws limiting teachers’
autonomy in the classroom, such as those prohibiting teaching of pacifism, of “certain concepts
of history,” and of evolution.
Although the last issue was something of an after-thought in the ACLU’s platform on
academic freedom, it soon took center stage. During July 1925, national attention was riveted on
Dayton, Tennessee, where Clarence Darrow and William Jennings Bryan clashed in the
courtroom over the scientific plausibility of creationism. For the ACLU, however, the Scopes
trial, which it sponsored, was a case about academic freedom rather than evolution. 60 Indeed, the
ACLU leadership was distressed by Clarence Darrow’s flagrantly anti-religious approach during
the trial and would have preferred a more moderate and publicly palatable strategy. 61 Much of
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the executive committee disapproved of his confrontational tone and wanted him replaced with a
more respectable attorney, ideally future Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, on appeal. 62
To Baldwin, the Scopes trial was an opportunity to reach out to a new constituency for
financial and political support. 63 “Persons who have not contributed before to the defense of
civil liberty will do it now on such an issue as this,” he reflected. “Supporters of educational and
scientific work will be interested, of course, and some liberal spirits in the churches. They need
not fear contamination with the defense of reds!” 64 To that end, Baldwin was careful to maintain
an independent defense fund for the “Tennessee Evolution Case,” distinct from the general
ACLU finances, “banked and handled separately under the auspices of the distinguished
committee” that the organization assembled for the task. 65 The ACLU assured correspondents
that its purpose in Scopes was neither to denigrate religion nor to eliminate moral instruction in
the schools. 66 Rather, it was to preserve American liberty by preventing the “complete
standardization” of the “intellectual life of [the] nation.” 67 The enemy was “force[d]
conformity”—which was why the ACLU could advocate the right of Catholics to private

62

Roger Baldwin to John T. Scopes, 10 August 1926, ACLU Papers, reel 44, vol. 299 (“[I]t is not a radical case and
does not require a man whose economic philosophy is radical to handle it. Furthermore, we believe that the
importance of the issue demands that we should get the lawyer most likely to impress the Supreme Court, and
certainly one who would not prejudice the court in advance. We believe that the man for that job is Charles Evans
Hughes, who has already made a corking public statement as the President of the American Bar Association on the
issues involved in your case. Furthermore, there is something to the psychology of having before the court a man
who is not an agnostic or atheist.”).
63
Larson, Summer for the Gods, 206–07.
64
Letter from Roger Baldwin, undated, ACLU Papers, reel 38, vol. 274.
65
Ibid.
66
Telegram from ACLU to Noah W. Cooper (President, Davidson County Sunday School Association), 11 June
1925, ACLU Papers, reel 38, vol. 274; ACLU, “Statement on Civil Liberty Situation in America at Present,” 29
August 1925, ACLU Papers, reel 41, vol. 285 (“It is not as an advocate of the theory of evolution but of academic
freedom that the American Civil Liberties Union is presenting an appeal to the Tenn. Supreme Court to test the
constitutionality of the statute. If similar legislation were aimed at the teachings of a religious group in the U.S. it
would be equally obnoxious to those who advocate civil liberties.”).
67
Forrest Bailey to Rev. Noah Cooper, 15 June 1925, ACLU Papers, reel 38, vol. 274.

196

education in Oregon and the right of Tennessee school teachers to explain evolution in the same
breath. 68
In the Oregon public school controversy, the ACLU’s nod to inviolate traditions and
family values had garnered conservative sympathy; in the evolution context, the notion that
experimentation and diversity in intellectual inquiry was the source of democratic progress
resonated with progressive audiences. As Roger Baldwin told James P. Cannon, the ACLU had a
particular crowd to reach in the overarching struggle for economic equality. 69 It was up to the
“liberals”—or, as Baldwin preferred to call them, “Libertarians”—to “fight for civil liberty as a
principle of progress.” 70 The ACLU’s pamphlet on the Scopes trial lumped anti-evolution laws
together with compulsory bible reading and restrictions on radical teachers. “All of them,” it
claimed, “involve precisely the same issues as the laws punishing opinion passed during the war,
and the criminal syndicalism and sedition laws passed in 35 states during and just after the war.”
All were part of an immense and unprecedented effort “to regulate public opinion and to penalize
minority and heretical views,” 71 and they were bound to narrow human understanding. Such
rhetoric was effective. In the fall of 1926, Baldwin recounted that “the Scopes evolution case in
Tennessee [had] opened the eyes of hundreds to the growth of intolerance and brought them into
camp.” 72
These early seminal cases—the Rand School, Pierce, and the Scopes trial—were
instrumental in attracting another constituency besides Baldwin’s Libertarians: lawyers. With
the battle over education, the source of repression had subtly shifted. Even more than before, the
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ACLU came to define itself in opposition to state authority. 73 Perhaps because the old
progressive convictions were so deeply ingrained, or perhaps because progressive ideology was
so pervasive and its language so dominant, the early ACLU had continued to pursue a number of
familiar and tested tactics. It had reached out to government agencies and public officials in
opposition to restrictive legislation and in pursuit of amnesty for political and industrial
prisoners. When mobs and vigilantes shamelessly beat dissenters, it had called upon officials to
intervene, notwithstanding its concerns about government abuses. More tellingly, when local
officials aligned with courts to quash local labor struggles, even Roger Baldwin had been
tempted to enlist state and federal assistance in leveling the playing field. 74 But for political and
legal reasons, the indoctrination of young citizens through state channels was best countered by
other means. 75
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The ACLU only gradually came to regard the rights it supported as enforceable primarily
by the courts. 76 Roger Baldwin was notoriously hostile to court-based activism in the early
1920s. 77 His distrust of judicial methods stemmed not only from notorious exercises of judicial
review, like Lochner v. New York, but also from the less mandarin but equally reviled labor
injunctions issued by the trial courts. As ACLU counsel Walter Nelles observed: “Judges are
chosen from lawyers of standing at the bar, and standing is attained by devoted service to
important property interests. It is extraordinary when a judge can slough off the prepossessions
which his practice has engendered.” 78
Ever a pragmatist, however, Baldwin encouraged experimentation rather than ideological
rigidity, and the organization’s lawyers continued to pursue judicially enforceable constitutional
rights, despite serious reservations from much of the ACLU’s membership—most notably Felix
Frankfurter, who staunchly opposed the pursuit of civil liberties through constitutional litigation
and regarded the Supreme Court’s “occasional services to liberalism” as a dangerous step toward
judicial legislation. 79 In the early years, of course, judicial victories were few and far between.
In 1921, the ACLU reported on the disheartening series of defeats in all cases pertaining to
freedom of speech, freedom of press, and the rights of labor. 80 The Supreme Court, the
organization declared, had “gone over to the side of reaction.” 81
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But eventually, a combination of periodic state-court successes, Holmes’s and Brandeis’s
powerful Supreme Court dissents, and victories in such non-labor cases as Meyer v. Nebraska
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters would make the courts an inviting venue. The ACLU sought to
build on the Supreme Court’s existing understanding that respect for “personal rights” was
crucial to rule of law. 82 For the most part, ACLU lawyers were unabashed legal realists, and
they brought their cases to the courts because, increasingly, that is where they were most likely
to win. In spring 1925, within a week of its decision in Pierce, the Supreme Court implied in
Gitlow v. New York that the First Amendment’s freedoms would henceforth be binding on the
states. Notably, Gitlow—like Whitney v. California—was argued by Walter Nelles and Walter
Pollak of the ACLU. By the end of the year, litigation appeared sufficiently promising to prompt
ACLU counsel Arthur Garfield Hays to propose a study of “affirmative legal action” as a means
of securing “labor’s civil rights.” 83 To labor leaders, seeking judicial protection for striking
workers was a betrayal of deeply held beliefs. 84 But as Baldwin freely admitted, he was “not
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troubled . . . about any issue of theory or principles.” 85 Throughout his career, he was more
concerned with achieving results than with ideological consistency. And for the time being—for
the ACLU’s core leadership, if not the growing number of members and National Committee
members from across the political spectrum—securing the rights of labor remained the
organization’s overarching goal.
Integral to the ACLU’s embrace of academic freedom in the 1920s was the deep
conviction of the leadership that radical propaganda could in fact bring about fundamental social
change. The ACLU’s establishment allies typically assumed that exposing radical ideas to
scrutiny would ensure their demise. For example, a brief of the Special Committee of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, of which Charles Evans Hughes was a member,
opposed the expulsion of Socialists from the New York Assembly on the theory that tolerance of
dissent was “the most efficient safety-valve against resort by the discontented to physical
force.” 86 By contrast, the ACLU leadership (though it often articulated the conservative line)
believed that a proper airing would convert the masses. Education, as Leon Whipple put it in his
ACLU-sponsored treatise on civil liberties, was “the source of all true progress in social
liberty.” 87 In Whipple’s view, civil liberties were most important not at revolutionary
moments—“in serious struggles,” he argued, they were “but one part of the battle” in which the
most powerful force would prevail—but in the calm periods in between. 88 Whipple explained
that once an emergency has passed, “the executive, the courts, and the police sink back into
normalcy from which they have been prodded.” Active violence ceases and restrictive laws are
ignored, repealed or struck down as unconstitutional. “In such times,” he continued,
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“constitutional liberty has perhaps its greatest value for it is the educational force of new ideas
that produces social change, not the spectacular struggles that are in fact only symbols of how far
the change has gone.” 89
A muted radicalism infused the ACLU’s theory of civil liberties in the 1920s. The
organization’s leaders ordinarily spoke in terms of pluralism and tolerance, but their true
objectives were more ambitious, and occasionally they came out. In Roger Baldwin’s
understanding, “the Klan’s attempt to compel all children to go to public schools” and the
“Fundamentalist attack on scientific teaching” were instances of a more general phenomenon,
namely, “the effort of all groups in power to hold on their privileges, and to write those
privileges into law.” 90 The consolidation of power of which they were reflective had coincided
with the War, but its true cause was the Russian Revolution: “Bolshevism is the issue which has
aroused the propertied classes to the defense of things as they are all over the world.” 91 Baldwin
invoked familiar progressive tropes even while he speculated that “political liberalism [was]
dead.” The prewar radicals, when they fought for the initiative, the referendum, and “other
devices for popular control,” had “voiced the old American faith that privileged classes could be
controlled by the ‘Public.’” Indeed Baldwin, “as a humble members of the reformers’ crew of
those hopeful days,” had “believed it too.” But he had since come to recognize that there “is no
‘Public’; the ‘People’ as a political party are unorganizable.” In place of the public interest there
were only “economic classes.” Industrial autocracy had taught Roger Baldwin that “the only
power that works is class-power.” 92
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As Baldwin often emphasized in correspondence with critics, his views were his own, not
the ACLU’s. 93 Still, they were echoed in the private correspondence of many within the
organization’s inner circle. 94 The ACLU leadership promoted a broad right to education because
it hoped that the radical labor movement, if given the opportunity to educate the masses, would
ultimately triumph. 95 The organization’s new rallying cry was Justice Holmes’s dissenting
proclamation in Gitlow v. New York 96: “If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian
dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only
meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.” 97
By the mid-1920s, the ACLU was staunchly committed to contesting the government
regulation of unconventional ideas in the education context. The question for the next halfdecade was how far its new program would reach. In the minds of the ACLU leadership, state
inculcation of religious orthodoxy was clearly inimical to revolution. So was the effort to shut
unconventional ideas, whether political or otherwise, out of the schools (including the
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prohibition on ACLU-sponsored meetings in the New York Public Schools, an ongoing battle
that in 1927 the ACLU deemed the “most important free-speech fight of the year”). 98 There was
one field, however, into which the organization had not yet ventured. In spite of the
longstanding association of radicalism with “free love,” 99 the ACLU had resolutely excluded the
regulation of sexual relations from its purview. Nonetheless, there was a mounting sentiment
within the ACLU that social progress was threatened not only by laws directly suppressive of
radical ideas, but (in Leon Whipple’s words) by the “steady extension of the police power over
health, morals, and personal habits”—the “slow encroachment” of the state onto all aspects of
personal liberty. 100 With the suppression of Mary Ware Dennett’s foundational sex education
pamphlet, the ACLU faced the new terrain head on.

The Sex Side of Life
Mary Ware Dennett had challenged social norms throughout her life, politically and
personally. Born in 1872 to a middle-class family in Worcester, Massachusetts, she attended
Boston-area schools (public and private) and studied at the School of Design and Decoration at
the Boston Museum of Fine Arts. From 1894 to 1897 she headed the department of decoration
and design at the Drexel Institute in Philadelphia. In 1898 she and her sister opened a gilded
leather shop, the kind of fancywork to which aspiring female artists could turn for an income,
and the two women garnered national attention for rediscovering a lost process for making
cordovan gilded leathers. 101
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Mary Ware married William H. Dennett in 1900. Together, they had three children, one
of whom died in infancy. Dennett separated from her husband in 1909 when he declared himself
a free lover and sought to convince her to accept his relationship with their friend and neighbor,
whose own husband sanctioned the relationship and invited William to live in their home. The
custody proceedings and subsequent divorce generated sensationalist news coverage, which
distressed Dennett deeply. 102 Despite her aversion to publicity, however, she remained active in
public life. During the first decade of the twentieth century she served as field secretary of the
Massachusetts Woman Suffrage Association, and in 1910, she was elected corresponding
secretary of the National American Woman Suffrage Association. During the First World War,
Dennett became a prominent pacifist. She was a founding member of the People’s Council of
American for Democracy and Peace and a member of the Woman’s Peace Party in New York.
Notably, she also served as field secretary for the American Union Against Militarism and, once
it was organized as a separate entity, for the NCLB. In that capacity, she witnessed first-hand the
unchecked use of postal censorship to curtail public exposure to unpopular views.
When the war drew to a close, Dennett’s focus shifted to birth control, the cause that
would dominate her life for the next two decades. In 1915, Dennett had helped organize the
United States’ first birth control organization, the National Birth Control League. Four years
later, she founded the Voluntary Parenthood League—the institutional rival of Margaret Sanger’s
American Birth Control League—and became Sanger’s chief contender for leadership of the
birth control movement. While Sanger tempered her demands for birth control reform in the
interwar period by advocating medical regulation rather than open access, Dennett called for
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repeal of all restrictions on contraception. In particular, she was a fierce and vocal opponent of
the 1873 Comstock Act. A federal statute, the Comstock Act gave the postal authorities
immense discretion to censor obscene material, and Dennett considered it a formidable obstacle
to birth control reform. Under its terms, the postal service was free to suppress not only “lewd”
images and literature, but also publications considered morally suspect, such as arguments
against the legal regulation of marriage and pamphlets providing information about
contraception, as well as contraceptive devices themselves. 103
In the early 1920s, Dennett believed the Comstock Act was on its way out. Under the
leadership of Postmaster General William Hays, censorship of political materials had declined
from its wartime heights, and Dennett thought Hays might even petition Congress for a change in
the laws. 104 But the postal crusade against obscenity and birth control redoubled under Hubert
Work, who took over the office in 1922 when Hays was named president of the Motion Picture
Producers and Distributors of America (it was in this role, which he held for more than twenty
years, that he would implement the influential 1930 “Hays Code” for movie self-censorship).
Consequently, Dennett spearheaded a legislative effort to repeal the prohibition on the
dissemination of information about birth control, which she unavailingly distinguished from the
dissemination of contraception itself. In 1923, after a long effort, she managed to find sponsors
in the Senate and the House. The Cummins-Vaile Bill, which Dennett drafted, would have
prohibited postal censorship of birth control materials. 105 But despite her unflagging efforts,
including her publication in 1926 of Birth Control Laws, 106 a book that criticized the Comstock
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laws and advocated legislative change, the bill reached a dead end. According to Dennett, few
members of Congress actually opposed the bill, but it was kept off the floor to avoid the liability
of a vote. 107
Ultimately, it would be the courts rather than the legislatures that would rein in the postal
censors. The impetus for change was Dennett’s own sex education pamphlet, The Sex Side of
Life: An Explanation for Young People. The pamphlet was heralded by secular and religious
reformers as an indispensable educational tool, 108 and its censorship, coupled with Dennett’s
conviction for mailing an obscene publication, touched off a firestorm of public outrage and
offended judicial sensibilities.
For all the controversy it would engender, The Sex Side of Life was penned, ostensibly,
with very modest intentions. Dennett claimed that when she wrote the pamphlet in 1915, she had
particular “young people” in mind: her sons Carl (then fourteen years old) and Devon (age ten).
According to Dennett, Carl asked her a series of questions about sex in his letters home from
summer camp. She prepared the pamphlet by way of response and sent it to him while he was
away. Coincidentally, at just that time, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company was
sponsoring a competition for the best pamphlet on sex education for adolescents between the age
of twelve and sixteen. 109
Dennett sampled more than sixty books and pamphlets on sex before writing her own.
She rejected their tone of disapproval and insisted that sex, in the appropriate context, “is the
very greatest physical and emotional pleasure there is in the world.” She criticized one attempt
107

Mary Ware Dennett, “Cummins and Birth Control,” New York Times, 22 August 1926.
Among the pamphlet’s thousands of supporters and subscribers were the Bridgeport, Connecticut public library;
the First Methodist Episcopal Church in Pueblo, Colorado; the Juvenile Court of Cook County, Illinois; the Boy
Scouts of Louisville, Kentucky; the Massachusetts Department of Public Health; the Bethel Evangelical Church in
Detroit, Michigan (whose pastor, from 1915 to 1928, was Reinhold Niebuhr); the Minnesota Department of
Education; and numerous YMCA chapters. List of Larger Contributors, Dennett Papers, reel 21, file 445.
109
Chen, Story of Mary Ware Dennett, 176.
108

207

at sex education for its “old-fashioned stupid idea about women,” which made her indignant
because it implied that “women were made to be taken care of” rather than being “partners in
life with men.” 110 Moreover, she worried that the literature assumed prior knowledge and traded
in euphemisms instead of frankly explaining the terminology and physiology of sex.
Dennett’s introduction to The Sex Side of Life attributed the deficiency in sex education
literature to the fact that “those who have undertaken to instruct the children are not really clear
in their own minds as to the proper status of the sex relation.” Educational literature was
confused with respect to physiology and sentimental in its description of natural science, but it
was most troubling in its moral treatment of sex; it presented children with a “jumble of
conflicting ideas,” from fear of venereal disease and the duty of suppressing one’s “animal
passion” to the sacredness of marriage. 111 Emotionally, Dennett noted, the subject was simply
ignored. 112
Endeavoring to correct these omissions, Dennett outlined the physiological process of
sex, including an explicit description of the mechanics of intercourse. She addressed tabooed
topics from venereal disease (which, she assured her readers, was treatable by modern medicine)
to masturbation, which she discouraged unless the urge was “overwhelming.” 113 Finally, she
made the “frank, unashamed declaration that the climax of sex emotion is an unsurpassed joy,
something which rightly belongs to every normal human being.” 114 By the time Dennett was
haled into court, sentiments like these would be par for the course (Sanger, for one, also utilized
them). Indeed, social scientists would make mutual sexual gratification a prerequisite of the new
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companionate marriage. 115 But in 1915, Dennett’s celebration of sexual pleasure was
unconventional, even radical. 116
The Sex Side of Life combined advanced views about women’s sexuality circulating
among sophisticated feminists with the social hygiene impulse that was burgeoning at that
time. 117 A progressive-era reform initiative, the social hygiene movement sought to hold men
and women to a “single standard” of sexual fidelity in order to combat prostitution, venereal
disease, and associated social pathologies. Social hygienists—particularly the women among
them—also imagined sexual responsibility as a mechanism for achieving sex equality, though
their ambitions were predictably undermined in practice. 118
Where Dennett broke from the social reformers was in her permissive approach to
sexuality. Dennett, too, advocated a single standard for men and women, but hers was a standard
of relative leniency. Whereas her reformist counterparts sought to mobilize state regulatory
authority on behalf of sexual purity, Dennett consistently counseled her young correspondents
that sexual experimentation was natural and desirable. This bolder message, however, was
understated in The Sex Side of Life, and Dennett generally minimized it when she promoted the
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pamphlet. As late as the early 1930s, organized vice crusaders assumed that Dennett was an ally
in the struggle against sexual promiscuity. 119
Consistent with her family-friendly narrative, Dennett kept the focus on Carl and his
wholesome boyhood curiosity. According to Dennett, Carl did not mention his mother’s essay
until he returned home from camp, when he called out from the shower, in the hearty manner
young boys used in sex education literature long afterward, “Hi, mother, that paper you sent me
was all right.” “Did it fit the bill?” Dennett asked. “It sure did,” he replied. 120 Carl’s
enthusiastic endorsement was only the beginning. His friends began borrowing the text, and her
own friends and colleagues requested copies. Soon thereafter, the medical community took an
interest in Dennett’s explanation. The Sex Side of Life was printed in The Medical Review of
Reviews, alongside a glowing editorial review, in February 1918. Dennett began producing the
text in pamphlet form. Copies were distributed by the YMCA, a chief purveyor of social
hygiene literature, and used for instruction in the Union Theological Seminary and the
Bronxville, New York public schools.
Despite the warm response to Dennett’s pamphlet in educational and social science
circles, 121 circulation of the pamphlet was beset by legal difficulties. In 1922, Postmaster
General Work declared The Sex Side of Life obscene and unmailable. Three years later, a second
postmaster agreed and upheld the ban. Notwithstanding Dennett’s repeated requests, the postal
service refused to identify the offending characteristics or passages of the pamphlet. 122 Dennett
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solicited letters from senators and other prominent individuals in an effort to convince the postal
service to reconsider the ban, but the campaign was unsuccessful. 123 Dennett believed her
pamphlet was targeted in retaliation for her outspoken criticism of postal censorship practices,
and she was outraged. 124
After trying to reason with the postal authorities, Dennett began to consider her other
options. Newspaper accounts, to make her a more sympathetic defendant, would later portray
Dennett as a matronly grandmother who had been dragged into a humiliating judicial
entanglement against her will. In fact, many journalists quite consciously constructed Dennett as
an unassuming figure, over Dennett’s own objections. 125 According to most reports, Dennett’s
only ambitions were to educate her children and to help other mothers do the same; they painted
the outspoken feminist as an appropriately modest woman, the unwitting victim of a ruthless
legal assault. Dennett, however, resented this characterization. It was true that she was shy of
publicity, and while her case was pending, she turned down all but one of the many speaking
invitations she received. 126 But Dennett, at fifty-three and in robust health, had always taken a
much more calculated and proactive approach to the law, and her own case was no exception. 127
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Dennett was intimately familiar with her potential allies in the effort to end postal
censorship. After all, as secretary of the NCLB she had organized the 1918 conference on
“American Liberties in Wartime.” She had met or corresponded with most of the leaders of the
interwar civil liberties movement, and she counted as friends and acquaintances many of the
early board members of the ACLU. 128 The challenge, as she well knew, was to convince her
former colleagues that sex education was part of the broader struggle for expressive freedom.

The ACLU and Obscenity
Although the ACLU professed to “make[] no distinction as to whose liberties it
defend[ed]” and to put “no limit on the principle of free speech,” 129 this sweeping language was
misleading. Baldwin and his peers were adamantly opposed to the silencing of ideas, but they
were relatively untroubled by “moral” censorship and its implications for personal autonomy. 130
The monthly ACLU bulletins reporting on the “civil liberty situation” occasionally included
blurbs on obscenity cases, but the organization rarely took an aggressive stand on such
prosecutions. 131 Even as rampant artistic censorship in Boston rendered the city a laughing stock
in much of America, the ACLU remained largely aloof from the debate.
The censorship cases in which the organization did become involved almost invariably
pertained to political speech 132 or to the prior restraint of expression, an issue with a very
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established pedigree. 133 The limits of this enterprise were conspicuous to prewar free speech
activists. In correspondence between Theodore Schroeder and Baldwin in 1918, the former
complained that the ACLU was narrowing the scope of civil liberties to the political, to the
exclusion of “the more personal liberties which are being very much invaded.” 134 Baldwin,
unpersuaded, dismissed these issues as peripheral to “the wider political question which we are
discussing.” 135
In the mid-1920s, however, a new minority within the ACLU began to argue that
obscenity prosecutions were of considerable public importance and ought to receive more
attention from the organization. The two most prominent voices for expansion were Arthur
Garfield Hays and Morris Ernst, who were appointed general counsels during this transitional
period. 136 As contemporaries of their ACLU colleagues (almost all of whom were born in the
1880s and came of age during the progressive era 137), Hays and Ernst endorsed protective labor
laws and distrusted judicial oversight in the economic realm. And yet, they were uneasy about
state interference with personal conduct and beliefs. They defended free speech not because they
thought it the surest way of securing radical economic change, or even of finding political truth,
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but because they recognized how rapidly public morality (as well as political ideology) shifted.
They were skeptical that any overarching truth was ascertainable by anyone, let alone the
government.
Though they were cynical about the process of judicial decision-making, Ernst and Hays
were lawyers. As such they tended to favor the courts as a venue for protecting civil liberties. 138
Moreover, both maintained successful private law practices and regularly defended periodicals
and publishing houses against obscenity charges. In these private censorship matters, they based
their legal strategies on the long-term interests of their clients. 139 And their clients, though fully
conversant in the language of “public good” and community enrichment, were unenthusiastic
about submitting their investments to government review. They knew that respectability
conferred certain advantages, but the costs of confiscation and prosecution far outweighed the
benefits of official approval. Keeping the state out was best for the bottom line.
Relatively speaking, then, Ernst and Hays stood out as liberal individualists 140 in a circle
of reformers and radical activists. Moreover, as Jews in an overwhelmingly Protestant
movement, they came to the ACLU from different backgrounds and with different values. 141 By
1928, both were vocal opponents of censorship. In 1926, Hays had represented H. L. Mencken,
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editor of the American Mercury, in his notorious battle with Boston’s Watch and Ward
Society, 142 and he was celebrated as a hero in the Boston anti-censorship campaign. 143
Meanwhile, Ernst was fighting censorship through multiple channels. In 1926, he testified
before the Senate Committee of Interstate Commerce against the Dill Bill to restrict
broadcasting. He advocated the free use of radio for the expression of public opinion, cautioning
that “[o]nce the country has become accustomed to censorship of broadcasting, it is but an easy
step to the censorship of newspapers.” 144 And while he was certainly concerned about the
suppression of political speech, 145 he was eager to protect artistic expression as well. In 1927,
Ernst unsuccessfully defended John Herrmann’s What Happens, an unremarkable book
containing an apparently objectionable profanity, before a New York jury. 146 In the wake of the
defeat, he undertook a systemic study of obscenity censorship in America. His 1928 book, To
the Pure: A Study of Obscenity and the Censor, co-authored with William Seagle, was a scathing
critique of the obscenity laws. 147
Notwithstanding their opposition to the vice societies, Ernst and Hays tended to separate
their service to the ACLU from their private (and usually remunerative) anti-censorship work.
By the late 1920s, however—just as Ernst and Hays were gaining influence within ACLU—the
organization’s agenda was in flux. After several years of largely haphazard expansion in its
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activities, the ACLU leadership lacked the clarity of its early vision, and a revised statement of
principles and commitments was in order. Meanwhile, the mounting success of civil liberties
claims in the courts commended litigation as a strategy for reform and afforded a new measure of
power to the organization’s lawyers. In November 1928, Ernst proposed to the National
Committee the expansion of the ACLU’s activity to include censorship of the movies and talkies,
and the committee approved the addition. 148 And yet, as late as 1929, the organization stated
that while it opposed advance censorship of any kind, prosecution of a published work was not a
civil liberties concern. 149 Despite their public position, however, many ACLU members had
begun to reassess their views on this issue.
In February 1929, Roger Baldwin, on behalf of the executive committee, urged a formal
clarification and extension of the organization’s objectives. Baldwin reminded members of the
national committee that “the policy of the American Civil Liberties Union since its foundation
has been to protect the civil liberties described as ‘freedom of speech, press, and assemblage’”
and occasionally, if incidentally, the “right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.” 150 But these rights, he emphasized, were not the only ones protected by the state and
federal constitutions. The letter laid out several avenues for expansion, ranging from civil rights
and criminal defense to opposition to the draft and American imperialism. Among its various
proposals was opposition to the censorship of books, plays, radio, and movies, though the
committee likely intended to curb political censorship rather than foster artistic freedom.
The members of the National Committee were open to some changes and hostile to
others. Baldwin received a flood of letters opposing the ACLU’s expansion into fields not
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directly associated with freedom of speech and press. In response to this criticism, the Executive
Committee promised not to take on such issues as the rights of criminal defendants, civil liberties
in areas under American military control, or the validity of the draft (“as a violation of liberty of
conscience, instead of as now, opposition only to interference with agitation against it” 151). A
few members of the National Committee, including labor activist and University of Chicago
settlement house director Mary McDowell, opposed any new involvement in censorship work. 152
Most, however, supported or at least accepted the ACLU’s recommendations with respect to
censorship.
A letter to Baldwin from Harvard Law professor and future Supreme Court justice Felix
Frankfurter cogently expressed concerns shared by much of the National Committee. 153
Frankfurter argued against diluting the ACLU’s message and spreading its resources too thin.
He explained: “I am emphatically for a restriction of the Union to the protection of freedom of
speech, press and assembly, and equally emphatically against assuming responsibility for the
protection of negroes, the promotion of pacific ideals, the resistance of economic penetration in
Latin-America, etc., etc., etc., except in so far as activities or opinions in regard to the foregoing
or any other item, like birth control, raise questions of freedom of speech, press, and
assembly.” 154 Frankfurter wanted the ACLU to be interested in such issues as civil rights,
pacifism, internationalism, and birth control only to the extent that they implicated the freedom
to espouse those causes. He reasoned: “[I]t is one thing to ‘back up’ local groups that seek to
gain a hearing for birth control; it is a totally different thing to ‘back up’ that local group in
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securing birth control legislation. The former is the Union’s essential concern; the latter is none
of the Union’s business.” 155
Like an increasing contingent of civil libertarians, Frankfurter was ready to defend speech
regardless of its viewpoint. But he had a particular kind of speech in mind—namely, speech
advocating political or economic change, or access to the democratic process. As a veteran of
the post-World War I civil liberties movement, that is what “free speech” meant to him and to
the majority of his colleagues. A more libertarian position on artistic censorship would require a
major change in public values as well as the law. That change found an unexpected form in
United States v. Dennett.

United States v. Dennett
In 1926, Dennett proposed a legal challenge of the Comstock laws to Arthur Garfield
Hays. She hoped a court might be persuaded to enjoin the postal service from censoring The Sex
Side of Life. Hays was sympathetic to the project, but he thought their chances slim and
counseled Dennett to wait for a more opportune moment. 156 The problem, he explained, was the
standard of review. A court would declare the postal ruling invalid only if it was “arbitrary and
wholly without foundation”—a decidedly difficult hurdle. Dennett’s pamphlet was explicit in its
description of sex, and if a court considered its propriety subject to debate, it would uphold the
ban. 157 In other words, in the mid-1920s, postal suppression of Dennett’s pamphlet was so
clearly lawful that a renowned civil liberties attorney considered it imprudent to bring a test case.
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No court was likely to consider the censorship inappropriate, let alone declare it contrary to
legislative intent or, even more radically, unconstitutional.
Two years later, however, Dennett had better luck. When Morris Ernst published an
article attacking censorship, she wrote to him about her plight. Responding to her overture, Ernst
told her that he had followed her work for years and asked whether she had “ever considered
testing out the legality of the pamphlet in the courts.” 158 Dennett was forthright about Hays’s
discouraging advice. 159 Nonetheless, after some initial hesitance, Ernst enthusiastically devoted
himself to Dennett’s case, and he promptly began exploring possibilities for getting The Sex Side
of Life into court.
Postal authorities beat Ernst and Dennett to the punch. Despite the postal ban, a resolute
Dennett had continued to send her pamphlet through the mail in sealed envelopes throughout the
1920s. 160 The postal service quietly tolerated her defiance until 1928. In that year, however, in
purported response to a complaint by members of the Daughters of the American Revolution, the
Post Office Department ordered The Sex Side of Life from Dennett under a fictitious identity. 161
Dennett obligingly mailed out a copy of the pamphlet. 162 Soon thereafter, in December 1928,
she was indicted under the Comstock law in the Federal District Court sitting in Brooklyn, the
jurisdiction in which her Astoria, Queens home was located. Dennett faced a maximum sentence
of five years in prison or a five thousand dollar fine or both. 163 Ernst immediately agreed to
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represent her (he donated his time at both the trial and appellate levels 164), and he convinced the
ACLU to sign on as well.
When the ACLU agreed to sponsor Dennett’s case, no one on the Executive Committee
was advocating a full-scale assault on the obscenity laws. Rather, still reeling from their divisive
role in the Scopes trial, they saw Dennett’s prosecution as another opportunity to defend a
contentious contribution to modern science from the censorial reach of old-fashioned moralists—
this time, they hoped, without triggering public resentment. 165 According to ACLU literature,
The Sex Side of Life contributed to an important public discussion about sexual hygiene and
sexual relations within marriage. No one, they insisted, actually thought the pamphlet was
“obscene” in any legitimate sense of the word; squeamish, if not vindictive, authorities were
using the obscenity laws to quell discussion on an important but uncomfortable social issue.
Ernst’s strategy in the District Court was consistent with the ACLU’s expectations. His
first act as Dennett’s attorney, in January 1929, was to file a motion to quash her indictment.
That is, he asked Grover M. Moscowitz, the presiding judge, to rule that The Sex Side of Life was
not obscene as a matter of law. To do so, he sought to portray the pamphlet as an irreproachable
example of good, clean sex education—in the words of one of its medical endorsers, as “[t]he
simplest, sweetest, and most direct treatment of the subject” 166 ever produced. Adolescents,
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Ernst suggested, are not satisfied with cryptic allusions, and when no appropriate literature
exists, they rely on the “filthy misinformation of the streets, the dirty words chalked upon
signboards and the obscene gossip of other children.” 167 By contrast, the truth, unadorned and
respectful, was not obscene.
Ernst also urged the court to consider the motives and circumstances of publication. 168
Dennett’s rationale for producing the pamphlet—her belief that existing sex education literature
was inadequate because it did not grapple with the physical, moral or emotional implications of
sex—was, according to Ernst, “in complete accord with modern scientific thought.” The fact
that Dennett produced the pamphlet “as an unselfish social service,” 169 rather than to make
money, confirmed that her motives were pure. 170
In short, rather than challenge the existing definition of obscenity, Ernst argued that The
Sex Side of Life was safely outside its realm. The pamphlet, he insisted, “is neither smut nor
pornography. There is not a dirty word or a dirty thought in it.” 171 His memorandum to quash
the indictment quoted at length from a pamphlet produced by the New York State Department of
Health describing a need for comprehensive sex education materials of precisely the kind
Dennett had produced. 172
In the face of Ernst’s argument, Judge Moscowitz felt inadequate to the task of assessing
the pamphlet’s character. He therefore proposed an open hearing at which representatives from
both sides would express their opinions of the pamphlet. And he called three members of the
clergy—a Catholic priest, a Protestant minister, and a Jewish rabbi—to join him on the bench
167
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during arguments and to “aid the conscience of the court on the matter.” 173 All of this may
sound like the setup for a joke. And indeed, the exaggerated rhetoric of the prosecuting attorney,
United States District Attorney James E. Wilkinson, seems comical in retrospect. Wilkinson
denounced “The Sex Side of Life” as “pure and simple smut.” 174 “If I can stand between this
woman and the children of the land,” he proclaimed in court, “I will have accomplished
something.” 175
To Moscowitz, however, the issues were serious. Although he privately believed that
Dennett’s pamphlet was not obscene, he did not feel comfortable deciding the issue without
submitting it to a jury. 176 To make matters worse, Moscowitz was facing legal difficulties of his
own—charges of misconduct in an unrelated matter—and he feared the publicity that might
attend a decision either way in the highly publicized Dennett case. As it turned out, Moscowitz
never made use of his clerical guests 177; instead, he permitted the parties to submit written
statements. Ernst chose a representative sample from the scores of endorsements the pamphlet
had received, and Wilkinson submitted a collection of letters solicited in opposition. Even then
the decision was too much for Moscowitz, and he delayed the trial yet again. After a series of
postponements, he simply punted. With apologies, he convinced Ernst to have the case
transferred. 178 Ernst thereupon withdrew his motion to quash the indictment and filed a
173
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demurrer instead, which brought the matter before another judge, Marcus B. Campbell. Judge
Campbell heard argument from Ernst and Wilkinson on the demurrer, which he denied. He then
reassigned the case on the theory that Ernst would no longer want him to preside over the matter.
Dennett’s case finally went to trial April 1929, before Judge Warren B. Burrows. The
only evidence submitted to the jury, despite Ernst’s best efforts, was the pamphlet itself.
Burrows excluded all evidence of Dennett’s motives as well as the approval of the pamphlet by
educators and physicians. 179 The all-male jury returned a guilty verdict in under an hour. 180
Dennett was fined three thousand dollars, but she refused to pay and declared that she would
serve out her prison term instead. 181 Ernst promptly filed an appeal.
Although Ernst’s strategy did not avail Dennett in the District Court, he was optimistic
about persuading the appellate judges to reverse her conviction. He hoped that public outrage
over the lower court’s decision would carry weight on the appellate level. He devoted the bulk
of the brief to arguing that the District Court improperly excluded evidence of Dennett’s
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motivations and of the pamphlet’s positive reception, and that the case should never have gone to
trial. 182
But he also made a series of powerful substantive claims about the Comstock Act that
moved beyond his arguments at trial. First, he argued that The Sex Side of Life did not fall within
the category of obscenity as it ought to be defined. In his brief, Ernst traced the history of
obscenity in the law and argued that the “essence of the crime is sexual impurity, not sex
itself.” 183 A publication like Dennett’s, which neither was impure nor “pander[ed] to the prurient
taste,” was not properly within the meaning of the statute.
In this regard, Ernst’s rhetorical task was to portray The Sex Side of Life as an “honest
presentation of sex facts,” firmly planted in an educational mission. He was at pains to
distinguish the pamphlet from those modes of speech deemed subject to regulation in the past:
“lurid literature and advertisements distributed by quacks to beguile the public into buying
worthless nostrums” (that is, the information on birth control that had once been grist for the
Comstock mill), “violent attack[s] on religion or religious customs,” “defense[s] of illegitimacy
or moral laxity,” and “forthright pornography.” And Dennett’s book was indeed a departure
from these earlier forms of sexualized literature, some informative, some prurient.
Ernst also made a bolder argument on appeal: he claimed that the Comstock Law was
unconstitutional. He argued first that the federal government had exceeded its authority in
propagating the statute—that control over people’s morality had never been relinquished to it.
He cautioned that if the obscenity law were deemed constitutional, the government would be
empowered to enforce a federal moral standard that might directly conflict with the local
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standards of the various states, to which such decisions were entrusted. 184 But Ernst, unlike the
historical predecessors he cited, did not merely suggest that the statute fell outside the federal
power to control the post roads under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. He also argued that
it flatly contravened the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 185
Ernst was not naïve about his chances. The ACLU had written off constitutional
argument in a 1928 bulletin describing its position on obscenity. “There is no longer any doubt
that so-called obscene publications are not protected by the federal constitution,” it reported with
apparent resignation. 186 The Supreme Court had ruled in Ex parte Jackson that the First
Amendment did not apply to the mails, and it had given no indication that it was about to change
its mind.187 Indeed, Ernst conceded that obscenity statutes had been repeatedly deemed
constitutional by the federal courts. 188 He nonetheless contended that changing public mores
warranted reconsideration of the issue. Most important, he sought to extend the powerful
rhetoric of Justice Holmes and Brandeis’s dissents in the Supreme Court’s recent First
Amendment cases, which dealt with political speech, to the obscenity cases. For example, he
quoted from Justice Holmes’s dissenting opinion in United States v. Schwimmer: “if there is any
principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the
principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the
thought that we hate.” 189
In 1930, the vast majority of what today falls within the scope of the First Amendment
was beyond its purview. Even in the realm of political speech, few interwar free speech
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advocates believed that the Founders had anticipated and enshrined in the Constitution a robust
vision of freedom of expression. Rather, ACLU attorneys sought consciously to write free
speech into the First Amendment. Law, to these legal realists, was not a vehicle for protecting
natural rights. It was a political tool. 190 And while Ernst’s First Amendment argument was
predictably unavailing, the fact that he made it at all reflects a sense of new possibility. He
argued that the Comstock Law was unconstitutional because he believed there was a fighting
chance that the Second Circuit would agree.
Judge Augustus N. Hand, writing on behalf of a three-judge panel, 191 accepted the spirit
of Ernst’s argument if not its implications. Hand insisted that there could be no doubt about the
constitutionality of the statute, but he nonetheless reversed Dennett’s conviction on the basis that
The Sex Side of Life was not obscene. The decision implicitly modified the test adopted by the
Supreme Court fifty years earlier in United States v. Bennett. 192 In Bennett, the defendant had
been convicted of mailing a pamphlet advocating the legalization of prostitution. Judge Samuel
Blatchford affirmed the District Court’s application of the “Hicklin test,” named for the 1868
British case, Regina v. Hicklin, from which it was derived. In that case, Lord Chief Justice
Cockburn had inquired “whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave
and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a
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publication of this sort may fall.” 193 Under the Hicklin test, a work could be judged obscene on
the basis of a single passage that would corrupt youth, the most susceptible of audiences. 194
Judge Hand’s opinion in Dennett was more permissive. A sex education pamphlet like
Dennett’s might have an “incidental tendency to arouse sex impulses,” he explained, but that
effect was “apart from and subordinate to its main effect.” Any sex instruction might titillate
some of its readers, but in Dennett’s case, this tendency “would seem to be outweighed by the
elimination of ignorance, curiosity, and morbid fear.” A work must be judged in its entirety; an
explicit passage in a truthful and socially constructive sex education pamphlet would not render
the whole work obscene. In sum, the court held, “an accurate exposition of the relevant facts of
the sex side of life in decent language and in manifestly serious and disinterested spirit cannot
ordinarily be regarded as obscene.” 195
Dennett was decided as a matter of statutory interpretation. Modest in its reasoning, it left
the Comstock Act more or less intact. And yet, it signaled the end of judicial deference to postal
censorship. Judge Hand’s opinion meant that judges would henceforth subject administrative
determinations of obscenity to genuine examination. Moreover, it acknowledged for the first
time that sexual matters were not always or necessarily destructive of social values. Indeed, its
basic recognition of a public interest in sex laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court’s midcentury extension of First Amendment protection to sexually explicit speech. 196
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Despite her relief, Dennett refrained from celebrating for a several days while the
government decided whether to appeal the case to the Supreme Court. The United States
Attorney filed a request to do so, 197 but the Solicitor General, Thomas T. Thacher, decided to let
the Second Circuit’s decision stand. According to Thacher, Dennett was a mere factual dispute
unworthy of consideration by the Supreme Court. 198 In reality, of course, the Second Circuit’s
decision effected a very real change in the law of obscenity. But public opposition to the case,
along with the possibility of an adverse judgment in the Supreme Court, no doubt dissuaded
Thacher from pursuing the issue.
A few years after Dennett, Morris Ernst would declare: “The decisions of the courts have
nothing to do with justice. . . . [T]he point of view of the judge derives from the pressure of
public opinion.” 199 While Ernst’s claim is an oversimplification, it rang true in the Dennett case.
Many prominent men and women, along with myriad organizations and members of the clergy,
had rallied to Dennett’s defense. 200 Indeed, in her letters to her family, Dennett described an
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outpouring of assistance and encouragement from all reaches of society. “The support for the
case is rolling up till it looks like a mountain range,” she reported. Aid was forthcoming from
organizations as well as private citizens. The New Republic donated its back cover to the
Defense Committee. Associations and universities issued official statements on Dennett’s
behalf. Old friends and colleagues from Dennett’s suffrage and Voluntary Parenthood League
days—including muckraker Ida Tarbell—reestablished correspondence and offered to help, and
hundreds of strangers sent letters, donations, and orders for The Sex Side of Life. 201 Dennett was
most touched by the support she received from ordinary people, including an Italian worker,
whose letter Dennett had translated by a neighbor, 202 and a “colored” man who offered to serve
Dennett’s sentence in her stead. 203
When the decision was announced, newspapers throughout the country ridiculed the
prosecution and congratulated Dennett on her victory. 204 Journalistic support may have been
particularly enthusiastic given the financial and editorial interests at stake. One might suppose,
for example, that Roy Howard agreed to chair the Dennett Defense Committee because the
prospect of leniency in the obscenity laws appealed to his business sense as well as his aesthetic
sensibilities. 205 But whatever the underlying motivation, coverage of the Second Circuit decision
was unqualifiedly exuberant. The Kansas City Star considered it “preposterous that [Dennett]
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should have been put to trial.” 206 The World called the reversal of Dennett’s conviction “a denial
of the archaic idea on which this prosecution rested and which threatened free thought so
seriously,” a decision “manifestly of the first importance.” 207 Lewis Gannett of the Tribune
labeled Dennett “an historic case, a landmark in the history of America’s attitude toward sex,” 208
and he hailed the court’s decision as a clarion call for broader reform.
The ACLU was effusive, calling the Second Circuit’s decision “an outstanding victory
for free speech” that would dissuade the government from bringing future prosecutions. 209
Dennett too was gratified by the outcome. 210 Ernst, however, was less sanguine. Certainly, he
was pleased by Judge Hand’s opinion and its vindication of The Sex Side of Life. He nonetheless
regretted that the decision did not undermine postal censorship more broadly. 211
In this context, a final point about Ernst’s litigation strategy bears mentioning. It is a
prerogative of the lawyer to argue in the alternative—to set out multiple and even inconsistent
theories according to which a court might reach a decision for the litigant. In the Dennett case,
Ernst did precisely that. The Second Circuit reversed Dennett’s conviction not because The Sex
Side of Life expressed the author’s imagination or because it evoked an intellectual response in
the reader or even because it did no harm, but rather because it enhanced the public good.
Though formulated a full decade after World War I, Ernst’s brief supplied the court with a
progressive vision of First Amendment Law: “[I]f enlightenment and breadth of vision are
necessary to social welfare; if it is right to try and banish ignorance from a realm of human study
where taboos and truth-dodging have been definitely established as the causes of incalculable
206
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harm in the past, then the judgment of conviction must be set aside, and the defendant
discharged.” 212 Ernst argued throughout the proceedings that Dennett’s pamphlet deserved
protection because it was of substantial social value. This was a position that the Second Circuit
proved willing to accept.
And yet Ernst also gestured, in conclusion to his brief, toward a bolder principle. “[E]ven
if the pamphlet were not educational, even if it were utterly worthless,” he suggested, “the mere
fact that it deals with sex would not bring it within the statute.” He clarified: “[T]o be obscene
within the meaning of the law [the pamphlet] must be more than coarse, vulgar or indecent, more
than scurrilous and vicious, more than indelicate and shocking to the sense of modesty of the
community, more than offensive to the institutions, ideals and doctrinal conceptions of the
people. It must be found to have a lewd, lascivious and obscene tendency calculated definitely to
corrupt and undermine the minds and morals of the community.” 213 Put simply, Ernst argued
that regardless of social worth, all expression should be permissible unless its principal purpose
was to pollute public morals. 214 In doing so, he urged the court to break from precedent and
accept a radical new vision of free speech.
Ernst would litigate dozens of obscenity cases over the next decade, winning most of
them. 215 The early cases involved “wholesome” materials of the Dennett variety. Over time,
however, Ernst became more ambitious. Still citing Dennett as a central precedent, he defended
a body of literature and illustrations that verged increasingly on the pornographic. 216 It is evident
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from Judge Hand’s decision that in 1930 the courts were not yet ready to accept this approach,
which would have removed government from the business of deciding which ideas are good for
society. Ernst, however, was ready to espouse it. And the Dennett case had made this new
position possible, even before the Second Circuit’s decision was handed down.

The ACLU’s Campaign against Censorship
In histories of free speech, United States v. Dennett is generally cast (often in footnotes)
as a pivotal precursor to United States v. Ulysses and the final demise of the Hicklin test. 217 And
indeed, as a doctrinal matter, Dennett did provide the basis for future decisions. But Dennett was
more than a step along the way to the judicial protection of artistic expression. In the months
after the Second Circuit’s decision, the ACLU capitalized on the popularity of the Dennett case
to reevaluate and expand its position on censorship. The reformulation was not a matter of
simple opportunism. Rather, the public conversation about censorship unleashed by Dennett’s
conviction and subsequent vindication changed the way that the ACLU related to the law and
politics of obscenity. Although it began as an education case in the mid-1920s mold, United
States v. Dennett sparked a debate about whether censors could ever be trusted to advance the
public good. The appeal and its aftermath strongly influenced the beliefs and tactics of
influential civil libertarians, as well as their contributors and supporters. Within a few years of
the Second Circuit’s decision, civil libertarians were aggressively advocating not only open sex
education but also artistic freedom and even, in some cases, birth control.
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United States v. Dennett marked a turning point in the intellectual trajectory of the ACLU
and, more broadly, in American understandings of and relationships to civil liberties. There is no
doubt that extrinsic developments, from the cultural experimentalism of the Roaring Twenties to
the compelling rhetoric of Holmes and Brandeis’ First Amendment dissents, influenced the
course of events. The ACLU appointed Ernst and Hays as general counsel in the late 1920s
because free speech was becoming an increasingly liberal and lawyerly affair. Ernst, for his part,
was moving toward a theory of expressive autonomy well before Mary Ware Dennett sought his
services. He was resistant to morals regulations from the start, and the professional and financial
pressures of his private law practice were nudging him ever more forcefully in that direction.
The circumstances of Dennett’s prosecution were, however, particularly well suited to Ernst’s
needs. Ernst was acutely aware that an unfavorable legal posture or an unsympathetic defendant
could undermine the soundest of litigation strategies. 218 He knew that a public relations defeat
for the ACLU would be costly for the organization; if it happened on his watch, it threatened to
shift internal authority to the board’s progressive holdouts. Dennett was Ernst’s opportunity to
bring together the tolerance of dissent and the freedom from sexual squeamishness under a single
civil liberties banner.
In a period when government regulation of private life seemed increasingly trivial,
ineffectual, and ill advised, the defense of sex education was a singularly persuasive cause. A
constellation of factors made Dennett a landmark event in the history of civil liberties, ranging
from popular support for the case and the financial contributions it generated to Ernst’s
newfound confidence in strategic litigation. The very fact of winning in United States v. Dennett
made a broader agenda seem possible.
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As an organizational and institutional matter, Dennett’s ordeal was instrumental in
expanding the ACLU’s position on censorship. The Executive Committee officially offered
Dennett the organization’s support in January 1929. 219 In April of that year, the board
constituted “The Mary Ware Dennett Defense Committee,” 220 which was to include educational,
religious, and scientific leaders from across the country and drum up public support for
Dennett’s cause. 221 In early November, the Defense Committee (headed by John Dewey, 222 after
several months under the leadership of Scripps-Howard newspaper publisher Roy Howard)
launched a national campaign on Dennett’s behalf, soliciting support throughout the United
States. 223
Early on, the ACLU was enthusiastically committed to Dennett’s defense but
conservative in its justification of the pamphlet. It explained its participation in the case in
narrow terms, emphasizing the propriety and importance of The Sex Side of Life rather than
asserting an abstract right against state interference in private matters: “[W]e condemn the
prosecution as an evidence of an intolerant and unenlightened attitude toward the serious
discussion of the facts of sex. Obscenity should not be defined in law or in facts as governing
the instruction of youth in matters of vital concern to wholesome living. Mrs. Dennett’s highminded motive, her wisdom in presenting a difficult subject and the practical value of her
pamphlet have been attested over ten years by thousands of educators, clergymen, and social
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workers.” 224 Freedom of the press, argued the ACLU, “means the right to print and distribute
freely facts or opinions on public issues.” 225 The Sex Side of Life was not obscene because it did
just that: it provided children with sorely needed information on sex education, a public issue of
the utmost importance. Even one year later, as the appellate decision neared, the ACLU clung to
its early position. 226 A press bulletin issued in January 1930 quoted Forrest Bailey, secretary of
the Mary Ware Dennett Defense Committee: “The real question the court is asked to decide,” he
said, “is whether a serious and accurate piece of writing on sex that has been found valuable for
ten years in the work of leading educational and welfare agencies can be condemned as
‘obscene’ in the meaning of the law.” 227
At Ernst’s urging, however, the Second Circuit’s decision ventured significantly beyond
the modest question that Bailey described—indeed, it fundamentally changed the legal doctrine
of obscenity. And the litigation, sensationalistic from the outset, 228 generated outpourings of
public support that changed the ACLU’s vision of civil liberties. The change did not quite
happen overnight. As late as 1932, Ernst complained that “many people who belong to an
organization such as the Civil Liberties Union are afraid of the right to spread sexual ideas.” 229
Still, after Dennett, obscenity was undeniably a civil liberties issue. The Executive Board of the
ACLU, guided by Ernst, seized on the Dennett case to explore and excoriate postal censorship
more generally. “The importance of the case in court far exceeds the issue of [The Sex Side of
Life] itself,” an ACLU pamphlet explained. “It involves the whole method of determining
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obscenity, the rules of evidence in trials, and the constitutionality of the law under which the Post
Office Department operates its censorship.” 230
Just as the Dennett case convinced civil libertarians that obscenity was a worthwhile civil
liberties issue, it also persuaded many anti-obscenity activists that censorship laws at least
occasionally resulted in the suppression of desirable speech. Mainstream organizations,
including the League of Women Voters and the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union,
advocated “rigid enforcement of anti-vice laws,” but they also lobbied for better sex
education. 231 Like their male counterparts in the anti-vice movement, they condemned “dirty”
magazines, movies, and burlesque shows. At the same time, however, they regarded marital sex
as natural and desirable. 232 Characteristically, Catheryne Cooke Gilman, a leading antiobscenity reformer, circulated The Sex Side of Life to teenagers (and planned to adapt the text for
younger children) in order to discourage the sex delinquency that she attributed to inadequate sex
education and induced ignorance, or “the conspiracy of silence.” 233
Gilman’s attitude was representative of an increasingly influential segment of the antiobscenity movement that sought simultaneously to eliminate prurience and to promote healthy
and fulfilling sexual practices within marriage. 234 “Old-fashioned” vice crusaders, such as
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Boston’s Watch and Ward Society and the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice,
indiscriminately condemned all sexually explicit material. 235 Indeed, from their perspective,
materials like Dennett’s were even more dangerous than outright pornography, because they
threatened to make sex respectable. 236 By contrast, reformers like Gilman saw sex education
materials as an antidote to sexual prurience rather than its cause. They feared that prosecutors
would target educational offerings rather than the more worrisome but better financed
commercial ones. 237 Many endorsed explicit medical materials about sex, and few frankly
opposed contraception. 238 While Gilman and her allies continued to distinguish desirable
treatments of sex, like The Sex Side of Life, from the more vulgar sort, 239 Dennett’s prosecution
demonstrated how easily censorship laws could target the former and prompted many social
moderates to question censorship in general.
In short, ordinary citizens felt strongly that Dennett’s prosecution crossed a line, and free
speech enthusiasts pressed their advantage. In May 1929, fifteen hundred people attended a
Town Hall meeting to discuss the Dennett case and associated issues. Speakers cited a need for
freedom of instruction on “sex subjects” by health authorities, religious bodies, and educators,
among other groups. “Because this freedom [was] shown by the recent trial and conviction of
Mary Ware Dennett to be seriously menaced,” the attendees called for the formation of a
permanent agency on censorship. Its principal purpose was to resist the censorship of sex
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education, but its agenda would encompass the “systematic consideration of censorship and the
problems of public policy underlying it,” as well as “recommendation for alterations in existing
laws, federal and state, wherever required to insure the necessary freedom.” 240
Out of this meeting, the National Committee for Freedom from Censorship (“NCFC”)
was born. Crucially, contributions to the Dennett Defense Fund had far exceeded what was
necessary for the appeal, and the ACLU voted to finance the NCFC out of the surplus. The
fundraising potential of the anti-censorship work took on increasing significance in the wake of
the stock market crash and encouraged the organization’s new direction. 241 From the outset, the
NCFC emphasized the need for direct action as well as litigation. In March, a few days after
Judge Hand issued his opinion in Dennett, an ACLU bulletin instructed members to urge their
local broadcasting stations to protest exclusion of the subject of birth control from the air. 242
One year later, the ACLU’s Monthly Bulletin for Action asked ACLU constituents to monitor
for news of censorship initiatives or ordinances in their cities and towns.
By 1931, the ACLU was ready to enter the censorship fray in full force. The Board of
Directors hoped to unify the anti-censorship campaign, and to that end it hired a full-time
secretary for the NCFC. 243 In July, the council announced a “drive against censorship in all its
forms” headed by Pulitzer Prize-winning playwright Hatcher Hughes. 244 It pursued reform
through a combination of legislative change and test case litigation. In particular, it focused on
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post office censorship, state movie censorship laws, the New York state theater padlock law, and
the vice societies. 245
Dennett herself became a powerful voice for civil liberties, and she was influential in
expanding the ACLU’s mission. Fresh from her court battle, she had a lot to say about the
ACLU’s new project. “Censorship is like wearing gray clothes because they don’t show the
dirt,” she quipped in a 1930 forum. 246 For Dennett, the crusade against obscenity censorship
meant doing battle with the “miserable old concept that sex itself is dirty.” On the one hand, she
advocated the free distribution of birth control and sex education literature because she deemed it
“clean.” 247 But she went much further, at this point suggesting that sexually explicit expression
might be worth protecting even if she—or progressive social and scientific circles more
broadly—deemed it perverse instead of illuminating. 248
The antidote to obscenity, according to Dennett, was more speech. “In the course of time
it will become clear to all normal citizens,” she insisted, “that the dirt-seeing faculty can be
educated but not legislated out of people. As that discovery is made by larger and larger sections
of the public, the demand will grow for dumping the obscenity laws into the legal scrap-basket as
just so much useless clutter.” 249 Her stated goal—to “gradually eliminate the obscene mind from
the world”— was still publicly oriented, but no amount of legal finessing and fine-tuning would
accomplish the task. 250 “The cure for the situation,” she insisted, “lies not in more suppression,
but in less and less.” 251
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Significantly, Dennett was proposing the same remedy for antisocial and corruptive
speech in the moral realm as civil libertarians had been advocating in the political sphere for the
past half-decade. Her reasoning, however, was subtly different. In the political context, ACLU
lawyers argued that bad ideas (for example, the Ku Klux Klan’s) would be less powerful, and
less damaging, if they were exposed to scrutiny; good ideas, even unpopular ones, would
withstand a critical barrage. That rationale did not easily translate to the circulation of sexually
explicit speech, where legalization seemed sure to increase consumption of lascivious materials.
Dennett claimed that education would operate more effectively when its target was out in the
open, but the argument was clearly a stretch, as her former allies in the social hygiene movement
were quick to point out.
In reality, Dennett was approaching a libertarian stance on speech issues that far
outstripped her reformist roots. The problem, for Dennett, lay in specifying a legal definition of
obscenity. In her view, obscenity was by its very nature culturally dependent. “It varies
ridiculously from time to time and from place to place,” she noted, in a formulation that presaged
the language of the Supreme Court decades later. Given the slipperiness of social norms, it was
foolhardy and dangerous to enforce community standards from the top down. Though Dennett
still invoked the “public interest,” that notion was becoming increasingly theoretical and abstract.
When she said that the tolerance of divergent beliefs and behaviors served the public interest, she
simply meant that the best society was one that valued cultural pluralism, if not individual
freedom. The ACLU actively solicited Dennett’s views on what sorts of projects the NCFC
should pursue, and her evolving free speech absolutism pushed the organization in new
directions. 252
252
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Of course, Dennett and Dennett were only one part of the new movement. The NCFC
capitalized (literally and figuratively) on its victory in Dennett, but mounting public opposition
to censorship had helped make the groundswell of public support for Dennett possible in the first
place. As is so often the case, government efforts to ratchet up the suppression of speech gave
rise to a broad-based resistance movement. 253 Already in 1929, as vice crusaders in Boston and
New York intensified their efforts to suppress “immoral” speech, the ACLU counted the
censorship of books, plays and talking movies 254 among the three new issues facing civil
libertarians. 255 The onset of the Depression made matters worse, as publishers and producers
pushed the boundaries of acceptability in order to attract bigger audiences and stay afloat. In
New York State, the ACLU mobilized against a 1931 censorship bill that would have created a
bureaucratic mechanism for regulating plays, akin to the one already in place for motion
pictures. 256 Civil liberties advocates took advantage of the heated public debate surrounding the
proposal to attack censorship more generally. Participants at a meeting organized to discuss the
bill roundly condemned it, but they also “pledge[d] unremitting effort to repeal existing
censorship laws,” including post office censorship, the restrictive regulation of the airwaves by
the FCC, the censorship of moving pictures, mandatory curricula, and sectarian religious
exercises in the public schools. 257
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The public attention generated by the effort to defeat theater censorship also spilled over
into the NCFC’s campaign against customs censorship. During the 1920s, the Customs Office
unilaterally prevented the importation of thousands of medical, scientific, and artistic texts. In
the fall of 1929, the NCFC worked with Senator Bronson Cutting to craft amendments to the
tariff bill that sharply curtailed customs censorship authority by transferring the power to
determine whether a work was obscene from the customs office to the federal courts. 258 The
change in venue reflected a concerted effort on the part of civil libertarians to weaken
administrative control over speech. The post office, of course, had long been an eager censor,
from its quest for prurience after passage of the Comstock laws through its crusade to weed out
national disloyalty under the Espionage Act. But the interwar expansion of the administrative
state made the threat of bureaucratic authority increasingly pressing. As the Dennett case
demonstrated, unchecked administrative discretion was apt to target not only unpopular speech,
but even popularly valued speech—especially when its authors were critical of the state. Rather
than extol agencies for their expertise and insulation from political influence, as they had done
several years prior, groups like the NCFC overcame their lingering Lochner-era inhibitions and
hailed the courts as a fairer forum for resolving disputes.

Censorship in the Courts
Appropriately enough, the new tariff law became the vehicle for Morris Ernst’s next
major legal battles. Within a year of Judge Hand’s opinion in Dennett, Judge John M. Woolsey
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produced two trail-blazing obscenity decisions in the Southern District of New York. Both
involved the exclusion by customs agents of books written by Dr. Marie C. Stopes, a leading
British birth controller; both were argued by Ernst; and both were filed under the Tariff Act of
1930, which prohibited the importation of any material “which is obscene or immoral.” 259 In
both cases, as in the many others he would argue in the coming years, Ernst emphasized
changing public mores. The public, he insisted, was ready to talk openly about sex. 260
The first case, United States v. One Obscene Book, entitled “Married Love,” 261 centered
on Stopes’s sex manual for married couples. Stopes was a longtime friend of Dennett’s, and
Dennett urged Ernst to take up the case. 262 Although Judge Woolsey decided the matter on
procedural grounds (the proceeding was barred, he held, by a prior decision in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania that deemed the work not obscene and thus eligible for importation), he
was moving toward a wholesale reformulation of the Hicklin test, at least in the customs context.
In doing so, he relied heavily on the Dennett precedent. Ernst devoted three full pages of the
brief to comparison with Dennett, and he submitted a copy of The Sex Side of Life as well as his
appellate brief from the case to the court. 263 The strategy worked. The book was not obscene, in
Woolsey’s view, because it “treat[ed] quite as decently and with as much restraint of the sex
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relations as did Mrs. Mary Ware Dennett in ‘The Sex Side of Life, An Explanation for Young
People.’” 264 Married Love, according to Woolsey, “may fairly be said to do for adults what Mrs.
Dennett’s book does for adolescents.” 265
In The Nation, Dennett—who by virtue of her published writing as well as her own
travails had come to be regarded as something of an expert on obscenity law—celebrated
Woolsey’s decision in the Married Love case. She identified two factors that appeared
promising for future cases. First, judges had begun to appraise publications based on their total
effect and intent rather than considering isolated excerpts. Second, the recent decisions
presupposed a reader of normal intelligence and demeanor, not an unusually susceptible one. 266
Both ideas had been latent in her own case, but Judge Woolsey’s opinion in Married Love made
them explicit. His decision, according to Dennett, “has established another precedent by which
the absurd obscenity statutes of this country may be slowly but surely broken down.” 267
Three months later, in July 1931, Judge Woolsey built upon that precedent in United
States v. One Book Entitled “Contraception.” 268 Ernst and his colleague Alexander Lindey,
acting together on behalf of the NCFC, represented the book in what Gordon Moss called “the
first test case undertaken by this Council in an effort to liberalize the Customs censorship of
foreign books.” 269 The Contraception case, like Married Love, involved the importation of a
practical guide by Dr. Stopes. This one, however, was bolder in its content. Contraception was
an explicit account of the theory, history, and practice of birth control. Applying the test he had
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articulated in the Married Love case, Judge Woolsey reasoned that the reading of Contraception
“would not stir the sex impulses of any person with a normal mind.” 270 As a “scientific book
written with obvious seriousness and with great decency,” it was not obscene. Nor was it a drug,
medicine, or article for the prevention of conception within the meaning of the statute. Woolsey
therefore dismissed the action against the seized book and held that Contraception was eligible
for importation into the United States. His opinion made it permissible to import birth control
information for the first time since the practice was made illegal in 1890. 271
However progressive Woolsey’s views, his decisions in the two obscenity cases are as
notable for what they did not hold as for the relief they granted. In both cases, the ACLU argued
that the customs law violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press.
Woolsey rejected this argument in short shrift. “I think there is nothing in this contention,” he
wrote. “The section does not involve the suppression of a book before it is published, but the
exclusion of an already published book which is sought to be brought into the United States. . . .
Laws which are thus disciplinary of publications whether involving exclusion from the mails or
from this country do not interfere with freedom of the press.” 272 Freedom of the press, for
Woolsey, meant freedom from prior restraints on publication. 273 He was not yet ready for an
extension of the First Amendment on the order of what the ACLU was suggesting. The
constitutional argument was a long shot in the customs case, just as it was in United States v.
Dennett.
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Nor did the Woolsey decisions represent a frontal assault on the Comstock Laws. As
NCFC Secretary Gordon Moss was careful to emphasize, the Contraception case involved the
Customs Bureau law, a statute far narrower than the postal laws, which explicitly prohibited the
transportation of birth control materials by mail. 274 Moss was skeptical that the decision (or any
others) would have much weight in “whittl[ing down the meaning of the postal prohibition,”
which “appear[ed] to be water-tight.” 275
Finally, Married Love and Contraception applied only to medical and scientific tracts. 276
The judiciary had not yet signaled a similar openness with respect to literary texts. The ACLU
was ready to move on this issue, but it was waiting for an ideal test case. In a letter to Arthur
Garfield Hays regarding a medical text containing “many illustrations of a decidedly risqué
character,” Gordon Moss relayed the position of at least one representative of Ernst’s office
when it came to strategic litigation: “[W]e should take only those cases where the cards [are]
stacked in our favor, and where a favorable decision would establish precedent for an entire class
of literature heretofore prohibited.” 277 The constraints were even more rigid in the realm of
artistic expression, 278 where the ACLU was hesitant to defend any book written in the twentieth
century. Strategic litigation had availed the ACLU well in the past decade, and it was a method
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with strict practical guidelines. Gordon Moss believed that censorship “in the field of literature”
should first “be taken up on behalf of these old classics.” 279
Nonetheless, the book that would break down the censorship barriers turned out to be
decidedly modern: James’s Joyce’s Ulysses, a book as celebrated by critics as it was castigated
by vice crusaders. Ernst represented Random House, which had contracted with Joyce to publish
an American trade edition of the book, and he actively sought to avoid litigation in the matter. 280
Although the U.S. Attorney’s office chose (reluctantly) to prosecute, Ernst was able to arrange
for Judge Woolsey to preside over the case. 281 Chastened by Woolsey’s dismissive tone in the
Stopes cases, Ernst did not even raise a First Amendment claim. Instead, he played up Ulysses’s
artistic innovativeness and its reliance on real and familiar patterns of colloquial speech. Joyce’s
profanity was not intended to incite lustfulness, he argued; it was designed to reveal the harsh
reality of human expression and behavior. Judge Woolsey was convinced. In United States v.
One Book Entitled Ulysses, 282 Woolsey explicitly repudiated the Hicklin test. Once again
deeming the customs laws inapplicable, he reasoned that even in the literary context a book must
be judged by its aggregate effect, not by isolated passages, and that obscenity must “be tested by
the court’s opinion as to its effect on a person with average sex instincts.” In November 1933,
the Second Circuit agreed. 283
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The public outcry over the censorship and prosecution of Ulysses became a political
liability for the Hoover administration, a lesson that the newly elected Roosevelt took to heart.
The devastating effects of the Depression had made the vice crusaders’ efforts to curb the
circulation of sexual materials seem increasingly trivial. As Ernst explained in 1934, “In this
period while men’s stomachs have been empty, there appears to have been less fear of writings
dealings with sex.” 284 The press coverage of Ulysses drove this point home, and in the wake of
the Second Circuit’s decision, the Customs Service hired a special advisor on obscenity matters
and downsized its censorship effort substantially. 285 In short, Ulysses changed the practice as
well as law of customs censorship—and, by extension, it precipitated a real shift in mainstream
American attitudes about obscenity. After Ulysses, many foreign books long since barred as
obscene were made available in reputable American bookstores for the first time. This ease of
access, in turn, encouraged many American readers to rethink the acceptable parameters of
sexual propriety in literature. Whatever its limitations, the Ulysses case was a major victory for
Ernst and the civil liberties movement. A 1938 Harvard Law Review article, reflecting on the
decision, called it a “new deal for literature.” 286
A new public appreciation for artistic freedom and the reformulation of obscenity law
were the most visible legacies of United States v. Dennett. But birth control was Dennett’s true
and enduring passion, and it is appropriate that her own legal battle paved the way for a major
liberalization on that issue as well. As with obscenity, the legal battle was only part of the story.
To begin with, Americans were becoming increasingly suspicious of government regulation of
private life. The failure of Prohibition provided a timely example of the folly of interfering with
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private morality. A few years later, in the aftermath of Judge Woolsey’s decision in Ulysses,
Morris Ernst tellingly declared: “The ﬁrst week of December 1933 will go down in history for
two repeals, that of Prohibition and that of squeamishness in literature. . . . Perhaps the
intolerance which closed our breweries was the intolerance which decreed that basic human
functions had to be treated in books in a furtive, leering, hypocritical manner.” 287
Ernst might easily have extended the comparison to contraception. 288 Opinion polls over
the course of the late 1920s and early 1930s showed a steady upward trend in popular support for
birth control, which was rapidly winning mainstream approval. 289 The Depression was
instrumental in this change. Many Americans regarded family limitation as a necessary corollary
to their increasingly strained household finances. 290 In 1931, the Federal Council of Churches of
Christ in America, a coalition of mainline Protestant denominations (and the precursor to the
National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America), tentatively
approved the use of birth control by married couples. A substantial majority of its Committee on
Marriage and the Home believed that “the careful and restrained use of contraceptives by
married people is valid and moral” and that “[s]ex union between husbands and wives as an
expression of mutual affection, without relation to procreation, is right.” 291
Still, as in the case of obscenity regulation, the courts moved more closely in step with
public opinion than the legislatures did. Despite growing approval for contraception, state and
287
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federal governments were reluctant to anger religious constituencies by tackling the issue
directly, and they continued to censor materials advocating and explaining their use. 292
Disillusioned with the prospects of legislative change, Morris Ernst suggested “nullification” of
prohibitions on birth control, a process which entailed executive non-enforcement as well as
judicial erosion of the laws. 293 Significantly, and somewhat counter-intuitively, this strategy was
predicated on the realist assumption that judicial decisions would reflect changing social
norms—not the modern, liberal notion that courts would serve as a check on repressive
majoritarian impulses. In other words, Ernst believed, Lochner notwithstanding, that courts were
more likely than legislatures to resist pressures by powerful donors or by small but influential
voting blocs. Partly, the difference was a function of framing: whereas a legislative vote to
legalize birth control (or to permit communist leafleting) would look like a substantive
endorsement of promiscuous sex (or of communism), an equivalent judicial decision could more
easily be cast as an abstract commitment to individual rights. Consequently, Ernst increasingly
focused his energies on incremental judicial reform. His approach was fruitful, and Dennett was
among its critical components. The doctrinal progression from United States v. Dennett to the
pivotal 1936 birth control case United States v. One Package was indirect in comparison with the
parallel path from Dennett to Ulysses, but the Dennett precedent was nonetheless crucial.
One step in the “nullification” process was the Contraception case. As Dennett had long
argued, the practice of birth control would never be made legal as long as information about
contraceptives was forbidden. The Comstock Act, however, had prohibited more than writing
about contraception; it had also banned from the mails “any drug or medicine, or any article
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whatever, for the prevention of conception, or for causing unlawful abortion.” That provision,
too, needed to be whittled down.
The first major breakthrough came in 1930, with the Youngs Rubber case. 294 In it, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was asked to decide a trademark
infringement lawsuit by the manufacturer of Trojan condoms. In his opinion, Judge Thomas
Swan, who had been a member of the Second Circuit panel that reversed Dennett’s conviction,
declared (albeit in dicta 295) that contraceptives were permissible when prescribed by physicians.
Three years later, the Comstock laws were limited still further, with the Sixth Circuit’s decision
in Davis v. United States. 296 The defendants in that case, contraceptive wholesalers, were
charged in Ohio with the circulation of contraceptive devices by common carrier. 297 The Sixth
Circuit judges were not bound by Second Circuit precedent, but they nonetheless cited Dennett
for the proposition that birth control laws “must be given a reasonable construction.” 298
The Davis decision, in turn, provided a persuasive doctrinal basis for the Second Circuit’s
1936 decision in United States v. One Package, which invalidated importation restrictions on
medically indicated contraceptives. 299 That case was sponsored by Margaret Sanger and the
American Birth Control League. Like so many others, it was argued by Morris Ernst, who
would serve for many years as general counsel of Planned Parenthood. As fate would have it, it
was heard in the District Court by Judge Grover Moscowitz, who by then had ridden out the
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misconduct charges that stole him away from the Dennett case. 300 Moscowitz held that the
diaphragms at issue had been seized improperly by customs because they were intended for
medical purposes. Judge Augustus Hand, once again writing for the Second Circuit, affirmed
Moscowitz’s decision. 301 According to Hand, Congress would not have intended to “prevent the
importation, sale, or carriage by mail of things which might intelligently be employed by
conscientious and competent physicians for the purpose of saving life or promoting the well
being of their patients.” 302
Like Dennett itself, the case was decided as a matter of statutory interpretation only. It
did not create a liberty interest in contraception, despite Ernst’s efforts, 303 nor did it use the term
“right.” It applied only to the importation of contraceptives; as a matter of precedent, it had
virtually no relevance to a subsequent interpretation of a state statute by a state court. And many
such statutes still existed. A summary of birth control laws in the United States prepared by the
NCFC in July 1931 provides a useful snapshot of the regulations and restrictions on the books at
that time. According to the report, twenty-one states specifically prohibited the dissemination of
information about contraception (though only Connecticut forbade actual use). 304 Despite all
this, Sanger celebrated the decision as “the end of birth control laws,” “an emancipation
proclamation to the motherhood of America.” 305
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Dennett, no doubt, was more reserved about the decision. Beginning with her effort to
repeal the Comstock Act—which, of course, began her long civil liberties saga—she had
criticized Sanger for advocating a narrow medical exception to the birth control laws. Dennett
believed strongly that only universal access would guarantee “birth control knowledge for all
citizens instead of class privilege.” 306 The dispute came to a head in the early 1930s, when
Dennett argued against Sanger’s proposed amendment to the birth control laws because it
exempted medical professionals from penalty without removing birth control from the auspices
of the obscenity laws. In the same month that the ACLU endorsed Sanger’s bill, Dennett urged a
“clean repeal amendment” 307—prompting an editor of Time to advise Dennett to “get together
for unified action in behalf of birth control, voluntary parenthood or what you agree to call your
movement” lest people come to regard their “several causes as the mere fields of action for
ambitious ladies.” 308 Still, even for Dennett, United States v. One Package must have seemed an
important victory. In it, Ernst did not argue that advocacy of birth control was permissible, or
even that instructions on the use of birth control was permissible. He argued that birth control
itself was an inappropriate subject for government regulation.
Almost a decade after her indictment, Dennett retired from public life. In her letters to
colleagues and friends, she often reflected on how future historians would regard her, and one
wonders whether she later was satisfied with her legacy. Dennett dedicated her life to “public
work,” and she was vehement that she had “done a thing or two beside achieve ‘silver hair’”
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during her years of service. 309 In addition to her many accomplishments as a suffragist and birth
control advocate, she helped limit the scope of obscenity laws and, indeed, helped redefine civil
liberties. Still, she believed that future generations would enjoy a robust individual autonomy
that her contemporaries could barely imagine. In a celebration of Judge Woolsey’s decision in
Married Love, she wrote, “If we who are living now could come back to this earth a hundred
years hence we should probably view with amused incredulity the records of the preposterous
doings of our century in the field of censorship.” 310 As for her disagreement with Sanger,
Dennett felt strongly that half-measures were destructive and that history would vindicate her
approach.
For his part, Ernst assisted and in turn was influenced by Sanger as well as Dennett. 311
An article in The Nation written while Dennett’s appeal was pending reflected on the irony that
the “[t]wo well-known women” had come together in the New York penal system. “For on
successive days Mrs. Dennett, the conservative, was convicted of sexological heresy by a federal
jury over in Brooklyn, while Mrs. Sanger, the militant, sat in a Manhattan police court and heard
eminent volunteers from the medical profession so smash charges against her birth-control clinic
that it appears improbable that the magistrate will hold the case for trial.” 312 Ernst, of course,
was defense counsel in both matters.
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In retrospect, there was much to recommend both strategies. Dennett’s disillusionment
with legislative change made the social reformist ever more radical; Sanger’s success at
ingratiating herself with professionals endeared the erstwhile socialist to incremental reform.
The differences were ideological as well as strategic. In time, Dennett adopted a theory of civil
liberties much like the rights-based individualism that Sanger had espoused decades earlier and
gradually repudiated. 313 For the mature Dennett, birth control was a matter best left to private
discretion, despite its public implications. Government interference in individual
decisionmaking was impossible to modulate and undesirable as a matter of principle. Sanger’s
compromises may have yielded more in the way of concrete results, but the ACLU was deeply
indebted to Dennett for the civil liberties revolution it wrought.
The question whether to sacrifice principle in favor of stop-gap gains would plague the
ACLU for decades. In his many years of service to the ACLU, Ernst himself would often face
precisely this dilemma. 314 Indeed, he foresaw with astounding acuity the path that birth control
litigation would follow over the coming decades, with its halting expansion of the health
exception to include, eventually, threats to a woman’s psychological wellbeing, irrespective of
her marital status. 315 He was uneasy about this medical “compromise,” and yet he regarded it as
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a potentially fruitful strategy. 316 In their court briefs, however, ACLU lawyers were free to make
their boldest arguments. And while practical exigencies influenced what cases they chose to
pursue, their theory of civil liberties became ever more capacious.

Conclusion
United States v. Dennett ushered in a new era of civil liberties advocacy in America. In
the years immediately after World War I, the reformers-turned-radicals who led the civil liberties
movement had envisioned free speech as a vehicle for working-class power, a backdoor
approach to a just society. As the enforced conformity of the 1910s gave way to the pluralistic
ambivalences of the 1920s, their rhetoric subtly shifted. Increasingly, they called for an open
public conversation about how best to govern America. Throughout, they retained a progressive
emphasis on advancing the public good, and they defended free speech in political and economic
terms.
After Dennett, a new theory of civil liberties steadily gained ground. Lawyerly and
individual-centered, that vision prioritized autonomy over equality. Where earlier free speech
advocates (including Dennett herself for much of her career) had hoped that a rich and varied
public discourse would ensure the best political and social outcome, a growing crop of civil
libertarians felt that government intervention in the realm of private beliefs was inherently
against the public interest. For some, even this abstract interest in maximizing the public good
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receded into the background. By 1942, the Colorado Supreme Court framed the central tension
of one First Amendment case as the “liberty of the individual v. the general welfare.” 317
Many within the ACLU resisted the new approach. Some still clung to a radical vision of
the right of agitation. Others, such as Alexander Meiklejohn, thought that art was worth
protecting only to the extent that it enabled the “voting of wise decisions.” 318 An important
minority, however, were articulating the alternative justification for civil liberties, at least in the
non-political context. These influential few defended free speech not as an avenue to peaceful
revolution, or as a prerequisite of self-governance, or even because they thought it the surest way
of discerning the truth, but rather because they believed that people’s convictions and
dispositions were their own concerns. Put simply, they were committed to what a 1934 NCFC
statement labeled “personal choice.” The committee explained: “A certain amount of unworthy
material is bound to come into existence in one form or another, as time goes on. It is for the
individual to approve or condemn whatever he encounters—to accept what he deems desirable
for himself and to reject the rest. However, it is he, the individual who must exercise this
choice.” 319
Crucially, Dennett taught Ernst and the ACLU that “civil liberties” was a pliable
category. If it could hold non-political speech, perhaps it could also stave off state interference
with private conduct. Sex education was only the beginning. Lawyers like Ernst called for the
protection of artistic expression and later of self-expression of any sort—political, artistic, or
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“personal”—as long as it did not cause actual harm to others. They would ultimately conclude
that birth control advocacy and birth control use are flip sides of the same civil liberties coin. 320
In short, after Dennett, key figures within and outside the ACLU understood the category
“free speech” and the scope of civil liberties advocacy differently than they had at the outset of
litigation. Perhaps that transformation was a product of broader forces and would have occurred
even absent Ernst and Dennett’s intervention, though a close reading of the historical record
points to contingency rather than inevitability. But whatever its immediate effects, United States
v. Dennett demonstrates that popular and judicial acceptance of a negative vision of civil liberties
in America—one that incorporated nonpolitical speech and embraced individual autonomy—was
a new development. Today, the protection of speech like Dennett’s seems fundamental to civil
liberties advocacy; it is hard to imagine a world in which administrative censorship on the basis
of morality was thought to facilitate free speech, by enhancing the quality of public discourse.
Nonetheless, that is precisely the sort of world in which Ernst and Dennett lived. 321
The freedoms grouped together under the new civil liberties tent were framed against a
common enemy: the state. In the early interwar period, the ACLU’s progressive allies had
maintained their commitment to regulatory governance even as they distanced themselves from
majoritarian politics. They imagined the legislative and executive branches as potential
protectors of minority interests, a counterbalance to powerful private forces (primarily, industry)
320
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as well as mass ignorance and prejudice. Administrative censorship cases, including Dennett,
brought home the dangers of central government authority much more convincingly than did
earlier appeals to labor voluntarism. They also demonstrated that free speech, properly framed,
could attract popular support. And they rehabilitated the judiciary—a longtime bastion of antidemocratic values and a reviled instrument of corporate power—as a potential forum for social
advocacy.
Whatever the costs and benefits of the new approach, and there were many of each, the
new model of free speech was wildly successful. Its institutionalization during the next halfcentury gradually erased the stigma of a more radical free-speech past. By promoting artistic
freedom and sexual autonomy, the ACLU made civil liberties into something more than a
stepping stone to economic redistribution. Critics alleged that its defense of personal freedom
was disingenuous—that it ventured into the new realm precisely to bolster its credibility. 322 For
some members, no doubt, the allegations were true. Nonetheless, over the course of the 1930s,
much of the ACLU leadership internalized a more generalized commitment to civil liberties. In
turn, the vision of civil liberties that United States v. Dennett helped to validate gave rise to an
individualist language that anticipated, and perhaps even supplied, the state-skeptical rhetoric of
postwar American liberalism. 323
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CHAPTER 4: FROM LEFT TO RIGHTS

A deep irony pervades the story of civil liberties during the 1930s. For over a decade, the
ACLU leadership had been promoting a robust right of agitation—a right to challenge the
existing industrial and political order through direct action by organized labor. During the New
Deal, for the first and only time in American history, a substantial part of the government shared
the ACLU’s early understanding of civil liberties. And yet, at the precise moment when its
project became possible, the organization abandoned its commitment to civil liberties as a
vehicle for fundamental social change. In its place, it promoted a value-neutral vision of civil
liberties based on constitutional protections, secured through the federal courts and against the
state.
The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt precipitated sweeping changes with respect to both
labor policy and the civil liberties agenda. In the early months of Roosevelt’s presidency, the
ACLU was optimistic. Before he even took office, the ACLU sent Roosevelt a series of
proposals for safeguarding civil rights through federal action. 1 Recommendations for
administrative action included the restoration of rights to those convicted under the Espionage
Act, issuance of passports irrespective of political views, provision of radio airtime to minority
viewpoints, and continuation of the Department of Justice’s hands-off policy with respect to
working-class political and economic movements. 2 Legislative proposals touched on such issues
as the abolition of postal censorship, prohibitions on wire tapping to obtain evidence in federal
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cases, and the admission of pacifist aliens to citizenship. 3 Given the change in administration,
the ACLU was hopeful that its proposals would be enacted. In fact, Baldwin professed to be
“embarrassed by the number of friends of Civil Liberty in public office in Washington and in the
states.” 4
Although the ACLU was pleased with Roosevelt’s personnel choices—especially the
Secretary of the Interior, ACLU member Harold I. Ickes 5—Baldwin expressed concern that it
would be “difficult to quarrel with friends.” 6 His apprehension turned out to be prescient.
During the 1920s, when liberals, progressives, and radicals all were shut out of power, the
disagreements among them posed little threat to a unified civil liberties campaign. In the 1930s,
by contrast, seemingly small differences took on immense proportions. Over the course of the
decade, ACLU supporters would split over the desirability of radio censorship, the extension of
free speech to Nazi marches, and the propriety of racial discrimination in public
accommodations. 7 The most important fracture in the civil liberties alliance, however, occurred
over New Deal labor policy.
3
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The NIRA
The first test of the administration’s commitment to labor was the National Industrial
Recovery Act, signed by President Roosevelt in June 1933 after heated congressional debate. 8
Although the primary purpose of the act was to modify antitrust laws to permit trade associations
and to promote industrial efficiency, it was drafted in consultation with the AFL and contained
several concessions to labor. Section 7(a) of the NIRA affirmed workers’ right to organize
without employer interference and to engage in collective bargaining. Most labor leaders
celebrated the provision, and in July, the ACLU wrote to labor organizations to offer its help in
enforcing the act. Employers, it emphasized, were creating company unions and discharging
employees for union membership, in “plain denial of the rights accorded to organized labor by
the law.” The ACLU was confident that complaints by unions would be taken up by federal
officials as long as “the facts are plainly put to them.” It therefore requested any information on
employers’ unlawful activity and promised to present all complaints to the Labor Advisory
Committee initially charged with enforcement of the labor provisions of the act. 9
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In practice, however, Section 7(a) proved largely ineffectual. A combination of poor
leadership and inconsistent support from the administration served to buttress organization in
already strong unions while abandoning the most vulnerable. 10 Employers quickly discovered
that their recalcitrance would be quietly accepted. In August 1933, Roosevelt sought to address
widespread labor conflict by creating a National Labor Board (NLB) empowered to investigate
and mediate labor disputes. Its chair, Senator Robert F. Wagner, was a staunch union advocate.
Although the NLB lacked independent enforcement power, it often issued decisions favorable to
labor. It opposed company unions, promoted secret elections, and ordered companies to
recognize and negotiate with unions. And yet, at the same time, the National Recovery
Administration (NRA) charged by statute with implementing the NIRA opposed the closed shop
and exclusive representation by majority unions, and it defended employers’ rights to form
company unions. 11 Roosevelt vacillated between the two approaches, ultimately undercutting
the authority of the NLB. In December, the ACLU organized a Committee on Workers and
Farmers Rights. Its first order of business was to submit to both President Roosevelt and the
officers of the AFL a list of violations of labor’s right to organize, strike, and picket to
demonstrate the ways that NRA officials had thwarted the collective bargaining clause of the
NIRA. 12
The administration’s failure to enforce the NIRA was only one of the ACLU’s objections.
In fact, a sizeable contingent of the board was relieved at the weakness of the NLB. During the
1920s, the ACLU had supported left-wing miners in their struggle to disrupt John L. Lewis’s
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control of the United Mine Workers of America. It continued that policy when a group of Illinois
miners split off from the UMW to form the Progressive Miners of America, and it expressed
concern to Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins that the NIRA would buttress Lewis’s ability to
secure an exclusive bargaining arrangement that would marginalize the radical minority. 13 The
ACLU’s longstanding concern for minority representation became a basis for cooperation with
the far left, whose representatives were most likely to suffer the effects of the government policy
and thus were most vocal in denouncing the NIRA.
Despite frequent allegations to the contrary by patriotic groups and congressional
inquiries, the ACLU was never simply a front or an apologist for the Communist Party.
Although the two groups had often worked closely together on particular cases and issues, they
clashed on multiple occasions. 14 Nonetheless, many ACLU board members were attracted to the
Soviet experiment, and while none but Elizabeth Gurley Flynn officially joined the Communist
Party, several made regular financial contributions and expressed sympathy for communist
ideology, if not party practices. In 1935, when the Communists abandoned their opposition to the
New Deal in favor of an anti-fascist united front, relationships like these would become
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commonplace. In the early 1930s, however, they were a source of significant tension within the
ACLU.
The ambivalence on the ACLU board toward the NIRA was divisive. When Roger
Baldwin submitted a letter to President Roosevelt and to NRA chief Hugh Johnson demanding
protection for minority unions, the labor experts within the ACLU strongly objected. 15 Morris
Hillquit considered the ACLU’s stated concern for minority unions to be meddlesome as well as
misguided, and he threatened to resign over the board’s position. 16 Joseph Schlossberg, the
general secretary-treasurer of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America and a member of
the ACLU’s National Committee, cautioned Baldwin that his well intentioned intervention
would undercut labor’s strength by propping up company unions. 17 Despite these criticisms, the
left wing of the ACLU board, including Harry Ward, Corliss Lamont, William B. Spofford, and
Robert W. Dunn, along with Baldwin, steered the ACLU toward a radical course. In September,
Baldwin began collaborating with radical unionists in devising a statement on the NRA. 18 The
program they produced entailed unchecked freedom to strike (regardless of the terms of any
applicable NRA code), prohibition of racial discrimination by unions, and proscription of the
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closed shop, in addition to more conventional recommendations for the elimination of labor
spies, the union shop, and compulsory arbitration. They sent a delegation to discuss the program
with Roosevelt and asked him for decisive presidential action. 19 Roosevelt, though polite, was
unsympathetic. 20
Conflict within the ACLU temporarily abated when it became clear that the NRA, in
practice, was serving to buttress employer interests; leftists and liberals alike condemned the new
turn in administration of the Act, albeit for different reason and in different tones. By the end of
1933, the ACLU’s board was able to recruit a respectable group of liberals to a new Committee
on Workers and Farmers Rights, convened at the request of radical socialists and Communists to
marshal liberal support for their anti-New Deal agenda. 21 Mary Van Kleeck—director of
industrial studies for the Russell Sage Foundation, and a communist sympathizer—was
appointed chair of the committee, ensuring that it would follow a reliably anti-state path. Like
the other leftists on the ACLU Board, Van Kleeck had come to believe that economic planning
that aimed to ameliorate the dangers of capitalism would undercut the class struggle and lead
America down a path to fascism. To Van Kleeck, the right of trade unions to engage in collective
bargaining was an important civil liberty that was threatened rather than protected by the
NIRA. 22 Her initial draft of a memorial to President Roosevelt was so critical of New Deal
policies that the ACLU Board asked her to revise it. Baldwin helped write the final version,
19
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which lamented the administration’s tolerance of company unions and the failure of the National
Labor Board to support strikes.
For Baldwin, opposition to the NIRA reflected broader antipathy to state intervention in
the field of labor relations. In a 1934 radio discussion, Morris Ernst told Baldwin that if the
major avenues of communications—the newspapers, the radio, and the movies—were kept open,
the problem of labor relations would take care of itself. 23 Although Ernst claimed that he was
“not much of a believer in law,” he thought “the fundamental right of free speech” could be
preserved as long as “responsible positions” were filled by “fair-minded men.” Baldwin was far
less sanguine about administrative solutions. He conceded that Roosevelt had thus far proven
tolerant of minority viewpoints—he had not censored the realm of ideas, despite having the
power to do so, and he had evinced tolerance toward aliens, Indians, the unemployed, and
political dissenters—but Baldwin believed that the relative openness of the administration
stemmed merely from a lack of significant opposition to its goals. 24 He also thought that civil
liberties entailed something more than the right to air disfavored ideas. Indeed, the “central
struggle involving civil liberties” was the conflict between capital and labor, and on that score,
the influence of the New Deal had been detrimental and far-reaching. Baldwin explained: “We
have seen in these ten short months an enormous growth of trade-union organization, inspired by
the codes. At the same time, we have seen an unparalleled attack by employers upon trade union
rights. Troops have been called out against strikers in five states. Police, gunmen, indeed every
23
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weapon known in the struggle between capital and labor, has been invoked. Scores of strikers
have been killed or wounded and hundreds have been jailed. On the whole we have seen the
N.R.A. administration refuse to interfere in this strike except to get workers back to work by
accepting some form of government mediation or arbitration, usually to their disadvantage.” 25
Baldwin insisted that the New Deal was paving the way to economic fascism, that is, the
protection through “dictatorship [of] the economic system of business for private profit,” if not
the “wholesale suppression of all opposition.” He pointed to the abrogation of states’ rights and
the centralization of power in the federal government, “reaching out to every home and business
in the land,” and he dismissed as naïve the hope that the New Deal was “a back-door entrance to
state socialism.” 26 He expressed the same point more strongly in his speech at the ACLU’s
Annual Meeting in February 1934. Whereas the ACLU of the 1920s had been embroiled in local
struggles, the New Deal necessitated action on the national stage. Baldwin emphasized that in the
“new federal arena of combat,” resistance to the expansion of state power was minimal. “On the
right it comes from employers still wedded to laissez-faire economics,” he explained. “On the
left it comes from radicals who oppose state capitalism as a form of economic fascism, denying
to the working class a chance to develop its power.” Even the workers and farmers, however, had
largely abandoned their opposition in the face of doles and subsidies. “The price of a temporary
industrial peace,” he lamented, “is the sacrifice of their own struggle for increased power.” 27
According to Baldwin, the New Deal had not delivered on its promise to support
organized labor, which Baldwin considered the only plausible mechanism for improving social
and economic conditions. The Roosevelt administration had failed to protect activity by
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independent trade unions and, despite protests from the ACLU and many other groups, 28 had
declined to outlaw company unions. It had curtailed the right to strike and discriminated against
left-wing unions. It had withheld union representation on the code authorities—a right in any
case far less valuable than the rights to organize, convene mass meetings, and hold a picket line.
Baldwin concluded: “The present tendencies are to take labor into camp as part of the
governmental industrial machine and thereby to lull opposition to sleep by making the workers
believe the government will look after their interests. It will do nothing of the sort. Labor gets its
rights only as it fights for them.” 29 In the history of the New Deal to date, the workers who had
accomplished most were the ones who had struck hardest. “The real fight is on the job,” he said,
“not in Washington.” 30
Baldwin’s view became the institutional position of the ACLU. The 1934 annual report
cautioned that the “enormous increase of the power of the federal government under New Deal
policies carries with it inevitable fears of inroads on the rights of agitation. Alarms are widely
expressed over alleged dictatorship by the President, the abrogation of States’ rights and the vast
economic powers of the federal government.” 31
For the next year, Baldwin would sound the consistent message that “the issue of liberty
is inseparable from economic power.” 32 He reiterated his longstanding belief that “only as
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channels of agitation are relatively open for the growth of all political forces can the struggle be
carried on without bloodshed and violence.” 33 His understanding of the right of agitation had,
however, shifted subtly. In Baldwin’s increasingly Marxian historical view, the liberties
enshrined in the Bill of Rights had grown out of the triumph of capitalism over feudalism; “civil
liberty and democracy were the necessary political tools of the new system of free competition in
business.” 34 According to Baldwin, it was up to the middle class to ensure the preservation of
civil liberties and to reduce the incidence of violence during times of crisis. In fact, it was the
“disinterested agitation” of the middle class that would “keep open the high road of tolerance.”
Baldwin acknowledged that the complete absence of repression was “impossible in a society
made up of warring class and controlled by the strongest,” since “the state is always an
instrument of violence and compulsion in the hands of the dominant economic class.” 35 He was
adamant that the slide into Fascism could be prevented, but only if the channels for organization
and protest were preserved. “No greater tasks confronts that active section of the middle class
outside the immediate conflict between capital and labor,” he believed, “than the maintenance of
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those rights of agitation, of organization, of the building of power from below through which,
throughout all history, progress has come.” 36
In light of these views, Baldwin and the other leftists on the ACLU board were even
more hostile to Senator Robert F. Wagner’s labor disputes bill than they were to the NIRA.
Introduced in March 1934—the same month that President Roosevelt betrayed the trust of union
organizers in the automobile industry by endorsing proportional representation and company
unions—the Labor Disputes Act would have given the National Labor Board power to enforce
the labor-protective measures of Section 7(a) of the NIRA. It sought to prohibit company unions,
and it required recognition of independent unions and exclusive majority representation. It also
ensured that mediation and arbitration were voluntary and guaranteed the right to strike. The bill
received enthusiastic support from the NLB, the AFL, and the Socialist Party. The Communist
Party, however, condemned it as a tool to break strikes and cripple working class agitation, and
Mary Van Kleeck adopted the Communist Party line. She told Senator Wagner that “to prevent
or discourage strikes which have for their purpose gradual increase in the workers’ power in a
period when fundamental economic change in the ownership of industry can clearly be
envisaged may only serve to check the rising power of the exponents of human rights.” 37
Baldwin supported Van Kleeck’s position but treaded gingerly around his labor allies. He
invited Van Kleeck, along with a representative of the International Juridical Association, a leftwing labor lawyer group, to explain their reservations about the bill at a meeting of the Board.
After discussion, the board authorized Baldwin and Harry Ward to write to Massachusetts
Senator David I. Walsh, chair of the Senate labor committee, in opposition to the bill. They told
Walsh that they “regard[ed] the regulation of labor relations by the Federal Government as
36
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dangerous to the rights of labor to organize and strike.” Administration of the NIRA had
demonstrated that any state machinery for the conciliation of conflict, no matter how well
intentioned, was bound to undercut the rights of labor to organize and strike in the long run. 38 In
conclusion, they suggested that in the event that action on the bill was inevitable, amendments
proposed by the IJA would correct the worst of its faults. 39 The letter angered both moderate
labor advocates and committed leftists, especially Van Kleeck. 40 Baldwin sought to appease Van
Kleeck by assuring her that although he was constrained to moderate his position in official
communications on behalf of the ACLU, he had “always objected to the N.R.A. as well as to the
New Deal,” since its underlying purpose was to “help prolong the capitalist system.” 41
The ACLU was never forced to settle its internal disagreement over the labor disputes
bill. In the end, Wagner’s version met with vehement opposition from business interests and
received little support in Congress. Critics charged that it was unconstitutional because it
extended to manufacturers not in interstate commerce and because it trampled due process by
combining prosecutorial and adjudicative roles in a single body. 42 Senator David Walsh’s
committee offered an amended bill that expressly disavowed class antagonism and jettisoned the
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pro-labor provisions of the original. The new, watered down version made collective bargaining
voluntary and permitted company unions. An ACLU communication urged members of
Congress to oppose the amended bill as a “sham and a fraud” that weakened existing rights and
would “inevitably serve as a weapon in the hands of employers to crush organized labor.” 43 In
fact, the ACLU considered it “the severest blow to organized labor yet proposed,” and the
International Juridical Association condemned it “unequivocally.” 44 Although the revised bill
had significant political approval, it never reached a vote. Roosevelt, convinced by a wave of
strikes in the late spring that some kind of immediate action was necessary, pushed his National
Industrial Adjustment Act, or Resolution No. 44, through Congress. The resolution authorized a
National Labor Relations Board to conduct investigations, hold elections, and issue orders in
furtherance of Section 7(a). Wagner thought it best to accept the stopgap measure while building
good will for a more aggressive bill. A permanent resolution would have to wait for the new
Congress.
The summer and fall of 1934 witnessed violent and widespread strikes among radicals as
well as established AFL unions. It was soon clear the new NLRB, which was governed by a
progressive vision of bureaucratic expertise as a means of maintaining orderly industrial
relations, would be inadequate to the task of administering national labor policy. Its decisions
were very much like those of the NLB’s, and as with the earlier board, they were summarily
ignored by employers. The Department of Justice initially proved unwilling to sue for
enforcement of NLB orders, and when it was finally convinced to do so, it lost in the federal

43
44

Harry Ward and Arthur Garfield Hays to Senators, 5 June 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 107, vol. 698.
ACLU Press Release, 15 June 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 107, vol. 698.

273

courts. 45 Meanwhile, in January 1935, Roosevelt announced that the NLRB would not operate
in industries already governed by code authorities. In February, a federal district court issued a
decision in a case involving an NLB order, holding that manufacturing did not fall within
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. Frank Nebeker, who had so eagerly
prosecuted the IWW in Chicago almost two decades earlier, argued and lost the government’s
case. 46 In March, NLRB chair Francis Biddle pronounced that Section 7(a) was a mere “paper
right, a sort of innocuous moral shibboleth.” 47
In the meantime, Roger Baldwin set about mobilizing support for his critical vision of the
New Deal and labor’s rights. Much of his energy in the fall of 1934 was invested in a conference
on “Civil Liberties under the New Deal,” held in Washington, D.C. in early December. 48 Its
stated purpose was “to put pressure on Congress and on the administration to make good those
professions of belief in liberty voiced by the President last spring.” 49 The announcement for the
conference, which labeled the ACLU a “militant organization,” stated that three hundred
prominent liberals would attend, with the goal of recommending federal legislation, changes in
federal regulations, and test cases in the courts “to protect rights of labor and minorities and to
assure freedom of expression.” 50 The final program included representatives of a broad range of
liberal and radical organizations, including the American Federation of Teachers, the Church
League for Industrial Democracy, the Committee for Protection of Foreign Born, the Fellowship
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of Reconciliation, the International Labor Defense, the National Committee on Federal
Legislation for Birth Control, the National Urban League, and the NAACP. 51 Representatives of
the government were invited to reply to arguments and data presented. 52 President Roosevelt
was asked to prepare a statement to be read at the Conference on Civil Liberties, but on receiving
the ACLU’s file from the Bureau of Investigation, he declined. 53 ACLU chair Harry Ward
explained that the conference, which in his view had “historic significance,” was designed to
“raise[] a test not only of the value of the New Deal but also of the whole democratic process,”
by asking “whether the claim that civil liberties are the means to orderly social change is
anything more than an idealistic belief.” 54
The organizers sought to present a comprehensive picture of the state of civil liberties in
all its manifestations. Panels touched on such far-ranging issues as anti-lynching legislation,
tribal autonomy for American Indians, expansion of political asylum, transfer of colonial
possessions from naval to civilian rule, and the rights of the unemployed. 55 Legislative proposals
discussed at the conference included bills to expand asylum for political refugees, to provide jury
trials in postal censorship cases, to repeal the postal censorship provision of the Espionage Act,
to require equal radio airtime on all sides of controversial questions, and to criminalize lynching
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under federal law. 56 There were occasional differences of opinion between New Deal
representatives and their critics and between the competing camps among the representatives.
For example, in debating a resolution protesting the conviction of the Scottsboro boys, NAACP
representatives refused to endorse language “support[ing] the legal defense of the boys by the
International Labor Defense,” until Baldwin proposed compromise wording. Members of the
panel on radio censorship clashed over the dangers of administrative discretion, the desirability
of federal regulation of radio content, and the tradeoffs between private and public control of the
airways. 57 On the whole, however, the delegates “showed surprising unanimity of opinion on
fundamentals,” and the ACLU was optimistic “that a comprehensive civil rights legislative
program,” to be drafted by a continuing committee, would “receive support of all the liberals and
radicals of the 22 cooperating organizations including church, legal, Negro, educational, anticensorship, farm, student, and labor defense groups.” 58 At the end of the month, representatives
drafted a letter to President Roosevelt asking him to sponsor some of its strongest legislative
proposals. 59
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For Baldwin, of course, the most important proposals formulated at the conference were
those involving labor relations. 60 The agenda, if not the output, of the labor sessions was heavily
slanted to the left. The attendees took up a bill to bring farm workers within the provisions for
collective bargaining, amendments to Section 7(a) to buttress rights of collective bargaining and
to prohibit company unions, and a measure to prevent discrimination against black workers
under the NRA. 61 Mary Van Kleeck was supposed to speak on “The Rights of Labor Under the
new Deal,” but she withdrew several days before the conference. Instead, a speech submitted by
Francis Gorman of the United Textile Workers, also absent, was read aloud by an aide. Although
Gorman was critical of the manner in which Section 7(a) had been administered, he was not
opposed to an effective legislative solution. Like most of the socialists and liberals within the
ACLU and in the New Deal coalition, he thought that reform within the existing system was a
tenable, if not preferable, alternative to revolution. So did the conference’s predominantly
socialist Committee on Labor’s Rights, which submitted a report condemning the NRA and
regional labor boards for declining to enforce Section 7(a) but withholding criticism of Roosevelt
and the NLRB. 62
The introduction to the resolutions issued by the conference noted that New Deal
legislation, “at the most important point of conflict, that between capital and labor,” had failed to
follow through on its promise to facilitate collective bargaining. A qualified anti-New Deal
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statement presented by a special committee on labor’s rights was “vigorously debated” on the
floor and passed, in amended form, with several opposing votes. 63 It declared that the NRA, in
practice, had served to buttress employer control and to “deceive the workers as to their rights,
and to weaken the power of reliance upon their own organized strength.” It therefore concluded
that the “principle of the NRA” was “in violation of the interests of workers’ rights to organize
and strike—their only sources of power and liberty.” The conference participants had “no
illusions as to the place of law in achieving civil liberties”—“we know from experience that
economic power and organized pressure alone make for strength,” they explained—but they
nonetheless proposed legislation that would undercut the influence of industrial interests. 64 In the
end, the labor proposals sent to Congress were modest ones: to outlaw company unions and to
require employers, in agriculture as well as industry, to bargain collectively with representatives
of the majority of their workers. 65 In fact, the resolutions were so compatible with mainstream
liberal sentiment that many members of Congress promised their support. 66
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The NLRA
By the spring of 1935, persistent labor tensions, coupled with a newly elected laborfriendly Congress, rendered true congressional reform a realistic possibility for the first time. On
February 21, Senator Wagner introduced his new National Labor Relations Act in Congress.
Wagner told Baldwin that “some of the suggestions which were made last year by the American
Civil Liberties Union and by some of the lawyers associated with the International Juridical
Association [had] proved most helpful in connection with the preparation of a new bill.” 67 The
Wagner Act was a revised version of the earlier bill, with a new preamble to insure against
constitutional challenge. It drew from the most protective strains of American labor policy. As
Senator Edward P. Costigan noted during debate over the bill, it codified the very provisions that
the Commission on Industrial Relations had endorsed two decades before. It guaranteed
workers’ right to organize without employer interference, mandated that employers bargain with
representative unions, and preserved the right to strike. It also ensured that employers would not
unduly influence representation elections and legitimated exclusive majority representation. And
it created a three-member quasi-judicial board to resolve labor disputes, whose orders would be
enforceable by the federal courts. In short, it gave collective bargaining the stamp of government
approval. As with Wagner’s earlier bill, labor endorsed it wholeheartedly. The President once
again waffled. Employers were just as adamant that it be defeated, and they were eagerly
assisted in their propaganda efforts by the recently founded American Liberty League, an
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organization of conservative Democrats and other New Deal opponents who deemed the bill an
affront to the American constitutional tradition.
For the ACLU, the debate over the Wagner Act provoked a heated controversy between
its liberal and leftist contingents. Despite the position adopted at the Conference on Civil
Liberties, the leftist majority on the board remained opposed to state regulation of labor relations.
The ACLU’s committee on labor’s rights, which was assigned to make further recommendations
on pending legislation, was dominated by three members of the International Juridical
Association who had shared Baldwin’s and Van Kleeck’s view of the 1934 bill. Among them
were Carol Weis King, a lawyer for the International Labor Defense who would go on to join the
Communist Party, and Nathan Greene, co-author with Felix Frankfurter of The Labor
Injunction, 68 whom Baldwin would later describe as a “fellow traveler with the Communist
opposition.” 69 On March 18, the ACLU board considered a memorandum by the IJA on the
faults of the Wagner bill and voted to oppose the proposed legislation.
In a letter to Senators Wagner and Walsh, Baldwin explained that the ACLU would not
support the Wagner Act because no federal agency “intervening in the conflicts between
employers and employees [could] be expected to fairly determine the issues of labor’s rights.”
Almost in passing, Baldwin expressed several concrete objections, including the ability of the
board to act on its own initiative, the exclusion of agricultural workers, and the failure of the act
to prohibit “discrimination on account of sex, race, color or political convictions.” 70 In later
68
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years, the latter objections would become major civil liberties concerns. For the time being,
however, Baldwin’s central objection was to the desirability of any governmental intervention in
the labor struggle. He pointed out that all of the boards established by the federal government
had “tended to take from labor its basic right to strike by substituting mediation, conciliation or,
in some cases, arbitration.” He reiterated the view, first adopted by the ACLU board in 1920,
that “only unions militant enough and strong enough to withstand many pressures have been able
to achieve anything like an unrestricted exercise of their rights.” 71 Baldwin acknowledged that
the labor movement believed Wagner’s bill would strengthen its ranks but insisted, based on “a
very wide contact with struggles of labor for its rights to organize, strike and picket all over the
country,” that the dominant view was misguided.
Wagner was disappointed at the ACLU’s position and considered it short-sighted. He told
Baldwin, “Whether we will it or not, government in every country is going to be forced to play a
more important role in every phase of economic life, and for that reason it seems to me more
useful to attempt to direct the nature of that role rather than merely to state the truism, that
government is likely to be influenced by the forces in society that happen to be strongest.”
Wagner believed that governmental authority was the only feasible means of countering
powerful private interests. Over “a decently long period of time,” appropriate state policies
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would buttress labor, not quash it. In fact, in Wagner’s view, even Section 7(a) had proven to be
“a galvanizing force.” 72
After fifteen years, the ACLU was up against fundamentals. For the first time, the
progressive project for the affirmative protection of labor’s rights was a realistic possibility. The
ACLU had been founded on resistance to state power. Its concept of civil liberties as a right of
agitation was premised on a theory of labor voluntarism that labor itself had come to abandon.
When the state appeared ready to come genuinely to its aid, the labor movement set aside its
reservations (which, in any case, had always been qualified) and embraced government action.
But for the ACLU, resistance to state authority was a core unifying ideology, within and outside
the labor context. In such cases as Pierce, Scopes, Dennett, and Ulysses, they had convinced
others and themselves that the governmental oversight of ideas is dangerous and misguided.
Over the course of the 1920s, they had expanded from a skeptical stance toward state
intervention in labor disputes to a general aversion to state interference with minority viewpoints,
personal morality, and private life.
Significantly, the liberals within the ACLU were less hostile to the motivating philosophy
of the Wagner Act than were the labor radicals. For lawyers like Arthur Garfield Hays and
Morris Ernst, 73 as for other New Dealers, the rights to organize, picket, and strike had always
been derivative of a larger commitment to expressive freedom. They had never entirely accepted
the notion of a right of agitation as an independent revolutionary force, productive of (rather than
protected by) the marketplace of ideas. More to the point, they never were opposed to state
power as such, merely to the intrusion of the state into the realms of democratic decisionmaking
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and private conduct. As a result, they were willing to bracket the regulation of labor relations as
an appropriate forum for the exercise of state power—even if the result was ameliorative and
counter-revolutionary—as long as rights derived from the First Amendment were preserved. In
other words, for liberals, fundamental transformation of the economic system might be
accomplished through the exercise of civil liberties, but it was not a civil liberty in and of itself. 74
Indeed, for many, the notion that labor relations should be isolated from state intervention
smacked of the Lochner-era tradition of economic liberty, which they had all expressly
repudiated. Francis Biddle, chair of the NLRB created under Public Resolution No. 44, wrote
Baldwin to express his surprise that the ACLU board was opposing the Wagner bill in the face of
“enthusiastic support” from organized labor, particularly as it contained no mediation
provision. 75 Baldwin answered that Biddle’s board had been “the only bright spot in the whole
record of the past two years of the government’s mediation of labor disputes.” He expressed
support for the provisions of the bill outlawing company unions and protecting the right to strike,
but he fell back on his conviction from “experience” that “labor wins its rights to organize and
bargain collectively not by dependence upon governmental agencies but by its own organized
power.” 76 Reliance on administrative machinery inevitably would weaken unions’ independent
strength, Baldwin concluded. Biddle thought that Baldwin was “too damned theoretical.” He
was convinced that the Wagner bill would enhance union cohesion and power. More to the
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point, he told Baldwin: “You sound a little, I confess to say, like the Liberty League. If that
doesn’t stop you I don’t know what will.” 77
Biddle was right: his criticism struck close to home. For months, Baldwin had been
concerned that the board’s objection to federal labor legislation seemingly allied it with
industrial interests. In fact, he professed “to hesitate to use so misunderstood a word as ‘liberty,’
invoked today so loudly by those rugged defenders of property rights, the ‘Liberty League’ and
allied organizations,” who understood liberty as a “right to exploit the American people without
governmental interference.” 78 Baldwin took great pains to distinguish the agenda of the Liberty
League from the ACLU’s, emphasizing that “the historic conception of liberty” was “the
freedom to agitate for social change without restraint.” 79 In his address to the Conference on
Civil Liberties Under the New Deal, he again clarified that the ACLU was “not concerned with
those liberties so loudly proclaimed today by reactionaries opposed to the New Deal economic
controls,” whose conception of liberty was based on “property rights,” rather than “human
rights.” 80 And in his letter to Wagner, he noted that although the board regretted that its
opposition was shared by “reactionary employers,” its position was based on “diametrically
opposite grounds.” 81

77

Francis Biddle to Roger Baldwin, 17 April 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780.
Roger Baldwin, “Civil Liberties under the New Deal,” 24 October 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 109, vol. 717.
79
Ibid. He added: “Practically today that means freedom for the working-class to organize and of minorities to
conduct their propaganda.” The following month, Baldwin again rejected the liberty espoused by groups like the
American Liberty League and Americans First, explaining: “They are the dying gladiators of individualism in
business of laissez faire economics. But the landslide has buried their straw man of liberty. Collectivism has come to
stay.” Roger Baldwin, “Coming Struggle for Freedom,” 12 November 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 109, vol. 717.
80
Baldwin, “The Main Issues of Civil Liberties under the New Deal,” 8 December 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 110,
vol. 721.
81
Roger Baldwin to Robert Wagner, 1 April 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780. See also Joseph Schlossberg to
Roger Baldwin, 14 May 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780 (“Rightly or wrongly the American Federation of
Labor is committed to the Wagner Bill. By your opposition to the bill you unwillingly lined up with the employers
and all reactionaries who opposed the bill. . . . This is one case in which the Civil Liberties Union can well afford to
take no official position.”).
78

284

Baldwin’s vigorous protestations betrayed an underlying insecurity, and when pressed
hard enough, he capitulated. In light of substantial support for the Wagner Act both within the
ACLU and among the organization’s allies in the labor movement and the government, the board
ultimately agreed to reconsider its position.82 In May 1935, it held a referendum for the members
of the National Committee and local branches on the desirability of the Wagner bill. 83
Notwithstanding the strong convictions of the ACLU leadership, the majority of the returns
favored support of the Wagner Act in some form, and the board voted to rescind its opposition
and take no official position on the bill. 84
As it turned out, the ACLU’s change in position was of little relevance except as a matter
of internal politics. 85 By the time the board issued its retraction, passage of the bill was all but
assured. The Committee on Education and Labor reported favorably on it, and it passed both
houses of Congress with decisive majorities. When the Supreme Court unanimously declared
82
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the NIRA unconstitutional in the Schechter Poultry case, it was clear that a new measure was
necessary. And on July 5, 1935, President Roosevelt signed the bill into law.
For the ACLU, the split over the Wagner Act was symptomatic of a fundamental shift in
its understanding of civil liberties. The board’s memorandum issued in conjunction with its
referendum on the Wagner Act acknowledged the sentiment of some members of the ACLU that
its central argument—that labor could advance “only through its own economic power, not
through dependence on legislation”—was not properly within the field of civil liberties. This
perceived slippage was a substantial point of contention for liberals on the national committee,
who had never shared the board’s commitment to the right of agitation. Alexander Meiklejohn,
writing to record his support for the bill, commented on “the tendency of the Board to engage in
industrial disputes instead of fighting for the maintaining of civil liberties in connection with
them.” 86 Judge Charles Amidon, head of the ACLU-sponsored National Committee on Labor
Injunctions, thought the organization should limit its work to “the civil liberties rights of persons
when those rights are directly invaded.” He cautioned that “to carry on campaigns against
economic wrongs, which ultimately affect civil liberty, would probably lead the union into
controversies that would impair its usefulness in the field of its special work.” 87
Until the Wagner Act, the ACLU did not regard civil liberties as bounded by the Bill of
Rights. The board often merged the right of workers to a living with the right of workers to
espouse their economic program, emphasizing that civil liberty preexisted the Constitution. The
debate over the Wagner Act taught the ACLU leadership an important lesson. The
organization’s impressive successes during the 1920s had generated broad-based support for a
vision of civil liberties based on expressive freedom. The upshot of the ACLU’s expansion into
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new realms and its enlistment of new constituencies was a change in its perceived purpose. The
new supporters of the civil liberties agenda did not regard it as appropriate for the ACLU to
intervene in “purely” economic matters. Even longtime members had come to rethink the
theoretical basis for their commitment to free speech. For the time being, the leftist majority on
the board clung to its substantive commitments, but its justification for doing so had begun to
crumble.
Ironically, the ACLU’s early understanding of civil liberties found its strongest ally in the
NLRB, which came to regard the effective organization of workers as the most important of civil
liberties. The new vision, of course, was enforced by the state, not asserted against it. Still, the
underlying objective of the Wagner Act was to strengthen organized labor, and labor leaders
wasted little time in using the new mandate to their fullest advantage. In the months after its
passage, John L. Lewis, Sidney Hillman, and other AFL labor veterans turned aggressively to
organizing unskilled workers in the mass production industries. When the AFL rebuffed their
strategy in its 1935 convention, Lewis assembled his allies in the new Committee for Industrial
Organization. He also worked closely with New Deal Democrats, who enacted additional
protections to foster CIO efforts. 88
For their part, employers flagrantly resisted compliance with the new legislation. They
continued to engage in blatant anti-labor practices, including industrial espionage,
strikebreaking, and the use of munitions and private police forces. 89 Although these methods
were clear violations of workers’ new statutory rights, employers’ lawyers advised that the
Wagner Act was unconstitutional and would shortly be declared so by the Supreme Court. True
to form, employers mobilized around a legal campaign, supported most visibly by the American
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Liberty League’s National Lawyers Committee, a collection of corporate lawyers who believed
that the Wagner Act was incompatible with Lochner-era values. The threat of an adverse
decision was so menacing that the NLRB devoted much of its energy during 1935 and 1936 to
formulating its own legal strategy.
Congress, however, did not leave the new body without recourse. In the spring of
1936—prompted by the suppression of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union, an organization of
tenant farmers and sharecroppers in northeastern Arkansas, and by the ineffectuality of the
NLRB—Wisconsin Senator Robert M. La Follette, Jr. submitted a Senate resolution authorizing
the investigation of “violations of the rights of free speech and assembly and undue interference
with the right of labor to organize and bargain collectively.” 90 La Follette initially doubted that
the Senate would act on his proposal, but after highly effective preliminary hearings, the
resolution was approved in June with significant public support. 91 Known as the La Follette
Civil Liberties Committee, the new body, like the NLRB, regarded civil liberties as synonymous
with the rights of labor, whether statutory or constitutional. It set out to investigate the activities
of detective agencies, employer associations, corporations, and individual employers “in so far as
these activities result in interference with the rights of labor such as the formation of outside
unions, collective bargaining, rights of assemblage and other liberties guaranteed by the
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Constitution.”92 The younger Senator La Follette, whose famous father had begun his career as a
law partner of the Free Speech League’s Gilbert Roe, chaired the subcommittee, which was
organized within the Senate’s Committee on Education and Labor. 93
Several members of the ACLU, including Morris Ernst, Norman Thomas, and the
Washington-based Gardner Jackson, were instrumental in engineering the new measure, which
they had first proposed at the Conference on Civil Liberties under the New Deal. The ACLU
suggested situations that warranted investigation, and it recommended appropriate witnesses and
offered to pay their travel expenses. Baldwin was convinced that “the worst evil which should be
investigated is the mounting rise of force and violence by employers against the organization of
labor,” which threatened “rights presumably guaranteed by federal legislation.” 94 He thought a
successful inquiry would justify a full slate of federal legislation protecting the rights of labor
against public and private curtailment. 95 At first, the ACLU urged the committee to investigate
civil liberties abuses in other contexts as well. 96 It soon became evident, however, that the La
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Follette Committee would confine its inquiry to labor relations. 97 At the preliminary hearings,
NLRB chair J. Warren Madden was the first witness. He tellingly declared, “The right of
workmen to organize themselves into unions has become an important civil liberty.” 98 The
connection between the two bodies was not merely ideological; much of the La Follette
Committee’s staff was borrowed from the NLRB.
The civil libertarianism of the La Follette Committee was in many ways a holdover from
the ACLU’s early days. Its principal goal was the elimination of all interference with workers’
right to organize, whether perpetrated by local law enforcement or by employers themselves.
Like the ACLU, the committee sought to generate liberal support for its vision by invoking the
specter of totalitarianism—“We are unquestionably the most powerful agency against Fascism in
this country,” one staff member wrote—and the corresponding collapse of American
democracy. 99 In his testimony at the hearings, NLRB member Edwin Smith recited the ACLU’s
well-worn argument that the unchecked abuse of civil liberties would lead to violent revolt. He
denounced “entrenched interests” and “alleged patriotic organizations” for arguing that
repression was the only means of saving America from the radicals. “You cannot suppress
freedom of expression,” he cautioned, “without rapidly undermining democracy itself.” 100 The
true goal of the committee, however, was something more than expressive freedom or individual
rights. As Smith put it in an address to the ACLU: “Civil liberties are not abstractions which
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hover above the passions of contending groups and can be successfully brought to earth to
promote the general welfare.” 101 Robert La Follette was adamant that “the right of workers to
speak freely and assemble peacefully is immediate and practical, a right which translates itself
into the concrete terms of job security, fair wages and decent living conditions.” 102
In the coming years, the ACLU would do its utmost to sustain the work of the La Follette
Committee through publicity, lobbying, and letter-writing campaigns. 103 Indeed, it considered it
to be “the most helpful single agency in exposing violations of labor’s rights by employers.” 104
Like the committee, the ACLU would defend the Wagner Act as a guarantor of labor’s rights to
strike, picket, and organize. Still, the perceived threat of the expansion of state power would
linger in the background. Eventually, it would reemerge as a shield against intrusion on
employers’ “personal rights,” in the form of constitutional protection for employer free speech
and procedural safeguards on the discretion of the NLRB. The ACLU leadership had come to
accept government intervention in the realm of labor relations, but in the process, paradoxically,
it had shifted its agenda from the rights of labor to a content-neutral Bill of Rights.

Civil Liberties in the Courts
For the ACLU, mounting support for a theory of civil liberties premised on the Bill of
Rights translated into a complicated relationship with the federal courts. During the 1920s, the
federal judiciary had been one of many institutions to which the ACLU turned for protection of
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constitutional rights—and for much of the decade, not the most important one. Increasingly,
however, the federal courts were a favorable forum for the ACLU’s efforts to protect civil
liberties, particularly in cases involving infringements by state courts and legislatures. On the
other hand, federal litigation threatened to undermine the labor movement’s most important
legislative victories, including the Wagner Act. The ACLU had long struggled with these
tensions, but the president’s ill-fated judiciary reorganization proposal finally forced the
organization to face it squarely.
As soon as the Wagner Act took effect, dozens of challenges to the statute began making
their way up through the federal courts. In May 1936, the Supreme Court had declared in Carter
v. Carter Coal Company that labor provisions in the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act were an
unconstitutional extension of Congress’s commerce power. 105 Relying on Carter Coal,
corporate attorneys easily convinced judges that the Wagner Act was inconsistent with a century
of settled judicial precedent. Unlike earlier measures (for example, the Clayton Act), the new
legislation was unmistakably pro-union in its statutory language. Courts nonetheless proved
ready and willing to invalidate it on constitutional grounds. Lower court decisions severely
undercut the NLRB’s authority to issue orders in all but the most clearly interstate industries,
such as transportation and communications. Industry and labor alike considered it a matter of
time until the Supreme Court took up the Wagner Act and expressly declared a broader
application unconstitutional.
President Roosevelt was determined to forestall that outcome. With the help of Labor’s
Nonpartisan League, founded by John L. Lewis to mobilize labor voters, the 1936 presidential
election resulted in a landslide victory for Roosevelt. The President considered the results a
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mandate for the New Deal. Popular support for his new labor policies seemed unequivocal, and
he pledged to do whatever was necessary to preserve them. With the NLRB mired in
constitutional litigation, its legitimacy squarely rejected by industry and its lawyers, preserving
those labor policies meant doing something about the courts.
There was substantial liberal support for measures to curb the power of judicial review in
economic cases through such means as constitutional amendment or statutory limitations on
federal jurisdiction. 106 The approach on which Roosevelt ultimately settled, however, was less
direct and distinctly unpopular, even among critics of the Court. 107 In February 1937, Roosevelt
recommended a bill that would have authorized the appointment of an additional justice to the
Supreme Court for every sitting justice who had not retired within six months after reaching the
age of seventy (up to a maximum of six). Had the bill passed, Roosevelt would have been able to
appoint six new justices. Although it was clearly designed to ensure a pro-New Deal majority,
Roosevelt publicly justified the measure on the grounds that the current justices were unable to
meet the demands on their resources.
The proposal polarized supporters of the New Deal. Organized labor endorsed it, as did
many administrators of the NLRA. 108 Liberals, however, were divided, 109 and the ACLU, which
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had never satisfactorily resolved its own relationship to the courts, found it difficult to settle on a
position. In its early years, the ACLU had only grudgingly adopted a judicial strategy for the
vindication of civil liberties. Roger Baldwin thought the courts would simply enforce existing
power disparities as they had in previous decades. Felix Frankfurter staunchly opposed the
pursuit of civil liberties through constitutional litigation, and he regarded the Supreme Court’s
‘occasional services to liberalism’ as a dangerous step toward judicial legislation. 110 Even the
ACLU’s general counsels turned to the courts out of practical exigency rather than ideological
commitment.
On the other hand, the ACLU had always proven willing to use the courts when it suited
their cause. Unlike labor lawyers, many of whom spurned the judiciary on principle, the
organization had spent two decades whittling away at adverse precedent in the domain of free
speech. Baldwin would have preferred to rely on grass-roots agitation and direct action, but he
had resigned himself to the fact that “the middle-class mind works legalistically”—that
“whenever rights are violated, the first thing they want to do is get a lawyer and go to court.” 111
In fact, when Baldwin refused to endorse the Wagner Act in light of past administrative denials
of the rights of labor, his labor allies were quick to criticize his inconsistency. That, “in many
cases, the right of free speech, assemblage, and press have been denied in the courts,” they told
him, “has not led us to fight against the courts and to seek to strike down the rights guaranteed in
the constitution.” 112 On the contrary, they had used the courts to their fullest advantage.
To be sure, the ACLU was not sanguine about the power of the federal judiciary. It had
bitterly opposed the use of federal labor injunctions and, along with the AFL and state labor
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federations, it had been instrumental in securing passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In 1931,
its National Committee on Labor Injunctions, whose four hundred members included Frank P.
Walsh, managed to produce a draft anti-injunction measure agreeable to the AFL, labor lawyers,
law professors, and interested organizations. 113 The bill eliminated ex parte hearings, ensured
that all violations of injunctions would be tried by juries, limited punishment of contempt,
abolished yellow dog contracts, and ensured that no acts “which involve only workers’ rights to
meet, speak, [or] circulate literature” would be enjoined. 114 Once the federal bill was passed,
William Green, president of the AFL, arranged for the ACLU to assist in the preparation of state
anti-injunction bills, as well. 115 The object of such laws, the ACLU explained, was to stop
judicial “law-making.” 116
At the same time, however, the ACLU was urging labor lawyers to turn the power of
injunctions to their advantage. A 1930 ACLU pamphlet called Legal Tactics for Labor’s Rights,
condensed from a book co-authored by Arthur Garfield Hays, laid out a “new policy for
aggressive fighting in the courts to establish labor’s rights.” 117 The pamphlet, aimed at labor
groups, argued that judicial action was advisable even when defeat appeared inevitable, because
lawsuits generated positive publicity and produced “a good moral effect.” Moreover, in the long
run, they were capable of whittling away the courts’ approval of repressive employer
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practices. 118 The authors hoped that the pursuit and denial of injunctions would convince the
public that labor had been wrongfully oppressed by law—that its “ancient legal rights of civil
liberty” were being violated. 119 They encouraged attorneys to appeal all strong cases, even after
a strike had ceased, to build favorable precedent or, if relief were consistently denied, to buttress
their charge of bias. If they were successful, they mused, employers themselves might come to
favor legislation to curb the power of the courts. “The vital thing for labor to realize, and to make
labor attorneys realize,” the pamphlet insisted, “is that the chief object to be gained is, not the
winning of legal actions, but the bringing of them.” 120
The ACLU understood that organized labor was hesitant to make use of the federal courts
because it “regard[ed] the injunction as a weapon which should be abolished” and was reluctant
to “sanction it by using it.” 121 The organization nonetheless dismissed such concerns as overly
scrupulous. “It is almost like saying to the employers ‘we won’t use this because you do,’” one
ACLU pamphlet protested. 122 Employers were adept at generating public sympathy by
complaining of disorder. The workers, in response, would do well to “stir up the cry of
repression of civil liberty,” and the pursuit of legal remedies was the most effective way of doing
so. 123 Of course, even more than in the administrative context, unions were hesitant to
compromise their independence by relying on judicial redress of their grievances. Veteran labor
leaders, the ACLU acknowledged, were likely to regard a favorable court decision as a palliative
that undermined the cure. On the other hand, the “impatient tactician . . . maintains that there is
no conflict between pressing for strong organization and at the same time seeking relief in the
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courts.” 124 Curiously, despite Baldwin’s profound concern that the Wagner Act would weaken
unions, he was less concerned by the pursuit of judicial remedies. After passage of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, he felt that injunctions were “pretty well hedged in,” and that “under the new
rule” labor’s use of injunctions was potentially advantageous. “As a matter of fact,” he added,” I
have always taken the position . . . that labor made a mistake in being so ethical about not using
weapons so often used against it.” 125
Injunctions were not the only use that the ACLU made of the federal judiciary. During
the 1920s, the national office and its local affiliates were involved in virtually every significant
civil liberties decision that made its way to the United States Supreme Court. In 1931, in
Stromberg v. California, which the ALCU handled jointly with the ILD, the Supreme Court
invalidated a California red-flag law. 126 The same year, in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931), it prohibited prior restraint on the press in a case involving a hate-mongering Minnesota
newspapers shut down under a public nuisance law. The ACLU immediately agreed to represent
the targeted newspaper, but it turned the defense over to the Chicago Tribune and the American
Newspaper Publishers’ Association. 127 The ACLU was intimately involved in the Alabama trial
of the “Scottsboro boys,” falsely accused of raping two white women. Two cases involving the
defendants reached the Supreme Court, and both were argued by ACLU attorney Walter Pollak
upon the request of the ILD. 128 Then, in January 1937, the Supreme Court decided De Jonge v.
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Oregon, involving a Communist Party organizer convicted under the Oregon criminal
syndicalism law. 129 ACLU attorney Osmond Franekel argued the case. The decision was the
first of a flood of civil liberties victories in cases involving Communists, Jehovah’s witnesses,
and the labor movement.
Within the ACLU, debate over the “court-packing plan” centered less on its immediate
threat to civil liberties decisions than on the general desirability of judicial review. After all, the
addition of pro-New Deal justices was unlikely to disrupt the trend toward greater protection of
civil liberties, particularly in cases involving radical speech. Norman Thomas thought it was
possible that an enlarged court would be favorable to civil liberties, but he also noted the
possibility that “the psychological and practical effects” of the proposal, as a precedent for future
maneuvers, might prove injurious. Thomas noted that the Supreme Court had rarely protected
civil liberties against congressional encroachment. On the other hand, it had proven willing to
intervene in cases involving repressive state legislation. Indeed, Thomas thought that stripping
the court of all review would prompt “a flood of legislation, especially in Southern states, of
what I might call a Ku Klux Klan sort,” “a whole series of Herndon cases.” 130
Many members were concerned that weakening the Court would undermine civil
liberties. 131 William Fennell was adamant that the board should oppose the President’s plan, and
he was outraged when it expressed hesitation. “Have they forgotten the Oregon school case?” he
asked. “The Herndon case? The Scottsboro case? The De Jonge case? I hope a small group of
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New Dealers and socialists on the committee will not be permitted to overlook the point . . . that
when the courts are subservient to the executive all hope of democracy dies.” 132 John Haynes
Holmes thought that the ACLU should consider only the effect of the Supreme Court problem on
“the sanctity and authority of the provisions for civil liberty embodied in the Constitution,” not
labor and industrial questions. “What impresses me,” he commented, “is that the United States
Supreme Court, so far as civil liberties is concerned, is for us and not against us, and we should
be for and not against the Court.” 133
Not everyone was so impressed. In fact, a lively debate unfolded within the ACLU on the
desirability of judicial review in civil liberties cases. Critics of the Court accused their opponents
of whitewashing its record, while defenders of judicial review thought the detractors were
“mak[ing] the Court’s record worse than it is.” 134 In an attempt to formulate a position, the
ACLU circulated a survey to ten “eminent lawyers,” including Hays, Ernst, Fraenkel, and
Thomas, requesting their views of the most commonly cited proposals. 135 Although the
responses were submitted after the President’s plan was unveiled, the survey predated it, and
none of the participants addressed it. They did, however, offer their opinions of other proposals.
The responses ran the gamut. Most of those polled thought the Court should retain its
power to invalidate both acts of Congress and state legislation on constitutional grounds. Several
thought it acceptable to require a supermajority of the Supreme Court in decisions invalidating
federal laws. The participants split over suggestions to permit a two-thirds congressional veto of
constitutional decisions or to make the constitutional amendment process less demanding.
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Notably, all thought it acceptable to restrict the due process clause to procedural matters while
making the Bill of Rights binding on the states, as long as the provision was carefully worded. In
effect, that was the compromise that the Supreme Court itself ultimately adopted.
The participants’ comments illuminate the various tensions among self-described civil
libertarians with respect to state and judicial power. Walter Gellhorn, an administrative law
scholar who was then serving as regional attorney for the Social Security system, considered all
of the proposals to be harmless. He thought the importance of the courts in safeguarding liberties
was exaggerated. The principal threat to civil liberties, in his view, was administrative abuse.
Lloyd Garrison, dean of the University of Wisconsin Law School and the first chair of the
original NLRB, thought that all of the measures posed some danger to civil liberties and
cautioned against “giving majorities too much say over minorities.” 136 Morris Ernst felt that
some check on the Supreme Court was necessary, but he favored a congressional override, and in
fact wrote a book advocating just that. 137 Edwin Borchard, a law professor at Yale, commented
that he did not think it necessary to weaken the Court or its influence. “On the contrary,” he
wrote, “it ought to be apparent that the current danger is an expansion of the executive power
into dictatorship”—and he considered the Court to be “the greatest safeguard we have against
executive arbitrariness.” 138 Finally, Norman Thomas emphasized that a simple count of Supreme
Court decisions would underestimate the effectiveness of the federal judiciary in fostering civil
liberties. He noted the “psychological effect of the review power of the Court,” which he
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thought—based on “some fairly close contacts with American life”—was more significant than
the Court’s critics appreciated. 139
In May, the ACLU issued an analysis of the Court’s record in civil liberties cases in an
effort to educate the public regarding the pending proposals. The pamphlet was designed to
address the question frequently posed to the ACLU as to “how far the Court has been a defender
of civil liberties.” It tallied the Court’s decisions in such far-ranging areas as military trials,
slavery or peonage, searches and seizures, freedom of religion, education, aliens and citizenship,
freedom of speech, and labor relations. Its author, Osmond Fraenkel, was the ACLU’s Supreme
Court litigator and was optimistic about future gains. He acknowledged that the Court had
“more often failed to protect the Bill of Rights than preserve it,” and that those decisions
favorable to civil liberties involved “less important issues.” Pointing to decisions sustaining
convictions under the Espionage Act and state criminal syndicalism laws, he concluded “that the
Court has been unable to withstand popular hysteria.” Nonetheless, he thought the Court had
begun to protect personal rights more vigilantly as a result of its “widening conception” of the
due process clause. 140 In responding to the board’s survey on proposals for limiting the Court’s
power, he emphasized that “so long as we believe in safeguarding the rights of minorities, the
power of review is essential to protect these rights.” 141
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In the end, the ACLU board elected not to adopt a formal position on the judiciary
reorganization plan in light of the substantial disagreement among its members. Other groups,
however, proved eager to voice their opinions on the connection between civil liberties and the
President’s proposal. For example, Robert La Follette favored a constitutional amendment but
thought that Roosevelt’s statutory measure was warranted as a stopgap measure. He
acknowledged the importance of preserving civil liberties but argued that “no kind of legal
guaranty has ever been able to protect minorities from the hatreds and intolerances let loose
when an economic system breaks down.” 142 Similarly, the National Lawyers’ Guild and the
International Juridical Association endorsed the President’s plan as the best possibility for
immediate action, though they believed a constitutional amendment would be “necessary in the
end.” 143 An IJA pamphlet distributed by the Guild minimized the protective potential of the
Court in civil liberties cases. According to the pamphlet, the only satisfactory solution was
“fundamental action” in the form of a constitutional amendment preventing any court, state or
federal, from invalidating any legislation of Congress or the state legislatures on constitutional
grounds. “Judicial protection for civil liberties by means of the power to invalidate laws cannot
be separated from judicial protection for the selfish interests of large property,” it argued, nor
from “dangerous restraints upon legislative authority to provide for the general welfare.” In a
view diverging increasingly from the ACLU majority’s, the pamphlet concluded that “there can
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be no true enforcement of the Bill of Rights in the interests of persons instead of wealth, except
by the elected representatives of the people.” 144
On the other hand, those members of the ACLU who valued judicial independence as a
check on majoritarian repression had ample company. In the face of mounting criticism of the
federal courts, conservative lawyers, most of whom had resisted the Supreme Court’s speechfriendly turn, evinced a sudden concern for the preservation of civil liberties. In protesting the
growing strength of the New Deal state, a Liberty League lawyer reasoned that “the lawyer is, in
the nature of his profession, a conservative force, and is constantly called upon to defend the
individual against the tyranny of the majority.” It was the lawyer’s duty, he argued, to speak out
against violations of the Constitution. Indeed, he promised that “if and when any American
citizen, however humble, is without means to defend his constitutional rights in a court of
justice,” a Liberty League lawyer would agree to take the case without compensation. 145 When
Arthur Garfield Hays wrote to inquire whether the offer was genuine, Beck responded that it
was. “I have always had a feeling of sympathy for the work of your Civil Liberties Union in
defending constitutional rights of citizens,” he said, “even though I might not always agree with
your intervention in every case.” 146
Mainstream lawyers shared the Liberty League’s new enthusiasm for civil liberties. The
American Bar Association staunchly opposed any restriction on the power of the federal courts,
and it mobilized a massive publicity campaign that substantially weakened the prospects for
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passage of the President’s bill. 147 In convincing New Deal supporters that the independence of
the Supreme Court should be preserved, the Court’s recent civil liberties decisions proved
invaluable. An ABA committee brainstormed methods for arousing popular hostility toward
reorganization of the judiciary, and its “best idea” was to develop a series of radio broadcasts
featuring “famous case[s] in which personal rights have been upheld by the Supreme Court” in
the face of contemporary criticism. 148 In the two issues of the ABA Journal devoted to the courtpacking plan, its threat to the Bill of Rights was a dominant theme. One article cautioned that
labor leaders, by attacking the court, were undermining their future strength; the power to
organize rested on free press and the right of assemblage, it argued, and in these “unsettled and
quickly changing times” a future Congress might forbid unions altogether. 149 Another urged
minority groups, including labor, “to wake up to the fact that an independent judiciary is their
best friend.” 150 William Joseph Donovan (later a founder of the Office of Strategic Services)
devoted an entire article to “the question whether the existence of an independent judiciary in
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this country has protected the civil liberties of minority groups.” 151 Citing Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, Meyer v. Nebraska, the Scottsboro cases, and DeJonge, he concluded that they had.
In the end, of course, liberals sympathetic to the ABA’s arguments were spared the
choice between judicial enforcement of civil liberties and the New Deal economic agenda. For
three long months during the spring of 1937, as the public debated the President’s proposal, the
Supreme Court deliberated over five cases testing the constitutionality of the Wagner Act. 152 In
April, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote for a five-member majority in upholding the
broadest construction of the statute. All of the companies in question, he insisted, operated
within interstate commerce, and the NLRB’s procedures were consistent with due process.
Employers and unions could not be made to agree on a contract, he concluded, but they could
lawfully be compelled to try. The administration declared victory. Henceforth, the Supreme
Court would allow Congress significant latitude in its regulation of labor and industry, but it
would become ever more vigilant in upholding the Bill of Rights.
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CHAPTER 5: THE CIVIL LIBERTIES CONSENSUS

Residents of Jersey City during the 1930s had little doubt about the attitude of their
municipal government toward labor relations. Their mayor, Frank Hague, had staked the
economic vitality of the New Jersey industrial center on its employer-friendly reputation. The
signs posted on the major thoroughfares made Hague’s commitments unmistakable. “This is
Jersey City,” they boldly proclaimed. “Everything for Industry.” 1
By most accounts, Hague’s opposition to organized labor was a matter of convenience
rather than conviction. 2 When the Depression hit Jersey City, Hague was halfway through his
thirty-year reign as one of America’s last and most powerful political bosses. 3 During the 1920s,
Hague had professed support for labor. 4 In the early 1930s, however, Jersey City was struggling.
Hague had raised corporate taxes to the breaking point, and industry was fleeing the city. His
solution was to lure New York-based employers to Hudson County by clamping down on
unions. In 1934, Hague and the Chamber of Commerce began a campaign to attract potential
employers by emphasizing that Jersey City industries were more than 80 percent open shop. 5
“We took a hand and reorganized labor without regard for national heads of organized labor
1
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themselves,” he boasted that year. “The leaders who planted a feeling of hatred in the minds of
the men are gone, and in their place are leaders with whom you can deal.” 6
To ensure the most agreeable arrangements for employers, Hague’s police force harassed,
beat, and arrested agitators and shut down all picketing, meetings, and leafleting by organized
labor—even after Congress as well as the state and federal courts had made it unlawful to do so.
When organizers began provoking arrests in order to challenge local ordinances and police
practices in the courts, Hague simply had them deported across city lines by southbound buses or
by ferry or the Hudson tubes to Manhattan. Given the relatively robust protection of labor’s
rights in nearby communities, these draconian tactics gave the city a distinct competitive edge. 7
They also led to a series of clashes between Hague and the ACLU beginning in 1934, when
board member Corliss Lamont was arrested for picketing. By 1938, many prominent ACLU
activists, including several of the organization’s attorneys, had become entangled in the struggle.
It is unclear what the people of Jersey City thought of their well advertised labor policy.
Hague routinely won reelection by overwhelming margins, and there was little vocal opposition
to his administration. According to Hague’s critics, much of his support was secured by bribery
or intimidation; the election fraud in Jersey City was sufficiently famous to make the term
“Hagueism” a household word. 8 The New York Post reported that ten thousand New Jersey
families held their publicly funded jobs at Hague’s sufferance and that his most vocal and ardent
supporters depended on him directly for their incomes. 9 Many Jersey City residents were won
6
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over by Hague’s Red Scare tactics and his appeals to patriotism. Moreover, the high revenues
generated by the Hague machine supported generous municipal services and a famously low
crime rate, in addition to the mayor’s lavish vacation homes. 10
Whatever Hague’s popularity among his voters, outsiders came to regard him as an
unequivocal menace to American democracy. 11 His mistake, in large measure, was his failure to
adapt to changing times. In a 1938 address, Hague promised to protect the “great industries” of
Jersey City from outside threats. “We hear about constitutional rights, free speech and the free
press,” he observed, echoing leaders of an earlier generation. “Every time I hear these words I
say to myself ‘that man is a Red, that man is a Communist.’” 12
By the late 1930s, Hague’s insistence that a “real American” would never invoke the Bill
of Rights sounded outdated, even unpatriotic. 13 Dozens of prominent national organizations
condemned his flagrant disregard for rule of law. Free speech advocates emphasized the
similarities between Hague’s autocratic practices and similar speech restrictions under Hitler and
Stalin. Like Father Coughlin and Huey Long, Boss Hague was emblematic of dangerous
totalitarian tendencies within the United States. 14 His oft-quoted pronouncement, “I am the
law,” was palpable evidence that fascism could happen at home. 15 Indeed, Reinhold Niebuhr, in
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agreeing to sit on a committee for civil liberties in Jersey City, remarked that “Mayor Hague’s
defiance of our laws is one of the most flagrant pieces of fascism in the modern day.” 16 With
prodding from the ACLU, President Roosevelt overcame his initial reluctance to censure a
fellow Democrat and declared in a fireside chat that “[t]he American people [would] not be
deceived by any one who attempt[ed] to suppress individual liberty under the pretense of
Patriotism.” 17
With the force of public opinion behind it, the ACLU adopted a bold strategy in Jersey
City. When Hague prohibited CIO leafleting and rejected meeting requests by the ACLU and
the Socialist Party, ACLU attorney Morris Ernst sought and secured an injunction in federal
court. The litigation culminated in the Supreme Court’s 1939 decision in Hague v. CIO, 18 which
affirmed the district court’s order. The victory for civil liberties, though limited, was celebrated
not only by labor groups, but by mainstream individuals and organizations throughout the
country. 19
The events leading up to Hague fundamentally influenced the articulation and reception
of free speech advocacy during the 1930s. When Hague was decided, civil libertarians had
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already convinced much of the public that some modes of censorship—in the realms of academic
freedom, sex education, and literature, for example—were more damaging than edifying. On the
whole, however, they had failed to translate those lessons into the political realm. With the
Hague case, for the first time, many Americans enthusiastically endorsed the judicial protection
of radical speech. Most tellingly, the American Bar Association, known for its conservative
politics, established a Committee on the Bill of Rights in 1938. Its first action was to file an
amicus curiae brief on behalf of free speech in Hague v. CIO.
The ACLU’s emphatic disavowal of radicalism was effective, but it precipitated a deep
rift with the left. In time, it eclipsed the radical origins of the civil liberties movement, just as its
proponents had hoped. In 1934, Roger Baldwin considered “the struggle of capital and labor . . .
the most conspicuous and vital application of the free speech principle.” 20 At mid-decade, the
ACLU sent its representatives into the field to picket alongside union organizers, as it had
throughout the 1920s. Just a few years later, ACLU leaders carefully divorced advocacy of free
speech from the underlying messages of the radical groups they were defending. At trial and in
interviews, they stressed the rights of fascists and conservatives as well as leftist groups. 21 In
their courtroom arguments and briefs, the enemy was censorship, not substantive oppression. At
the heart of this shift in strategy lies a fundamental transformation in the relationship between the
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radical labor movement, individual rights, and state power—a transformation that the ACLU
itself had helped to create.

The Hague Machine
“For a great many years,” according to the New York Herald Tribune, the United States
Constitution was “a dead letter in Jersey City.” 22 The Hague machine commanded complete
obedience, and potential dissenters were either bought off or crushed. To Frank Hague, the state
legislature and state courts were tools of local government, and their federal counterparts, when
they could not be turned to useful ends, were irrelevant.
In 1938, the New York Times described Hague as “a tall, red-faced, vigorous-looking man
in his sixties,” with “hawk-like features.” 23 The New Yorker called attention to “his pale blue
eyes,” which were “heavy-lidded and suspicious,” and his thins lips that curved “morosely
downward.” 24 According to Dayton David McKean, author of a 1940 biographical exposé on the
Hague Machine, “no political boss ever looked less like one than Mayor Hague.” 25 The mayor
of Jersey City was an avid walker, health enthusiast, and mild hypochondriac. “His physique,”
McKean reported, “was that of a prizefighter now elderly but excellently preserved.” 26
Appropriately, he was feared for his quick temper and frequent resort to physical violence.
Indeed, he was known to pummel police officers and politicians who resisted his demands. 27
22

“The Constitution Re-Enters Jersey City,” New York Herald-Tribune, 3 April 1938.
Russell B. Porter, “Hague at Hearing on His CIO Ban,” New York Times, 2 June 1938; Russell B. Porter, “Hague
Urges Exile of ‘Reds’ to Alaska to Bar Revolution,” New York Times, 15 June 1938.
24
John McCarten, “Profiles: Evolution of a Problem Child,” New Yorker, 12 February 1938, 22.
25
McKean, Boss, 1.
26
Ibid.
27
Most accounts of Hague’s political career rely heavily on McKean’s biography. Alan Karcher, Speaker of the
New Jersey General Assembly from 1982 to 1985, believed that McKean exaggerated the degree of corruption
within the Hague administration. Alan J. Karcher, New Jersey’s Multiple Municipal Madness (Rutgers University
Press, 1998), 185. Pointing to the memoirs of Hague adversary Governor Walter Edge, who recounted that Hague’s
operations were orderly, Karcher linked most of Hague’s corruption to support of bootleggers and bookmakers
23

311

Born in 1876 to Irish immigrants, Hague was the third of eight children. He spent his
youth (as he habitually reminded his constituents) in the slums of Jersey City’s Horseshoe
District. 28 He was expelled from the public school system for misbehavior in the seventh grade,
and he made no subsequent effort to compensate for his lack of formal education; 29 despite his
lavish tastes in clothing and travel, 30 his syntax and demeanor always retained the strong flavor
of his working class upbringing. After a brief stint as assistant to a blacksmith—“playing
nursemaid to a locomotive,” as he described it—he tired of manual labor. 31 He next tried his
hand managing a mediocre boxer from Brooklyn. Although he made little money, he began
cultivating connections, and by the age of twenty-one he was elected to his first public office.
From there, Hague engineered a swift and shrewd ascent up the political ladder. He was
intimately familiar with the gritty realities of Hudson County governance. Graft and election
fraud were staples of the Jersey City tradition, and though Hague presented himself as a
municipal reformer, he adeptly turned them to his advantage. In 1913, he became Commissioner
of Public Safety under the new form of commission government. The police and fire
departments, which were under his jurisdiction, had organized into AFL locals. Citing
corruption (though most likely exaggerating its extent), he gave their members the choice
between leaving the unions and resigning from the departments. The union charters were
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surrendered, and Hague succeeded in replacing the existing leadership of both groups with
grateful and reliable subordinates. 32
This combination of suppressing criticism and promoting fealty was a trademark of
Hague’s political style. 33 In fact, Hague once stated publicly that he had studied Tammany Hall
and considered his own organization to be superior. When Princeton University students were
sent to Jersey City in 1921 to monitor elections on behalf of the Honest Ballot Association, they
were beaten to the point of hospitalization.34 In addition to informal persuasion, Hague ensured
that repression would have legal sanction. In the early 1920s, he introduced a series of measures
restricting the ability of dissenters to air their views. For example, three years after Hague
became mayor, the city introduced a permit requirement for public meetings advocating political
change in private halls and event spaces. In 1924, the Board of Commissioners adopted an
ordinance restricting the distribution of handbills and periodicals in public places and in
residential neighborhoods. And in 1930, it passed the ordinance at the heart of Hague v. CIO,
forbidding public assembly without a permit and authorizing denial of a permit to prevent riots
or “disturbances.” 35
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Control and expansion of the municipal payroll was a core feature of Hague’s influence,
and it was expensive. Under Hague, the city added thousands of new employees and awarded
many new contracts, often in exchange for minimal provision of services. 36 In return, Hague’s
party received loyalty, as well as “contributions” amounting to at least three percent of most
employees’ salaries.
To sustain this system, Hague increased taxes on businesses operating in Jersey City by
as much as an order of magnitude. 37 Among the most important potential revenue sources were
the railroad companies. Nearly all were forced to route their trains through Hudson County in
order to reach New York City, and Hague took advantage of his bargaining position to impose
threefold increases in assessments. 38 When the State Board of Taxes and Assessments in Trenton
tried to thwart Hague’s maneuvers, he resolved to elect a governor who would appoint a more
sympathetic board, along with friendlier prosecutors and judges. Hudson County was populous
enough to sway elections for state office, and within a few years it obligingly secured the
governorship for A. Harry Moore, a Jersey City political ally who would serve three terms plus a
stint in the United States Senate over the next two decades. By the late 1920s, Hague asserted
his authority throughout the state, even under Republican governors. 39 On the rare occasion that
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his policies were challenged, the state court judges who owed him their appointments decided in
his favor. 40
Although Hague’s political dominance removed all external constraints on Jersey City’s
taxing authority, businesses were so strained by the increased rates that many eventually
relocated. The problem became particularly acute during the Depression, when many companies
could not afford to pay. Hague’s first solution was to decrease the level of municipal services.
A 1929 investigation revealed that more than a quarter of children in Jersey City were denied a
fulltime education due to school overcrowding. A decade later, school playgrounds were the
smallest in the state, and many schools still had outdoor toilets. Meanwhile, the streets were
rarely cleaned, and public recreational spaces were sparse and decrepit. 41 These reductions,
however, were minimal in comparison with the city’s other expenses. The Hague machine
depended on its ability to remunerate its loyal servants with lucrative employment, and
reductions in the city’s revenue stream threatened to undercut the source of Hague’s power.
Lowering taxes was not an option.
Federal assistance helped some, notwithstanding Hague’s complicated relationship with
the Roosevelt administration. Hague had been vice chairman of the Democratic National
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Committee since 1924, and Hudson County voted Democratic in every presidential election
thereafter. The mayor might have exerted considerable national influence were it not for a
political blunder in 1932, when he endorsed his close friend Al Smith—who shared Hague’s love
of boxing, baseball, and expensive vacations—for president. At the 1932 Democratic
Convention, Hague imprudently announced that Roosevelt was unelectable (indeed, “the one
man who is weakest in the eyes of the rank and file”) and intimated that he would not back him if
he were nominated. 42 When his ploy failed, however, Hague threw his support to Roosevelt, at
the cost of his friendship with Smith. With aggressive campaigning, he delivered New Jersey for
Roosevelt by a margin of thirty thousand votes. 43 He also voiced his unequivocal support for
New Deal policy. Although the President disliked Hague, he understood his value and was
hesitant to rebuke him. 44 More important, he ensured that Jersey City would receive ample
federal funds. Hague claimed to receive 500,000 dollars a month for distribution to the needy,
and as usual, he exercised considerable discretion in determining which recipients were most
worthy.
Still, Hague faced a dramatic shortfall in the municipal budget, and Jersey City industry
was increasingly unwilling to make up the difference. As the tax base declined, Hague was
forced to explore new methods for making Jersey City businesses more profitable. His solution
was to ensure businesses that they could offset high taxes by paying low wages to unorganized
workers. According to the New Jersey Labor Department, in the late 1930s more than three
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hundred thousand Jersey City workers were paid less than the minimum living wage. 45 In the
end, the policy was unsuccessful; wages could not drop indefinitely, and the astronomical tax
rate outweighed low labor costs for all but a handful of sweatshops, to which Hague claimed to
be “utterly opposed.” 46 Hague was nonetheless determined to deliver on his “pro-industry”
promise.
Hague had always followed an instrumentalist course when it came to the labor problem.
In his early years, his policies were sufficiently pro-labor to prompt a prominent political writer
to label him an incipient leader of the urban proletariat. 47 In 1919, his police blocked fifty
strikebreakers who were sent from New York to unload a steamship. The following year, he
openly declared himself “a friend of labor” when he defended a strike by breakaway railroad
workers who believed the AFL was no longer protecting the interests of the rank and file. 48
“Have confidence in me,” he assured the workers, after A. Mitchell Palmer denounced the strike
as a Red plot: “I shall be at your command every hour and every minute.” 49
Notwithstanding Hague’s ostensive support, unions were a minimal presence in Hudson
County during the 1920s. They were more significant only in the building trades, where they
generally played by Jersey City rules. Early on, Hague developed a close working relationship
with Theodore Brandle, a corrupt union organizer who headed the Jersey City ironworkers’
union and went on to lead the Hudson County Central Labor Union and eventually the State
Federation of Labor. Although Hague rarely intervened on labor’s behalf, the Central Labor
Union endorsed him during his first election and throughout the 1920s. In 1927, a prominent
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industrialist pronounced that Jersey City residents were “less affected by the radical tendencies
of the age than . . . people of any community on earth.” 50
By the early 1930s, organized labor was no longer consistent with Hague’s design for
Jersey City. With Hague’s blessing, the McClintic-Marshall Company employed non-union labor
in constructing the General Pulaski Skyway, the freeway system connecting Jersey City and
Newark en route to Manhattan. Hague and Brandle clashed over the project, and their alliance
broke down altogether in February 1932, when striking union members attacked six non-union
workers with iron bars, killing one. After the incident, Hague ordered the police to crush the
strike. 51 He justified his change in policy by claiming that he had only recently discovered that
union organizers were “racketeers” who accomplished their objectives through “sabotage,
double-dealing, brutality, terrorism, intimidation, exploitation, and gorilla-rule.” 52 Thereafter,
Jersey City was unequivocally hostile to organized labor. Union members engaged in peaceful
picketing were routinely arrest for disorderly conduct and equivalent violations. In most cases,
charges were dropped or never filed in order to forestall legal challenges.
When the Furniture Workers Industrial Union went on strike in 1934, ACLU board
member Corliss Lamont was arrested along with prominent observers, including a future New
York City magistrate. All convictions were set aside, and the acting mayor apologized, but
Jersey City’s draconian policy continued. 53 In February of 1936, the chamber of commerce
estimated that Jersey City was more than 80 percent open shop. The population was largely
unskilled and semi-skilled workers (more than one fifth of Jersey City residents were foreign50
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born 54). That spring, when a state anti-injunction bill was under consideration by the New Jersey
Senate, Hague denounced it as radical and claimed it would injure New Jersey industries. 55
Despite efforts by the ACLU’s National Committee on Labor Injunctions—which described the
“open political line-up of the leading Democratic politician in the state with commercial interests
against organized labor” as an unprecedented development and emphasized that all of New
Jersey’s neighboring states had enacted similar legislation without ill effect—Hague’s opposition
ensured the bill would never reach a vote. 56 Meanwhile, New Jersey’s Disorderly Persons Act of
1936 permitted the arrest of any person who could not “give a good account of himself.” Under
the act pickets were arrested and jailed, often until the relevant strike was broken. 57 Union halls
were closed for building code violations, leaders were deported, and property and pamphlets
were seized.
Jersey City’s anti-labor practices prompted an inquiry by a special commission of the
National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners (NCDPP), organized as an adjunct to
the International Labor Defense for the investigation of racial, industrial, and political
persecution. 58 Established in 1936, the commission—whose members represented such
organizations as the Hudson County Committee for Labor Defense and Civil Rights and the New
Jersey Civil Liberties Union, in addition to the NCDPP—invited testimony from all people who
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felt that their constitutional rights had been suppressed by Jersey City officials. The final report
was based on transcripts of testimony, sworn statements, and resumes of court cases. It pointed
to “a systematic strangulation of progressive labor forces and civil rights by police, municipal
and county authorities in Hudson County, New Jersey.” 59 Jersey City, it concluded, had become
a haven for New York City manufacturing concerns attempting to evade agreements that they
had made with the labor unions to which their employees belonged.

The First Injunction Suit
The conflict between organized labor and the Hague machine intensified in late 1936,
when a massive seamen’s strike initiated on the west coast shut down the Hudson County
waterfront. The International Seamen’s Union, associated with the AFL but flirting with more
radical tactics, picketed non-union crews in eastern ports, including Jersey City’s piers. Jersey
City’s Chief of Police, Harry Walsh, forbade the picketing and vowed to use necessary force
rather than arrests to ensure his orders were obeyed. He also ordered reporters not to approach
the scene of attempted picketing. Abraham Isserman, a left-wing New Jersey attorney who was
a member of the ACLU board, was acting as counsel for the seamen’s union. At the union’s
request, he invited the national office of the ACLU to become involved. 60 The ACLU was eager
to comply, and in late December it convened a meeting of local labor groups, including
conservatives ones. 61 Most of the important organizations attended, and all agreed to plans for a
test case. Members of the International Seamen’s Union, along with several other unions,
59
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volunteered to provoke arrest by picketing in contravention of Walsh’s orders. They agreed to
remain in jail, without requesting bail, in order to “break down police resistance.” If packing the
jails proved ineffective, they would turn to “well known liberals” like John Haynes Holmes and
Corliss Lamont to attract public attention. 62
Jersey City authorities were determined to keep the entire affair out of the courts. 63 The
coming weeks witnessed a few incidents of police violence, including assaults on reporters and
observers. Reverend Jay T. Wright of the New Jersey Civil Liberties Union was among the
victims. 64 For the most part, however, would-be picketers were turned back without arrest.
Representatives of the La Follette Civil Liberties Committee sent to Jersey City noted that actual
violence was minimal because participants offered little resistance for fear of being beaten. 65 On
January 1, union headquarters dispatched more than six hundred strikers to a mass
demonstration, but nearly all were denied entry at the ferry docks. 66 Civil liberties delegates,
too, were ordered out of the district, though they persistently snuck back across city lines. 67 In
the end, the secretary of the La Follette Committee decided that further observations were futile
and moved on to other inquiries, despite advice from an NLRB correspondent that the Hudson
County situation could refocus attention from industrial espionage to the Bill of Rights, which,
“as far as Labor [was] concerned, . . . [did] not exist in Jersey.” 68
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The legal strategy, too, turned out to be a non-starter. Arthur Garfield Hays, acting for the
ACLU, arranged a conference with Jersey City officials before Judge William Clark of the
federal district court. At the conference, the parties arranged for four picketers to march on a
designated street without interference, and the police allowed them to proceed as agreed. The
following day, however, the picket line was again disbanded. At Clark’s urging, Hays went to
Jersey City to investigate. The police (apologetically) attempted to turn him away, but when he
demanded to be arrested or released, they let him through. Although Hays’s sign was torn off and
his companions were all evicted into Hoboken, he was permitted to march for several hours with
an American flag. A few days later, others tried to emulate his performance and were promptly
cast out of town. After consulting with Judge Clark, Hays returned to the street and was himself
turned away. He asked the court for an injunction, but the strike settled before any challenge
made it into court.
By that point, however, Hays and the ACLU were determined to open Jersey City to
labor organizing. The same day that he requested an injunction in the seamen’s strike case, Hays
witnessed the police haul two picketers from the AFL-affiliated Boot and Shoe Makers union
onto the subway to Manhattan. He subsequently arranged for tests of Jersey City’s anti-labor
practices, and he applied to Judge Clark for an injunction on their behalf. 69 At the hearing, Jersey
City officials were remarkably candid about their anti-labor policies. Hays examined Joseph
Glavin, Assistant Corporation Counsel (and co-counsel with James A. Hamill in the case)
69
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regarding Jersey City’s legal policy with respect to strikes. Glavin relied on the “law of
necessity” as a basis for ejecting agitators from the city; arresting them, he explained, would
simply feed their sense of martyrdom and encourage further displays. He also insisted that
unions had no right to strike to close a shop when employees were “perfectly satisfied” with
existing conditions. 70 Daniel Casey, the Acting Commissioner of the Department of Public
Safety, testified that the determination whether or not workers were on strike was left to his
discretion, and that he would prohibit picketing that was aimed at persuading workers to
unionize. 71
Casey also admitted to instructing the police to remove trouble-makers from the city.
Hays found this policy particularly disturbing, and he charged that it violated the “fundamental
right of the American citizen to be arrested.” Jury trials and the writ of habeas corpus, he
reasoned, were meaningless in the absence of an arrest. Indeed, deportations to concentration
camps in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia demonstrated that the right to be arrested and brought
before a court was the “most fundamental right we have.” Judge Clark agreed. “The trouble with
[your] theory,” he told Casey, “is that when you make up your minds as to the sort of people that
are undesirable and escort them out, you are putting yourself right in the position that Hitler puts
himself in.” 72
One of the more colorful exchanges of the injunction hearing involved Hays’s personal
beliefs and political affiliation: Glavin accused Hays, a strong supporter of organized labor but a

70

Excerpts from testimony of Jersey City officials at injunction hearing during Boot and Shoe Workers strike,
before Judge William Clark, 1 March 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051, 3. Judge William Clark disagreed,
and advised Glavin to review the case law.
71
Judge Clark encouraged him to reconsider his testimony, but Casey held firm. Ibid., 2. When asked by what
authority he decided the legitimacy of strikes, Casey responded that he was not a lawyer. Judge Clark concurred and
offered his opinion that the Casey’s lawyers were not very good ones.
72
“Civil Rights vs. Mayor Hague,” ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063.

323

consummate and self-described liberal, of Communist agitation. 73 Jersey City had a
longstanding policy of openly excluding and suppressing Communists. 74 During the 1936
presidential campaign, the Communist Party was permitted to rent a hall in Jersey City only after
obtaining a court order with the assistance of the ACLU. 75 Hague put his position plainly in a
statement to the president of the Hudson County Central Labor Union that December: “When the
time comes, if ever, when Jersey City will be compelled to stand for Communist demonstrations,
there will be war, and either the Communists or I will have to leave Jersey City.” 76
Communism, of course, was interpreted loosely in Hudson County, and Judge Clark insisted that
Hays be given a chance to respond to the city’s allegations. 77 Glavin proceeded to present a long
list of organizations with which Hays was affiliated and which Glavin seemed genuinely to
believe were Communist fronts, from the National Committee for Freedom from Censorship to
the Committee on Coal and Giant Power. 78 Hays denied any connection between the named
organizations and the Communist Party, and he drew sharp distinctions among various left-wing
ideologies. 79
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As for the ACLU, he emphasized the substantial conservative support for the
organization’s work (“we get funds from the most ardent reactionaries,” he said) in such cases as
Scottsboro, Herndon, and Mooney. 80 Notably, he insisted that both he and the ACLU were
committed to free expression for all individuals and groups, not just radical ones. 81 “We have
defended the right of the Ku Klux Klan to hold meetings, as well as the right of labor to hold
meetings, as well as the right of people who believe in birth control, as well as the right of
negroes to hold meetings in the south,” he recounted. “We all over the country have defended the
right of free assemblage of everybody, no matter what they believed in.” 82 Hays had personally
defended the right of the Nazi party to march in Hudson County. Judge Clark was highly
sympathetic to Hays’s explanation and interjected arguments on his behalf. “Certainly you
cannot accuse Mr. Hays of being a Nazi,” he admonished Glavin. “He has tried to explain to you
the American Civil Liberties Union is an organization interested in free speech and free
assemblage, so that whether he is interested in the labor movement as a member of the American
Civil Liberties Union, is irrelevant.” 83
No one was surprised by Judge Clark’s decision. He awarded the unions a temporary
injunction restraining the city from interfering with the plaintiffs’ peaceful picketing, access to
the public streets, distribution of printed materials, and organizing efforts. On appeal, however,
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Jersey City secured a stay. The Court of Appeals delayed for more than a year before dismissing
the case as moot because one of the plants had declared bankruptcy and the other had settled
with the striking workers. 84 By that time, national attention was directed toward a Jersey City
injunction far greater in scope—one directed not at labor’s right to organize, but at the meaning
of civil liberties in a constitutional democracy.

The CIO in Jersey City
At the 1937 injunction hearing before Judge Clark, Hays testified that the ACLU would
continue its efforts in Jersey City until Hague agreed to “obey the fundamental law.” 85 In
November 1937, an ideal opportunity arose to deliver on that promise. That month, the CIO
launched a Jersey City organizing drive. 86 Quoting statements by William J. Carney, regional
director of the CIO for New Jersey, local newspapers proclaimed an imminent “invasion.”
According to reports, Carney had promised a “show down” between Hague and the CIO and
implicitly threatened violence if the city refused to permit peaceful organizing efforts. 87
On November 29, between fifty and one hundred CIO members tried to gather at their
headquarters in New Jersey. They were blocked by police, who searched them and the premises
and seized circulars announcing a scheduled meeting and informing residents of their rights
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under the Wagner Act. Officers were stationed at the Hudson Tube stations to prevent entry to
Jersey City of all CIO members arriving from New York City or Newark. A few made it into
town, but the police muscled them into squad cars, drove them to the city border, and ordered
them not to return, even if they were Jersey City residents. Those who disregarded the warning
were arrested and, within hours, made to stand trial. Anthony Botti, the city magistrate who
presided over the proceedings, voiced his approval of the city policy. “We don’t want the CIO in
Jersey City,” he announced, “and we’ll go to the limit to keep them out.” 88 He refused to
consider a motion for adjournment to prepare a defense, denied a jury trial, and excluded facts
challenging the court’s jurisdiction and the constitutionality of the city’s ordinance. Then he
sentenced seven of the defendants to five days in jail.
At the invitation of Lee Pressman, General Counsel for the CIO, Morris Ernst agreed to
assist the CIO with its legal challenge. Ernst seemed the ideal candidate for the job. Over the
past several years, he had been intimately involved in labor causes. In 1933, he had founded the
journalists’ union, the American Newspaper Guild, which had recently affiliated with the CIO. 89
He had just helped to organize the National Lawyers Guild for the purpose of defending New
Deal labor legislation from an over-zealous judiciary. For Ernst, however, the legal problem in
Jersey City was not one simply, or even primarily, of labor organizing. It presented a natural
extension of the principles he had defended in Dennett, Ulysses, and United States v. One
Package: the right to be free from the arbitrary control of an intrusive and irresponsible
authority. As he had emphasized during the early New Deal and again during the court-packing
controversy, the reality of totalitarianism abroad made the threat of government overreaching at
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home all the more palpable. In Jersey City, however, that threat emanated not from the Post
Office or the Customs Bureau, but from a local despot.
In his capacity as special counsel, Ernst (along with the law firm of Isserman & Isserman)
appealed the convictions, which the Hudson County Court of Appeals had declined to review on
the basis that the controversy was moot. 90 More important, Ernst orchestrated a broader
approach to the Jersey City legal campaign. In the past, virtually every civil liberties case that
reached the Supreme Court, and the vast majority of the ACLU’s legal work, involved defense
against criminal prosecution. Hague v. CIO was one of the first cases in which the ACLU
sought to marshal the authority of the federal government rather than to cabin it.
In Jersey City, the ACLU asked both Congress and the federal courts to intervene
actively on labor’s behalf. In fact, of all the possible and attempted mechanisms for opening the
city to labor activity and dissenting speech, Ernst considered a La Follette Committee
investigation and federal injunction proceedings to be the most important. 91 Together with
William Carney, he submitted affidavits and evidence to the Senate Civil Liberties Committee
and requested resumption of its inquiry in Jersey City. 92 La Follette expressed interest in the
matter but claimed to lack the funds for an investigation. The staff was nonetheless agreeable to
an “agitational campaign to get the committee interested,” since the publicity would
“strengthen[] the general support of the committee’s work.” 93
The federal judiciary ultimately turned out to be more forthcoming than its legislative
counterpart. In mid-December, drawing on its robust history of direct action in civil liberties
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cases, the ACLU boldly announced plans for a “siege” on Jersey City in conjunction with the
“CIO onslaughts.” 94 Consistent with the advice of the ACLU’s 1930 pamphlet on anti-industry
injunctions, Ernst arranged for the CIO to file a request for a meeting permit, with the
expectation of challenging a denial in court. But he also involved the ACLU directly, in an
effort to generate interest in the broader constitutional issues implicated by Mayor Hague’s
polices. To highlight the denial of rights, he proposed a “free speech mass meeting,” to be
addressed by members of Congress and “leading liberals,” within or near the city limits. 95 In
keeping with Ernst’s plan, the ACLU applied for a permit to hold an open air assembly featuring
three members of Congress and a New York attorney. The Director of Public Safety allowed the
proposed dates to pass without issuing a permit, citing the danger of public disorder in light of
purported public protest, most notably by a veterans’ committee consisting largely of Jersey City
employees. 96 “What Hague means when he talks of violence,” the Philadelphia Record
explained, “is that when the C.I.O. comes to Jersey City it will be the police who will resort to
violence.” 97
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The centerpiece of Ernst’s program was an omnibus injunction suit in federal court, in
which the ACLU itself, not just the CIO, was a plaintiff. But Ernst pursued a broad range of
tools and objectives in Hudson County during the months of preparation before trial. In addition
to public meetings, the ACLU and CIO were interested in opening Hague’s terrain to picketing,
literature distribution, and meetings in private halls, and to ending unlawful police practices,
including violence and expulsions. 98 They also wanted recognition of the CIO’s right to open
offices in Jersey City. The civil liberties forces were pursuing arrests and test case litigation
under the literature distribution ordinance, and even legislative impeachment proceedings. To
minimize conflict in coordinating the multifaceted campaign, interested organizations agreed to
cede control to a joint committee headed by the CIO. 99 All cooperating groups were asked to
clear proposals with Ernst’s office before acting. 100
As usual, Hague’s answer was to denounce his critics as Communists—and in particular,
as Communist intruders bent on radicalizing a peaceful and patriotic community. 101 According
to Hague, the suppression of the CIO was not intended to “deprive anybody of their civil
liberties,” but rather to “protect the rights of the people of this city against outsiders.” The
ACLU anticipated and understood this challenge, which was a common rhetorical frame for
excluding labor organizers. Its 1930 pamphlet had acknowledged that “a large part of the public
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still believes that strikes are the results of ‘outside agitation’” and had noted that “any action on
the part of the strikers which brings home to the community tyranny on the part of employers or
officials, has not only a legal, but also a great publicity value.” 102 The advice might have been
written for the Jersey City fight. Indeed, in a memorandum outlining the ACLU’s strategy and
objectives, Roger Baldwin wrote, “obviously one of the real difficulties is to overcome the fear
and apathy of Jersey City inhabitants and to switch the campaign from an apparent invasion of
outsiders to a movement by Jersey City residents themselves.” 103 Appropriately enough, Hague
touted that very memorandum (which was intercepted by postal officials in Jersey City 104) as
“documentary proof” that Baldwin was a “leading communist.” 105 Ernst, according to Hague,
was “second in command.” Together, the two men were “the leaders” of the Communist Party
and, “from behind the scenes,” they were “directing the whole CIO program.” 106
For the most part, the leadership of the Jersey City free speech effort responded to
Hague’s red-baiting by disclaiming affiliation with the Communist Party. Dean Spaulding
Frazer of the Newark Law School, who served as counsel for the CIO in the Supreme Court,
pleaded, “Let us not be misled by any herrings dragged across the trail, even though they be red
ones.” 107 William Carney pronounced himself a devout Catholic and challenged Hague to
“prove his charge that CIO leaders in the State are Communists,” which he dismissed as a
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distraction from the primary issue, namely, labor’s right to organize. 108 Baldwin disavowed any
sympathy for violent revolution, falling back on his pacifist determination to “fight[] violence on
every front.” His appearance at a church in Bayonne, New Jersey was an orchestrated display of
anti-totalitarian, God-loving Americanism; 109 his speech was preceded by remarks from a war
veteran and first commander of the Essex County American Legion committee. 110
Still, Baldwin was unwilling to vilify Communists outright. Whatever his misgivings
about the Stalinist suppression of civil liberties, he believed the Soviet economic program to be
laudable and had even declared in a 1935 Harvard Class Book that “communism is the goal”—
though he always insisted he meant “economic communism” rather than its political
counterpart. 111 When Ernst urged him to invoke the names of prominent anti-Communists and
to announce himself opposed to “any form of dictatorship—right or left,” Baldwin emphatically
refused. 112 In the winter of 1937–1938, well before the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact shattered his
remaining hopes for the Soviet experiment, Baldwin would not equate the Soviet Union with
Nazi Germany. 113 Instead, he criticized Hague for his “high-handed dictatorship,” which was
incompatible with the commitments of the Roosevelt administration he claimed to support. He
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predicted, “your baseless charges of communism to obscure the real issues will fall as flat as
your un-American denial of constitutional rights.” 114
This basic strategic difference was a source of tension among the various organizations
challenging Hague’s repressive policies. William Carney’s goal in Jersey City was to “tell the
world that the fundamental issue is that of the right to organize.” 115 The lawyers, on the other
hand, were eager to dissociate the civil liberties campaign from the substantive demands of their
labor clients. Hays told the New York World-Telegram that the ACLU would oppose violence
committed by organized labor against unorganized workers, just as it would protest employer or
police abuses. 116 Ernst was even more emphatic. Drawing on his experience with sex education
and artistic freedom cases, in which public opinion had proved to be a powerful influence on
judicial decision-making, he assembled a new Committee on Civil Liberties in Jersey City
composed of sixty-four of “the nation’s front-page figures in literature, the theatre, medicine,
religion, law, art, journalism, housing and the academic world.” 117 Labor leaders were notably
absent from the group. In his letter to potential members, Ernst emphasized that while the
current fight involved the CIO, Hague had employed the same tactics against the AFL. “It does
not matter where you stand on the question of industrial versus craft unionism, or even as
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between organized and unorganized labor,” he told them. “The real issue in Jersey City is
democracy versus dictatorship.” 118
When Ernst labeled Hague “the greatest radical of our day” in a radio address, CIO
organizers thought he had gone too far. 119 Neil Brant of the United Electrical, Radio, and
Machine Workers of America complained that the radio slot should have been given to the CIO’s
leadership rather than its lawyers. A remark of that nature “may sound cute,” he chided Ernst,
“but in my opinion it only tends to confuse the people and, intentionally or otherwise, it is a bit
of red-baiting because it holds up the word ‘radical’ to contempt.” Ernst’s opposition to a
“dictatorship of the left,” however sincere, was not the issue in the CIO’s fight against Hague.
Moreover, his cooperation with outspoken CIO opponents like Dorothy Thompson and General
Hugh Johnson, who were interested only in the free speech aspects of the case, would serve to
undermine the CIO’s broader objective. The goal in Jersey City was to facilitate a successful
organizing campaign, he told Ernst, not “to show the world how really respectable you are.” 120 It
was Brant’s opinion, shared by the Steering Committee, that Ernst’s “‘extra-legal’ activities were
not aiding the organizing drive, but on the contrary were doing it some harm.” 121 Months later,
that sentiment was even stronger. Aside from Carney, the CIO leadership “took the attitude that
the civil liberties angle was of no use to them.” 122
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A few days after calling Hague “the greatest radical,” Ernst complained that he was
“being ragged” by the “extreme left, who are inevitably bad tacticians.” 123 But the dispute was
about something more than mere tactics. Ernst was increasingly focused on the right of the CIO
to voice its views, not the likelihood that its message would ultimately triumph. And the right to
speak, by 1938, was an effective rallying cry. The battle over the judiciary reorganization plan,
still fresh in public memory, had strengthened the association between free speech and American
values. To Ernst, it was precisely Dorothy Thompson’s dislike for the CIO that made her an
ideal ally. In the New York Tribune, Thompson told readers she felt duty-bound to speak out in
Jersey City for the same reason that she had fought the court-packing plan: because she believed
that “the powers of government should be limited, and the basic rights guaranteed to individuals
under the Constitution should not be left to the interpretation of a ‘kept’ Court, switched into
line—to use the Nazi phrase—with the policy of this or that Administration.” 124 By the same
logic, Walter Lippmann reasoned in an article that proponents of an independent judiciary were
bound to join him in condemning the denial of civil liberties in Jersey City. 125 John Haynes
Holmes, impressed by such appeals to liberalism, declared the “Hague business” to be the most
important issue the ACLU had encountered in years. 126
Rule-of-law was a particularly persuasive argument in Jersey City in light of recent
developments in international politics. At a moment when Americans daily encountered
totalitarian purges and propaganda—when, faced with Hitler, Stalin, Franco, and Mussolini,
many believed that democracy in Europe was poised to topple altogether—Ernst emphasized the
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slippery slope from Mayor Hague to fascist dictatorship. He broadcast the message by all
available means, and a radio speech in December prompted dozens of congratulatory letters. 127
Others in the ACLU also embraced it. For example, Arthur Garfield Hays compared Germany’s
imprisonment of so-called Communists in concentration camps to Jersey City’s policy of
expelling them to Hoboken. He told Hague that his record in labor disputes amounted to “a
system of Fascism,” based on unbridled executive power. 128 Norman Thomas, in a speech titled
“Hagueism Is Fascism,” charged that Hague’s “process of working the masses up into a patriotic,
nationalist frenzy, is characteristically fascist.” 129 And the CIO declared that “‘I am the Law’
Frank Hague, Mayor of Jersey City, is playing the role of Adolph [sic] Hitler.” 130
Arguments like these made the Jersey City situation—previously dismissed as a local
matter—seem worthy of national attention. Statements denouncing the “Hudson Hitler” 131
resonated strongly with the public, and Ernst believed he had “done a swell job in taking a
handful of arrests and developing a national issue out of the situation.” 132 As Life Magazine
explained, the CIO and its supporters were answering the charges of “Red Communists!’ by
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“roaring back ‘Fascist’ and ‘Dictator’ at Hague”—and “out of the tumult, the Mayor of Jersey
City has suddenly burgeoned big and menacing on the political horizon of America.” 133
To make the case for broad popular resistance to Hague’s autocratic policies, Ernst
enlisted support from such disparate groups as the National Lawyers Guild, the Republican
Party, the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, and the Teachers Union. 134 Organized labor,
unsurprisingly, was divided. By late 1937, the AFL and the CIO were embroiled in a bitter
organizing battle, and the AFL was reluctant to come to its rival’s defense. 135 Hague tried his
best to retain AFL support, citing an honorary membership conferred on him by Samuel
Gompers and a purported commitment to excluding outside strikebreakers. 136 The New Jersey
State Federation of Labor was so hostile to the CIO that it sided with Hague, notwithstanding his
policy in the Pulaski Highway strike. The president of the Hudson County Building Trades
Council went so far as to call Hague the “protector of the people.” 137 And William Green,
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president of the AFL, “held his peace.” 138 Still, at the CIO’s request, some AFL unions agreed
to overcome sectarian differences in pursuit of a common goal. 139 In January 1938, a gathering
of AFL and CIO unions demanded that Governor Moore apply the NLRA in Jersey City and
resolved “that this un-American censorship cease at once, by Federal intervention if
necessary.” 140 The same month, the presidents of three AFL unions sought to revoke Hague’s
honorary membership in the national organization. They expressed concern at Hague’s use of
“the difference between the A. F. of L. and the C. I. O. to hide his own anti-labor purposes.” 141
The CIO may have felt ambivalence toward Ernst’s tactics, but it accepted assistance
from “progressive and liberal elements,” including consumers’ groups, women’s clubs, and
fraternal organizations, as “the genuine sentiment of the foremost citizens of the State.” 142 That
sentiment was substantial. The Liberal Ministers Club cautioned “that Fascism can happen here”
and issued a resolution “heartily support[ing]” the work of the ACLU. 143 The Labor Leader, the
organ of the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, emphasized that Hague was fighting not
Communism, but the CIO’s attempt “to win a living wage and a little sorely needed economic
security for the workers of Jersey City and New Jersey.” 144 The Newark diocese of the
Protestant Episcopal Church “call[ed] upon all American citizens who value the precious
heritage of liberty won for us by our forefathers to stand firm” for the freedom of speech, press,
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assembly and religion, which were “fundamental to our democracy.” 145 Even the Jehovah’s
Witnesses agreed to help; Olin Richmond Moyle, counsel for the Watch Tower Bible and Tract
Society, noted Hague’s long history of persecuting Witnesses in Hudson County and offered “to
cooperate in any way in bringing that dictator to time.” 146 Reactions like these had little effect on
Hague, who vowed in early January that the CIO would never come into Jersey City as long he
was mayor. 147
The appeal to civil liberties was all the more poignant in contrast to Hague’s flagrant
disregard for all criticism. 148 The mayor dismissed with a “pshaw!” the suggestion that he was
acting as a “tyrant and a dictator” in the vein of Mussolini and Hitler. “The answer to all that,” he
said, “is on election day.” Hague acknowledged that he exercised significant power in Hudson
County, but he insisted that the people had invested him with it because they trusted him to apply
it “for the benefit of the people.” 149
Certainly Hague had his share of supporters. The working class electorate of Jersey City
consistently handed him landslide victories, and his rallies and demonstrations reliably attracted
massive crowds. 150 Skeptics argued that many of the spectators were motivated by fear of job
loss or retaliation, 151 and the New York Post reported that “scores of letters [were] pouring in
from Jersey readers too scared to sign.” 152 Privately, however, the ACLU acknowledged that

145

“Roosevelt Avoids Comment on Hague,” New York Times, 11 May 1938. Suffragan Bishop Theodore R. Ludlow
declared that Hague, “by his highhanded methods, is hastening into power the very movements which he claims he
wants to destroy, by giving them a grievance and a cause.” While he noted that the church should not engage in
politics he insisted that “to be concerned about human rights is not politics.”
146
O. R. Moyle to Harriet Pilpel, 18 December 1937, Ernst Papers, box 280, folder 1.
147
“CIO Takes Legal Action,” Hoboken Observer, 8 January 1939, ACLU Papers, Reel 162, Vol. 2020.
148
McKean attributed the mayor’s political acumen in local matters to experience rather than intuition—and
Hague’s experience outside New Jersey was limited to leisure and travel. McKean, Boss, 13.
149
“‘Tyranny’ Charges Resented by Hague,” New York Times, 12 January 1938.
150
“‘Tyranny’ Charges Resented by Hague,” New York Times, 12 January 1938 (noting that Hague received
approximately 114,000 out of 120,000 ballots cast in previous election).
151
“Hague Radical, Ernst Asserts,” Hoboken (N.J.) Observer, 7 January 1938.
152
“‘End Hague’s Terrorism,’ Demands Aroused Public,” New York Post, 20 January 1938.

339

many Hudson County residents favored Hague’s approach. As Ernst put it in a letter to Hays,
“despite the feeling of many of our friends the people of Jersey City, through fear and ignorance,
are to a great extent back of Hague and have been right along.” 153
For some, the sense that geographic and cultural outsiders were criticizing their ways
strengthened their allegiance to Hague. When Jersey City Rabbi Benjamin Plotkin gave an
address defending free speech, the Jewish Community Center in which his congregation was
housed cautioned him not to discuss the Hague administration if he wanted it to remain there. 154
A month later, Plotkin told the ACLU that “retaliatory measures [were] being taken against some
of the Jewish people, and the wave of vigilante spirit [was] rising.” 155 Although Hague carefully
avoided antisemitic rhetoric, 156 the mayor’s supporters did not fail to notice that many of his
most outspoken detractors—including attorneys Abraham Isserman, Arthur Garfield Hays, and
Morris Ernst—were Jews. 157 Rising antisemitic sentiments brought the threat of totalitarian
violence that much closer to home.
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Jersey City residents stood by their mayor for less menacing reasons, as well. Many
pointed to Hague’s reforms in the fire and police departments, which he achieved by ousting
corrupt union influences. 158 Moreover, the administration had convinced Jersey City workers
that it was protecting their jobs against competition with neighboring cities. 159 And many Jersey
City residents, in an era of national uncertainty, were simply shy of change. 160 The apparent
fervency of local support led the New York Times ruefully to conclude, “[T]here is in Jersey City
a large population which is satisfied with things as they are and which really believes that
radicalism represents a menace to the United States.” 161
In the wake of a national CIO organizing campaign marked by radical methods—most
notably, the sit-down strikes of spring 1937—Hague could plausibly query whether his
adversaries had “any regard for constitutional rights, or for any law” when they took possession
of factories or blocked employees from getting to work. He had ample company in claiming that
such techniques were not legitimate labor tools and that the CIO was actually “trying to seize
the greatest Mayor in the U.S., you little sawed-off runt. You are a son-of-a-bitch trying to bore from within, but
we’re wise to you and your kind, you dirty little kike.”). At the same time, Ernst received “a mass of letters from
rich Jewish people begging [him] to withdraw from the matter” lest he exacerbate antisemitic tendencies, a form of
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power by creating violence and disorder.” 162 Indeed, in a sense, the question is not why so many
of Hague’s constituents supported him, but rather why so much of America condemned him. 163
After his anti-CIO rally at the Jersey City armory in January 1938, Hague reportedly received
hundreds of congratulatory letters and telegrams from throughout the United States. 164 Had he
limited his attack to the CIO—had he permitted speeches by liberal groups, members of
Congress, and the ACLU even while resisting CIO organizing efforts—he would very likely
have garnered considerable sympathy. When the ACLU challenged his despotic practices, many
of his advisors encouraged him to do just that.165 Hague, however, ignored their suggestions.
He adopted policies so extreme as to seem a caricature; Heywood Broun aptly likened Jersey
City officials to “vulgarized” versions of the characters in Marc Blitztein’s Broadway musical,
“The Cradle Will Rock” (which, notably, Ernst invoked in court). 166 Urged on by business
groups and the Catholic Church, Hague denounced free speech itself as a Communist ploy. 167 In
1938, that was no longer a palatable strategy.

The Civil Liberties Campaign
In the four months before the injunction proceedings commenced, a broad array of groups
and individuals expressed their support for the ACLU’s civil liberties campaign by attempting to
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speak publicly against Hague and his policies in Jersey City. The Hague administration reliably
denied meeting permits to these would-be speakers, whatever their topic or political bent. While
some were labor and radical groups, others were not. For example, the American WhigCliosophic Society of Princeton University wanted to host a speech by Senator Borah, and the
Independent Speakers’ Association of New York City, whose members included Thomas Dewey
and Fiorello La Guardia, sought permission to hold an open-air meeting to discuss free speech.
These proposals and many others were summarily rejected. 168
In February, the civil liberties forces decided to circumvent the permit requirement and,
appropriating Hague’s own terminology, “invade” Jersey City. At a meeting convened by the
Hudson County Committee for Labor Defense and Civil Rights, an ACLU affiliate, 250 Hague
opponents crowded into a rented hall (too small, but the only one they could secure) to
“denounce the Mayor’s campaign of repression.” 169 Another 250 listened through amplifiers
outside. The featured speakers were United States Representative Jerry O’Connell, a Montana
Democrat, and John T. Bernard of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party. Local Hague opponents
also addressed the audience, including Rabbi Plotkin, John R. Longo, and Jeff Burkitt. Longo,
an anti-Hague Democrat, was about to receive a nine-month prison sentence on a specious
charge of election fraud 170—and Plotkin would nearly lose his congregation for serving as a
character witness at Longo’s trial. 171 Burkitt’s history with Hague stretched back to the late
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1920s, when he was routinely arrested and beaten by the police for challenging Jersey City
speech restrictions. 172 Many of his allegations against the city were validated by the
investigation of the New Jersey Senate’s Case Commission,173 and in 1929 the ACLU had
volunteered to assist him in appealing a 90-day sentence for disorderly conduct based on an
address to an anti-Hague political meeting. 174 The events of 1938 brought Burkitt back to antiHague agitation after a five-year hiatus.
After the February meeting, civil liberties groups were even more eager to defy Hague’s
oppressive policies, including the bans on gathering in public spaces and on circulation of
handbills. 175 A perfect opportunity arose in March, when the United States Supreme Court
invalidated a Griffin, Georgia license requirement for the distribution of printed materials. In
Lovell v. City of Griffin—at the urging of the ACLU as amicus curiae, among other groups—the
Court overturned the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness for distributing literature without a
permit, declaring the ordinance constitutionally overbroad. 176 The ACLU immediately informed
Hague that Jersey City’s permit requirement was unconstitutional. At first, the city resisted. A
police captain explained to one representative of the Workers Defense League that Jersey City
investigation by La Follette of the ouster, which he and Plotkin considered an “infringement of religious liberty.” In
a telegram, Carney told La Follette: “I predicted some months ago that Hague would take away religious liberty if
something was not done about his denial of the workers right to organize. Protestant groups who have recently
criticized Hague will be next to feel the ire of this Jersey Hitler.” “Avers Clergy Will Next Feel Hague Wrath,”
Newark Sunday Call, 15 May 1938. In July 1938 the two groups made a quiet arrangement and did not make the
terms public. McKean. Boss, 158.
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officials were “enforcing the Jersey City ordinance—not the Constitution.” 177 Eventually,
Corporation Counsel James A. Hammill conceded that the Lovell decision was applicable and
advised the Department of Public Safety that the orderly distribution of circulars and pamphlets
should be tolerated. He nonetheless insisted that unlawful assemblage would be strictly
prohibited. “Under no circumstances,” he announced, “shall mass demonstrations such as were
attempted by the C.I.O. and other groups several months ago be tolerated.” 178
Jubilant announcements that Hague was no longer “the law” were premature. 179 In midApril, Jeff Burkitt was arrested when he attempted to speak publicly against Hague and on behalf
of John Longo, despite denial of a meeting permit. 180 The Jersey City Journal ominously noted
that an ACLU membership card was found on his body upon his arrest. 181 At trial, Judge Antony
Botti chastised Burkitt for using obscene language and sentenced him to six months in the county
penitentiary. 182
A few weeks later, the International Labor Defense announced a test meeting featuring a
repeat performance by Representatives O’Connell and Bernard. The night before the scheduled
event, two thousand Hague supporters, primarily veterans, gathered at the Jersey City armory at
the invitation of Colonel Hugh A. Kelly, secretary to New Jersey Governor A. Harry Moore.
The crowd adopted resolutions demanding that Commissioner Casey take action to prevent the
177

“Jersey City Faces New Fight by CIO,” New York Times, 30 March 1938. Jersey City authorities claimed that the
Supreme Court’s decision applied to the Georgia provision only. “Jersey City’s Ban Thwarts Radicals,” Hudson
Dispatch (Union City, N.J.), 30 March 1938; “Hague Faces Test on Handbill Ban,” New York Evening Post, 30
March 1938.
178
Telegram to Frank Hague, 20 March 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063; “Ruling of Corporation Counsel
James A. Hammill on the Jersey City Ordinance Relating to the Distribution of Literature on the Streets,” ACLU
Papers, reel 165, vol. 2042.
179
E.g., Poster, 7 April 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063; “Hague Concedes Death of Leaflet Law in Jersey
City,” 8 April 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063.
180
The case was initially handled by the International Labor Defense, although the ACLU offered assistance. Jerome
Britchey to Jeff Burkitt, 4 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2042; Claire Burkitt to Jerome Britchey, 28
September 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2042 (passing along her husband’s request for assistance from the
ACLU after severing relations with Samuel L. Rothbard and the ILD).
181
“Card Found on Burkitt,” Jersey (City) Journal, 18 April 1938.
182
“Anti-Hague Crusader Gets 6-Month Term,” New York Times, 24 April 1938.

345

meeting and calling upon all members of patriotic organizations to appear in Journal Square in
uniform in case the speakers nonetheless appeared. They implicitly threatened vigilante violence
if the meeting were allowed to proceed. 183 At first, the ILD and its guests refused to back down.
“We are going,” Bernard announced, “because we believe that this is still America and not Nazi
Germany.” 184 The following evening, however, a huge crowd of public employees, veterans,
AFL members, and other Hague supporters assembled in Journal Square to overwhelm the ILD’s
audience. 185
After conferring at the ILD offices in Manhattan for more than three hours, the two
representatives decided to cancel their appearance. Observers for the ILD and the National
Committee for People’s Rights, including a delegation of twenty “prominent writers and
liberals,” concluded that attacks by the crowd were inevitable. 186 Vito Marcantonio, ILD
president and a former United States Representative for New York, explained that the organizers
would have happily risked arrest, but the situation had become more dire in light of the “armed
mob instigated and directed by Hague himself through his stooges.” Noting that the police had
taken measures to facilitate rather than prevent violence, Marcantonio contrasted the vigilantism
and corruption of Jersey City with the ILD’s commitment to “the democratic and civil rights of
the American people,” and he called upon President Roosevelt to “restore law and order.” 187
According to the New York Daily News, a majority of those involved had been “won over to the
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theory that direct action should be abandoned and an appeal made to the Federal courts to
enforce the rights of free speech in Hague’s dominion.” 188 Although the retreat garnered its
share of criticism, the press and even a few Hague constituents accepted the decision as the
responsible move in the face of mass hysteria. 189 A New York Times editorial cautioned that the
true threat of totalitarianism in America came not from Hague himself, but from the mobs that
enforced his will—that is, from the “substantial number of persons so short-sighted that they
have as little respect for constitutional rights as he has.” 190
Still, the spring’s most celebrated free speech incident involved not mob action, but
police action. A week before the ILD’s attempted meeting, the deportation of Norman Thomas
at a Socialist Party rally made national headlines. 191 Thomas tried to address a May Day Eve
meeting at Journal Square, for which Casey had denied a permit. He was immediately seized by
police, pushed into a car, driven to the ferry dock, and eventually forced onto a boat bound for
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New York. Spectators fared little better; many were beaten or escorted to the city borders, and
Thomas’s wife Violet was allegedly punched in the jaw. Thomas returned later in the evening
“to find out what happened to [his] wife and other American citizens in Hitler-Hague
fiefdom.” 192 He was again escorted from the city, this time by the Hudson Tube. 193
The episode triggered a flood of newspaper editorials condemning Hague. Public figures
expressed outrage, including Alf M. Landon, the 1936 Republican presidential nominee, who
told Thomas that he was shocked by “such a gross violation of our sacred right of free
speech.” 194 According to the New York Post, critics were Republicans and Democrats,
conservatives and radicals. 195 The Board of Governors of the New York Republican Club
unanimously adopted a resolution condemning Hague. 196 The annual conference of Democratic
women, though it did not target Hague by name, declared its support for “freedom of speech and
thought in the United States, so that all Americans may retain their priceless heritage as free
citizens of a free democracy.” 197 Within a few weeks, the Workers Defense League asserted
confidently that “Mayor Hague’s regime was now on the defensive.” 198
Critics clamored all the more loudly because Arthur T. Vanderbilt’s Newark law firm
agreed to represent Thomas in the matter, without financial compensation. 199 Vanderbilt, who
was serving as president of the American Bar Association, was a prominent Republican lawyer
192

“Thomas Charges Police Kidnaping,” Boston Globe, 1 May 1938; “Hague Police Oust Thomas from City,” New
York Times, 1 May 1938.
193
One month later, after securing a permit, Thomas attempted to deliver the speech he had prepared for Jersey City
in Newark. The speech was drowned out by music and the platform was pelted with rotten eggs and tomatoes.
“Thomas Is Routed As Riot Halts Speech in Newark,” New York Times, 5 June 1938. Newark officials expressed
regret and agreed to set aside a downtown park for public speeches for a ninety-day test period. “Newark to Set
Aside a ‘Hyde Park’ As Sequel to Attack on Thomas,” New York Times, 9 June 1938.
194
“Ousting of Thomas Assailed by Landon,” Boston Globe, 2 May 1938. Although Landon was mostly celebrated
for his stand, critics labeled him a Socialist. “Landon Branded Socialist for Defense of Speech Right,” Los Angeles
Times, 29 July 1938.
195
“Landon and Sinclair—Both Against Hague,” New York Post, 3 May 1938.
196
“Republicans Assail Hague,” New York Times, 20 May 1938.
197
“Women of Party Clash Over Hague,” New York Times, 3 June 1938.
198
“Hague is denounced at Jersey City Meeting,” New York Herald-Tribune, 23 May 1938.
199
“Thomas Defenders Consult Bar Head,” New York Times, 3 May 1938.

348

and academic (and future drafter of the 1947 New Jersey Constitution, under which he was
appointed Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court). 200 The New York Post labeled him
“an extremely conservative man,” 201 but in reality, he was no stranger to civil liberties fights. At
the urging of Felix Frankfurter, the ACLU had approached him for legal assistance in 1928, after
Roger Baldwin was convicted of breaching the peace for his part in organizing a protest on
behalf of striking silk workers in Paterson, New Jersey. 202 Vanderbilt agreed to take the case for
the cost of his office overhead, and much to the organization’s surprise, he argued it successfully
before the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals. The speech-protective decision—for which
Baldwin thought Vanderbilt deserved “a large part of the credit”—was regarded as the ACLU’s
first important judicial victory. 203
Vanderbilt’s demonstrated commitment to individual rights had leant credibility to the
ABA’s position during the judiciary reorganization controversy. Indeed, Morris Ernst, one of the
principal architects of the National Lawyers’ Guild, told him that his nomination as ABA
president had undercut the Guild’s recruitment and organizing efforts; the Guild had been hoping
to “launch[] an attack on the ABA as being wholly reactionary,” but Vanderbilt’s election
spoiled that plan. 204 “It just so happens that I have spent a good many years in liberal movements
and have taken more body blows in these fights than have most of the men who are leading the
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National Lawyers’ Guild,” Vanderbilt explained to an ABA colleague. “I have even been so
brash as to represent the American Civil Liberties Union in our court of last resort. Think of
that!” 205 A 1937 biographical sketch for the ABA attributed to Vanderbilt “an enlightened and
progressive view of the lawyer’s duty to protect the rights of individuals against the
encroachments of arbitrary power in public or private hands.” The new president firmly believed
in “personal and civil liberties” and had “given freely of his services to defend these rights in the
Courts.” 206 Vanderbilt, in short, was the ideal spokesperson for a content-blind model of free
speech. Just as his track record in civil liberties cases had allowed him to champion the Bill of
Rights without provoking charges of hypocrisy from the New Dealers, his status as head of the
eminently conservative ABA belied Hague’s claim that free speech was simply a vehicle for
Communist agitation. Vanderbilt confidently brushed aside such allegations (along with
Hague’s accusation that Vanderbilt had taken Thomas’s case for “a large fat fee”), explaining
that “Mr. Hague does not yet understand that the lawyers of the country are deeply concerned
with the preservation of civil liberties guaranteed by our Federal and State Constitutions.”207
Lawyers at Vanderbilt’s firm organized a comprehensive legal challenge on Thomas’s
behalf. In federal court, they sought damages from city officials totaling 20,000 dollars. 208 They
also filed new permit applications with the city, and when those were denied by Commissioner
Casey—who cited a threat of violence by hostile spectators, anticipating decades of municipal
reliance on the so-called “heckler’s veto” 209—they sued in state court for a writ of mandamus. 210
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At oral argument, Vanderbilt insisted that Thomas should be permitted to speak “even if a riot
were to ensue,” but the New Jersey Supreme Court deemed the permit ordinance constitutional
and upheld Casey’s right to exclude him (“the people are entitled to their tranquility,” the court
explained, and the fact that “the police could quell any disorder is no reason to grant a
permit”). 211 Vanderbilt appealed to the state high court, which refused to hear the case before the
following spring. 212
Most notably, Vanderbilt’s firm pursued a federal prosecution under a Reconstruction-era
civil rights law. Immediately after the April 30 incident, Thomas, with the assistance of the
Workers’ Defense League, requested an investigation by the La Follette Committee and urged J.
Edgar Hoover and the Department of Justice to investigate the applicability of the 1932
Lindbergh law, Title 18, Section 408-A of the United States Code, which made it a federal crime
to transport a kidnapping victim across state lines. 213 A few days later, J. Dixon Speakman of
Vanderbilt’s office filed complaints not only under the Lindbergh Law, but also an 1870 civil
rights statute. 214
The Department of Justice was skeptical of the kidnapping claim. Even sympathetic
reporters acknowledged that the law required ransom or torture, neither of which was involved in
Thomas’s ejection from New Jersey. 215 Attorney General Homer S. Cummings agreed to
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consider the argument, given that Thomas had employed “very eminent counsel.” 216 The more
plausible avenue for prosecution, however—one which was the Workers Defense League had
advocated in Jersey City as early as December 1937 217—was Title 18, Section 51 of the criminal
code. Section 51 and its companion provision, Section 52, were passed during Reconstruction to
protect black southerners from vigilante violence and from other forms of interference with the
rights newly secured to them by the federal government. 218 In 1938, they were among just a
handful of federal statutes criminalizing the deprivation of civil liberties. As Dean Dinwoodey
commented for the New York Times, their use raised “the problem of the affirmative powers of
the Federal Government to protect constitutional guarantees against alleged infringement.” 219
Section 51 provided for a five thousand dollar fine and up to one year in prison for
conspiracy “to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or
enjoyment” of any right “secured by” the United States Constitution or a federal statute.
Although the law seemingly implicated a broad range of private interference with such rights, the
courts had interpreted it narrowly. In 1938, it was thought to reach only such manifestly national
rights as voting in congressional elections, performing the duties of public office, reporting
violations of federal law, and freedom from slavery or involuntary servitude. It had been
employed primarily in voting rights cases (most notably, in Kansas City), but on one occasion, in
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United States v. Wheeler, it had been invoked under circumstances much like Jersey City’s. 220
The ACLU had good reason to be familiar with that case, which involved the perpetrators of the
1917 Bisbee deportation of IWW miners. 221 Federal prosecutors alleged in Wheeler that the
sheriff and townspeople who deposited the Arizona miners in neighboring New Mexico, and
threatened them with death should they return, had violated the “right and privilege pertaining to
citizens of [Arizona] to be immune from unlawful deportation from that state to another state.” 222
The Supreme Court rejected the government’s argument, holding (without discussing the fact
that local law enforcement was instrumental in the episode) that the ejection of the miners by
individuals was a matter for state law. The District Court had emphasized that no federal statute
had been violated, as the federal kidnapping statute applied only to abductions into slavery,
involuntary servitude, and peonage 223—a failing that was not remedied until passage of the
Lindbergh Law.
The Department of Justice rescued Section 51 from disuse in the fall of 1937, when it
obtained an indictment against dozens of coal companies, executives, and public officials in
Harlan County, Kentucky for conspiracy to violate the NLRA. According to one ACLU board
member, it was an ACLU pamphlet that supplied the idea. 224 The Pittsburgh Courier, a
prominent black newspaper, wryly pronounced it “rather singular that neither Mr. Cummings
[nor] any of his predecessors, Republican or Democratic, have ever previously been able to find
this law or to talk about using it where and when colored people were concerned.” 225 Still,
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Harlan County was a good candidate for application of the statute. It had been the site of
publicly sanctioned anti-union terrorism for a decade, and in 1937, the La Follette Committee
had uncovered murders, assaults, and interference with UMW organizing efforts on the part of
the county’s “coal barons and deputized thugs.” 226 All efforts to curb the violence and secure
miners’ rights in state courts—by the ACLU, among other actors—had failed. 227 As the
Department of Justice considered possible courses of action in the Thomas case, its attorneys in
Harlan County were about to go to trial. 228
On May 18, Cummings announced that he had ordered a federal assessment of the Jersey
City situation to determine “whether any persons in Jersey City were being deprived of civil
rights guaranteed by Federal law.” 229 Assistant Attorney General Brien McMahon, chief of the
criminal division and an instrumental figure in the Harlan County prosecution, was assigned to
head the investigation. The ACLU and CIO both eagerly offered their assistance. The chair of a
New Jersey legislative committee that had examined Hudson County elections requested that its
findings be incorporated into the civil rights inquiry. 230 The New York Post, which had recently
filed in federal court for an injunction against interference with the distribution of its papers,
celebrated the Department of Justice investigation as “the action that we have been expecting
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from an Administration led by a man who now stands as the world’s foremost exponent and
defender of the principles of democracy.” 231
In practice, however, the Jersey City investigation proceeded half-heartedly. According
to Thomas, the Roosevelt administration was reluctant to antagonize Mayor Hague, who had
become one of the staunchest and most reliable supporters of the President and his agenda. A
federal grand jury considered indictments under the Lindbergh Law and Section 51 in July and,
at Thomas’s urging, requested further investigation by the Department of Justice and the FBI. 232
In early September, newspapers reported that the Department was dropping the case. 233 A few
weeks later, Cummings’s office—which, in Thomas’s assessment, was pursuing the case “like a
man who is looking for a job but hopes he will never find one”—announced that the inquiry was
still ongoing. 234 The New York Times surmised that allegations of “political influence” had
exerted “strong pressure” on the Department of Justice; even New Deal liberals had “loudly
clamored for action.” 235 In the end, two special assistant attorneys general, Welly K. Hopkins
and Henry Schweinhaut (both of whom had assisted in the Harlan County prosecution),
assembled well supported indictments. 236 The grand jury, which was drawn from Hudson
County, declined to indict, but Hopkins and Schweinhaut promised a new and more sweeping
investigation before jurors from the entire state. 237 At the Department’s request, the ACLU and
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New Jersey Civil Liberties Union sent the Attorney General a 60-page report listing 89 court
cases, directly involving nearly two thousand people and organizations, related to civil liberties
violations in Hudson County between 1930 and 1938. The authors emphasized that the cases
included were representative but by no means exhaustive, as many local lawyers had not
responded to the organization’s survey. 238 The ACLU was frustrated with the pace of the federal
investigation but confident that the Department would give the report appropriate
consideration. 239
Civil liberties advocates applied equivalent pressure to other political bodies and
officials, with similarly unimpressive results. Thirty-two members of Congress called for
Hague’s appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, presumably
without expectation of his compliance. 240 Meanwhile, the Workers Defense League and other
groups asked President Roosevelt to censure Hague publicly for his “lawless conduct.”
Representative O’Connell described Hague’s “mobsters, thugs and gunmen” and asked the
President to intervene. 241 Roosevelt was sufficiently disturbed to request a meeting with the
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Attorney General, but Cummings advised him not to become directly involved. 242 A few days
later, when Upton Sinclair wrote to suggest prosecution of Hague for conspiracy to deprive
citizens of their civil rights, the President’s Appointments Secretary, Marvin H. McIntyre, was
tempted “just to file [the] telegram.” 243 In late June, a group of clergy members, including one
of Roosevelt’s Harvard classmates, requested an audience to discuss Hague’s policies. McIntyre
wired that it would be impossible to arrange a conference with the President in the foreseeable
future, and the delegation was invited to meet with the Attorney General instead. 244
The ACLU was hesitant to pressure Roosevelt directly. 245 Many board members were
staunch New Dealers, and Morris Ernst was a frequent correspondent and informal advisor to the
President, as well as an occasional houseguest in Hyde Park. 246 But in early May, when
Roosevelt dismissed the issue as a “local police matter,” a vocal minority within the organization
demanded an ACLU response. 247 William Fennell, who regularly chastised the administration
for its infringements on the “civil liberties” of New Deal critics (including employers regulated
by the NLRA 248), denounced the President’s “weasel words” and admonished the ACLU to
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“plac[e] blame where it belongs,” lest it become a “party to this buck-passing game.” 249 Fennell
was adamant that while Roosevelt was “making a tremendous mistake,” the ACLU would be
making “even a greater one if it passes by this ‘wink and a nod’ attitude of the President to the
flagrant conditions in Jersey City.” 250 The board was evidently persuaded, because on May 26 it
urged Roosevelt, as well as Postmaster General and DNC chair James Farley, “to ‘consider the
propriety’ of retaining Mayor Frank Hague of Jersey City as Vice-Chairman of the Democratic
National Committee in the light of his ‘flagrant opposition to the policies of the National
Administration.’” 251 Eventually the President addressed the situation, but only obliquely. In a
move with which the New York Times thought “all thoughtful Americans, ‘conservatives’ and
‘liberals,’ supporters and opponents of the Administration, [could] wholeheartedly agree,” he
announced in a fireside chat that “the American people [would] not be deceived by any one who
attempts to suppress individual liberty under the pretense of patriotism.” 252 Although there was
“no possibility of misunderstanding” the passage, the President refused to rebuke Mayor Hague
by name. 253
The La Follette Committee, too, disappointed the free speech forces. After repeated pleas
from Norman Thomas and the ACLU, the Committee indicated that it would launch an
investigation over the summer if funds permitted. 254 When the Senate approved the Committee’s
requested appropriation (with significant help from an ACLU publicity campaign), Baldwin
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assumed that its future work would cover Jersey City. 255 By September, however, there was no
indication that the Committee intended to act. A letter from sixty prominent liberals “earnestly
request[ing]” an investigation of the “extraordinary and open defiance of constitutional
guarantees” in Jersey City was similarly fruitless, despite the inclusion of eight members of
Congress. 256 In November, Baldwin stated that he had “canvassed [the] situation thoroughly”
and concluded that no Senate inquiry was forthcoming. He related the Committee’s explanation
that “funds [were] limited and that they had other work previously scheduled.” He also accepted
La Follette’s professed desire not to step in where other federal agencies, that is, the Department
of Justice and Judge Clark, were already involved. Despite the ACLU’s utmost efforts in the
public arena, the Jersey City situation was a matter for the federal courts. 257

Hague v. CIO
By the spring of 1938, Jersey City was a stomping ground for individuals and
organizations determined to make their mark in the civil liberties fight. Roger Baldwin, though
he advocated greater coordination of the anti-Hague forces, was heartened by the widespread
interest. 258 When one ACLU board member (and Communist sympathizer) advised a civil
liberties sympathizer to direct his donations toward the ACLU instead of Norman Thomas 259—it
made him “rather tired to see Norman and the Workers Defense crashing in and refusing all the
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time to play the game in a united front,” he explained—Baldwin demurred. 260 Indeed, he felt that
a “diversified attack is all to the good.” 261
Morris Ernst, however, had a different view of the situation. When Arthur Garfield Hays
invited arrest by making an impromptu address from the roof of a car in late May, the press
hailed him “as the first man to defy the Hague ban on free speech in Jersey City and get away
with it.” 262 Ernst did not share the general enthusiasm. “I have all along been opposed to small
groups going in here to speak,” he told a reporter. Ernst thought such small-scale displays
merely played into Mayor Hague’s hands. For Ernst, the heart of the Jersey City campaign was
the injunction proceeding in the federal district court, and he did not want other parties, even his
co-counsel at the ACLU, meddling with his plans.
Although Ernst opposed Hays’s involvement in the realm of legal as well as direct action,
he considered it important to enlist the assistance of local counsel. 263 To that end, it was Dean
Spaulding Frazer of the Newark Law School who filed the ACLU and CIO’s complaint. 264 The
plaintiffs claimed that the CIO’s sole objective in Jersey City was to educate workers regarding
their rights under the National Labor Relations Act. The ACLU had offered to assist the CIO in
light of its own mission, namely, to protect “the rights to freedom of speech, the press, and
260
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assembly, as guaranteed to the people by the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitutions of the respective states.” 265 No one, they emphasized, had intended to advocate the
overthrow of the local or United States governments.
The complaint named as defendants Mayor Hague, Daniel Casey, and Harry Walsh,
individually and in their official capacities, along with the Board of Commissioners. It described
in detail the thwarted CIO organizing drive of November 1937—with its deportations, illegal
searches, and confiscation of CIO literature—along with other efforts by the ACLU and CIO to
hold meetings and distribute materials in Jersey City (it was subsequently amended to include the
attempted speeches by Representative O’Connell and Norman Thomas as well 266). The plaintiffs
argued that Jersey City’s leaflet and meeting ordinances were unconstitutional, and they sought
to enjoin municipal officials from interfering with public and private meetings, picketing, the
distribution of literature, and lawful CIO labor activity. 267 The actions of Jersey City officials,
they claimed, violated the Privileges and Immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the
United States Constitution; the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment; the National Labor Relations Act; and the “Civil Rights Act of the United States,
which declares criminal conspiracies to injure persons in the exercise of their civil rights secured
to them by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 268
Hague v. CIO went to trial on June 1, 1938, after early attempts to reach a settlement fell
apart. 269 The case was heard by Judge William Clark, the same judge who had decided Hays’s
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injunction suit in the ACLU’s favor the previous year. As a concession to civil liberties
advocates, President Roosevelt had promised Morris Ernst that he would nominate Clark to the
Court of Appeals; the appointment was confirmed in the midst of the trial, and Clark had to
obtain permission from the Third Circuit to sit as a district judge in order to finish hearing the
case. 270 Unsurprisingly, Clark was sympathetic to the anti-Hague forces. He repeatedly
admonished Hague and the defense team to adopt a more respectful tone, and he made a number
of interjections on behalf of the plaintiffs. On one occasion, reflecting on “the difference between
actual government and paper constitutions,” he quoted the free speech provisions of the Soviet
constitution. “I don’t know whether I will be accused of being a Communist,” he added
tellingly. 271
The courtroom testimony unfolded along predictable lines. Witnesses recounted
numerous episodes of interference with CIO meetings, leaflet distributions, and other organizing
activities, and the deportations, violence, and other abusive practices employed by the Jersey
City police. They described court proceedings in which CIO organizers were deprived of basic
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legal rights. They reported conversations with private hall owners who were unwilling to rent
their facilities after receiving threats from city officials. 272
Daniel Casey, called as a witness for the plaintiffs, testified that as Commissioner of
Public Safety he was solely responsible for decisions whether to grant meeting permits. 273 To
Ernst, Casey’s prophylactic denial of permits to forestall rioting was a patently unconstitutional
example of prior restraint. It was also a bridge to totalitarianism. “[T]he operation of preventive
devices in anticipation of overt acts is the threshold of a dictatorship, no question about it,” he
declared. “It is the Hitler, the Stalin, the Mussolini, the Japan of today; they all start in the same
pattern. They say ‘We have got to prevent disorder; we have got to do it in advance.’” 274
The climax of the trial was the four-day “direct examination” of Hague, who appeared as
the plaintiffs’ principal witness. Ernst and Frazer hoped that Hague’s sense of infallibility would
prove self-defeating, and they were not disappointed. The mayor frequently referred to himself in
the third person, and he routinely answered questions over the objections of his own counsel. 275
Though he professed to “have no desire to stop anybody from talking,” 276 he openly conceded
his restrictive policies and practices, with the sole exception of coercing halls owners to rent to
CIO speakers (he explained that a “mere expression” of displeasure would be sufficient to induce
proprietors to close their doors). 277 In his view, the seizure of subversive literature and the
prevention of radical meetings were wholly justified in the interest of public safety. The proper
means of dealing with potential insurgents was to “suppress them,” he explained, “just as we are
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suppressing them in this case.” 278 On the issue of deportation, he insisted that eviction was “a
favor” compared with arrest.
Hague adopted a largely cooperative stance on the witness stand as long as Frazer
handled the questioning. Once Ernst took over, however, Hague abandoned the “congenial
manner” he had assumed during the first two days. When his lawyer tried to prevent him from
answering a potentially damaging line of inquiry, Hague ignored him and challenged Ernst to
“go to the limit.” Borrowing a metaphor from his favorite pastime, he told Ernst to “go right after
it” and “take the gloves off.” 279 “At times the scene took on the aspect of a Donnybrook fair,”
wrote New York Times correspondent Russell Porter, “with the Mayor and Mr. Ernst both
shouting at each other, and the Mayor’s lawyers also yelling at the top of their voices in a bedlam
through which nothing could be clearly heard.” 280 According to Hague, Ernst had fooled
President Roosevelt and the New York Governor Herbert Lehman into thinking he was a liberal.
Hague, however, would not be duped. When Ernst attempted to contain Hague’s longwinded
answers, Hague scornfully accused the lawyer of attempting to curtail his freedom of speech. 281
To Hague (as the New York Times put it), “Americanism and law and order, not free
speech and constitutional rights” were the values at stake in Jersey City. 282 Hague assured the
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court that the “question of free speech . . . [was] not involved in this controversy.” 283 He was
unmoved by Ernst’s suggestion that he, as a Jew, and Hague, as a Catholic, should be
particularly mindful of the First Amendment’s protection of minority rights. 284 To Hague, those
who advocated revolution were simply not entitled to the protections of the Constitution—
anyone who demanded civil rights could be expected to have “a Russian flag under his coat.” A
broad range of organizations came within Hague’s definition of Communism, from the American
Labor Party to the IWW. 285 Indeed, according to Hague all of the CIO’s leaders were
Communists, with the inexplicable exception of founder John L. Lewis. 286 So were Norman
Thomas, Representatives O’Connell (who was “ten communists 287”) and Bernard, Roger
Baldwin, and the worst offender, Morris Ernst. 288
Hague insisted that his peculiar classifications were grounded in experience. After
spending a few days in Russia in 1936, he professed to be an expert on all things Communist.
He also relied heavily on the report of the 1930 Fish Congressional Committee, which identified
the ACLU and the Garland Fund as pivotal Communist organizations (notably, even Hamilton
Fish was critical of Hague’s anti-speech policy). 289 Hague claimed that the true purpose of the
attempted CIO meetings was to overthrow the government—an effort that the organization
arguing against federal jurisdiction, Hershenstein claimed that the rights to organize, rent halls, and picket were
“merely aids to the right to earn a livelihood—the right to do business,” a property right, rather than independent
constitutional rights, and that the amount in controversy requirement consequently applied. Ibid., 2133.
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initiated during the 1936–1937 (AFL) seamen’s strike, when it dispatched five hundred “strongarm men and killers” to the city, of which Morris Ernst was the alleged “master mind.” 290
Indeed, Hague was sufficiently concerned by the imminent threat of Communist invasion to
advocate the deportation of alien radicals from the United States and the creation of a
concentration camp in Alaska for citizen “Reds.” 291
Hague intended to buttress his claims that the plaintiffs in the case were Communist
operatives (and thus came to the court with unclean hands 292). His attorneys issued sweeping
subpoenas to the CIO, the ACLU, and many of the individuals who had been denied permits by
Commissioner Casey. 293 Hague promised in his testimony to prove that Ernst, as treasurer of the
Garland Fund, was responsible for supplying “all the funds to the active Communistic groups in
the country” and to expose Ernst as a “known Communist” in the process. In fact, he claimed
confidently that Ernst, “when he gets on this stand,” would be “made to admit [it].”294 In the end,
however, the defendants declined to call any witnesses, hinting out of court that there was no
need to mount a defense in light of the patent inadequacy of the plaintiffs’ case. Baldwin
countered that Hague “did not dare put any of his witnesses on the stand, for fear that the
reckless charges he has so elaborately built up and smeared on the record would collapse.” 295
After such a strong showing, the plaintiffs hoped for a quick decision. Much to their
disappointment, Judge Clark announced that he would not issue a decision in the case before
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fall. 296 In the interim Mayor Hague’s spin fell just as flat outside the courtroom as it had within
it. In early June, the Hague administration mounted a massive “Americanism” demonstration
(“Against Communism and Against the Red Invasion”) to display its continued popularity in
Jersey City. 297 With the exception of a few stunts—the word “Bunk” was painted across some of
the posters advertising the demonstration, and swastikas were painted under Hague’s photos 298—
locals did not let their mayor down. The New York Times estimated that half of Jersey City’s
300,000 residents turned out for the two-hour event. Nationally, however, Hague faced
increasing criticism across the political spectrum. Newspaper rhetoric comparing Hague to Hitler
and Mussolini was ubiquitous during the trial, and the Americanism rally only exacerbated
matters. 299 A Washington Post editorial predicted that “those who have studied the development
of modern dictatorship [would] find a distinctly ominous note” in the demonstration, which
“contained, in embryonic form, many of the attributes of those Fascist or Nazi demonstrations
which accompanied the overthrow of democracy in Italy and Germany.” Despite its “liberal
display of American flags,” cautioned the author, the mass display of loyalty (by a largely
immigrant population) was distinctly un-American. 300 Hague’s credibility further plummeted
when a Nazi radio broadcast praised Hague as a “man fighting for the cause in the United
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States.” 301 Even veterans groups began to denounce Hague for his un-American suppression of
constitutional rights. 302
For the ACLU, on the other hand, the courtroom proceedings and surrounding publicity
were a tremendous success. Press coverage of the trial was overwhelmingly favorable to the
plaintiffs, and the ACLU received a “flood” of congratulatory letters from throughout the
country, many of which were accompanied by contributions. 303 The challenge for the ACLU was
to maintain its momentum over the summer. Despite widespread optimism about the outcome,
holding the various civil liberties groups together was proving to be increasingly difficult. Ernst
left for vacation in July and beseeched Baldwin to “keep them all cool” in his absence. “It’s our
luck,” he confided in Baldwin, “that Hague’s attorneys never understood all the petty jealousies
of those organizations that want to build organizational strength on the Jersey fight, with a loss
of sight at times as to the real objective, that is opening Jersey City.” 304
Ernst thought it important that no new test cases be filed pending the decision, and the
ACLU board urged compliance with his recommendation. 305 He also thought it ill-advised to
hold additional meetings or to spend significant funds on publicity efforts over the summer
months. Instead, Ernst asked Baldwin to begin preparations for disseminating the decision once
it was handed down. For Ernst, the greatest challenge was not the legal battle (he had “no doubt”
about a “swell decision”), but convincing Jersey City residents that they could safely disregard
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Hague’s will. He wanted 100,000 copies distributed as leaflets and by mail, which would take
“money and some real planning,” and he thought the task should be coordinated by Carney and
“any Jersey City people or committees who will really work at the program.” 306 In the meantime,
he suggested circulating anti-Hague pamphlets to workers at the factory gates (“After all the
courts are sounding boards working on the public and affected by the public opinion”). 307
The ACLU adopted Ernst’s proposal, and in August, it initiated a “campaign to acquaint
the people of Jersey City with the reaction throughout the nation to Mayor Frank Hague’s
wholesale suppression of civil rights.” 308 Volunteers received detailed instructions on legal
compliance and were advised not to disrupt traffic, argue with police officers, force pamphlets on
uninterested pedestrians, or distribute pamphlets without an observer present. 309 Among the
leaflets handed out were 50,000 copies of a compilation of editorial cartoons, entitled “Candid
Views of Mayor Hague,” lambasting Hague’s dictatorial practices. 310 When local Hague
supporters attempted to interfere, “Frankie’s police came along, ‘broke it up,’ and stood by to
insure the peaceful distribution of the leaflets.” 311
Two months later, on October 27, 1938, Judge Clark issued an opinion in Hague v.
CIO. 312 The front page of the New York Times announced, “Hague Loses CIO Fight,” and
congratulatory letter flooded into the ACLU offices. 313 In the days that followed, however, both
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sides declared victory. 314 As expected, the court decided in the plaintiffs’ favor on the issues of
deportation, 315 literature distribution, 316 and the right to carry placards. 317 It also held that the
city’s past policy for allocating meeting permits was impermissible. According to Ernst however,
there was “only one point really open as a matter of law” 318—and on that issue, Clark’s language
was discouraging. 319
To Ernst, holding that the meeting ordinance was unconstitutionally administered was not
enough. Rather, he saw the Hague case as a “chance to upset all of the damn ordinances.” 320 He
conceded that municipalities could legitimately consider traffic in regulating public gatherings,
but in his view, that was the limit of their discretion. 321 Ernst argued at trial that the recent First
Amendment cases—Near, DeJonge, and Lovell—had rendered any law providing for
“precensorship of what a man may say” unconstitutional. 322 He conceded that the law had not
always been on his side, 323 but he assured Judge Clark that the Supreme Court would strike
down the Jersey City ordinance as unconstitutional. 324 Clark was was impressed by the gravity of
the problem before him. In fact, he thought that the preservation of a “democratic form of
government” depended on its “sound solution,” and he expressed his hope that the Supreme
314

“Hague Loses CIO Fight,” New York Times, 28 October 1938; “Clark Tells Hague,” Newark Sunday Call, 30
October 1938.
315
Hague, 25 F. Supp. at 142 (“[N]either a city, a state, not the nation can resort to the banishment of its citizens
even after a compliance with the due process and fair trial requirements and even as a punishment for crime. Any
such drastic power is manifestly an attribute of sovereignty. . . . Any contrary doctrine would destroy our national
unity and relegate us to the passport system of earlier times.”).
316
That issue was resolved by Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
317
Hague, 25 F. Supp. at 151 (“[T]he prohibition of placards must be restrained.”).
318
Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 18 July 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041.
319
The court did not consider the plaintiffs’ claims under the NLRA in light of its decision on the same claims in the
context of the 1937 injunction, which was still pending in the Third Circuit. That case was dismissed as moot in
December 1938. “Old Curb on Hague Voided on Appeal,” New York Times, 14 December 1938.
320
Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 18 July 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041.
321
The court’s decision left open the question whether street meetings could be denied, as the plaintiffs had
requested access to public parks. Clark assumed, however, that a city could deny access to all speakers.
Communication to attorneys, 7 November 1938, Hague District Court Papers.
322
Hague trial transcript, vol. 2, 2173.
323
Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
324
Hague trial transcript, vol. 2, 2259.

370

Court would settle the issues before him swiftly and surely. 325 In the meantime, however, he
arrived at a compromise solution.
Judge Clark’s decision opened with a theoretical treatment of free speech, which featured
excerpts from such diverse thinkers as Spinoza, Machiavelli, John Locke, Aristotle, Herbert
Spencer, John Stuart Mill, Thomas Jefferson, and Oliver Wendell Holmes. 326 Clark seemingly
embraced Zechariah Chafee’s assessment that “one of the most important purposes of society
and government is the discovery and spread of truth on subjects of general concern.” That aim
was made possible only by “absolutely unlimited discussion,” as force might be as easily
asserted on the side of falsehood as of truth. Following Chafee, Clark acknowledged that
unfettered expression might interfere with other legitimate purposes of government (including
“order, the training of the young, [and] protection against external aggression”) but believed that
“freedom of speech ought to weigh very heavily” in the equation. 327 “As in many matters of
political science,” he explained, “there exists a necessity for balance,” and the trouble was to
strike the right “adjustment of the scales.” 328 That the issue was one of political science, not mere
legal doctrine, was significant. In the years since the First World War, political scientists had
traded in their idealistic vision of the public welfare for a hardboiled model of interest group
pluralism. In fact, to many, the erasure of difference in the public interest was the distinguishing
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feature of totalitarianism. 329 Fragmentation and friction were fundamental to American
democracy, and they were best facilitated by freedom of speech.
Clark was no relativist. He believed that some ideas, some forms of government, were
better than others. In particular, he considered Communism “economically unworkable” and the
methods employed in its propagation “abhorrent to all true believers in democracy”—though he
was loathe to make martyrs of its advocates. 330 He also believed that abusive epithets or
inflammatory rhetoric were unlikely to persuade, and it was senseless to countenance bloodshed
“in the effort to convert those possibly impervious to conversion.” 331 In other words, productive
political conversation required civilized public discourse, and to that end, he thought the state
might be justified in curtailing speech where riot was truly likely to ensue. The right of access to
public places for the purposes of “mental recreation,” that is, “the opportunity to impart and
receive instruction,” was limited by “the sovereign’s interest in the public peace.” 332
Judge Clark was clear that Jersey City’s existing practice of denying permits to all CIO
and ACLU speakers—a “deliberate policy” of discrimination to which Hague and Casey freely
admitted 333—violated the constitutional right to free assembly. 334 The CIO was pursuing the
organization of workers into labor unions consistently with federal law, and the ACLU was
devoted to “enforcement of the rights secured by the First Amendment and the Fourteenth
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Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.” 335 Neither group was after radical social
change.
Clark was equally explicit, however, that a municipality was entitled to require permits
for meetings in order to ensure public enjoyment and safety. 336 Relying on English case law, he
concluded that if a speaker’s past conduct was sufficiently provocative, the city could require a
copy of the speech to be delivered and censor it “in the light of the reasonable apprehension of
disorder of ‘firm and courageous’ city officials.’” Alternatively, the speaker could be “bound
over to keep the peace and be of good behavior.” 337 On the other hand, a speaker who had
observed “the decencies of discussion” in the past “should be given the full protection consistent
with the strength of the local guardians of public safety.” 338 Whether mob violence was in fact
likely to ensue was bound to be difficult to judge. “The effect of opinion upon the human mind
lies in the field of psychology,” Clark conceded, and was “not an exact science.” 339 Moreover,
the danger of “mob censorship” was troubling. 340 Still, the city’s determinations would be
reviewable in the courts, and the question was “again that matter of balance.” 341 Judge Clark had
expressed the same sentiment more colloquially during the trial: “As far as public meetings are
concerned, it might be the law, or it should be the law, rather, that if the persons who live in the
city object to the views, and really object, I mean without fomentation or anything of that
character, from what the speakers either have in the past expressed or say that they are about to
express, the authorities need not permit those views to be expressed on the public streets or the
335
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public parks.” 342 In his opinion, Judge Clark laid down precisely that rule, though without
addressing the issue of “fomentation.” Although the problem was posed by the Hague case itself,
he made no provision for a municipality that actively promoted vigilantism in order to justify
denial of a permit.
To the Jersey City authorities, Judge Clark’s decision was an invitation to continue
denying meeting permits to the ACLU and CIO. In the days after the opinion was issued, the
city announced that there would be “no let up” in the drive to exclude “radicals and Red.” 343
According to James Hamill, corporation counsel, Judge Clark had declared the ordinance
constitutional. Hamill added that where the district court’s opinion differed from that of the New
Jersey Supreme Court, upholding the same ordinance in the Thomas matter, the city would
follow the latter—a position that Spaulding Frazer cautioned would put the Jersey City
authorities in contempt of court. 344 When the New Jersey Civil Liberties Committee (on behalf
of the Hudson County Committee for Labor’s Defense and Civil Rights) requested a permit for a
meeting celebrating Judge Clark’s decision, Commissioner Casey denied the application. 345
Because Judge Clark had not yet filed his final order, there could be no proceedings for
contempt. Still, Baldwin chastised Hague for “flout[ing] the dignity of the Federal Courts.” 346
As the shortcomings of Judge Clark’s opinion became clear, the ACLU abandoned its
initial celebratory posture. The board expressed gratification “with the general attitude
expressed by Judge Clark” but formally instructed its counsel to oppose inclusion of the
342
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censorship provision in the final decree. Requiring manuscripts in advance, it announced in a
press statement, was “contrary to the principle of free speech,” “wholly unnecessary to preserve
public order,” and “without precedent in American law.” 347
Other civil liberties advocates were equally anxious. The International Juridical
Association (IJA), a leftist legal organization devoted to labor law and civil liberties issues, was
unwilling to defer to the ACLU and opted instead to take matters into its own hands. At the
Newark courthouse, Ernst bumped into Morris Cohen, who was carrying papers for a petition to
intervene—prepared by IJA attorney and ACLU board member Nathan Greene. 348 Cohen was
cooperative, and Ernst convinced him that “intervention could do no good and might hurt.” Still,
he was concerned once again by the lack of coordination. The various groups involved in Jersey
City were operating at cross-purposes. “What with Norman proceeding in a state court action
bound inevitably for defeat, and other groups proceeding with intervention and other collateral
moves, the situation is greatly confused,” he complained. “Can’t you get the group to have
patience? They have gone for a decade with nothing but total defeats.” 349 He expressed the same
sentiment to ACLU secretary Lucille Milner. “If we only had a united front in civil liberties in a
case like this,” he lamented, “life would be fairly simple.” 350 Ernst was “entirely convinced” that
the “obiter dicta in regard to the reading of speeches in advance was merely dicta,” and that final
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decree would be “satisfactory.” Indeed, he told Baldwin, Clark had said as much from the
bench. 351
Ernst turned out to be right. The final order enjoined city officials from excluding or
deporting the plaintiffs; from restraining them except in connection with a lawful search or
seizure; and from interfering with their rights to distribute leaflets, converse with passersby in
public places, or carry placards. 352 On the crucial issue of public meetings, it forbade the city
“from placing any previous restraint upon or in any other manner whatsoever directly or
indirectly interfering” with the right of the plaintiffs to hold meetings and assemblies in the open
air and parks, “provided that an application for a permit to hold such meetings . . . has been made
three days in advance.” 353 The city could refuse a permit only if the designated time or place for
the meeting would undermine the public recreational purpose of the parks, reasonably construed.
Morris Ernst got everything he requested.
In fact, he got more. Judge Clark did not merely require the city to stay out. He set the
further condition, unprecedented in the federal courts and rarely followed in subsequent
decisions until the Civil Rights era, 354 that the city actively prevent “interruption by such persons
as may be present.” In other words, he required the police to protect the plaintiffs against
interference by hostile spectators, “provided only that such protection is reasonably consistent
with the ability of defendants to carry out their obligations in regard to the safety of the residents
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of Jersey City.” 355 Judge Clark’s affirmative guarantee of access had its limits. He implied that
the city could lawfully adopt a policy of “forbidding meetings of any kind” on the public streets
and thoroughfares. But in those public parks that were “dedicated for the purposes of the general
recreation of the public,” the plaintiffs were entitled to speak their minds. 356
This time, civil liberties groups were justifiably elated. The ACLU called the injunction a
“clear-cut victory.” 357 The New York Post, which (to Ernst’s dismay 358) had harshly criticized
Judge Clark for his initial opinion, was “happy to pay tribute to him . . . for his splendid and
unequivocal final decree.” 359 Although the fight against Hague’s “dictatorial lawlessness” was
not yet over, the ACLU was confident that “the power of a federal court order [would] go far
toward winning it.” 360 Judge Clark evidently shared the organization’s optimism. In a
communication to the attorneys involved in the case, he implicitly repudiated Hague’s posturing
of the previous weeks. Noting that “the passions aroused by this sort of controversy are
disruptive of democracy,” he told the lawyers that he expected his opinion would “carr[y]
sufficient convictions to the clients to effect a reasonable modification of their conflicting points
of view.” 361
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The ABA Committee on the Bill of Rights
The ACLU opted not to test the city’s compliance with Judge Clark’s warning. In midNovember, Baldwin reported that the only activities the ACLU would pursue pending appeal
were the distribution of the court decree and a possible meeting in New York. 362 Hague
continued his public relations campaign against the “invaders”; he accused Arthur Vanderbilt of
unethical conduct, and he called Baldwin, Ernst, and Thomas “the three Communist leaders of
the country.” 363 On the whole, however, the parties’ attention was focused on the legal
campaign.
On that front, the months between Judge Clark’s decree in November and the Third
Circuit’s decision in January were momentous ones. Procedurally, a few unusual developments
attracted newspaper attention (for example, when the plaintiffs challenged an effort to “pack” a
Third Circuit panel with Hague supporters). 364 In December, the Court of Appeals ruled that
Judge Clark’s injunction in the Boot and Shoe Makers Union case was moot. The Camden Post
cited the decision as evidence of the importance of observing a national Bill of Rights week. “No
one ever openly attacks the Bill of Rights,” it reflected, “yet it is in danger from officials and
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courts who tacitly disregard it and evade enforcement of it.” The Third Circuit’s decision was a
“perfect example” of this phenomenon. 365
But the truly noteworthy development came in the form of an amicus brief in Hague v.
CIO. According to the New York Times, it was a brief that “ought to stand as a landmark to
American legal history.” It offered a lucid and compelling argument for constitutional rights, and
it was worthy of being “spread about in all communities in which private citizens, private
organizations or public officials dare threaten or suppress the basic guarantees of American
liberty.” It was submitted by the American Bar Association’s Committee on the Bill of Rights. 366
That committee had its origins in a public relations initiative under the presidency of
Arthur Vanderbilt, in the wake of Roosevelt’s judiciary reorganization proposal. Vanderbilt
began contemplating proposals to improve the ABA’s image in early 1937. In February of that
year, Reginald Heber Smith of the Association’s Committee on Legal Aid Work wrote to request
additional funds for his committee’s work. He advised Vanderbilt that the ABA, out of a gross
income of almost 250,000 dollars, “devotes to the whole subject of legal aid for poor persons the
sum of $500.” Smith thought people would be appalled by the figure if it were made public. He
also speculated that increased expenditures would pay for themselves in good will. 367 Vanderbilt
felt constrained to turn him down. He explained that in light of a budget deficit made worse by
the court packing controversy, no additional funds would be available in the foreseeable
future. 368 Still, Smith persisted. In July, he tried to convince Vanderbilt that increasing legal aid
(and advertising the step in a “manifesto” to be printed in the nation’s newspapers) would detract
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attention from the newly created National Lawyers Guild. 369 The Guild, he emphasized, had
already formed a Committee on Legal Aid and approached the National Association of Legal
Aid Organizations to offer its assistance. Smith hoped the ABA would not “fumble the ball and
let the Guild pick it up.” 370
Although Vanderbilt never acted on Smith’s request, he found his argument compelling.
The National Lawyers Guild posed a seemingly significant threat to the continued vitality of the
American Bar Association. The Guild distinguished itself from the ABA by endorsing programs
and reform proposals “designed to promote human welfare,” such as the Child Labor
Amendment, social security legislation, minimum wage laws, and protections for collective
bargaining—all of which the ABA had opposed. 371 Its early executive committee included many
prominent officials, academics, and politicians, including Jerome Frank, Wisconsin Governor
Philip La Follette, and Washington Senator Homer T. Bone, as well as counsel for both the AFL
(Charlton Ogburn) and the CIO (Lee Pressman). 372 Its first president—who lived to see many of
his most idealistic ambitions championed by prominent lawyers and implemented by the
Roosevelt administration, before his death from a heart attack in 1939—was Frank P. Walsh.
Also on the executive committee was Morris Ernst, who was instrumental in founding
and promoting the new organization. 373 Ernst was an outspoken critic of the ABA, which he
considered a force of reaction. He had refused to join as a young lawyer when he learned that a
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black candidate had been admitted to membership “by mistake.” 374 Ernst imagined the National
Lawyers Guild as an opportunity for a segment of the legal profession to advance the causes that
he himself promoted in his private legal work and public service for such groups as the NAACP,
the CIO, and the ACLU. As the Guild’s “Call to American Lawyers” explained: “the civil
rights of the American people are under wide-spread attack. . . . Millions of people are actually
wanting of the necessities of life.” Lawyers were well equipped to improve social conditions, but
the organized bar had shirked its responsibility. Worse, it had acted to block the will of the
people as expressed in popular legislation. It had pandered to the interests of a minority of the
profession, for whom “concern for liberty” was “secondary to its concern for property.” 375
Vanderbilt was determined to soften this widely shared perception of the ABA. In the
winter of 1937–1938, he launched a “Public Relations” program on behalf of the ABA, 376 and in
January, a conference on the issue was convened at his request. 377 To Vanderbilt, the ABA’s
public relations problem was twofold. The first problem was the relationship between the
Association and the membership of the bar. The ABA leadership was formulating strategies for
undercutting the Guild’s recruitment in law schools (where students were favorably disposed to
the “revolutionary movement at the bar”) and among economically dissatisfied attorneys. 378 But
the second, more pressing problem, was the negative perception of lawyers, and the ABA in
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particular, among the general public. 379 Increasing legal aid was one potential solution to this
problem, but the ABA eventually opted for a more glamorous (and less expensive) way to
redirect the National Lawyer Guild’s positive press: creation of a new and high-profile
Committee on the Bill of Rights.
The idea for the committee came not from Vanderbilt, though it had his enthusiastic
support, but from Grenville Clark. Clark was a Wall Street lawyer, self-described conservative,
and frequent correspondent of Felix Frankfurter’s, who was actively involved in public service
throughout his life. 380 In June 1938, Clark delivered an address on “Conservatism and Civil
Liberty” to the Annual Meeting of the Nassau County Bar Association. 381 Clark told his
audience that the problem of civil liberties in America had “entered upon a new and crucial
phase.” The importance of “reconciling authority with individual freedom” stemmed not
primarily from the “growth of dictatorships abroad,” but from the “growth, largely inevitable, of
governmental interference with the social and economic life of citizens.” True civil liberty, he
explained in terms much like Morris Ernst’s, required both democratic self-government and the
“reign of law,” that is, the absence of arbitrary government action. 382
According to Grenville Clark, it was up to conservatives, not liberals or radicals, to strike
the appropriate balance. Conservatives wanted reform to come “gradually and with a minimum
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of friction.” They recognized that “vast changes” in society necessitated “new methods and
devices in government and new relations between the government and the individual,” but they
also desired to retain “the best of those values that have been brought out of the past.” In
practice, however, “the active defense of civil liberty [had] been allowed to drift very largely into
the hands of the elements of ‘the left.’” 383
Conversely, many Americans had come to believe leftist claims that conservatives were
more interested in the protection of property, not the “great rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment.” Clark emphasized that the ACLU, notwithstanding the “admittedly radical views”
of much of its leadership, deserved credit for serving the “underdog” and defending unpopular
causes. 384 He believed, however, that by cornering the field of civil liberties so completely, the
organization had created the “public impression that the active defense of civil liberties is not a
matter of primary concern with those of more moderate views.” 385 In other words, he suggested
that conservatives might have defended civil liberties more vigorously if the ACLU had not so
strongly stamped the cause with the taint of radicalism.
The time had come, in Clark’s view, for conservatives to reclaim the mantle of civil
liberties. That conservatives themselves, under the New Deal, were facing the purported
deprivation of civil rights for the first time was evidence of the need for a neutral defense of
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constitutional rights. 386 American conservatives could not “have it both ways,” Clark cautioned.
They could not countenance the oppression of minorities while conservatives were “in the
ascendant,” lest their own rights be suppressed when the situation reversed. 387 The only feasible
position was a “firm and impartial” defense of all constitutional rights, in all cases, “irrespective
of whether we approve or disapprove the sentiments and policies of the persons affected.” In
promoting that ideal, lawyers had a particularly crucial role to play. After all, lawyers were
conservative by nature and training. They had led the defense of civil liberties for generations,
and despite their quiescence of the past decades, they had recently rediscovered the central
importance of constitutional rights. What, he asked, was the secret of the legal profession’s
“united and powerful movement” to defeat the court-packing plan? “It was their conviction,
arrived at both by reason and instinct, that the proposal . . . was fundamentally a threat to our
civil liberties.” He concluded with an exhortation: “this zeal and power that manifested itself in
the crisis of a year ago ought not to be permitted to lapse but should be better organized for
opposition to other attacks on civil liberty that are constantly occurring.” 388
Grenville Clark’s pronouncements resonated within and outside the bar, and they were
widely publicized in professional journals and the popular press. 389 In the days after his address,
Clark received numerous letters applauding his suggestion, and he wrote Arthur Vanderbilt to
advocate the creation within the ABA of a committee on civil liberties or civil rights. The
District of Columbia bar association had already created such committees, he advised Vanderbilt,
386
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and other local associations (for example, in Chicago and New York County) were
contemplating similar proposals. Perhaps most important, the National Lawyers Guild had
one 390; creating it was among the organization’s first priorities, and it was approved in February
1937, at the Guild’s inaugural national convention. 391
Vanderbilt was convinced. When the ABA’s Board of Governors met in Cleveland in
July 1938, he put the matter on the agenda—though at the request of his successor, Frank Hogan,
he “laid the matter over until the new Board took office.” 392 The new board, in turn, acted
promptly to implement Clark’s proposal. In his inaugural address as ABA president, Hogan
admonished the organization’s membership to be “alert and vigilant” in defending the “rights
and liberties of the individual.” 393 The protection of these rights, he insisted, was a historic
obligation of the bar. Hogan himself claimed a lifelong commitment to civil liberties work.
Twenty years earlier, he had delivered an address called “The Bill of Rights and What It means
to You,” and in the intervening decades he had “observed with increased regret” that individuals
were alert to the suppression of liberties only when their own views were suppressed. 394 Hogan
echoed Clark’s statement that civil liberties were worth protecting even when the underlying
speech was offensive or its proponents unlikable. He insisted that “violations of the Bill of
Rights are intolerable, no matter whom they affect.” 395 Rhetorically, he adopted precisely the
same line as the “liberals” on the ACLU board, who were constantly called upon to justify their
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defense of conservatives and reactionaries (most notably the Nazi Party) to their leftist
colleagues.
For Hogan, however, economic rights clearly still remained within the ambit of
constitutional protection. Indeed, Hogan portrayed the businessmen whose interests were
jeopardized by reform initiatives at the turn of the century as the unheralded victims of gross
authoritarian abuses. “Perhaps, because the trampling recently sometimes has been upon wellworn shoes,” he mused, “the hurt done thereby has been considered more important than when
the crushed toes were encased in patent leather footwear of the wealthy, or the rights denied or
the privacy invaded were those of the business corporation.” 396 It is little wonder that initial
reactions to the ABA’s announcement evinced skepticism toward its underlying objectives. 397
Still, Hogan’s examples achieved their effect. Later that day, the ABA House of
Delegates adopted a resolution creating a Special Committee on the Bill of Rights. Its mission
was to ensure that “whenever rights or immunities secured by the Bill of Rights are anywhere
denied to any citizen or threatened with denial, there shall be a speedy and impartial
investigation of the facts, and where the facts warrant it, there shall be certainty of the assistance
of competent lawyers and defense in protection of such rights.” 398 The new committee would
intervene, where necessary, to protect civil liberties by filing amicus briefs, educating the public,
and cooperating with state and local bar associations. Zechariah Chafee agreed to serve on the
committee, and Grenville Clark was appointed committee chair. 399 Clark was not personally
acquainted with all of the members, most of whom were conservative in their political views, but
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he thought it was a “good committee which will be really interested in the subject.” 400 Perhaps
its most notable member, aside from Chafee and Clark, was Joseph A. Padway, general counsel
for the American Federation of Labor.
The ACLU, while cautious, was gratified by the ABA’s emerging interest in civil
liberties. As rightwing critics quickly realized, the ABA’s involvement promised to make civil
liberties work truly respectable, with evident implications for ACLU fundraising and advocacy
work. 401 In a press statement, the ACLU offered its “full cooperation” with the new
committee—though it pointedly suggested that the ABA “lift its membership ban on Negroes as
the initial act on behalf of minority rights,” much to the distress of ABA members already
nervous about the ABA’s new venture, including Robert Carey, a vocal Jersey City lawyer. 402
Arthur Garfield Hays wrote Hogan personally to “welcome the American Bar Association’s
long-delayed recognition of its responsibility in this field” (he, too, mentioned the discriminatory
membership policy, and he threatened to resign from the ABA unless the issue was
addressed 403).
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Carey, 23 January 1939, Vanderbilt Papers, box 127, folder Civil Liberties (“[I] cannot take the view that crass
violations of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights are of mere local concern and that hence the striking down of the
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The Committee on the Bill of Rights reciprocated the ACLU’s interest. Immediately
after the announcement of the new committee, its members were flooded with requests from
criminal defendants complaining about denial of process. The committee considered these cases
to be of primarily local concern, however, and it recommended the appointment of local
committees to assume responsibilities for such matters. 404 The national committee, by contrast,
wanted to reserve its services for issues of national significance. 405 To that end, Clark asked
Hays to suggest areas in which it could most usefully intervene. 406 The ACLU board, after
discussion, recommended a few areas of particular importance, including the appeal of the
Minersville, Pennsylvania flag salute case, radio censorship, and third degree legislation. The
first and most pressing concern, unsurprisingly, was Jersey City. 407
At the ACLU’s urging, the Committee agreed at its first meeting, in November 1938, to
file an amicus brief in Hague v. CIO. Although Hague presented many issues, the Committee
was concerned only with one: the city’s arbitrary refusal to issue meeting permits. For the
Committee, the central problem was “the right of public assembly,” a “vital” civil liberty not yet
considered by the Supreme Court. 408 The brief was written primarily by Zechariah Chafee and
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Grenville Clark. 409 Doctrinally, it considered the Supreme Court’s recent First Amendment
decisions—Fiske, Stromberg, Near, Grosjean, Herndon, and Lovell—to have altered the
constitutional balance between state authority and liberty of expression. One case, DeJonge,
dealt specifically with the right of assembly in so far as it prohibited punishment for mere
participation in a meeting. Davis v. Massachusetts, upon which the city relied, was
distinguishable on the facts. 410
On the whole, however, the authors were more concerned with free speech theory and
policy than with case law. With respect to the latter, they deferred to the lengthy brief submitted
by the ACLU, which covered such issues exhaustively and—in stark contrast to the ABA’s
brief—with barely any reflection on the more capacious values at stake. By contrast, the ABA
committee’s brief argued that freedom of assembly was worthy of constitutional protection
because it was essential to the “American democratic system.” That system, in turn, was
premised on the “consent of the people,” 411 which was only meaningful when secured through
“adequate information and discussion.” 412 Legislation passed in the absence of robust debate
could not command popular support and would not be “law in a real sense.” Moreover,
oversight by an engaged constituency provided a check on administrative abuses. In short, it was
“only through free discussion” that democracy could “function at all.” 413 While there were many
409
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available forums for public debate—including print media, radio, and movies—the face-to-face
encounter of a meeting on the street corner or at the town square performed a unique and crucial
role in the production of public opinion. This was particularly true in the context of unpopular
minorities, who often had limited financial resources and whose ideas were otherwise unlikely to
be heard.
The brief’s authors were adamant that the unpopularity of an idea could not be cited as
justification for suppressing it. Indeed, they considered “the right to express unpopular opinions
and to hold unpopular meetings” to be the “essence of American liberty,” which was
fundamentally premised on tolerance. 414 This principle, the brief emphasized, applied not only
to determinations by officials that a particular idea was dangerous or undesirable, but also to the
perceived hostility of a crowd. A threat of disorder by opponents of a speaker (as opposed,
potentially, to a threat by the speakers themselves) was no reason to prohibit a public
appearance, whether spontaneous or contrived. 415 Rather, the appropriate response on the part of
the authorities was to schedule the meeting at an appropriate time and place and, more important,
to ensure adequate police protection in the event that violence indeed occurred. 416 Government
actors were bound not only to tolerate dissenting speech, but to take reasonable measures to
protect it from private disruptions. “Surely a speaker ought not to be suppressed because his
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opponents propose to use violence,” the brief proclaimed. “Let the threateners be arrested for
assault, or at least put under bonds to keep the peace.” After all, “It is they who should suffer for
their lawlessness, not he.” 417
For the authors, the purpose of free speech was to facilitate discussion of pressing social
issues, to ensure both the legitimacy and optimal outcome of the democratic process. It was not
enough, then, merely to prohibit state discrimination against unpopular speakers; the government
needed to prevent interference by hecklers, too. By the same token, a city could not elect to
close all of its property to public meetings. 418 In the Supreme Court, the ABA would argue that
to “safeguard the guaranteed right of public assembly,” the government was obligated “to
provide adequate places for public discussion.” 419 The Committee wanted the state to do more
than stay out. It was advocating an affirmative role for government in providing unpopular
speakers with an opportunity to air their views, if not the means to make them heard.
As Clark had hoped, the Committee’s involvement in the Hague case was “favorably
received.” In fact, editorial comments were “unanimous in commending the intervention as a
constructive public contribution by the American Bar Association.” 420 Jerome Britchey, for the
ACLU, called it “one of the finest and clearest briefs [he had] had the pleasure of reading.” 421
William Ransom, president of the ABA from 1935 to 1936, despised Ernst, Baldwin, Thomas,
and the CIO “for their incessant warfare against individual rights and in favor of an obnoxious
417
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collectivism.” Nonetheless, he thought the Committee’s brief was “one of the finest things the
American Bar Association has ever done,” and he told Clark that it would stand “for years to
come an historic document, often referred to and quoted by those who are trying to fulfill the
responsibility of so-called conservatives for the maintenance of civil liberties and free
institutions.”422
On the legal front, too, the ABA’s intervention was a success. On January 26, 1939, the
Third Circuit sustained Judge Clark’s injunction. On the issues of deportation, searches and
seizures, unlawful arrests, the posting of placards, and the distribution of leaflets, the Court of
Appeals unanimously approved Judge Clark’s reasoning and considered his findings to be amply
supported by the record. The central question, about which the judges on the panel disagreed,
was the constitutionality of the meeting ordinance. The dissenting judge thought the issue was
not “primarily free speech at all”; if it were, he surmised, the American Legion and Veterans of
Foreign Wars, many of whose members “risked their very lives . . . ‘to make democracy safe for
the world,’ would not be opposing the plaintiffs. 423 Conversely, the decision of the two-judge
majority was even more deferential to free speech than the district court’s.
In his majority opinion, Judge John Biggs, Jr., a recent Roosevelt appointee, held that the
ordinance was unconstitutional as administered. 424 There was no tangible threat of rioting,
despite Hague’s effort to “build up a dangerous situation,” and no evidence that the police would
have been unable to maintain order at any of the meetings for which the plaintiffs requested
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permits. 425 Nor had the plaintiffs intended at those meetings to advocate the overthrow of the
government, which might have complicated the issue.
More boldly, the majority considered the ordinance unconstitutional on its face. Freedom
of speech and of the press were “fundamental civil rights,” the hallmarks of “democratic
governments.” 426 The ordinance permitted city officials to curtail those rights in a manner
inconsistent with the due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment. Citing Near, Judge Biggs
condemned the prior restraint of speech as patently unconstitutional. The threat of violence was
not a legitimate basis for “prevent[ing] speakers from presenting their views.” Rather, it was the
function of the police to “preserve order while they speak.” The defendants’ interpretation of free
speech and assembly was “shocking,” in that it “place[d] these rights in the hands of those who
would destroy them.” 427 Indeed, following the defendants’ reasoning to its local conclusion
“would result eventually in the existence of but one political party as is now the case under
totalitarian governments.” 428
As for the District Court’s suggestion that Jersey City could close all streets to public
meetings, the Third Circuit majority disagreed. In Judge Biggs’s view, a municipality owned
and administered its streets and parks as trustees for the people. The people had an affirmative
right of access to public spaces for the purpose of public debate. Accordingly, the court required
Jersey City to open its streets in the same manner as the parks. “Minorities, however unpopular,
must be allowed to make their voices heard,” the court concluded. “Fundamental civil liberties
must not be tampered with if our system of democratic government is to survive.” 429
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Like the ABA’s brief, the Third Circuit’s decision was hailed by the press. 430 It was
clear, however, that the true test would take place in the Supreme Court, which promptly granted
certiorari in the case. Until then, there was plenty to keep the parties busy. A week before oral
argument, New Jersey Governor Harry Moore nominated Frank Hague, Jr., Hague’s thirty-four
year old son, to serve as a lay judge on New Jersey’s highest court. Thomas Glynn Walker, the
former Democratic leader in the New Jersey Assembly, resigned to create the vacancy, and he
was appointed to a newly created opening on the Hudson County Court of Common Pleas. 431
Hague, in turn, persuaded President Roosevelt to appoint Walker to the federal district court,
much to the distress of the ACLU.
That the young Hague (who was admitted to the New Jersey bar in 1936) had never
earned an undergraduate degree, let alone a law degree, did not stop his sponsors from pushing
his appointment through. Neither did vocal protest by the ACLU, CIO affiliates, the Workers
Defense League, or outraged citizens. 432 Reportedly, many state senators opposed the
nomination but were unwilling to risk reprisals from the court, before which most of them
regularly practiced as lawyers. 433 The Governor, cognizant of his many debts to the Mayor, was
unselfconscious about his motivations: “I know this appointment will make his dad happy,” he
said. 434
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While Hague made arrangements for his son’s future livelihood, the ABA was building
on its newfound popularity. In the January 1939 issue of the American Bar Association Journal,
the Committee on the Bill of Rights urged all state and local bar associations to form their own
committees to operate in local matters. The announcement advised the new committees to
secure counsel in meritorious cases, to protest legislative or administrative violations of civil
liberties, and to conduct discussions and disseminate information. It also suggested that
“considerable representation” should be given to the members of the Junior Bar. 435
The national committee, meanwhile, was eager to continue its efforts in Hague. The next
step was to file an amicus brief in the Supreme Court (Joseph Padway, AFL general counsel, was
“particularly anxious” to do so). 436 Both Arthur Vanderbilt and Frank Hogan supported the
endeavor, 437 and with minimal internal opposition and the approval of both parties to the
litigation, the Committee submitted a brief that was substantially identical to its earlier
version. 438
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The ABA Committee on the Bill of Rights had accomplished precisely what it was
supposed to. In February, Hogan noted to Vanderbilt that the National Lawyers Guild, for all its
publicity, was shrinking rather than growing. 439 Vanderbilt attributed the Guild’s failure in large
part to “the stand taken this year . . . on civil rights.” 440 Hogan agreed, and he wholeheartedly
endorsed the committee’s work in a letter to the Board of Governors. “Numerous editorials,
many of them contained in the leading newspapers of the country,” had commended the ABA for
its Third Circuit brief. The brief was expertly written and a genuine contribution to the
development of constitutional law. It had prompted praise from “all parts of the United States”:
the Deep South and the “Far West” as well as the Midwest and East. 441 In fact, there had been no
press criticism whatsoever.
To Hogan and Vanderbilt, the Hague brief was only the beginning. In the spring, the
Carnegie Foundation (whose President was none other than Frederick Keppel, the NCLB’s
correspondent in the War Department during World War I) made a substantial grant to the ABA
to support the “editorial and publication program” of the Special Committee on the Bill of
Rights. 442 That grant funded the ABA’s Bill of Rights Review, which was intended not so much
to raise awareness of civil liberties—that job, the introduction emphasized, had already been
done—as to connect the hundreds of lawyers and dozens of bar committees devoted to civil
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liberties work. 443 Meanwhile, the Committee’s legal work continued. In the coming months, it
would intervene in a variety of important cases, including Minersville v. Gobitis. 444 “It is not too
much to say,” Hogan wrote in reference to the Committee’s involvement in Hague, “that the
good ‘public relations’ reaction which has come to the Association from (a) the creation of the
Bill of Rights Committee, (b) the personnel of that Committee, and (c) its brief, has been of more
value, along the much discussed line of public relations, than anything since our stand in
opposition to the proposal to pack the Supreme Court.” 445 By the summer, he went even further.
He told the board that nothing the American Bar Association had done in recent years, not even
its “remarkably fine work” in opposition to the court-packing proposal, had produced “such
excellent public relations.” 446

The Civil Liberties Unit
One particularly noteworthy development took place in the months before the Supreme
Court issued its decision in Hague v. CIO. On January 3, 1939, Frank Murphy succeeded Homer
Cummings as Attorney General of the United States. Murphy was accustomed to public office.
443
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As mayor of Detroit from 1930 to 1933, he had been a strong advocate for the unemployed. He
was also one of the New Deal’s “most enthusiastic supporters,” 447 for which the President
rewarded him with an appointment as governor-general of the Philippines (and subsequently,
United States Commissioner). In 1937, Murphy was elected governor of Michigan. Shortly after
he took office, he refused to call in state troops to break a sit-down strike by the fledgling
UAW. 448 That decision was influential in the subsequent rise of the CIO. It was also sufficiently
unpopular to prompt Murphy to request a hearing before the Senate subcommittee assigned to
assess his fitness for office, even though it had already approved his nomination. In a prepared
statement, Murphy explained that workers in Michigan had been angry at the failure of
employers to abide by the Wagner Act, as well as the prevalent use of industrial espionage to
defeat unionization. In seizing control of industrial property, thousands of misguided but
“honest citizens” had acted to “defend[] their own rights against what they believed to be the
lawless refusal of their employers to recognize their unions.” Murphy emphasized that he had
never condoned sit-down strikes, and he had advised union representatives that they were illegal
and imprudent. He nonetheless believed that in the face of widespread disobedience, it was
necessary to “weed out the cause,” not merely to “enforce the law.” 449
Murphy brought the same sensibilities to his duties as Attorney General. He was
intimately familiar with the work of the La Follette Committee in his home state and elsewhere,
and he was convinced that the abridgement of workers’ “civil liberties” by employers and their
government collaborators was a major source of class strife. But Murphy’s commitment was not
447
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limited to workers’ rights. He considered civil liberties to be fundamental to every part of life,
“social, political, and economic.” They extended to such far-ranging ideals as “the right of selfgovernment, the right of every man to speak his thoughts freely, the opportunity to express his
individual nature in his daily life and work, [and] the privilege of believing in the religion that
his own conscience tells him is right.” The American model of civil liberties represented a
crucial compromise between governmental regulation, which was “necessary for an orderly
society,” and the unbounded freedom of nature. More basically, the rights to speak freely, to
practice one’s religion, to assemble peaceably and to petition government for the redress of
grievances were essential to a functioning democracy. They applied with equal force to “the
business man and the laborer,” to “the Jew and the Gentile,” to “people of all racial
extractions.” 450
Murphy, in short, believed passionately in civil liberties, and from his first day in office,
it was clear that he would make them a priority. Shortly after his confirmation, Murphy’s special
assistant in charge of public relations helped him arrange a radio program on the protection of
civil liberties by the Federal Government (as well as a speaking engagement with the National
Lawyers Guild). 451 He declined an invitation to attend the ACLU’s Bill of Rights celebration, but
he was “very sorry” to do so. He told Roger Baldwin that the subject was “one of the things that
interest[ed him] most keenly,” and that the opportunity to pursue it was one of the “great
satisfactions” of his service as Attorney General. Indeed, he was “anxious that the weight and
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influence of the Department of Justice should be a force for the preservation of the people’s
liberties.” 452
On February 3, one month after he was sworn in, Murphy’s office made an
announcement. Within the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, a new entity had
been established, to be known as the Civil Liberties Unit. Headed by former Assistant U.S.
Attorney Henry A. Schweinhaut—who had distinguished himself during investigations in both
Harlan County and Jersey City—its principal function was to prosecute violations of the
constitutional and statutory provisions “guaranteeing civil rights to individuals.” 453 In particular,
it would pursue cases of beatings and violence, denial of workers’ rights under the NLRA, and
deprivation of freedom of speech and assembly. 454 Murphy explained that in a democracy, the
enforcement of law entailed the “aggressive protection of the fundamental rights inherent in a
free people.” The Civil Liberties Unit, consistent with the recommendations of the La Follette
Committee, 455 would undertake “vigilant action” in ensuring that those rights were respected. 456
For the first time, it would throw the “full weight of the Department” behind the “blessings of
liberty, the spirit of tolerance, and the fundamental principles of democracy.” In Murphy’s
estimation, the creation of the Civil Liberties Unit was “one of the most significant happenings in
American legal history.” 457
The ACLU board wrote immediately to express its appreciation and to offer its “hearty
support and complete cooperation in an undertaking so significant as a development in the
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application of federal law.” 458 It expressed confidence that the Department of Justice could
“render immense service” in redressing deprivations of the “rights of citizens under federal
law.” 459 The organization had often sought to involve the Department of Justice in cases that
seemingly fell under federal jurisdiction, but the lack of a “special machinery of investigation”
had hampered effective action. The Department’s recent efforts in Harlan County and Jersey
City were “most gratifying” and hinted at what the Civil Liberties Unit might accomplish with
the appropriate internal support. 460
By the spring of 1939, there were many bodies devoted to advancing civil liberties,
including the La Follettee Committee and the ABA Committee on the Bill of Rights, in addition
to the ACLU. Still, the Civil Liberties Unit was particularly important. It had the authority not
only to identify violations of civil liberties, but to redress them. And its mechanism for
enforcement was unique. The NLRB, too, could command compliance with the law (at least in
cooperation with the injunctive authority of the court), but only the Civil Liberties Unit had the
power to prosecute violations. At a nationwide gathering of U.S. Attorneys in Washington, D.C.
(the first such conference ever held), Murphy enjoined the federal prosecutors to wield that
power responsibly—to enforce the civil rights statutes “not just for some of the people but for all
of them,” “no matter how humble.” 461 Civil liberties, he told them, were more important than at
any previous time in history. The Depression had brought with it “the usual demands for
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repression of minorities,” and it was up to the federal government to stave off the rampant
incursions. 462
Murphy’s plans for the civil liberties unit were ambitious. Among other functions, it
would alert local officials that the federal government would not tolerate arbitrary and abusive
conduct, alone or in conjunction with private interests. 463 It would also raise awareness and
influence public opinion. Murphy was adamant that the federal government could “take the
initiative,” but it could not “do the whole job.” The problem was partly jurisdictional; some
rights inhered in individuals as residents of the separate states, and they could not be vindicated
by federal authorities. The threats to American freedom came not only from city ordinances and
the arbitrary exercise of state power, but from mob murder, lynchings, and vigilante violence.
More basically, however, “the great protector of civil liberty, the final source of its enforcement”
was the “invincible power of public opinion.” The courts could provide a remedy for
lawlessness, but they could not prevent it. The Golden Rule, Murphy quipped, could not be
implemented by United States Marshals. The only true solution was “an overwhelming public
determination that it must not happen here.” 464
In the immediate term, the Civil Liberties Unit had a concrete program. It would study
and evaluate (and eventually prosecute under) the potential constitutional and statutory
provisions applicable to civil rights enforcement, including laws prohibiting kidnapping,
peonage, and mail fraud. 465 The most important of the potential causes of action, at least for the
462
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time being, were under Title 18, Sections 51 and 52 of the criminal code. 466 The Department
expected to make generous use of the statutes, though it recognized their limitations. Section 52
was applicable only to deprivations of civil liberties under color of State laws. It also suffered
“from the malady of old age”; after many years of disuse, it was likely to face significant
resistance. Section 51 was similarly limited in its usefulness. It was passed to rein in the Ku
Klux Klan, “and by reason of that fact, together with its severe punishment, it [was] a somewhat
difficult statute, for psychological reasons, to prosecute under.” Moreover, although it permitted
prosecution for violation of constitutional rights, few constitutional provisions could be
construed to limit private action. Finally, both sections faced an additional obstacle, in that both
criminalized conduct in violation of rights “secured by” the Constitution or federal statutes.
Defendants were apt to argue, as they had (unsuccessfully) in Harlan County, that Section 51
applied only to rights “created,” not “guaranteed,” by the Constitution, and that the rights of free
speech and assembly preexisted the federal government. 467 In light of these obstacles, the Civil
Liberties Unit expected to make recommendations for “some modern legislation on civil
rights.” 468
Until such legislation was passed, however, the Civil Liberties Unit would make do with
existing options. Within its first month of operation several hundred complaints were referred to
the Civil Liberties Unit, including lynchings, interference with meetings, illegal police practices,
Liberties. Frank Murphy and Senator Robert Wagner were also on the program. Program, National Conference on
Civil Liberties in the Present Emergency, 13 October 1939, Jackson Papers, General Correspondence, cont. 3.
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deportations, and voting rights violations. 469 The Department also contemplated prosecutions
under Section 51 for violations by employers of the Wagner Act. 470 Among the many requests
that the Civil Liberties Unit received, one was particularly tempting. A week after the new body
was announced, delegates from the Workers Defense League of New Jersey met with Henry
Schweinhaut to discuss the situation in Jersey City. 471 They asked the Department to continue its
investigation of the Hague administration and to pursue an indictment for, among other things,
the deportation of Norman Thomas.
Jersey City, of course, was very much on Murphy’s mind. He considered filing an amicus
brief in the Hague case, with an eye to action in future civil liberties cases. 472 In the end, he
decided not to, reportedly because a favorable outcome was expected without government
intervention. 473 Still, the interest of the Civil Liberties Unit was evident to all involved, including
the Supreme Court.
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The Supreme Court Decision
In its brief to the Supreme Court, Jersey City disputed only two significant points: federal
jurisdiction and the constitutionality of the meeting ordinance (both facially and as applied). 474
On the latter issue, it repeated the same arguments it had made in the two courts below.
Municipal officials, it claimed, have the authority and duty to maintain public spaces for the
enjoyment and tranquility of the public. Relying heavily on the Davis decision, it insisted that
there was no “catch-all” concept of “free expression” in the Constitution, as the ACLU and CIO
implied. Rather, rights were specific and idiosyncratic, tied to the “particular time, place and
circumstance of the particular attempted type of ‘expression.’” 475 In public places, the
boundaries of acceptable communication were constrained by the rights of the greater
community.
Ernst and Frazer likewise reiterated their earlier arguments. They rehearsed the many
abuses to which the ACLU and CIO were subjected and argued that broad injunctive relief was
justified notwithstanding the city’s concessions. They reviewed the Supreme Court’s recent First
Amendment decisions to make a case for a robust freedom of assembly. And they argued that
the right to speak in public places was a basic feature of democratic governance. In fact, it had
become “so integral a part of American democracy” that a number of state courts had already
moved to protect it by striking down permit requirements much like the one in Jersey City. 476
The Supreme Court, which issued a decision in Hague on June 5, 1938, barely touched
upon these arguments. The monthly bulletin of the International Juridical Association lamented
that the Court’s reasoning was largely technical and lacked the lucidity and urgency of the great
free speech cases. Unlike Holmes’s and Brandeis’s dissents and the Court’s recent decisions in
474
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De Jonge, Herndon, and Lovell, “not half a dozen paragraphs,” over five separate opinions, were
“devoted to a discussion of the scope of the civil rights involved and their significance in our
scheme of government.” 477 The article declined to add that the opinions were as muddled as they
were dry—a feature that likely explains the relative obscurity of the case in the subsequent
development of First Amendment law.
Of the seven justices who participated in the case (the recent appointments, Justices
Frankfurter and Douglas, did not take part), five voted to modify but affirm the district court’s
order, and two, Justices Butler and McReynolds, dissented. 478 Two competing theories were
advanced on behalf of the majority’s conclusion that the meeting ordinance was facially
unconstitutional. Justice Stone, in an opinion joined by Justice Reed, considered the city’s policy
to be an abridgment of the privileges or immunities of United States citizenship. Justice Roberts,
in a decision joined by Justice Black, analyzed the case through the lens of due process instead.
Justice Hughes split the difference. 479
Both opinions focused on the applicable cause of action and the district court’s
jurisdiction over the case, not the meaning or importance of freedom of assembly. Both began by
asserting that general federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) was lacking. 480
Although the case was clearly one “arising under” federal law, the plaintiffs had failed to meet
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the amount in controversy requirement of 3000 dollars. 481 The lower courts, however, had
located jurisdiction on alternative grounds as well. A provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
§ 24(14) of the judicial code (28 U.S.C. § 41(14)), conferred jurisdiction over suits at law or in
equity to redress the deprivation “of any privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the
United States, or of any right secured by any law of the United States providing for equal rights”
of citizens of the United States or others within its jurisdiction. 482 A subsequent measure, R.S.
§ 1979—then codified at 8 U.S.C. § 43 and now familiar to civil rights lawyers as 42
U.S.C. § 1983—originated in Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of April 20, 1871. It provided a
private cause of action for the denial of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws.” 483
Both Justice Roberts and Justice Stone concluded that the plaintiffs—with the exception
of the ACLU, which was not a natural person 484—had stated a cause of action under 8 U.S.C.
§ 43. Both also concluded that the district court appropriately asserted jurisdiction over the
claim under § 24(14). From there, however, the two opinions diverged widely. Justice Roberts—
nervous, perhaps, about a broad expansion of federal jurisdiction—limited his analysis to a
481
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“narrow question.” 485 The relevant inquiry, he reasoned, was whether freedom to disseminate
information about the Wagner Act and its advantages was within the scope of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and was therefore among the rights for which
the Civil Rights Act provisions “afford[ed] redress in a federal court.” According to Roberts,
there was no need to consider the larger questions briefed by the parties, including the scope of
freedom of assembly. “[T]he respondents had no other purpose,” he claimed, “than to inform
citizens of Jersey City by speech, and by the written word, respecting matters growing out of
national legislation.” 486 It was similarly unnecessary to address the city’s contention that
jurisdiction was lacking because the rights at stake preexisted the United States and were thus
not “secured by” it within the meaning of the statute. 487 It was indisputable, even under the
Court’s narrow interpretation of the Civil Rights Act in the Slaughterhouse cases and United
States v. Cruikshank, that “the right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of
petitioning Congress” on issues implicating the power of the federal government was an attribute
of national citizenship, and thus safely within the protective ambit of the federal courts. 488 On
the merits, Jersey City’s meeting ordinance was unconstitutional because it gave city officials
arbitrary authority to refuse a permit. Accordingly, it infringed the right of the public to use the
streets and parks “for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions”—and in particular, the privilege of a citizen to use them “for
communication of views on national questions.” 489
Relying on the Privileges and Immunities Clause had a number of pitfalls, as Justice
Stone was quick to point out. First, the provision applied only to citizens of the United States
485
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and thus limited freedom of speech in an unprecedented fashion. 490 Second, there was no basis
in the record for assuming that the plaintiffs were in fact citizens—nor, for that matter, that they
had intended to discuss the Wagner Act at the prohibited meetings. For that reason, Justice
Robert’s decision seemingly opened the door to an expansion of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause beyond the rule laid down in the Slaughterhouse Cases, which had confined its
application to rights arising out of the relationship of United States citizens to the national
government. The injunction, which the Court had resolved to sustain, was not limited to
interference with meetings pertaining to national labor legislation. Rather, it protected the right
to hold any lawful meeting and to circulate any lawful information. Justice Roberts, by loosely
construing the rights of “national citizenship,” was inadvertently “enlarg[ing] Congressional and
judicial control of state action” and endangering the “rightful independence of local
government.” 491
Instead of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Justice Stone based his opinion squarely
on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Freedom of speech and assembly
were rights of personal liberty, and “no more grave and important issue” could be brought before
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the Supreme Court. They were, moreover, rights that applied to all persons, regardless of their
citizenship. And they were squarely among the rights for the vindication of which 8 U.S.C. § 43
provided a federal cause of action; as Ernst and Frazer had argued in their brief, earlier cases to
the contrary (including United States v. Wheeler, the IWW case) were inapposite, because they
predated the Supreme Court’s incorporation of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth. 492 The
only open question, according to Justice Stone, was whether due process claims could be
maintained in the federal courts under § 24(14). After reviewing the legislative history of that
provision, he concluded that they could. 493
That the ACLU and other organizations could sue in federal court for injunctive relief
had obvious implications for future litigation strategy. Previously, the vast majority of ACLU
cases had originated in the state courts, generally as criminal defenses. The new rule gave the
ACLU an option to initiate test case litigation in federal court. Except in criminal cases, the
organization and its allies could henceforth avoid the state courts when their independence was
compromised—not just under circumstances like Hague, but in cases involving the civil rights of
racial minorities, particularly in the South. When the ACLU was founded, one of its central
objectives was to curb the injunctive power of the federal courts. Twenty years later, it was
responsible for a momentous extension of that precise power—which it would invoke often in
the years to come when seeking vindication of civil liberties claims.
The Supreme Court’s decision had ramifications for another body, as well. Henry
Schweinhaut, head of the Civil Liberties Unit in the Department of Justice, was “elated” by the
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Court’s decision in Hague and regarded it as a strong endorsement of the Civil Rights Act. 494
The Court’s interpretation of the jurisdictional and private action provisions were a seeming
invitation for criminal prosecutions under Sections 51 and 52. Justice Stone’s opinion implicitly
rejected the narrow interpretation of Section 51 in United States v. Cruikshank, an 1876 case
growing out of the mob murder of more than a hundred black Republicans in Reconstruction
Louisiana. 495 Cruikshank was just the sort of case that Section 51 was designed to cover. The
defendants were convicted of conspiracy to deprive citizens of the United States of their rights to
assemble and bear arms, among other charges. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions on
the theory that such rights were not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Stone’s
opinion suggested that Cruikshank was no longer good law. 496
Of course, the court’s decision left one fundamental limitation of the Civil Rights Act
intact. As Assistant Attorney General O. John Rogge told the ACLU’s National Conference on
Civil Liberties in October 1939 (which was designed to “honor the men in government service
who have done most to advance the cause of civil liberties in the United States” 497): “No matter
how much the content of the due process clause has been expanded, rights under the due process
clause are not protected against mere individual action, on the standard interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a restriction on State action only.” The state action requirement
expressed in such cases as Cruikshank and Wheeler meant that the statute was inapplicable to
“the great mass of civil liberties cases” the Department would otherwise have pursued. Rogge
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assured the audience that the Criminal Division was evaluating those cases to determine whether
they represented “sound law.” If they did not, the Civil Liberties Unit would have “no hesitation”
in asking the Supreme Court to overrule them. 498
There was one category of private action that Section 51 could be made to reach without
a radical revision of existing case law. The Department of Justice read the Court’s decision in
Hague to mean that “if a Federal statute otherwise constitutional gives a private right to a citizen,
Section 51 will serve for prosecution of any group of persons who attempt to take it away from
him.” This reasoning arguably applied to private acts of violence affecting statutory rights
“under the recently extended commerce clause.” The NLRA was the most prominent such
example, and its curtailment by employers was the theory of the Harlan County case. 499 In the
Department’s view, Hague was an invitation to seek additional indictments under the statute. 500
The CIO quickly announced that it would “request the Department of Justice to take steps for
criminal prosecution of all who interfere with its organizing activities by violating the civil rights
of workers.” 501 Over the coming years, the Department vigorously pursued the new strategy,
albeit with uneven results. 502
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In the meantime, Frank Murphy, was confident that the Court’s decision would bolster
efforts by the Department of Justice to prosecute infringements of constitutional rights. Indeed,
he predicted that the Civil Liberties Unit would soon “grow into something very important.”
Americans had come to recognize the importance of the fundamental rights the unit was
designed to protect. “It has been obvious for some time in our country,” he observed, “that our
people are becoming increasingly civil liberties conscious, as they should.” 503
Murphy was right. By the spring of 1939, civil liberties had a popular cogency that would
have astounded World War I dissenters. Public approval of the outcome in Hague was a
foregone conclusion. The dominant sentiment in press coverage of the decision was that the
Supreme Court had not gone far enough. 504

Aftermath
In the wake of their Supreme Court victory, the civil liberties forces were uniformly
jubilant. On June 12, the ACLU convened a “monster public meeting” to celebrate free speech in
Jersey City. 505 The announcement for the celebration called the Court’s decision “a clear
mandate to American citizens to exercise their rights of freedom of speech and assembly,” as
well as “a mandate to local officials not to interfere with those rights.” Most of the participants
would be New Jersey residents, the ACLU emphasized, and the purpose of convening was not to
espouse “radicalism or foreign doctrines.” Rather, the audience would include Republicans and
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Democrats; Catholics, Protestants and Jews. “This,” the statement declared, “is fundamental
Americanism.” 506
At the meeting, the speakers echoed the sentiments expressed in the announcement. That
civil liberties captured the true “spirit of America” was the theme of Rabbi Benjamin Plotkin’s
address. 507 Norman Thomas, true to his ministerial roots, stressed the importance of individual
conscience, as he always had. 508 He also argued that civil liberties were crucial to a functioning
democracy—that free discussion provided the opportunity for minorities to “become majorities
by persuading their fellow man,” and thereby to correct the country’s mistakes. The Jersey City
battle, he concluded, had “helped to assert the principle of liberty in which America has found its
true greatness.” 509 Roger Baldwin emphasized that while the controversy was pending he had
never attempted to make a speech in Jersey City. He was finally doing so, he said, “merely to
express a conception of Americanism which the Supreme Court has approved.” 510
Seven or eight thousand people attended the meeting, by Jerome Britchey’s estimate, and
the crowd was overwhelmingly sympathetic to the civil liberties cause. The Hague
administration, at last, had determined that it was time to cut its losses. Daniel Casey assured
that preparations for the meeting proceeded smoothly, and on the evening of the event, city
representatives offered their full cooperation (according to Britchey, it was a “wholly different
show and a totally different attitude”). 511 The whole evening, there were only a “few lone
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hoots.” 512 Britchey thought the effect was better, even, than the newspapers described. “It was a
wondrous sight to behold,” he mused, “all those heads close together and not a nightstick coming
down on any one of them; all the police on hand to help—not to pull down a speaker.” 513
This accommodating posture persisted through the summer. In July, Jersey City adopted
a new ordinance—the ABA called it “a model municipal enactment” 514—authorizing the
issuance of meeting permits in public places (it required four days notice in the city’s four major
parks, where “unfettered discussion” would be permissible, and twenty-four hours elsewhere). 515
Mayor Hague announced deferentially that “the Supreme Court [had] spoken” and that the city
desired “to comply in every way with the decision of the court.” 516 City officials administered
the ordinance liberally, and mass meetings (as well as literature distribution, picketing, and labor
activity) were allowed to proceed without interference.
The Washington Post thought that Hague’s capitulation to the Supreme Court’s decision
was an “occasion for rejoicing.” The distinguishing feature of a democracy, according to an
editorial, was “the readiness of the people voluntarily to submit to the law’s dictates.” The
coercive authority of the democratic state lay primarily in rule of law, not in physical force.
Hague, in capitulating to the Court’s decision, showed that he was “mindful of this fundamental
fact and fully prepared to live up to it.” 517 That Hague’s about-face was strategic rather than
ideological did not render his retreat less significant; the important thing was that democratic
liberties had been restored. By September, an update in the ACLU’s Civil Liberties Quarterly
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was titled “Jersey City Open to Free Assembly” and began with a heartening assessment: “All’s
quiet on the Jersey City front.” 518
In addition to its implications for free speech generally, the Hague decision was an
unmistakable “go signal” (as California’s state bar journal put it) for labor organizing in Jersey
City and elsewhere. 519 In the days after the decision, the CIO launched a massive organizing
campaign in Hudson County. The program, which it developed in consultation with Morris
Ernst, was months in the planning. In addition to a general literature distribution, it entailed
stationing CIO organizers at the factory gates, serving the court’s decree on government
employees (Ernst hoped official-looking papers would scare them into submission), radio
broadcasts, renting halls, outdoor meetings, and the relocation to Jersey City of the main CIO
offices. 520 William Carney, in his public statement on June 5, announced that the 30,000 CIO
members in Hudson County had “enlisted for the duration of the war” and would not give up
until Hague was “either in jail or in political oblivion.”
As it turned out, the parties came to terms much more easily than Carney expected.
According to Hague’s biographer, the CIO’s “defiant, anti-Hague attitude” lasted a month. 521 On
August 1, CIO representatives visited Mayor Hague’s office and emerged with assurances that
“the doors of City Hall [were] always open” to them. 522 On August 2, the Hague administration
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sided with a local CIO affiliate in a labor dispute. 523 Union officials announced that New Jersey
Republicans had supported them during the court fight for strategic reasons only and were hostile
to the larger objectives of the labor movement. “We must depend on the Democratic machine,”
one reportedly said, and “we will work with anyone who’ll help us.” 524 Hague, who proclaimed a
few days later that he was “one hundred percent” for a Roosevelt third term, had determined that
cooperation with local labor leaders was a more profitable strategy than defiance. 525
Hague was not the only one who proved willing to compromise for political reasons. It
was generally understood that the Hague administration was “so conspicuously devoted to the
third term” because it was “desperately afraid of Federal prosecution” and wanted to appease
federal officials. 526 Shortly after Hague’s endorsement, reports emerged that the Civil Liberties
Unit was dropping its investigation in Jersey City. Frank Murphy, who had spearheaded anticorruption efforts within the Department of Justice and was widely regarded as self-righteously
moral (he did not smoke, drink, swear, or eat meat, according to the Baltimore Sun), was accused
of selling out. 527
As the featured speaker at the commencement exercises of Jersey City’s John Marshall
College on June 21, Murphy stressed the importance of civil liberties and obliquely criticized
Mayor Hague. 528 During his trip, however, he was “taken in hand by the authorities, wined,
dined, . . . and told that there was ‘no vice, no crime, no racketeering’ in Jersey City.” 529 For the
next half-year, Murphy made little mention of Frank Hague. Then, a few hours before he was
sworn in as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, on January 18, 1939, Murphy issued a
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statement on his “unfinished business” as Attorney General. He denied “insinuations and
implications” that he had “for political purposes suppressed possible proceedings against . . .
Mayor Hague of Jersey City and other political leaders.” He insisted that there had been no
criminal prosecution of Hague because there was no evidence of criminal activity to support a
prosecution. 530 Murphy’s Jersey City allies—more likely out of obligation or prudence than true
conviction—backed him up. Norman Thomas said he had “no quarrel” with Murphy and had
made “no insinuations,” though he noted that the Department was slow to investigate civil
liberties violations unless doing so was politically expedient. Morris Ernst, who by 1940 was a
close personal advisor to President Roosevelt, went further. He stated publicly that he was
convinced that the Department of Justice had no basis for prosecuting Hague; he had worked
with the criminal division and knew it had made a “most thorough investigation of the field.” He
added, “Not only was there no suppression of the investigation, but the only way they could have
prosecuted Hague would have been by violating the Mayor’s civil liberties.” 531
Ernst’s willingness to modify or sacrifice his broader principles in the interest of political
expediency manifested in other issues as well. Although Ernst heartily supported the CIO’s
labor program and helped formulate its organizing campaign in Jersey City, he felt that the goals
of organized labor were distinct from those of the ACLU. In fact, the battle with Mayor Hague
was the last notable occasion on which the ACLU fought in the trenches alongside its labor
allies. For two decades, the ACLU leadership had stood at the head of the rallies and picket lines
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that precipitated the organization’s major court challenges. 532 In the 1920s, Roger Baldwin had
narrowly escaped a prison sentence for spearheading a demonstration by striking silk workers in
Paterson, New Jersey, just a few miles away from Hudson County. Throughout the 1930s,
ACLU representatives, including Corliss Lamont and Arthur Garfield Hays, had employed the
familiar tactics of direct action in Jersey City. But as the litigation in Hague v. CIO unfolded,
Morris Ernst and the ACLU decided that it was more effective to stand aloof from the fray as a
defender of neutral liberties than to provoke arrest by carrying placards or making car-top
speeches—a sentiment captured in Ernst’s public criticism of Hays as the legal proceedings
began.
By the time Judge Clark began hearing testimony in Hague, ACLU attorneys had
convinced the courts and the public that free speech was an important American value. Hague
himself, while insisting that free speech was not implicated in Jersey City, agreed during trial
that nobody “should be denied the right to talk.” 533 Over the course of the legal proceedings,
however, the meaning and purpose of civil liberties were still very much in flux. Increasingly,
the ACLU took steps to ensure its “neutrality,” as the CIO angrily pointed out. Whatever his
personal feelings, Ernst publicly and ardently disavowed labor issues as concerns of the ACLU.
Borrowing from his rhetoric in sex education and artistic freedom cases, he insisted that the
rights at stake were the right to air disfavored ideas and the right to be free from the censor’s
arbitrary and autocratic reach. As the La Follette Committee yielded the spotlight to Martin Dies,
532
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Jr.’s House Committee on Un-American Activity, Ernst and the ACLU made civil liberties more
palatable to mainstream liberals. 534
By the spring of 1939, the ACLU’s national office considered ousting Abraham Isserman
as counsel for the New Jersey Civil Liberties Committee on the ground that he, along with his
work in Jersey City, was “too pro-labor.” 535 At the public celebration following the Court’s
decision, William Callahan, an editor for the Catholic Worker reminded his audience that the
judicial victory was “only a small part of the larger, grander work of securing the fruits of
democracy for the millions to whom they are yet denied”—a project imperiled by the mounting
“danger of the Wagner Act’s being scrapped.” 536 But Callahan’s determination to use Hague as a
“springboard towards a larger, more generous freedom” was an increasingly marginal view
within the ACLU. Indeed, the meeting was intentionally divorced from the CIO and its
organizing efforts in Jersey City. 537
Even Roger Baldwin, in his speech, abandoned the radical rhetoric that he had so
resolutely embraced for the past two decades. At the outset of the litigation, Baldwin had
denounced Hague’s policies as inconsistent with the “striking advances made in the exercise of
civil rights under new labor laws, favorable court decisions and a growing trade union
movement.” 538 Around that time, a correspondent offered Baldwin some telling advice: “I know
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you’re a Marxist and all that, and I know the argument that civil liberties and economic liberties
are all of one piece and are as inseparable as the Trinity. Well, from my point of view that’s good
theology, but damn poor tactics.” 539 One year later, Baldwin had internalized that lesson, and he
no longer thought of civil liberties in staunchly labor terms. He acknowledged that “the real
issue” at stake in Jersey City “was the right of independent trade unions to organize in what has
been proudly heralded as an open shop town.” He nonetheless assured his audience that the
ACLU defended everyone’s rights without distinction and had “no ‘ism’ to promote except the
Bill of Rights.” Baldwin’s remarks neatly captured his organization’s mature position. The
ACLU, he insisted, was no more concerned with the rights of unions than the rights of
employers. Still, employers were better equipped to defend their own interests, whereas “unions
need help.” “It is our business to open doors that are closed to them,” he explained. “It is their
business to walk through the doors after they are opened.” 540
All told, Morris Ernst estimated that the Hague case took more of his firm’s time “than
all the other cases [it had] handled for the ACLU put together.” 541 The legal bill, which included
only expenses (Ernst donated his time), came to thousands of dollars and led to a spat between
the plaintiffs as to which group should pay. 542 The dispute over reimbursement, however, was
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the least important of the many disagreements that the Hague case spawned between the ACLU
and the CIO.
From the perspective of the ACLU’s dwindling labor constituency, the Jersey City
campaign had been most costly in non-financial terms. Hague v. CIO was the first time that an
ACLU legal action on behalf of organized labor attracted widespread public support. But its
popular resonance stemmed precisely from the erasure of labor issues from its central terms. As
the New York Times observed, “The notion that the right of free speech or public assembly may
properly be denied to persons with whom a political leader and his satellites disagree was an
astounding contradiction of democracy,” and it “served to wake people up.” 543 More pointedly,
the Yale Law Journal reflected that “when practically every shade of public opinion became
outraged at what appeared to be a blatant denial of fundamental rights, emphasis shifted from
specific attempts by one group at raising abnormally low Jersey City working conditions to the
more basic issue of whether constitutional guaranties of free speech, free press, and free
assembly apply to union sympathizers as well as to other citizens.” 544
Rightwing critics had feared that support for the civil liberties cause by self-described
conservatives, and particularly such eminent bodies as the ABA, would make the ACLU more
respectable—and indeed it did. Their fear, however, was largely misplaced. Respectability
attracted new members and new allies to the ACLU. In turn, it created new expectations. After
Hague v. CIO, the ACLU would rarely defend its labor clients on anything other than generally
applicable First Amendment grounds. The next step was to extend those same rights to the very
individuals and entities whose dominance the ACLU was founded to resist. In 1940, the ABA’s
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Committee on the Bill of Rights announced its intention to file its next amicus brief in a case
involving the right of employers to free speech, asserted against the coercive apparatus of the
NLRA. 545 Its position on the matter was squarely in line with the ACLU’s.
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CHAPTER 6: FREE SPEECH OR FAIR LABOR

On May 26, 1937, a few dozen representatives of the United Automobile Workers of
America assembled near the Ford Motor Company’s River Rouge plant in Dearborn, Michigan
to distribute union leaflets. They were greeted by Ford agents and, in the presence of peaceful
observers and press representatives, brutally beaten. The message was clear: the Ford Motor
Company would not be organized.
The “Battle of the Overpass,” as the events of May 26 came to be known, is among the
most notorious of American labor struggles. The well documented and widely publicized
violence perpetuated by agents of the Ford Motor Company against peaceful organizers for the
United Automobile Workers of America soured Americans’ widespread image of Henry Ford as
a model of industrial benevolence. In a period when organized labor was under attack, it
generated much-needed support for the efforts by workers to secure union recognition.
The River Rouge assault is widely acknowledged as a pivotal event in negotiations
between the Ford Motor Company and the UAW. But an equally important legacy of the Battle
of the Overpass has been largely lost to history. The attack on union organizers occurred just six
weeks after the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act. 1
The National Labor Relations Board’s swift condemnation of Ford’s labor policies in the wake
of Ford’s violence precipitated a second and more protracted battle with implications that were
as far-ranging, if not more so, than the first. Ford’s attorneys, hard pressed to defend the
propriety of the company’s response to UAW organizing efforts, instead launched a legal and
public relations campaign against the NLRB itself. Their indictment of Board procedures shook
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the already precarious public confidence in the adjudicative capabilities of the NLRB and, in
significant respects, paved the way to the Taft-Hartley Act, enacted ten years later.
The most original contribution of Ford’s lawyers, however, was not in the field of
procedure—where a battle between industry and the NLRB was already raging—but rather in the
ongoing struggle over the meaning of civil liberties in New Deal America. In National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, the Supreme Court had foreclosed the
standard employer argument that the legislative enforcement of collective bargaining infringed
on its Fifth Amendment right to manage its business in an orderly fashion of its choosing. 2 For
employers, Jones & Laughlin Steel meant coming to terms with a new constitutional landscape
in which they no longer could count on the federal courts simply to strike down pro-labor
machinery. They would need instead to whittle away at state power by invoking those checks on
majoritarian power capable of mustering broad popular and political support. And so, seizing on
civil libertarian rhetoric of the past two decades, Ford introduced a new twist on old liberties. By
dictating the terms of employers’ communications with their employees, it argued, the NLRB
was trenching on freedoms that were guaranteed by the Constitution to protect democratic
processes. The NLRB was curtailing employers’ freedom of speech.
Organized labor and the left quickly dismissed the new argument. Although they
acknowledged free speech as an important value, they insisted that anti-union statements by
employers were coercive per se and therefore outside the protection of the First Amendment. To
hold otherwise, they insisted, would be subversive of the public interest in precisely the same
fashion as substantive due process. For the ACLU, however, the issue was more complicated.
As Lucille Milner, longtime secretary of the ACLU, put the matter in a 1938 letter to the
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NLRB’s regional director in St. Louis: “This subject of the employer’s right in the N.L.R.B.’s
order has been the most controversial one which has ever come before the Board and we have
been discussing it for the past six months. . . . We have never seen the Board so completely at
loggerheads on any issue since the organization has been in existence.” 3 Ford v. NLRB
fundamentally challenged the ACLU’s relationship to labor and the state, forcing the
organization to rethink its broader policy agenda and to reassess the meaning of free speech.

The NLRA, the ACLU, and the Retreat of Radical Labor
During the winter of 1936-1937, national attention was directed not toward Dearborn,
Michigan, but toward Flint. Over the course of a forty-four day sit down strike, the UAW-CIO
forced the General Motors Company, the world’s largest industrial corporation, to recognize it as
the exclusive bargaining representative of GM workers. Although the strike organizers had
embarked on their course with little hope of success, the New Deal realignment of state power in
labor relations facilitated a stunning victory for labor. When GM secured an injunction against
the strikers, Michigan’s new governor, Frank Murphy, refused to intervene on the company’s
behalf. 4 Like President Roosevelt, Murphy conceded that the seizure of GM property was
illegal—but so too, he insisted, was GM’s violation of the Wagner Act. 5 Murphy mobilized the
National Guard troops but ordered them to maintain the peace and protect the strikers from local
law enforcement and vigilantes rather than break the strike. In the end, the strikers secured their
most aggressive demands, including at least six months of exclusive UAW representation.
3
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Nationally, the victory generated a mix of outrage and admiration. Labor justified the sitdown strike as a remedy for employers’ ongoing disregard of the rights of labor. UAW attorney
Maurice Sugar claimed that the practice was both ethical and legal. 6 An employee had “a right
to work for decent wages, for decent hours and under decent conditions,” he charged, and in an
era of industrial monopolies and rampant unemployment, workers were entitled to fight to retain
their jobs. When the right of workers to live conflicted with the right of an employer to dispose
freely of its property, a decision had to be made as to which right took priority. 7 And that, he
claimed, is precisely what New Deal legislation had done. Recent laws had recognized the right
of labor to engage in practices that encroached upon employers’ property. Whether that
encroachment took place inside or outside the plant was irrelevant to the balancing of relative
rights. “The American worker is breaking his chains,” Sugar concluded. “The employer protests
loudly and indignantly that his chain law has been violated. But it hasn’t been violated. Actually,
whether we know it or not, the chain law has fallen with the chains.”
Like other radical labor leaders, Sugar regarded the sit-down strike as an essential
weapon in labor’s struggle. By the spring of 1937, sit-downs had directly affected 400,000
workers, 8 and UAW membership had reached a quarter-million. As the architect of the new
strategy, the CIO had become a formidable opponent. In March, United States Steel entered into
bargaining agreement with the Steel Workers Organizing Committee-CIO, no strike necessary. 9
By late spring, however, the tide had begun to turn against labor. Almost one quarter of
organized labor was unionized, and the majority, for the time being, belonged to CIO-affiliated
6
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unions. 10 But the CIO was already struggling to maintain its power and legitimacy. Employers
groups organized—some drawing explicitly on the ACLU’s methods of earlier years—to
mobilize public opinion against worker lawlessness and to pressure local police and
administrators to enforce the law. 11 Increasingly, public and political figures expressed concern
at unions’ aggressive attitude, and momentum was seeping from the congressional labor agenda.
The economy had contracted sharply as a result of Roosevelt’s fiscal policy, fueling frustration
and desperation by industry and workers alike. 12 By summer, fear of sit-downs was pervasive,
and the Senate had roundly condemned the practice. 13
Sit-down strikes were only the first congressional casualty. The failure of Roosevelt’s
judiciary reorganization plan had suggested that pro-labor legislation was vulnerable. The
Wagner Act, newly secured by the Supreme Court from constitutional attack, was suddenly open
to legislative challenge. Republican opponents of the New Deal reached out to Southern
Democrats, who feared that active intervention in labor disputes would open the door to federal
interference with Jim Crow. To make matters worse, the AFL attacked the NLRB for favoring
the CIO and undermining labor voluntarism. New Deal Democrats responded by citing the
violent and unlawful suppression of labor by employers, relying heavily on the findings of the La
Follette Civil Liberties Committee. By the summer of 1938, however, the committee’s staff was
regularly fielding demands that it investigate labor unions in addition to employers. One
outraged citizen, voicing widely shared anti-union sentiments, insisted that “people read the
10
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News Papers and know that if strikers did not attack men hired to protect plants, there would be
no fighting.” 14 In this anti-union climate, the administration was no longer willing to stake its
political leverage on organized labor. 15
Neither, for that matter, was a sizable contingent of the ACLU’s National Committee.
Between 1935 and 1937, differences of opinion within the ACLU had been a matter of degree.
Through decades of litigation and advocacy, the organization had established a broad consensus
around the impropriety and unconstitutionality of interference with the speech of radicals and
other unpopular minorities. They had restored a measure of credibility to the courts, persuading
some of the most recalcitrant labor advocates to regard the federal judiciary as a potential forum
for vindicating their rights. They had convinced many Americans, including many judges, that
government had no business interfering with academic freedom, artistic expression, sex
education, or even birth control, because efforts at suppression stifled democratic change and
unduly burdened individual autonomy. On the whole, however, they had always agreed that the
rights of labor were the most pressing civil liberties concerns.
In the spring of 1937, changing circumstances called for a reevaluation of the
organization’s underlying goals. The CIO’s new tactics were not obviously about speech or
expression. Nor was the ACLU board’s endorsement of the Wagner Act or the NLRB. And
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increasingly, the mainstream press and the ACLU’s own members—many of whom had recently
joined—were critical of the organization’s identification with the labor cause.
In a March 1937 statement, the ACLU Board of Directors took a first cut at clarifying its
position. 16 “So many friends and critics have recently raised questions as to the purposes of the
American Civil Liberties Union in relation to current issues,” it began, “that we desire to make it
clear beyond debate that the Union has no purpose to serve other than the maintenance of
democratic rights.” The ACLU, the statement explained, was a “united front” of people who
agreed only on the defense of civil rights. Its only commitment was to “protect orderly and
peaceful progress through the exercise of those civil rights guaranteed in the Constitution.” The
board reiterated the organization’s longstanding claim to political neutrality, but this time, it also
professed to have no “economic direction” or connection with any “economic movement.”
The latter claim was both disingenuous and novel. ACLU annual reports had always
proclaimed the organization’s allegiance to labor; indeed, defending labor’s right to organize had
been the reason for its coming into existence. Its entire understanding of civil liberties had
derived from a commitment to the rights of labor to picket and strike. In the 1937 statement,
some of the old flavor was retained. The board assumed, for example, that the Bill of Rights was
“originally intended . . . to cover all forms of agitation and propaganda not associated with acts
of violence.” The old “right of agitation” appeared alongside the “guarantees of personal liberty
set forth in the Bill of Rights.” But the emphasis was different. In lieu of substantive results, the
Board invoked the “maintenance of democratic processes.”
As in earlier statements, the board justified the disproportionate representation of
“radicals” in the ACLU leadership as a function of the reluctance of conservatives to “take a
16
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stand.” 17 For the time being, the ACLU was comfortable resting on the assumption, still
reasonable in 1937, “that an inclusive organization is bound to number among its active
members those who have a radical economic outlook.” Still, the board was unusually clear about
its eagerness for broader support. It promised not only to “welcome the more active
cooperation” of individuals with differing economic views, but to “so reorganize its personnel as
to put such persons into positions of official responsibility.” It backed up its claim by reference
to its willingness to “defend those who do not espouse progressive causes.” It emphasized that it
would even protect, “if occasion required, as it does not, the rights of non-union workers.”
The board’s general policy statement did not, however, put the matter to rest. While
much of the organization could agree about abstract commitments, conflict quickly arose over
the application of those principles to the specific case of the sit-down strike, much as it had when
the NCLB had considered defending the IWW’s use of “sabotage” two decades earlier. A
proposed statement on “So-Called Sit-Down and Stay-In Strikes” opened by acknowledging the
sharp divide on the issue among advocates of civil liberties and stating the case for both sides. 18
Whereas some people considered such strikes to be clear cases of trespass, it explained, others
asserted that workers have a property interest in their jobs. 19 The board conveyed the position of
labor advocates—naïve in hindsight, but a mark of the dramatic shift in labor’s opinion of the
federal judiciary—that soon the courts might recognize sit-down strikes as appropriate and
lawful under certain circumstances. 20 On the other hand, it recognized the objection that the new
17

That excuse would not hold up for long: in just a few months, Grenville Clark would convince the ABA to take up
the civil liberties cause. See Chapter 5.
18
“Proposed Statement on So-Called Sit-Down and Stay-In Strikes Submitted to the National Committee of the
American Civil Liberties Union by a Subcommitee Appointed by the Board of Directors,” March 1937, ACLU
Papers, reel 142, vol. 970.
19
The statement made a slightly stronger case for protection under the rubric of civil liberties of the occupation of
public relief offices or legislative halls by the unemployed.
20
As late as August 1937, Maurice Sugar wrote to Homer Martin: “It has been amply demonstrated that with
sufficient power on the industrial field reflecting itself in the political consciousness of the judiciary, judges are

431

tactic allowed a minority of workers “to deny rights to a majority” and, in certain industries, to
“cripple service essential to a whole community.” The ACLU, the statement concluded, would
not take a position as between these two views other than to discourage excessive force in
making arrests. The chief concern of the organization in the field of industrial relations was to
“keep open the processes of discussion and negotiation as against coercion and violence.” Such,
said the board, was “the heart of the civil liberties doctrine.”
The board’s decision not to take a firm stand on the sit-down strike, intended to be
diplomatic, pleased no one. By failing to follow Congress and the press in condemning the tactic
outright, the board alienated its more conservative members. For refusing to endorse labor’s
most powerful weapon, it was attacked just as vigorously from the left. Both of the ACLU’s
attorneys wrote to complain, though for different reasons. Morris Ernst wanted the Board to
draw a distinction between “personal and social property.” Though he had long been the
ACLU’s most vigorous defender of “personal rights” on such issues as obscenity and birth
control, he had been thoroughly won over by the New Deal. 21 Notably, he was not suggesting
that workers had a civil liberty interest in sharing the wealth of their employers; he was arguing
that economic equality had nothing to do with “civil liberties” at all. Arthur Garfield Hays,
conversely, was concerned about labor’s new strategy. He acknowledged that the sit-down was
an important and effective tool, and he was personally inclined to celebrate “the splendid result
that was accomplished in Michigan.” 22 Like Ernst, he felt that his sympathy for labor had no
place in the ACLU. Hays, however, went one step further. He worried that the sit-down strike
capable of changing their minds about the illegality of picketing.” Like the ACLU, he believed that “an active public
opinion can make itself felt in judicial decisions.” Maurice Sugar to Homer Martin, 9 August 1937, Sugar Papers,
box 4, folder 4-15.
21
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22
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might undermine “the right of non-union men to work”—an extraordinary and unexpected
concern for a labor sympathizer who had so often proven willing to provoke his own arrest in
defending the right to strike. 23 For both lawyers, the sit-down strike involved more than the
expression of opinion, and unlike the ordinary strike, it was not a tactic that the organization
could reasonably defend as integral to freedom of speech.
These criticisms were sufficiently pervasive within the ACLU to prompt the board to
submit the matter to the National Committee for an advisory referendum. 24 The results revealed
a deep division within the ACLU and prompted several threats of resignation. 25 John Codman,
for many years the most conservative voice on the National Committee, thought the issue was
simple: “If employees are idle or do work unsatisfactory to the management and are therefore
ordered to leave, they are trespassing if they do not do so.” 26 There was no such thing as a
property right in one’s job in the absence of an employment contract that so provided. Similarly
resolute statements came from Edward Tittman, an Arizona attorney whose disagreements with
the Board’s labor policies would unfold in an increasingly hostile series of letters over the
coming months, culminating in his resignation, 27 and William Pickens, an NAACP field
secretary and columnist for the Associated Negro Press, who thought that sit-downs would lead
to revolution and dictatorship. 28
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At the other end of the spectrum, A. J. Muste called the Board’s statement “inadequate,
weak [and] timorous” and thought it “so seriously understate[d] the arguments for the sit-down
strike” as to promote the attitude of AFL President William Green and the Liberty League. 29 He
wanted the ACLU to emphasize that the sit-down was a remedy for persistent denial by
employers of the right to strike. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn was bewildered that the ACLU
leadership would credit the crippling of essential services as a legitimate concern when they had
so often refuted it in the past. 30 Frederic Howe recognized that sit-downs were technically
unlawful, but he emphasized the vast range of daily practice in which Americans routinely
ignored the law. Ethically, he considered the sit-down to be an important assertion of “the right
to something more than a daily wage in connection with a job,” and he predicted that it would
soon be a legal right as well. Howe believed what Baldwin had long proclaimed: the sit-down
would be successful because it was a show of power. “Pragmatically,” he reflected, “things
survive in conflicts of this sort that are socially effective. And pragmatically, anything that is
effective is to be approved.” 31
In the face of this barrage, the board elected to maintain its non-committal course. The
statement it ultimately circulated was almost identical to the draft. 32 Baldwin’s views on the
issue were influenced by Ernst’s. He told his left critics that their arguments were grounded in
labor policy rather than civil liberties and could not be espoused by the ACLU. 33 On the other
hand, he refused to condemn seizure of property, which he insisted was none of the ACLU’s
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concern. 34 Perhaps the most telling response to the referendum was that of Herbert S. Bigelow,
who personally thought the sit-down justifiable but considered the issue largely moot. “With the
Labor Relations Act in force,” he said, “there should be little provocation for sit-down strikes.” 35
Disagreement about sit-down strikes was only the beginning of a more general fracturing
of allegiance within the ACLU. Controversy erupted over every pressing issue in the rapidly
changing world of labor relations. The ACLU consistently professed neutrality, and yet it leaned
heavily toward labor in its assessment of conditions, prompting criticism from its more cautious
and moderate members who resented “the Union’s partiality toward union labor.” 36 For
example, in the summer of 1937 it issued a statement on violence in strikes in which it claimed
that “the Civil Liberties Union does not take sides in the industrial struggle” and would act
against violence by organized labor “on precisely the same basis as violence by its opponents.”
It nonetheless presented its conclusion that allegations of union violence were largely
fabricated. 37
The most fundamental division in the board pertained to the NLRB itself. Rather than
quieting discussion, the Supreme Court’s decision upholding the Wagner Act had only
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exacerbated public and congressional complaints against the NLRB. Constitutional legitimacy
emboldened the Board, and within a few months, it had more than tripled its caseload. Almost
always, it ruled against employers. When congressional opponents sought to water down the act
by amendment, ACLU members and sympathizers called for a statement of the Union’s position
on efforts to rein in the NLRB. The organization complied by waffling. It noted that increased
labor activity and the prevalence of the sit-down strike had prompted proposals for compulsory
incorporation of unions, the forced disclosure of union accounting practices, the requirement of
public notice before strikes, and the criminalization of occupying company property. The ACLU
opposed the new measures not on substantive grounds, but because they had not been
sufficiently studied. 38
Taking a frank position on the Wagner Act amendments became unavoidable over the
coming months. In the summer of 1937, Republican Senator Arthur Vandenburg suggested
provisions that would have restrained unions and introduced new employer rights. Many similar
proposals followed, fueled by an increasingly bitter struggle between the AFL and the CIO. 39
The AFL felt that NLRB policy favored the CIO, and at its October convention, it unanimously
passed a resolution calling for the collection of evidence regarding the NLRB’s improper
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administration of the NLRA and recommending a slate of amendments to the Act. 40 In 1938, the
AFL leadership allied with business to oppose the NLRB—going so far as to collaborate with
former Liberty League attorneys who were representing the National Association of
Manufacturers. Although these congressional efforts to curb the NLRB were unsuccessful, they
were reflective of growing public and political opposition to the administration of the act.
Many of the efforts to counteract the increased power of trade unions focused on bringing
labor under greater state control. In January 1938, the ACLU came out squarely in opposition to
proposed legislation providing for compulsory incorporation of trade unions and compulsory
publication of financial statements. 41 This was precisely the sort of strangulation through
regulation that Baldwin had worried about when the Wagner Act was first debated. As a result,
the ACLU’s articulation of its position was both predictable and less controversial than others
then under consideration. The report, formulated by a newly organized Committee on Labor’s
Rights, argued that the provisions were discriminatory because they imposed burdens on unions
that were not applicable to trade associations and other voluntary associations. The differential
treatment, it stressed, was not justified by any social evil particular to labor unions. On the
contrary, the La Follette Committee had gathered extensive evidence that industrial racketeering
was also rampant. Compulsory incorporation would transform the right to organize into a
licensed privilege, revocable at will. Moreover, it would enable a worker hostile to the union
40
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(and perhaps hired by the employer for the purpose) to tie the union up in court by citing small
violations of the union by-laws. 42 According to the statement, the true purpose for the proposed
amendments was not protection of the public welfare, but restricting legitimate trade union
growth. 43
The flip side, of course, was that insofar as the proposed amendments were really about
labor policy, a growing contingent of the ACLU thought the organization had no business
interfering. One member told Baldwin that a substantial majority of the organization’s members
were using constitutional liberties instrumentally to advance the radical cause. “In fact,” he
complained, “many of them have no use for the Constitution or any other document that places a
curb upon excesses.” 44 Others argued more insistently that the ACLU should be supporting
amendments to temper the administrative power of the NLRB, on the one hand, and to protect
the constitutional rights of employers and non-union employees, on the other. 45 Both strains
flowed directly out of the ACLU’s prior language, if it not its substantive policy. 46 Like other
advocates of administrative law reform, the members of the ACLU worried about unchecked
administrative discretion, even while they believed that administrative expansion had been
necessary “to meet the demands of a new era of unparalleled change and of increasing
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complexity in business and society.” 47 The call to administer the new machinery in a manner
consistent with the framework of American “constitutional democracy” 48 hardly seemed
objectionable from a civil liberties standpoint. Indeed, at the very moment the ACLU was
opposing legislation to curb fascist activity in the United States because it raised the specter of
improper administrative enforcement against radicals and religious minorities. 49 There was little
principled basis for distinguishing the NLRB from the Post Office Department or the Federal
Radio Commission, whose censorship the ACLU routinely opposed. The ACLU’s labor
sympathizers sidestepped this problem by claiming that the NLRB, unlike those other entities,
had operated responsibly and within the bounds of constitutional law. A vocal minority of the
organization’s membership found that response unconvincing.
Meanwhile, a growing number of ACLU members, even those who personally supported
labor, were persuaded that the Wagner Act curtailed the civil liberties of non-union members.
The first and, from the perspective of past ACLU practice, less troublesome such example was
opposition to the closed shop. One member suggested to Morris Ernst that the ACLU’s
advocacy of the rights of CIO picketers in New Jersey be followed by a “similar effort on behalf
of those who through no fault of their own—except in the refusal to contribute to an organization
of which they disapprove—are denied the right to work in the jobs they have held for so many
years?” 50 The Committee dutifully drafted a statement in defense of the closed shop, which it

47

Arthur T. Vanderbilt, One Hundred Years of Administrative Law (New York: New York University Press, 1937),
123; O. R. McGuire to Jerome Britchey, 14 December 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 170, vol. 2081 (Discussing LoganWalter Bill and suggesting that “the enactment into law of the Administrative Law Bill is absolutely necessary for
the protection of the civil liberties of the American people” and the ACLU “should lend its vigorous support for the
enactment of this bill”); Jerome Britchey to O. R. McGuire, 18 December 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 170, vol. 2081
(“We ourselves are interested in the problem and shall study all the material on the matter with great care.”).
48
Farnum, “America Confronts Bureaucracy,” 3.
49
Memorandum of the Special Committee to consider Legislation To Curb Fascist Activities in the United States,
21 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080.
50
William D. Scholle to Morris Ernst, 20 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078. ACLU secretary Lucille
Milner forwarded the letter to the chair of the committee on labor’s rights, noting that it raised new issues for the

439

circulated for comment. 51 R. W. Riis, 52 the son of muckraker Jacob Riis and a longtime member
of the ACLU, told Baldwin: “For the life of me I cannot see why it is any more a civil liberty to
join the union than to refuse to join the union.” 53 William Fennell, the lone conservative member
of the Committee on Labor’s Rights (tellingly, at Fennell’s request the board eventually voted to
change the committee’s name to the Committee on Civil Rights in Labor Relations 54), echoed
Riis’s sentiments.55 The ACLU had consistently argued that discharge of an employee for
membership in a union was a violation of civil liberties and had endorsed the Norris-La Guardia
Act, outlawing the yellow-dog contract, on precisely that basis. He felt that the ACLU was
bound to defend with equal vigor the rights of employees not to join a union.
Writing at a time when the ACLU’s defense of content- and value-neutral rights had
become axiomatic, Fennell’s argument fundamentally misconstrued the organization’s earlier
justification for its indictment of yellow-dog contracts. The ACLU had never claimed that an
employee’s right to join a union was a matter of personal autonomy. Nor did it suggest that
irrespective of contractual language to the contrary, the employee’s choice could not be curtailed
because it was derivative of the constitutional right of free expression. Such a theory—that
judicial enforcement of a private contract providing for the abrogation of one party’s
constitutional rights was unconstitutional state action—would have required an expansive
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construction of state action rarely endorsed and almost never effectuated. 56 In the early 1930s,
the ACLU had unselfconsciously assumed that the right of labor to bargain collectively was a
substantive right of its own, whether constitutional or otherwise. Indeed, it had always been the
most important of rights to which the ACLU was committed. In place of the right to unionize—
the ACLU’s “right of agitation”—Fennell was (re-)introducing a right of autonomy and
individual conscience that had more in common with the proffered right of conscientious
objection during World War I than with the rights of labor championed by the ACLU thereafter.
Rather than address this misunderstanding, the ACLU avoided it. As it had in the case of
the sit-down strike, it summarized competing points of view on the closed shop. It then
concluded without explanation that “the American Civil Liberties Union sees no issue of civil
liberty in the claims of non-union workers against a closed shop agreement except where they
may be excluded from union membership by reason of any arbitrary or unreasonable restriction
on membership,” such as racial discrimination. In such cases, it promised, the organization
would “defend the[] right to continued employment by recourse to the courts.” 57
The ACLU’s increasing ambivalence toward a radical theory of rights was the source of
its trouble in a final class of arguments about civil liberties and the labor movement: the
controversy over employer free speech. The issue first attracted the organization’s notice in the
fall of 1937, when the NLRB’s purported interference with the press in two investigations caused
a media uproar. In the first case, a local newspaper printed an editorial speculating that the
town’s largest industry, which was under investigation for unfair labor practices by the NLRB,
would be forced to fire workers if the employees decided to unionize. The vice-president of the
company was a director and substantial stockholder in the newspaper, and the author of the
56
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editorial was the wife of a company engineer. The NLRB sought to introduce evidence that the
company had paid for or otherwise influenced the newspaper to publish an indictment of the
union. 58 In the second case, the NLRB subpoenaed the editor of Mill and Factory to testify
about an article in its October 1937 issue. The article had criticized the board’s investigation of
the Weirton Steel Company, and the Board was investigating whether Weirton had encouraged
or written the article. 59
Newspapers and politicians were quick to condemn the NLRB’s new practice, which they
claimed threatened the autonomy of the press. 60 Republican Senator H. Styles Bridges called the
NLRB’s subpoena of the Mill and Factory editor “one of the most open attacks on the freedom
of the press that we’ve ever seen.” 61 The New York World Telegram, noting that “bureaucracy at
best is never too popular in this country,” predicted that the “high-handed performance” of the
NLRB would fan popular outrage against the NLRA. 62 ACLU members began asking for a
statement of the organization’s position on the controversy. 63
Nathan Greene, co-author with Felix Frankfurter of The Labor Injunction, was chair of
the Committee on Labor’s Rights, and he drafted a response to the charges. A staunch labor
advocate, he sprang unflinchingly to the defense of the NLRB. For Greene, the only question
raised by the incident was “the propriety of obtaining evidence as to an employer’s unlawful
course of conduct from the editor of a newspaper”—specifically, whether compelling a
newspaper editor to disclose information in such an inquiry was a restriction of freedom of press.
His argument centered on a journalist’s privilege, denied in most states, to withhold confidential
58
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communications relevant to a pending inquiry before a legal tribunal. He accepted the Board’s
explanation that it was concerned not with the right to write the article, but whether the
employers had interfered with the rights of their employees. 64
An important prerequisite of Greene’s argument was the assumption that employers
themselves could be prevented from expressing anti-union views. Of this fact, Greene had no
doubt. Citing the NLRB’s October decision in Mansfield Mills, 65 he approved the Board’s
conclusion that distribution by an employer of anti-union statements “constitutes an attempt to
circumvent the act by interfering with his employees’ rights unprejudiced by the employer to
make up their own minds regarding self-organization.” In Greene’s view, preventing an
employer’s distribution of anti-union propaganda was not the sort of violation of free speech
with which the ACLU should be concerned. “We defend free speech as a deliberative force and
as an application of the power of reason intended to touch off, in Brandeis’s phrase, ‘thought,
hope and imagination,” he insisted. Anti-union propaganda, by contrast, amounted to an order
rather than an argument, and the ACLU would be “deluded” to protect it. He concluded by
insisting that the ACLU would “not defend speech when it is but the velvet glove that conceals
the iron fist”—an unusual qualification for an organization founded to protect radicals, as the
press soon pointed out. 66
Baldwin was convinced by Greene’s disposition of the matter. In fact, he found it so
persuasive that he secured the board’s approval to redraft it as a letter, send it to the chair of the
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NLRB, and issue it as a press release. 67 The letter reported that the ACLU had evaluated the
widespread criticism of the NLRB and had concluded that it was unjustified. Past experience
had taught the ACLU to be wary when the issue of freedom of press was raised; it had been
invoked as an excuse for resistance to the labor organization of newspaper staff (a case argued
successfully by Morris Ernst on behalf of the Newspaper Guild), to cite a recent example. After
careful study of the situation, the ACLU considered the NLRB “entirely justified in determining
whether an employer has purchased publications used among his employees to say what he has
no right under the law to say himself.”
After sending the letter, Baldwin circulated it to the National Committee. 68 If he was
expecting consensus in favor of the Board’s position, however, he was sorely disappointed.
Almost immediately, a flood of critical letters poured in. 69 Amos Pinchot told Baldwin that he
“disagree[d] profoundly” with the letter. 70 Whatever the ostensive target of the investigation and
however noble the NLRB’s intentions, he insisted, the ability to order an editor to appear before
the board and open its files to inspection was bound to intimidate the press. And he felt
compelled to register a vigorous protest. “At this time when the doctrine that the end justifies the
means is decimating the ranks of American liberals,” he cautioned, “the Civil Liberties Union
should be extremely careful not to abandon a vital principle of liberty.” John Codman expressed
similar concerns. As a general matter, Codman objected to the ACLU’s recent pronouncements
that the establishment of labor’s rights under the NLRA had been the greatest civil liberties gain
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in years. He was not sure, he said, that the Wagner Act itself was not a violation of civil
liberties. 71
The Board initially responded to members’ reservations by emphasizing that the
investigations targeted employers only, and that newspapers were not at risk of direct sanction. 72
But the assumption that the press could properly be questioned regarding the unlawful activity of
employers begged the more important question: whether the NLRB could constitutionally
prohibit employers from expressing their opinion on unions in the first place. 73 For Baldwin, this
was a matter of “sound public policy”; the NLRB could not guarantee the rights of labor in the
face of “employer coercion.” 74 Baldwin equated employer distribution of anti-union literature
with employer efforts to influence employees’ votes in public elections. In the past, the ACLU
had supported legislation prohibiting employers from circulating political advice in pay
envelopes; attempts to intervene in union elections seemed to Baldwin theoretically
indistinguishable. 75
Many ACLU members disagreed. Arthur Garfield Hays urged the board to “fight against
interpretations of the Wagner Act which would prevent an employer from expressing his opinion
of labor unionism or of anything else.” 76 Amos Pinchot thought the board’s attitude “short-
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sighted” and predicted that it would “land the Civil Liberties Union in a lot of trouble.” It was his
opinion that the ACLU should be resisting “any kind of law, or any kind of procedure, that
breaks down, or in any way tends to break down, the guarantees of free speech and free press.” 77
Another member, Philadelphia attorney T. Henry Walnut, recounted his defense of labor’s rights
during the soft coal strike of 1922. When operators had complained that union speech was unfair
and unjustified, he had always told them their remedy was to denounce the unions with
equivalent expressive force. That, he told Baldwin, is what he “considered to be the American
conception of freedom of speech.” To Walnut, freedom of the press was an ancillary issue. The
heart of the matter was the right of any individual, including employers, to express criticism of
existing conditions. “Both you and I have lived long enough to see the wheel turn,” he cautioned
Baldwin—and in the future, employers were bound to reclaim control of state power. Once they
did, the ACLU would be best served by a consistent record of the rigorous protection of all
opinions, no matter how unpopular or distasteful. 78
Faced with a barrage of comments like these, the board agreed to address the issue of
employer free speech head on. 79 In January, it requested an advisory vote on two memoranda: a
“proposed statement on employers’ rights in industrial conflict,” 80 together with a minority
report by R. W. Riis.81 The majority report reiterated Greene’s earlier arguments. It noted that
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the ACLU’s defense of free speech was not absolute, and it introduced a long list of examples
that the organization would regard as properly punishable. 82 Given the coercive nature of the
employer-employee relationship, it concluded that the regulation of employers’ anti-union
speech was “sound public policy.” Notably, the majority report sought to assuage fears of
NLRB censorship by stressing the inability of the Board to act without judicial approval. It
emphasized that no employer could be punished for violating a mere order of the Board; the
United States Courts of Appeals had the power to enforce, modify, or set aside any order of the
NLRB. Consequently, remedies at law provided “ample protection” for employers. 83
Riis submitted the minority report because he felt that the board had abandoned its
motivating principles. In his assessment, those who approved the NLRB’s suppression of
employer opinion did so for fear that “pro-union utterances may not be able to get themselves
accepted in the free competition of the market.” 84 In his report, he articulated the true stakes of
the controversy, and he called the board to task for its attempt to avoid the crucial decision that it
faced. 85 “The desire to restrict the employer’s potential anti-union speech stems from a desire to
bring about a more equitable propaganda-balance between employer and employee,” he
explained, anticipating one of the central questions in scholarly debate over free speech. 86 In
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Riis’s assessment, the pro-labor contingent of the ACLU was not really satisfied with neutrality,
despite its claims to the contrary. It professed commitment to the marketplace of ideas, but it
wanted to be sure that radical voices would be heard. And for Riis, “laudable and humane” as
the board’s desire was, it was not a legitimate objective for an organization devoted to free
speech. The ACLU, he insisted, “must not attempt to control speech, even in the interests of
social betterment.”
The National Committee found Riis’s argument convincing. The committed leftists, of
course, endorsed the majority statement. To Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, “coercion [was] the whole
point, as opposed to free speech,” 87 and it was naïve to advocate an abstract commitment to
viewpoint neutrality when employers exercised such disproportionate power. In the same vein,
A. F. Whitney, president of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, argued that the theoretical
availability of a legal remedy for unlawful discharge could not counteract the real and immediate
effects of losing one’s livelihood. 88 But many members of the National Committee, including
reliable labor advocates, questioned the propriety of suppressing employer speech under any
circumstances. Morris Ernst, about to go to trial in Hague v. CIO, worried that the reasoning of
the majority report would jeopardize the ACLU’s effort in Jersey City. 89 Arthur Garfield Hays
wanted a frank statement by the board “that we disapprove of any law which would prohibit the
expression of opinion of any kind, at any time, by anyone or anywhere.” 90 Playwright Elmer
Rice was concerned that the board’s position sanctioned administrative censorship by the NLRB.
87
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He reminded the board of the ACLU’s “traditional policy” opposing any limitation on free
speech by administrative action. As in the customs context, “the question of whether or not an
individual in the exercise of his constitutional right to freedom of speech has been guilty of a
violation of law should be determined by a judicial process.” 91 Even those members who
supported the majority report acknowledged a problem of appearances. Lloyd K. Garrison, dean
of the University of Wisconsin Law School, emphasized that the freedom of workers to organize
was a civil liberty in its own right; in a contest between two important values, the board’s
resolution was a reasonable one. Nonetheless, Garrison thought the argument should come from
the NLRB, not the ACLU, and he counseled against any statement at all. 92
In practice, however, ignoring the issue was no longer a practicable option. The
circulation of the majority and minority reports had touched off a firestorm in the ACLU that
would not be truly quieted until 1940, with the expulsion of Communists from the ACLU Board.
In the meantime, a heated exchange of letters between two major players in that controversy—
Harry Ward, longtime ACLU chair, and John Haynes Holmes, who replaced him in that capacity
once the anti-Communist resolution was passed—captures the brewing tension within the
ACLU’s leadership. Holmes thought that Riis’s statement was “magnificent, and
unanswerable,” while the majority report was “the most specious document” the ACLU had ever
produced. Accepting the board’s position would mean promoting fascism; it would destroy the
ACLU and leave Holmes no choice except to resign. 93 He asked Ward to convene a special
meeting to address head-on the meaning of civil liberties in the field of labor. The Union, he
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said, was “face to face with fundamentals.” 94 Like many members of the ACLU, Holmes
supported the labor movement and belonged to organizations committed to protecting its rights.
The ACLU, however, was about civil liberties, not the class struggle. Holmes worried that the
organization’s detractors were correct to challenge its impartiality. Gradually, “almost without
. . . realizing it,” the leadership of the ACLU had been seduced by its “real sympathy for labor’s
cause,” he said. Rather than upholding the “basic universal right of every man to express his
convictions,” the ACLU had become a “mere advocate[] of the rights of labor.”
Ward agreed to bring Holmes’s request to the board, but he flatly denied the premise of
his argument. 95 According to Ward, the true conflict was between free speech, on the hand, and
a constitutionally protected right to organize on the other. Within the board, there was an
“honest difference of opinion” as to where to strike the balance. By questioning the motives of
those who would strike it differently, he warned, Holmes would only exacerbate the conflict
within the organization. Holmes, of course, was not persuaded. 96 He reaffirmed his belief that
there were members of the board who believed in civil liberties only as a matter of tactics, not of
principle. Free speech, for them, was a means to an end, and “if or when this end is achieved,
they will drop civil liberties as promptly as they were dropped in Russia.” For the time being,
Holmes was “not asking for any excommunications or purges,” let alone the “abrogation of free
thought and speech inside our Board.” 97 But he could not sanction the leftists’ instrumentalist
approach. As for the proposed test of coercion, it was bad precedent, impossible to implement in
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practice, and inconsistent with the ACLU’s commitment to protecting all speech short of
violence.
Holmes was right to regard the cleavage within the board as a fundamental turning point.
The ACLU had occasionally acted to restrict individual choice to enhance opportunities for
dissenting expression. For example, it had advocated the mandatory allocation of radio airtime to
political minorities, over the stated opposition of private radio stations. But the right of an
employer to criticize unions was an unprecedented problem for the ACLU, because it involved
the right of the establishment to uphold the status quo. In the 1920s, the federal government had
almost exclusively targeted radical speech. State and local governments had sought to suppress
such reactionary groups as the Ku Klux Klan and the Nazi party, but these episodes, contentious
as they were at the time, did not raise the same fundamental challenge to the ACLU’s theory of
free speech. 98 After all, the rights of the KKK to rally in Catholic Boston or of the Nazi party to
march in New Jersey were the rights of disfavored minorities to make their viewpoints, however
repugnant, known. The ACLU acknowledged as much in its statement defending free speech for
Nazis: “Those who defend the right of free speech defend it because they believe that few more
effective weapons against oppression exist. . . . Defense of free speech today means one of two
things—either defense of minorities or defense of the working class.” 99 In 1937, a full forty
percent of the cases handled by the ACLU involved infringements on the rights of labor, usually
the CIO. 100
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Before the New Deal, there was no realistic possibility that the state, with the approval of
the courts, would operate to curtail the expressive freedom of the capitalists—which, in part, was
what made the free speech strategy so appealing. The ACLU could pursue its “right of
agitation”—the pre-constitutional right of an oppressed class to disrupt the prevailing political
and economic system—while simultaneously appealing both to progressive notions of progress
through democratic deliberation and to conservative ideals of individual rights. Never before
had the ACLU faced a situation in which defending free speech legitimately threatened the
substantive gains of labor. For the first time, upholding the right to speak meant undercutting the
right of agitation.
Even for those who supported free speech for strategic reasons, the issue of employer
speech raised a genuine question whether the cause of labor was best served by expansive
expressive freedom or sympathetic state control. Some within the ACLU thought that the
controversy over employer speech was exaggerated. They assumed that an employer’s distaste
for unionization would be known to employees regardless of whether it was explicitly
articulated, 101 and that it was far better to “err on the side of free speech,” both in the immediate
term (to forestall attacks on the NLRA) and as a general policy. 102 The crucial thing, they
insisted, was to eradicate coercive employer conduct like espionage and discharge, not mere
speech. This view, of course, hinged on a belief that radical speech—whether in the form of the
picket and the strike, or advocacy of political change—was capable of making a concrete
difference in political and economic conditions. It also assumed that workers would not be
persuaded by their employers’ pronouncements on the shared benefits of welfare capitalism and
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the perils of organization. The other side, which began as the progressive view, was voiced by
an increasing contingent of political activists and academics over the coming years. It
emphasized that free speech, in a society dominated by commercial media, was never really free,
and that radical ideas were bound to be drowned out in a marketplace of pre-packaged ideas. It
danced around the edges of a theory of false consciousness, harking back to the master-servant
relationship and insinuating that the oppressed were no longer capable of perceiving their chains.
Ever since the IWW trial, the ACLU leadership had been aware that private checks on expressive
freedom were just as repressive as, if not more so than, the state. 103 In fact, the Wagner Act was
a notable effort to protect workers’ speech from private curtailment. As the NLRB frequently
boasted, the NLRA had operated to uphold the civil liberties of workers, who for generations had
been silenced in the workplace. Like the La Follette Committee and the Civil Liberties Division
of the Department of Justice, the NLRB was protecting, for this brief moment, a robust vision of
free speech as a substantive right to be heard, independent of—indeed, protected by—state
action.
In the end, “in view of the almost even distribution of opinion in the Board and in the
returns from the members of the National Committee,” the board tabled both the majority and
minority reports. 104 Instead of issuing a statement, it finally heeded the lawyerly advice that
Felix Frankfurter had given the board a year earlier, when the controversy over the NLRA first
erupted—namely, to establish its policy in particular applications rather than issuing abstract
statements of principle. 105
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The case that it chose to examine had been brewing since the fall, and it had been
invoked in support of both positions on employer free speech. 106 That case was Ford Motor
Company v. NLRB. 107

Prelude to Battle
Henry Ford was adamant in his belief that unions were bad for labor. He was an
outspoken proponent of welfare capitalism, and his company prided itself on its excellent
package of salary and benefits for employees. In 1914, the Ford Motor Company announced a
profit-sharing-plan. It introduced the 40 hour-work week in 1926. Working conditions were, in
Ford’s view, as attractive to workers as business necessity would permit. But Ford was also a
true believer in the individualist creed of the Lochner era, and on the issue of unions, he would
not budge. 108
Indeed, Ford was determined to prevent his workers from organizing by any means
necessary. He delegated the task of combating unionization to the Ford Service Department,
whose head, Harry Bennett, was a trusted confidant and close personal friend. Bennett’s
unsavory connections with organized crime were a valuable recruitment tool in assembling
Ford’s private army, which the UAW referred to as Ford’s Gestapo. 109 His “Servicemen”
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included boxers, wrestlers, gangsters, ex-convicts, and retired policemen. They were responsible
for preventing the organization of the Ford workers through espionage, intimidation, and
violence, and they were very effective at their job. 110
By the spring of 1937, the UAW was determined to take on its most formidable
adversary. In Michigan, as in the rest of the country, public opinion had turned against labor.
The radical tactics of the CIO were an inescapable presence in daily life. In March, thirty-five
thousand workers seized every Chrysler Corporation plant in the Detroit vicinity, along with
hotels, industrial laundries, restaurants, and department stores, culminating in a half-day general
strike that shut the city down. 111 In April 1937, a sit-down strike failed at a small Yale and
Towne Company plant in Detroit, when the company secured an injunction and the police used
tear gas and riot sticks to break the strike and arrest organizers, two of whom were sentenced to
jail terms. In the wake of the strike, Yale and Towne closed the plant and fired all of its
workers. 112 Michigan residents were demanding the restoration of order, and neither the state
nor the federal government was willing to intervene on labor’s behalf.
That the state was no longer actively assisting labor may have been a disappointment to
the UAW, but it was not a surprise. 113 If labor wanted to improve its lot, it would have to
organize. And to the UAW, the failure at the Yale and Towne plant made organization at the
Ford Motor Company all the more crucial. 114 Not only had Ford kept unions out of its own
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plants, but it had stood in the way of efforts to organize its purchasers and suppliers. 115 The
atmosphere of the mid-1930s had made the company even more determined to resist the
organization of its workers. As strikes rocked Detroit, Ford invested thousands of dollars in guns
and tear gas, increased the size of the Service Department, and distributed antiunion literature.
During the GM sit-down strike, the UAW had carried banners declaring, “Today GM Tomorrow
Ford!” 116 By April, Homer Martin proclaimed that the Ford campaign was set to begin, 117 and in
late April there was a sit-down strike at the Ford plant in Richmond, California. 118 Richard
Frankensteen, a UAW field general at the GM and Chrysler strikes, was assigned to head the
organizational efforts and announced on May 18 that the UAW would mobilize 200,000
organized workers to help convince Ford employees to join. 119 Ford’s River Rouge plant in
Dearborn was a crucial organizing target. It dominated the local landscape, and it set the tone for
labor relations in the Detroit area.
For months, UAW organizers had been holding secret meetings in the River Rouge plant,
but it was evident by late spring that a more visible gesture would be necessary to reach the
largely insulated employees. To that end, they planned a literature distribution for late May.
After surveying the terrain, they settled on a location for the demonstration: an overpass
constructed by the Ford Company to provide a walkway from the plant gates to a nearby
streetcar stop. Because the company had leased the overpass to the Detroit Street Railway
Commission, it was public property, as was the abutting road.
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On May 26, 1937, when they arrived at the River Rouge plant, UAW organizers were not
expecting a fight. If anything, Walter Reuther had been unusually cautious. He had obtained
approval of the UAW pamphlets from the Dearborn city clerk and secured a permit for the event.
He had ensured attendance by respected observers, including clergy members, the local press,
and La Follette Committee staff. To further forestall the likelihood of violence, a women’s
auxiliary was designated to pass out the union literature. Reuther assured the participants that
peaceful leafleting was constitutionally protected activity and would not be forcibly stopped. Of
course, union organizing was always a risky endeavor, particularly in Dearborn. But there was
no reason to suspect any more than the usual trouble.
When Walter Reuther and Richard Frankensteen posed for a photo outside the plant
gates, however, a menacing group of Ford Servicemen wrongly informed them that they were
trespassing on company property and ordered them to leave. Reuther and Frankensteen
peacefully turned to comply, 120 but they only made it a few steps before they were attacked from
behind. Reuther was beaten severely in the face, chest, and groin and then picked up and
dropped onto the concrete seven or eight times. Frankensteen was pummeled repeatedly and
thrown down three flights of stairs. The women distributing the leaflets were punched, albeit less
forcefully, and were “called all manner of vile names usually attributed to women of the streets.”
Richard Merriweather was brutally assaulted and suffered a broken back, among many other
injuries. Many of the participants were knocked unconscious and spent days in the hospital
recovering.
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The assailants, concerned about bad publicity, pursued press photographers to seize their
films and plates. Nonetheless, a few managed to slip through. Ford servicemen chased one
reporter on foot for five miles, until he reached safety in a police station. 121 Detroit News
photographer James Kilpatrick held on to his photographic films by hiding them under a car seat.
His iconic images of the brutal attack on Reuther and Frankensteen were circulated throughout
the world and inspired the Pulitzer committee to introduce a prize for photography.
In the span of a few hours, the Ford Motor Company ensured the demise of its reputation
for treating its workers fairly. In the process, it opened itself up to a powerful unionization
drive. 122 In the days after the Battle of the Overpass, as UAW organizers sought to capitalize on
a rare wave of favorable publicity, 123 Maurice Sugar took the lead on the legal front. Sugar was
alert to the need for effective legal representation. As he told Martin, employers had long
understood the importance of legal work, and labor would do well to take that lesson to heart; the
efforts of the UAW and CIO in the legal field had “contributed in no small measure to their
phenomenal success.” 124 Almost immediately, he initiated charges before Common Pleas Judge
Ralph Liddy, who called for the prosecution of eight Ford servicemen on charges of assault and
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battery. 125 Concurrently, Sugar prepared a lengthy complaint for a hearing before the NLRB. 126
In it, he alleged that the Ford Motor Company had engineered the events of May 26. He also
accused Ford of a host of other unfair labor practices, including threatening and intimidating its
employees; soliciting members for the Ford Brotherhood of America, allegedly a company
union; and discharging, demoting, transferring or otherwise adversely affecting the employment
status of three dozen employees for engaging in union activities. 127 Finally, the NLRB complaint
charged the company with distributing statements and propaganda critical of labor organizations
and discouraging union membership.
The hearings began on July 6 before NLRB Trial Examiner John T. Lindsay. The federal
courtroom in which they were held was filled to capacity, including standing room, every day of
the trial. 128 The attorney for the NLRB was Laurence A. Knapp. Ford was represented by a
local attorney, Louis J. Colombo—who, according to the attorneys at Cravath, Swaine & Moore,
the white-shoe New York law firm that represented the company on appeal, did a barely passable
job. After addressing such preliminary matters as the public status of the overpass and the
details of the UAW’s permit, the bulk of the testimony focused on the Battle of the Overpass.
Witness after witness described the callous brutalities in vivid detail. Victims described being
beaten unconscious. Richard Frankensteen recalled being “bounced, thrown, dragged and
knocked down three flights of stairs.” An observer filled in the gaps, describing how
Frankensteen was “kicked in the groin and kidneys and knocked down, . . . lifted to his feet and
then knocked down and beaten again.” A member of the women’s auxiliary saw a group of men
125

“Labor: Fordism v. Unionism,” Time, 26 July 1937.
Christopher H. Johnson, Maurice Sugar: Law, Labor and the Left in Detroit, 1912–1950 (Detroit: Wayne State
University Press, 1988), 224.
127
Ford Motor Company (Highland Park and Dearborn, Mich.), 4 N.L.R.B. 621 (1937). The complaint originally
named thirty-eight employees. Some of them were dropped and other added over the course of the proceedings.
128
J. T. C., Memorandum for Mr. McCormack, Investigation of Smith Committee Exhibits, 2 January 1941, 6, Ford
Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 2, file: Re-Examination of Exhibits in Smith Committee Investigation.
126

459

leaning over Richard Meriweather shouting “Kill him! Kill him!” while blood poured out of his
nose and mouth. A reporter who had been covering the events summed things up neatly in his
testimony: “everywhere you looked there was someone getting kicked around.” 129
As a public relations tool, the hearings were a resounding success for the UAW.
Newspapers reprinted large portions of the testimony documenting Ford’s history of spying,
intimidation, blacklisting, and other unlawful practices, as well as the harrowing events of May
26. 130 The UAW, by contrast, was portrayed as peaceful and law-abiding. For the first time in
months, the NLRB was presented in popular accounts as a forum where the trampled underclass
could secure justice against the tyranny of its employers. 131
Legally, too, the UAW scored an important victory. The trial examiner’s voluminous
report, which served as the basis for the Board’s order in the case, was highly favorable to the
UAW. 132 In internal memoranda, Ford’s Cravath attorneys described the case for the Board as
“well-prepared and well-presented,” almost certain to create an impression unfavorable to Ford.
They thought there was ample evidence to sustain any findings the Board was likely to make. 133
The statement of what happened on May 26 accorded fully with the testimony, and while there
might be some room to argue about Ford’s responsibility for the incident, it would be “entirely
impossible to deny on the record that union members were beaten without provocation.” 134 The
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case for Ford, on the other hand, was “deficient, both by omission and commission.” 135 Many of
the Board’s charges, and many descriptions of damaging conversations and events, were never
answered or refuted.
After meeting with their clients in late December, the Ford lawyers began to formulate a
strategy. They spoke extensively with Everett Moore, Bennett’s second-in-command at the
River Rouge plant, who oversaw the Servicemen’s preparations for the scheduled UAW
literature distribution. Moore had ordered the closure of five plant gates and had parked trucks
inside several others to repel a possible automobile cavalcade. In the midst of the spring sitdown strikes, Moore had been preparing for the possibility of “actual invasion of the plant.” 136
Of course, there was no evidence that the UAW was planning anything of the sort. But their
actual intentions were irrelevant, because Moore and Bennett “both seemed to genuinely believe
that . . . this visit to the Rouge Plant on May 26 was for the purpose of entering into the plant and
going among the workmen and calling a sit-down strike at that very moment.” If Ford’s lawyers
could convince the courts to take judicial notice of the prevailing hysteria in May 1937, they
could perhaps provide a measure of justification for the brutality with which the company shut
down a peaceful UAW organizing event.
Still, given that the case did “not appear very favorable on the facts,” the heart of Ford’s
legal plan was to attack the NLRB itself. 137 Ford’s lawyers accused the Board of acting as a
prosecutor rather than an unbiased tribunal. They insisted that the administrative machinery
developed in the fields of trade and commerce were “not suited to the field of labor relations, in
which emotion is dominant and partisanship is rife,” and they questioned whether the quasi-
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judicial function could be fulfilled “by handing down quasi-decisions based upon a quasi-record
which has been fabricated out of quasi-evidence unearthed at a quasi-hearing.” 138
Ford’s lawyers were realistic about their chances on this front. By 1938, the federal
judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, was a friendlier forum for labor than the legislature
was. In fact, in the late 1930s the Supreme Court overturned NLRB orders and procedures only
a handful of times. 139 The legal team discussed the situation at length with Edsel Ford, president
of the company and Henry’s Ford son, whose opposition to organized labor was less obstinate
than his father’s. One attorney pointed out that the Detroit case “was just one battle in a general
war.” The Wagner Act, he explained, was a federal law, and the Supreme Court had pronounced
it constitutional. Although minor amendments were possible, there was no reasonable prospect
of reversing national labor policy in the foreseeable future. 140 Nonetheless, the courts might be
open to arguments about frank bias in the NLRB, or its failure to act in the “quasi-judicial
manner required of administrative bodies.”
First, however, the company would have to exhaust its remedies before the NLRB. The
Board issued its order on December 22. Accepting virtually all of the trial examiner’s findings,
the Board emphasized “the unconcealed hostility with which the Ford Motor Company views
138
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bona fide labor organizations and the utter ruthlessness with which it has fought the organization
of its employees by the U. A. W.” 141 The Ford Motor Company had conveyed its antagonism to
labor not only through public statements, but also through direct admonitions to employees,
buttressed by the hostility of supervisors and foremen, the discharge of union advocates, and the
employment of hired thugs. No Ford employee could fail to comprehend that disregarding
Henry Ford’s opinion on unions was an unacceptable choice. Accordingly, the Board ordered
the company to cease and desist from discouraging union membership, dominating or interfering
with any labor organization of its employees, threatening or assaulting any member of a union,
or otherwise interfering with employees’ rights to self-organization or collective bargaining. 142
On January 3, Ford filed a petition to vacate and set aside the decision to provide an
opportunity for rehearing and additional testimony. In addition to drawing attention to industrial
unrest in Michigan the previous spring, the petition emphasized Ford’s high wages and good
working conditions, a statement by Henry Ford that he would not prevent union membership,
and other mitigating circumstances. 143 Above all, however, it focused on questions of law. Ford
claimed that it was denied a fair hearing and due process because the trial examiner had never
issued an intermediate report to which it could file exceptions. And it claimed that the Board’s
order, which prohibited Ford from disseminating its anti-union views, was an unconstitutional
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infringement of free speech. The Board denied Ford’s petition and, on January 7, filed in the
Sixth Circuit for enforcement of its order. 144
Over the coming months, it was Ford’s last argument that would attract the most
attention. Paragraph 1(e) of the Board’s order required Ford to cease and desist from
“circulating, distributing or otherwise disseminating among its employees statements or
propaganda disparaging or criticizing labor organizations or advising its employees not to join
such organizations.” The provision was meant to address the company’s distribution at the River
Rouge plant of various anti-union materials. The first was a pamphlet entitled “Ford Gives
Viewpoint on Labor,” in which Henry Ford explained his belief that union membership was
unnecessary and ill-advised. 145 Ford supervisors also distributed cards that listed, under the
heading “Fordisms,” various excerpts from Henry Ford’s written criticism of organized labor. 146
When Ford’s lawyers first considered the free speech angle, it was by no means an
obvious approach. 147 One attorney wrote in an internal memorandum that the Board could likely
limit speech when it infringed on other fundamental rights. 148 Although an employer could
probably advise employees not to join a union, “if such right is exercised in such a way as to
interfere with, coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of their fundamental right to self144
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organization . . . such an exercise of the right by the employer may be prohibited by the Board
without doing violence to the constitutional right of the employer under the First Amendment.”
A few months later, another lawyer read and summarized every Supreme Court decision
involving freedom of speech and press (which, in 1938, was still a manageable task). 149 He
concluded that Henry Ford was entitled to make public statements about his views without
NLRB interference, but he anticipated difficulty “as to the reprinting and circulation among
employees of statements by Henry Ford and as to any other publication by the Company itself.”
Whatever its doctrinal vulnerabilities, however, it was immediately clear that free speech
strategy was an immensely popular one. When newspapers decried the NLRB’s encroachment
on freedom of the press in the cases involving subpoenas of editors, they often noted the Board’s
order in the Ford case as well.
Ford did not file an answer to the Board’s petition for enforcement of its order by the
Sixth Circuit until April 11, 1938. 150 Its arguments were largely the same ones it had presented
to the NLRB, but the court never had an opportunity to rule on them. On May 2—following an
intervening Supreme Court decision, Morgan v. United States, 151 in which a rate-fixing order of
the Secretary of Agriculture was held void for lack of a “full hearing”—the NLRB filed a motion
for leave to withdraw its transcript of record and its petition for enforcement without
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prejudice. 152 The Sixth Circuit granted the NLRB’s motion a few days later, but Ford challenged
it on procedural grounds. For the next half-year the case would be stalled, until the Supreme
Court finally held in January 1939 that the Sixth Circuit’s judgment was proper. 153
In the meantime, however, the legal team continued to prepare the company’s substantive
case. It investigated the legislative history of the NLRA and discovered that the House had
adopted an amendment providing that “nothing in this act shall abridge the freedom of speech or
the press as guaranteed in the first amendment of the constitution.” 154 The Senate and House
conferences had recommended that it be dropped as unnecessary, since nothing in the act could
be construed to undermine First Amendment protections. 155 During Senate debate on the bill,
Senator David I. Walsh, Chair of the Committee on Labor and Education, had stated that
employers and employees alike would have the right to discuss the merits of any organization.
“Indeed,” he clarified, “Congress could not constitutionally pass a law abridging the freedom of
speech.” 156
The more Ford’s lawyers researched, the more confident they became that the NLRB’s
order was an unconstitutional infringement on free speech. The Act, they concluded, could not
reasonably be construed to prohibit substantive argument about the desirability or necessity of
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unionization. The Supreme Court’s March 1938 decision in Lovell v. City of Griffin—which the
ACLU was using to such great effect in its campaign against Mayor Hague in Jersey City—
provided additional ammunition. In a case involved leafleting by Jehovah’s Witnesses, it further
established the inviolability of free speech and free press. 157 In May 1938 draft brief, Ford’s
lawyers quoted from Zechariah Chafee’s scholarship and from Justice Holmes’s Abrams dissent,
as well as the Supreme Court’s newer entries in the First Amendment debate, including
Stromberg v. California 158 and Grosjean v. American Press Co. 159 To connect these cases to
employer speech, they invoked the metaphor of industrial democracy so often promoted by
labor. It was congressional intent, they argued, that “workers should have the same freedom of
action in determining the manner of their organization as citizens have in the sphere of politics.”
If free speech facilitates the appropriate and informed exercise of rights in the political sphere, it
is “likewise essential in order that workers may intelligently exercise their rights to organize or
to designate representatives or engage in concerted activity.” 160 Ford’s workers had been
exposed to a broad range of opinions about the desirability of unionization. The CIO and UAW
had been actively engaged in recruitment and had made their views known in the national press
as well as in the plant. What could be objectionable, they asked, about advising workers that
they should consider the potential disadvantages of joining a union before they made up their
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minds? By the summer of 1938, the Ford Motor Company and its lawyers considered the free
speech argument to be the strongest element of their case. 161

The Ford Case and the ACLU
When the NLRB’s order in the Ford case erupted onto the public stage in the fall of 1937,
demands for ACLU comment immediately poured in. 162 The case was bound to cause
controversy within the already divided organization. After all, it brought together all of the
elements about which the ACLU’s board and its national committee had been fighting since
spring. It was closely tied to the sit-down strikes of spring 1937 and raised questions about the
propriety of employers’ measures to safeguard their property. It involved the procedural
limitations of the Wagner Act in the immediate aftermath of the constitutional revolution. It
touched upon company unions and industrial espionage. But above all, it squarely raised the
question whether employer speech was constitutionally protected. And on this issue, the Ford
case precipitated a major shift in the rhetoric of civil liberties and in the internal politics of the
ACLU.
161

H. G. W. Jr., Memorandum for Messrs. Wood and McCormack, Ford Labor Cases Settlement Possibilities, 26
August 1938, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 5, vol. 1. In the intervening months, the NLRB had initiated charges
of unfair labor practices at Ford plants throughout the country. Many involved facts less sympathetic than those of
the Detroit case, but the Board consistently prohibited anti-union communications by the company. In August, one
of Ford’s attorneys advised that the moment was opportune for settling the eight cases then pending. At the time,
divisiveness within the UAW made the union vulnerable. Homer Martin, president of the UAW, was attempting to
oust the communists from union office, angering the CIO leadership and escalating existing tensions within the
organization. The conflict would eventually culminate in Martin’s resignation in January 1939 and his formation of
a competitor AFL-affiliated union. Dubofsky and Van Tine, Lewis, 234. In advocating settlement of the Ford case,
the attorney predicted that a loss by Martin would shift control to leaders “much more radical in thought and action,”
and that Ford should act while a more moderate agreement was possible. He thought the NLRB would be amenable
to a settlement, since only a few of the cases were clear-cut and settling would end the attack on the Board’s
procedure in the Detroit case. As events unfolded, settlement between the UAW and Ford would wait another three
years. Tellingly, the attorney acknowledged the likelihood that no compromise whatsoever “would be acceptable to
the client on the free speech issue.”
162
One ACLU member wrote to Baldwin in December 1937 to tell him that while he was “strongly sympathetic
with the law of unions in this fight to bring Henry [Ford] to his knees,” he and his wife felt that the Ford order was a
clear infringement of free speech. John Beardsley to Roger Baldwin, 27 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143,
vol. 978.

468

Ford v. NLRB was by no means the first encounter between the Ford Motor Company
and the ACLU. Roger Baldwin had corresponded at length with Maurice Sugar after the “Ford
Massacre” of 1932, in which the Dearborn police, assisted by Harry Bennett and his servicemen,
opened fire on hunger marchers outside the River Rouge plant and killed four members of the
Youth Communist League. 163 Baldwin made multiple visits to Detroit and worked diligently
with Sugar and the International Labor Defense to assemble a damages suit, but they were unable
to collect sufficient evidence and eventually abandoned the effort. 164 Throughout the mid-1930s,
Baldwin worked closely with local civil rights groups, including the Conference for the
Protection of Civil Rights 165 and the Professional League for Civil Rights. 166 The former
organization, which became the Civil Rights Federation in the summer of 1937, handled
publicity after the Battle of the Overpass, and the ACLU helped it translate public sympathy for
the UAW into a broader organizing drive. 167 When the organization issued a pro-UAW
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pamphlet on the NLRB hearing in the Ford case in August 1937, Baldwin only regretted that it
did not include the names of the ACLU’s National Committee. 168 For years, the Ford Service
Department and the local police had worked together to shut down every attempt at unionization
in the River Rouge plant. They had trampled over workers’ constitutional rights to march, picket,
and distribute literature, often through use of violence. Given this context, the efforts by Ford’s
lawyers and the conservative press to present the company’s anti-union literature as a mere
expression of opinion were understandably infuriating to much of the ACLU leadership.
Nonetheless, the Wagner Act had reshaped the free speech landscape, and the ACLU
would need to adjust to the new terrain. The ACLU was accustomed to attacking the Ford Motor
Company for its flagrant interference with civil liberties. For the first time, Ford v. NLRB pushed
an increasing contingent of ACLU members to consider whether employers had corresponding
rights of their own. The ACLU had never considered property rights to be part of the civil
liberties program; the organization was born out of opposition to Lochner-era judicial reasoning,
and it had always flatly dismissed efforts by groups like the Liberty League to equate the
deprivation of property or freedom of contract with attacks on other liberties protected by the
Bill of Rights. 169 But the problem of employer free speech was a different one. It involved
precisely the same constitutional provision that the ACLU had invoked for decades. Many
ACLU members, including the attorneys, worried that a narrow reading of the First Amendment
would inevitably backfire against the radical groups to whom the organization was most strongly
committed.
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In February 1938, Arthur Garfield Hays tried to address these issues in a draft statement
on the Ford case. Ford presented an opportunity for concrete application of the theory that he
had been working toward in debate over the ACLU’s general statement on employer free speech.
Hays thought that the NLRB could lawfully prohibit direct threats or acts of coercion. But his
definition of coercion was clearly narrower than that of the leftists on the ACLU board. He
announced that any attempt by the NLRB or the courts to restrict employers’ “expression of
opinion” would be contested by the ACLU. And in keeping with the policy he espoused, he
considered the non-distribution provision in the Ford case to be a violation of civil liberties. He
was careful to specify that the ACLU did not disapprove of the judgment against the Ford
Company, which was justified by ample evidence of unlawful labor practices. 170 But the order
to cease and desist from circulating statements critical of labor unions was too broad, and it
infringed on important constitutional guarantees.
Nathan Greene was deeply opposed to Hays’s report. He insisted that the NLRB’s order
could be understood only in its broader context, namely, as a remedy for “merciless beatings,”
“shameless violence,” and “bitter and uncompromising warfare” against workers’ every effort to
organize. Greene wanted to except from constitutional protection speech like Ford’s that was
“implemented by force.” While the ACLU would defend the right of employers to voice their
anti-union sentiments in a “normal way,” the literature distributed at the River Rouge plant was
far more than a mere expression of opinion. It was “simply and clearly a promise of beatings to
come.” 171 Greene’s theory found expression in a substitute statement endorsed by the
Committee on Labor’s Rights, which concluded that speech effectuated by force or threat of
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violence was unworthy of ACLU attention. 172 In its sole concession to the Hays camp, it
concluded with a clarification: “We assume that the provision in the order prohibiting the
circulation of propaganda among its employees was intended to be limited to conduct coercive in
character, and we deem it advisable that any court decree entered to enforce the Board’s order
make this clear. It would follow, therefore, that the section of the order will not survive the
genuine abandonment by the Ford Company of its policy of coercion.” Baldwin was clearly
attracted to Greene’s interpretation. He admonished Hays that the ACLU had always drawn the
line between words and deeds—a distinction that would seem to favor Hays’s views, but that
Baldwin construed as support for Greene’s. According to Baldwin, Ford’s words contributed to
an unlawful act and were therefore subject to regulation. 173
The ACLU board, however, gravitated toward Hays’s version instead. The issue was one
of several on the agenda at the special meeting requested by John Haynes Holmes and attended
by twenty-five members of the board. 174 After lengthy discussion, the majority of the board
concluded that “there should be no limitation on the expression of views.” 175 They voted to adopt
Hays’s statement and authorized transmission of the memo—along with a request for
clarification of the order—to the NLRB. 176 Significantly, the tally of the National Committee’s
votes on the majority and minority statements on employer free speech were reported to the
board at the same meeting. The majority report had received sixteen votes, and the minority
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report fifteen. Two members had counseled against any statement at all. The ACLU, it seemed,
was equally divided. 177 Baldwin subsequently circulated the statement to the National
Committee. He did not request a formal vote, because he claimed that there had been no
departure from existing ACLU policy. 178
The ACLU’s allegiances were clearly shifting in conjunction with the dispute. During
this same period, the board resolved to reach out more vigorously to “outwardly conservative
characters.” It had often been criticized for the disproportionate representation of radicals among
its members, and it decided to address the imbalance at last. 179 As part of this effort, it invited
Grenville Clark, chair of the ABA’s Committee on the Bill of Rights, to join the ACLU board.
Clark declined but promised to steer toward the organization “a number of men whom we all feel
would be desirable.” 180 The board was increasingly willing to chastise New Dealers for civil
liberties abuses. When Sherman Minton’s Senate committee ordered tax returns from the
Treasury Department for corporations under investigation, the ACLU wrote him a public letter in
protest for acting in a manner “out of line with the spirit, if not the letter, of our Constitution.” 181
These maneuvers were a stinging rebuke to the leftists and labor advocates on the ACLU
board. Soon after Hays’s statement was adopted, Baldwin sent the Ford memo to J. Warren
Madden in keeping with the board’s instructions. In language suggesting that he was relaying the
opinion of others rather than his own views, Baldwin told Madden that “an organization
concerned with the issues of free speech must necessarily take note of the charges made by
employers that in the administration of the National Labor Relations Act their rights of
177
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expression are curtailed.” 182 The no-distribution provision of the board’s order, he suggested,
would “create an unfortunate precedent” if upheld by the Court of Appeals, because it would
continue to apply even if Ford ceased all coercive conduct. “We assume,” Baldwin said, that the
Board intended only to prohibit language that is “coercive in effect” and that it had concluded, in
light of the context, that all of Ford’s statements was coercive. But he hoped that the NLRB
would clarify its order to accommodate this “comparatively minor distinction.”
Unsurprisingly, Madden was not mollified by Baldwin’s efforts to minimize the effect of
the ACLU’s position. He knew that the effect of the ACLU board’s decision would be to
embarrass the NLRB and provide ammunition not just to the Ford Motor Company, but to all of
the Wagner Act’s detractors. Madden claimed with a touch of defensiveness that no other
organization had done more to protect the rights of free speech and free assembly during the
period of its existence than the NLRB. 183 He insisted that he and his colleagues were fully alert
to the importance of free speech, and that employers were at liberty to speak publicly in any
manner they chose. They were limited only in conversation with their employees, “in which
their economic position gives them peculiar power.” Madden took issue with the ACLU’s
assumption that expressions of opinion are necessarily non-coercive. Indeed, he reported to
Baldwin on the Board’s experience “that anti-union statements made by employers directly to
employees, even though stated in the form of expression of opinion, are normally coercive per
se.” 184 However an employer conveyed its disapproval of unions, the message was that
employees who joined would be subject to discharge or discrimination. In Madden’s view, “any
attempted distinction in our orders between ‘coercive language’ and ‘expressions of opinion’ not
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only would draw a line where none in fact exists but would go far to defeat the whole purpose of
the National Labor Relations Act.”
The pro-labor faction of the ACLU was outraged by the organization’s criticism of the
NLRB. Harry Ward had been ill the evening of the special meeting, and he was unable to attend.
When he heard what had happened, he immediately sought reconsideration of the board’s
position, and he offered a substitute statement on the case. Where Hays had distinguished
between opinion and coercion, Ward wanted the analysis to turn on the overall “course of
conduct of an employer.” 185 An employer engaged in the sort of anti-labor activity practiced by
the Ford Motor Company could be constrained in its expression, whereas an employer that had
negotiated willingly with a union and had acted lawfully in all other respects would be free to
make its opinion of unions known. These were distinct theories, and Ward’s was clearly
friendlier to the NLRB. For their part, the proponents of employer free speech accused the labor
advocates of split loyalties. R.W. Riis thought the release of the statement adopted by the ACLU
board would “do the ACLU an incalculable amount of good” in convincing skeptics that the
organization was dispassionately committed to the civil liberties cause. True, it might harm the
NLRB, but “as between the ACLU or the NLRB, our decision seems simple as childhood and
clear as day.” 186
For another two months, the board remained hopelessly divided. Madden asked the
ACLU to reconsider its position, and the board complied by inviting NLRB counsel Charles
Fahy to attend one of its meetings (Riis tellingly told Baldwin that he “hate[d] to miss a meeting
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these days, lest the NLRB take over the [ACLU] Board”). 187 Fahy did not manage to persuade
the majority, however, and in late April, Baldwin reported that the ACLU was reaffirming its
original position. 188 Madden, in turn, was equally firm. Throughout the spring, Baldwin urged
minor revisions in the wording of the Board’s order. When the NLRB announced its intent to
withdraw its order for further consideration, Baldwin tried to convince Madden to take the
ACLU memorandum into account in formulating its revisions. 189 Madden responded by stating
that the NLRB was clearly without authority to prohibit language that did not “interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization and collective
bargaining,” and that any clarification that the order was intended to prohibit only coercive
communications would be superfluous. 190 The only accommodation that he offered the ACLU
was an opportunity to be heard before the Board if the case was in fact withdrawn and
reargued. 191
Meanwhile, Harry Ward continued to advocate revision of the ACLU’s statement. He
argued that the board had misconceived the true tension in the Ford case, which represented a
conflict not between civil liberties and majoritarian policy, but rather between two competing
civil liberties: the right to free speech, and the right to join a union. To Ward, the latter deserved
more deference as a matter of law as well as “social necessity.” 192 He dismissed the comparison
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to political speech as inapposite, because an employer “uses words in organic relationship to his
use of coercion and violence.” It was possible to advocate assassination without incitement to it,
but the employer who inveighed against unions, even without direct threat or violent act, was
using words “as part of a planned course of conduct in violation of labor’s rights and in defiance
of the law.” If the anti-labor faction thought that Ward was acting as a partisan of labor, Ward
thought that his detractors were acting out of a misguided desire to prove the ACLU’s
neutrality, 193 and he threatened to voice his opposition publicly in a dissenting opinion if the
board persisted in its views. 194
R. W. Riis objected to reopening discussion on what he considered to be a settled matter
that had been more than amply discussed. 195 He also demurred on ideological grounds.
Adopting what had become a familiar line, he argued that “today’s error may be tomorrow’s
truth” and insisted that “since man first emerged from protoplasm, he has progressed in
accordance as his thought has been free.” Ward’s memo reduced freedom of expression to a
political and economic instrument, he complained, and it was incompatible with the agenda of
the ACLU. “To say that the right to join a labor union is the greatest of all the civil rights is to
bare a crusading partisanship for labor unions. That is right enough in its place. Its place is not
the Civil Liberties Union.” Harold Fey, another board member, expressed similar views. For the
first time, he said, he was unsure whether he would remain active in the organization. 196
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Finally, at the end of the month, the Committee on Labor’s Rights recommended
adopting Ward’s proposed statement as an addendum to the original. 197 In a desperate ploy to
preserve organizational unity, it declared that there was “no substantial difference” between the
two statements except in “points of emphasis.” At the following board meeting, the moderates
agreed to delete from the first statement a paragraph pledging the ACLU to further action. It also
adopted the committee’s recommendation and issued Ward’s report as a supplemental statement.
For many members of the ACLU, the statement went too far in protecting employers’ anti-union
utterances; for many others, it was not far enough. 198 For the time being, the board chose to
gloss over fundamental differences to preserve a measure of organizational peace. 199
The truce held for the summer months. 200 In September, the Committee on Civil Rights
in Labor Relations took up the Muskin Shoe Company case, 201 a case involving industrial
espionage and clear-cut discharge for union activity as well as the distribution of anti-union
pamphlets. The board accepted the committee’s conclusion that the literature distribution was
“so colored by the whole factual setting of employer coercion that it may properly be considered
coercive.” The same reasoning applied in the Mock-Judson-Voehringer Company case, in which
197
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the company distributed materials critical of the CIO. 202 The ACLU stressed that the Board had
taken the employer’s anti-union literature into account in finding an unlawful course of conduct,
but it had not prohibited future dissemination of literature in either case. 203 A public statement
reported that the ACLU had concluded, after exhaustive study, that “no violations of employers’
‘rights of free speech’ [were] involved” in either case. 204 When one former board member
complained, Baldwin replied that there was no reconciling the absolutist view “that employers
should be allowed to carry on anti-union activity until overt acts are committed and the view
shared by most members of our Board that the test of coercion is valid.” 205
Subsequent NLRB cases, however, impinged more boldly on employer speech, and the
shaky equilibrium in the board soon began to break down. In October, Baldwin sent Nathan
Greene a copy of the Labor Relations Report, with a notice of a Court of Appeals decision
refusing to enforce an NLRB order. Superintendents of the employer, Union Pacific Stages, had
told employees that union membership was not advantageous. The Ninth Circuit found that
there was no substantial evidence of discharge for union membership, and thus there was no
adequate ground for prohibiting employer speech. 206 “The right of workers to organize freely
must be conceded,” the court explained. “It is a natural right of equal rank with the great right of
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free speech, protected by the Constitution. But the right of the workers to organize is not
destroyed by expressions of opinion of the employer or employees, such as referred to above.”
Union Pacific Stages was the first federal court decision on employer speech under the NLRA,
and Baldwin thought it warranted favorable ACLU comment. 207 Greene disagreed. He felt that
the case involved the typical acts of employer interference and discriminatory discharge, and
while the court had reversed the Board’s findings of facts, the NLRB had relied on them in
formulating their order. There was no way to predict how the Board would have construed an
anti-union statement standing on its own, and he therefore recommended withholding
comment. 208 Despite Greene’s opinion, the board concluded that further investigation was
warranted. 209
In early cases, including Ford, employers’ clearly abusive conduct had rendered a precise
definition of coercion unnecessary. When the NLRB curtailed the expression of employers
whose interference with organizing was less flagrant, the ACLU’s initial theory became less
plausible. Increasingly, it seemed that the Board was implementing Madden’s notion of
employer communications to employees as coercive per se. The Wagner Act, as NLRB member
Edwin Smith explained, was meant to ensure “that the working population may attain a fuller life
within the framework of the democratic state.” In Smith’s view, that goal justified the
occasional curtailment of existing rights. Indeed, the NLRA was “frankly predicated on the
proposition that the employer must give up a number of important rights, in order that rights of
his employees, which the Congress and the courts have found deserving of public protection,
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may not be impaired.” 210 For Smith and Madden, the abrogation of an employer’s right to
communicate with employees was no different from the right to hire and fire at will. Both had
been protected by the Constitution as interpreted by the federal courts, and both were expendable
in the interest of social progress.
For the ACLU, the calculation was much more complicated. Free speech was not simply
one among many attributes of democracy, subject to balancing in the interest of social progress.
Certainly, there was a time in the 1920s when such an interpretation might have been possible—
when “free speech” was a component of “civil liberties,” not its core value. That moment,
however, had long since passed. The ACLU could no longer claim, like the NLRB, that a frank
denial of free speech was necessary to counteract inequalities of bargaining power in the
employer-employee relationship. It was left with an unstable compromise, a distinction between
coercion and opinion that seemed bound to collapse. For the first time, the right to speak without
state interference was fundamentally incompatible with the best interests of labor. The
organization was trying to maintain its underlying commitment to the rights of labor to agitate—
to challenge the existing allocation of resources, and with it the basic social structure—while
preserving a neutral right of expression as a political tool. Eventually, the ACLU would have to
choose.

Ford in the Courts
When the Supreme Court handed down its decision on the procedural issue in the Ford
case in January 1939, the NLRB was under attack. 211 In the 1938 Democratic primaries, anti-
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New Deal candidates overwhelmingly defeated Roosevelt’s supporters, and the general elections
swept almost one hundred Republican candidates into Congress and many more into state and
local office. Frank Murphy, the Michigan governor whose conduct during the sit-down strikes
had invigorated the UAW (and who would soon be appointed Attorney General 212), suffered a
stinging defeat. 213
In early 1939, a congressional coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats
introduced a host of amendments designed to curb the authority of the NLRB. Some commanded
considerable support. The most notable was a set of amendments proposed by Senator Walsh
with the backing of the AFL. Walsh’s amendments addressed such familiar concerns as the
separate certification of craft workers. Others more directly favored employers. For example,
one would have allowed an employer to call an election independently, and another provided for
more robust judicial review. This time, the ACLU paused to consider the issue. Arthur Garfield
Hays convened a committee to study quasi-judicial boards. 214 He agreed with the Committee on
Civil Rights in Labor Relations that it was unadvisable to single out the NLRB for special
requirements. He nonetheless thought the time had come for the ACLU to make a general
declaration of policy on the subject of procedure before government boards. 215 Hays lamented
the growing trend toward “trial by commissions,” and he believed that citizens should have the
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justice.”).
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same protections before commissions as before the courts. Although he acknowledged the cost
and inconvenience of modifying the existing system, he felt that “practically these commissions
amount to a censorship on business, which is just as bad as a censorship over literature.”
One of Senator Walsh’s suggestions demanded particular attention: a provision
guaranteeing an employer’s right to free speech. The free speech amendment capitalized on
liberal disquiet over the free press cases, Union Pacific Stages, and, of course, Ford v. NLRB.
The testimony of J. Warren Madden before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor only
exacerbated matters. It was clear from Madden’s testimony that the NLRB’s interpretation of
coercive speech was far broader than that of the liberal establishment. Madden told the
committee than an anti-union statement made by an employer to a longstanding union, with
which it had negotiated over time, might not constitute coercion. On the other hand, “those same
expressions in a situation where the union was new and timid and where you had a history of
anti-union attitude on the part of the employer” probably would. 216 Ohio Senator Robert Taft, a
Republican, pointed out that Madden’s distinction effectively meant that “you could call an
A.F.L. union anything, but you cannot call a C.I.O. union anything”—an implication that
Madden acknowledged but considered an irrelevant historical accident. Madden further
suggested that under most circumstances an employer’s accurate statement that the leaders of a
union were communists would constitute coercion, because an employee would assume the
organization would be ill regarded and would therefore be unlikely to join. “The fact that it is
true,” he insisted, “does not keep it from being coercive.” Citing labor injunctions, he argued that
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“there is no privilege against being enjoined from telling the truth if you state it at such times or
under such circumstances that you destroy somebody else’s rights.” 217
Unsurprisingly, the ACLU was not willing to endorse Madden’s reasoning, which
threatened to undercut a decade of civil liberties gains. The day after Madden testified, John
Haynes Holmes wrote Baldwin to complain. “I see that Brother Madden, of the NLRB, is
testifying that it is against the law for an employer to tell his employees that a Union
representative is a Communist, even though he is a Communist,” he said. If Madden’s
interpretation was correct, Holmes felt that the Wagner Act should be amended to conform with
the Bill of Rights. If Madden was wrong, Holmes considered him unfit to continue in his
capacity as chair of the NLRB. Either way, he insisted, “this is business for our Board.” 218 And
for the first time, the board was significantly divided on the desirability of amending the
NLRA. 219 Just over a month before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Hague v. CIO,
Hays wrote to Lee Pressman, CIO General Counsel, for his assessment of the free speech
amendment. Pressman told him that the CIO was “violently opposed.” Like Madden, Pressman
was convinced that “mere expression” of an employer’s distaste for unionism was “tantamount
to a threat of discharge.” 220 Hays was evidently unconvinced, and he told the board that the Ford
case had demonstrated the necessity for an amendment like the one Walsh had proposed. 221
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The ACLU finally opposed the free speech amendment, along with the other
amendments, as “either unnecessary or dangerous to the fundamental purpose of the act.” 222 The
organization did not, however, endorse the NLRB’s position on employer speech. In formulating
its position on the Wagner Act amendments, the ACLU billed its criticism of the NLRB’s order
in the Ford case as a compromise. The organization would not bow to the anti-NLRB hysteria,
but neither would it defer without qualification to every NLRB decision. In fact, the Ford case
was a perfect opportunity to test its theory that existing limitations on the Board’s authority were
adequate. The ACLU would ask the NLRB to modify its order to comport with constitutional
concerns. 223 If it proved unwilling to do so, the federal courts would serve as an adequate check.
Thus in January 1939, when the NLRB issued an order setting aside its original findings,
Baldwin wrote to Madden to reintroduce the ACLU’s now familiar free speech concern. 224 A
return letter indicated that the Board was now acting in its judicial capacity and would no longer
consider informal communications. The ACLU would be free, however, to file a brief setting
forth its views. 225 The ACLU board was satisfied with this option, and Hays suggested
redrafting its letters and memoranda in brief form. Meanwhile, in late January, the NLRB issued
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a proposed order in the case. 226 The new order was practically identical to the original. A Ford
press release noted that the “Board ha[d] copied word for word the report which it previously
withdrew, except for minor changes in the parts of the report and proposed order which
prohibited Henry Ford and the Ford Motor Company from making statements ‘criticizing or
disparaging’ any labor organizations, [which] were subject to severe criticism from many
sources, including a stinging rebuke from the Civil Liberties Union.” 227 In the earlier version,
the Board had required Ford to cease and desist from the dissemination of anti-union views. In
the revised order, this clause was slightly qualified; the Board prohibited the Company from
“interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act” by engaging in the communications it had previously proscribed
In effect, the NLRB had done precisely what Greene and Wald had advised it to do: it
had implicitly limited its prohibition to communications that interfered with employees’ rights
under the NLRA. ACLU staff counsel Jerome Britchey therefore concluded that the new
wording “cure[d] one of the defects we had in mind when we objected to the order.” 228 He noted,
however, that the NLRB’s intention was ambiguous. It was unclear whether the Board would
construe mere expressions of opinion as permissible, or rather consider all anti-union
communications to fall within the qualifying clause, as its public statements had suggested.
The two camps within the ACLU had never been farther apart. Greene believed the
clarification fully addressed the ACLU’s earlier concerns and thought it “would be tragic to
contend otherwise.” 229 Hays, on the other hand, thought it was time for the ACLU to take a
more aggressive stand. He told the board: “I think we must take the position that an expression
226
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of opinion is lawful under any and all circumstances.” 230 He acknowledged the difficulty in
certain cases of distinguishing between opinion and veiled threat, but he considered that to be the
only question for the NLRB to decide. If the ACLU had previously suggested that expression of
opinion could be curtailed when it was accompanied by unlawful acts, it had been mistaken. “It
isn’t the opinion that is unlawful,” he insisted, “it is the acts.” Mere speech should never be
subject to punishment or prohibition. In response, Ward reiterated his earlier distinction between
expression by an employer in the workplace and expression by a speaker in a public forum. In
his view, an employer’s words themselves were the conduct forbidden by the law. 231
The board rejected Hays’s absolutist position and, for the time being, adhered roughly to
the parameters of its two earlier statements. The leftists on the board sought to ensure that Hays
would not inject his own views into the ACLU’s official communications. Although the NLRB
had invited the ACLU to defend its views in oral argument, they refused to endorse Hays’s
appearance. 232 They also insisted that a neutral party be assigned to draft the brief, and Osmond
Fraenkel was selected for the job. Fraenkel sought to hew as closely as possible to the 1938
memoranda. In April, shortly before the brief was due, 233 Britchey circulated Fraenkel’s brief,
Hays’s letter in opposition, and Ward’s comments. “The whole problem,” he explained, “boils
down to this: which of the two views follows more closely the position we took in the original
Ford order.” 234
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In the end, the ACLU filed its brief, signed by Fraenkel and Walter Frank, while Hays
was abroad. 235 The final version urged the NLRB to rephrase its order to forbid only those
communications that “interfere with or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights.” The
brief opened by declaring the ACLU’s belief that “all groups in the community” were entitled to
free speech, “be they powerful or weak,” employers or employees. According to Fraenkel and
Frank, employer speech could be punished only when the speech in itself was coercive or when
its relation to other unlawful acts produced a coercive effect. 236 Although the Board’s order did
connect the proscribed propaganda to the interference with employee rights, it did not
specifically limit the prohibition to coercive materials, nor was it clear whether the prohibition
would continue once the company ceased commission of other unlawful acts. 237 In its most
concrete gesture toward clarification of its position, the brief contended (citing DeJonge 238) that
a statement must be “in fact intimidatory” to justify curtailment consistent with constitutional
rights, implicitly repudiating the NLRB’s assumption that employer speech was inherently
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coercive. 239 In concluding, however, Fraenkel and Frank once again hedged. “There can be
little doubt that in the setting of this particular case, distribution of anti-union literature would
constitute an unfair labor practice so long as any of the other practices referred to in the order
continued,” they claimed. Nonetheless, given the lapse of nearly two years since the Ford
proceedings had begun, “it would hardly seem appropriate to bar the Ford Company from the
distribution of non-coercive anti-union literature if its other acts of hostility toward the union had
completely ceased.” The ACLU announced its conclusion in the same press release in which it
stated its continued opposition to amendment of the NLRA. 240 The brief’s timid chastisement of
the NLRB was enough for the New York Times to proclaim, “Liberties Union Again Aids
Ford.” 241
Fraenkel’s and Frank’s brief was the last ACLU statement on the matter until the NLRB
issued its final order in the fall. In the meantime, the Ford Motor Company refined its strategy
for the case. In March 1939, Ford’s attorneys filed a motion to reopen the record and introduce
additional evidence, but their motion was denied. In April, when the ACLU submitted its amicus
brief, Ford submitted a brief of its own. Ford continued to pursue its arguments about sit-down
strikes and the partiality of the NLRB, but it focused on free speech.
In various memoranda and draft briefs, Ford’s attorneys assembled a mass of case law
and legislative history in support of its position.242 Their primary obstacle in this department
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was, appropriately enough, the body of pro-industry labor injunction cases that had plagued labor
for so many years. 243 Notably, they did not assume that pre-1937 cases hostile to labor speech
and picketing had been overruled. Rather, they sought to distinguish these cases or fit them to the
facts of the Ford case. One memorandum, for example, concluded that advice was
constitutionally protected as long as the speaker did not interfere with the hearer’s “free right to
choose” whether to comply, a test with obvious limiting implications for employer speech.
Ford’s attorneys also worried about the question of corporate personhood, which the ACLU
seems never to have considered. 244 The most immediate cause for concern was Justice Harlan
Fiske Stone’s opinion in the Hague case, in which Justice Stone had assumed (citing
Northwestern Life Insurance v. Riggs and Western Turf Association v. Greenberg) that the
ACLU could not be “said to be deprived of the civil right of freedom of speech and of assembly,
for the liberty guaranteed by the due process clause is the liberty of natural, not artificial
persons.” 245
In all of its internal documents and in its communications to the NLRB, Ford quoted
frequently and fervently from the free speech decisions that the ACLU had fought so hard to
promote and defend. One memorandum declared that “the nearest approximation to truth is
arrived at by the clashing against each other of rival theories.” It then explained that employers
Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930), and noting that while the Railway Labor Act
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were the most motivated to formulate arguments against organized labor, and they consequently
made the “most effective cross-examiners of the proponents of labor unions.” To prevent the
expression of their opinions would be to impoverish the marketplace of ideas. 246
After several months of deliberation, the NLRB issued its final order in the Ford case in
August 1939. In it, the Board eliminated its earlier finding that Ford Motor Company had
“deliberately planned and carried out” the Battle of the Overpass to crush unionization in the
plant. On the free speech issue, however, the new order was virtually unchanged from the
January order or the original of December 1937. 247 In a press release, the NLRB noted public
concerns about employer free speech but explained that the company’s circulation of literature
had to be considered in context.248 “Coming at a time when the U.A.W. was conducting a drive
to organize the respondent’s employees,” the Board concluded, “the publications had the
unmistakable purpose and effect of warning employees that they should refrain from joining the
union.” Ford’s statements denounced labor organizations and characterized their leaders as liars
and racketeers. Under the circumstances, they were not “directed to the reason of the employee.”
On the contrary, “no employee could fail to understand that if he disregarded the warning he
might find himself in difficulties with his employer.” The publications signaled to employees
that joining a union likely would result in discrimination or discharge, and at the least would lead
the employer to regard them as gullible and foolish. “The employees could not fail to believe
that in matters of promotion or selection of men for lay-offs, such an opinion would have
weight.”
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Responses to the decision within the ACLU fell along predictable lines, 249 though an air
of resignation had settled on both camps. Green assumed that “those who quarreled with the
proposed order [would] quarrel with this one,” and he also predicted a strong attack in the
courts. 250 Fraenkel thought the Board’s contextualization of Ford’s literature distribution took
the “sting out of our objection” by clarifying that the Board was concerned only with
communications that were coercive in intent and effect. 251 The Committee on Civil Rights in
Labor Relations voted not to object to confirmation of the order in the Sixth Circuit and
authorized Fraenkel to prepare a report to distribute to the press. 252
The draft report recounted the ACLU’s earlier suggestion that the Board rephrase its
order to bar only employer statements that operated to deprive employees of their rights.
Although the Board had not adopted the ACLU’s recommendation, it had indicated its intention
to interpret the language of the order to apply only to coercive speech. 253 That was good enough
to render the order consistent with the Constitution. The report concluded by stating that if Ford
had “faithfully obeyed the provisions of the order and complied with the spirit of the National
Labor Relations Act, it, like any other employer, should remain free to state to its employees its
opinion concerning labor unions or any other relevant subjects.” 254 With that proviso, the ACLU
board voted to adopt the committee’s report, over John Haynes Holmes’s dissent. Much of the
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discussion centered on the statement that the ACLU would “vigorously protest” and offer to
come to Ford’s assistance if the Board attempted to punish the company for non-coercive
expression, a statement that the labor contingent thought superfluous 255 and the absolutists
considered empty verbiage. 256 The board ultimately struck it out, 257 but a promise to scrutinize
all efforts by the NLRB to enforce its order stayed in. At the end of the month, the ACLU
released a public statement explaining its position and its decision not to a file a brief. 258
Meanwhile, the NLRB once again filed for enforcement of its order in the Sixth
Circuit. 259 In response, Ford made all the familiar arguments: the Trial Examiner was biased,
partisan, and abusive, thereby depriving Ford of a full and fair hearing; the Board erroneously
failed to consider the facts and circumstances leading up to the May 26 clash; the
decisionmaking process was procedurally flawed; and the Board’s findings of facts were
insufficient to support its order and unsupported by the evidence. 260 It also fully briefed its First
Amendment argument—namely, that the limitations imposed by the Board on the Ford
Company’s right to distribute anti-union literature were not authorized by the NLRA, and that
the act, if construed to permit them, would violate the First Amendment.
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Ford rejected the NLRB’s contention that the introductory clause in its order prohibiting
literature distribution satisfied constitutional requirements. It argued that the proposed
construction was inconsistent with the rules of interpretation and with the Board’s public
position that anti-union communications from employers to employees were coercive on their
own terms. 261 Moreover, Ford argued that the general climate at the River Rouge plant was not
in fact coercive. Only eight of the employees purportedly discharged for union activities were
there at the time the literature was circulated, and there was no evidence that their discharges or
the reasons for them were widely known in the plant. “To give the literature circulated by
respondent—not in itself of an intimidatory or coercive nature—the character of intimidation and
coercion because of the effect on the readers’ minds of extraneous facts, it must be shown that
those facts were known to the readers. There is no such showing.” 262
According to Ford, suppression of an employer’s opinion as to the merits of unionization
was never contemplated by the NLRA. In discussing the bill, Senator Walsh had stated that
nothing in the act would prevent an employer from expressing anti-union sentiments. 263 Ford’s
lawyers made much of international events, of “current history in other countries,” which pointed
to the importance of the vigorous protection of First Amendment principles. 264 “It is not difficult
to prophesy,” they declared ominously, “that if ever, at some unhappy time in the future, citizens
of this country are prosecuted for expressing beliefs contrary to those held by the government of
the day, the leaders of that government will seek to justify themselves by the very statement
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which the Board has made.” 265 “There are no qualifications whatever to the provisions of the
First Amendment,” they emphasized, in language that would have bewildered labor lawyers two
decades earlier. Citing Lovell v. City of Griffin and Schneider v. New Jersey, they celebrated the
important place of pamphleteering in American history and culture, a practice that the Supreme
Court had declared “vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.” 266 The Board’s order,
they cautioned, amounted to a prior restraint on utterance and threatened the heart of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech.
The Board, in turn, found itself in the unlikely situation of defending the curtailment of
free speech by relying on the cases that had haunted labor for generations. It invoked the “verbal
act” cases in the Schenck line, as well as Gompers v. Bucks Stove. 267 In arguing that freedom of
speech for employers should be no greater than that afforded employees, they risked
undercutting the tremendous gains secured for labor speech in the past decade. Ford’s attorneys
appreciated the irony. “It is generally admitted that those cases went too far in restraining
legitimate union activities,” they reasoned, “and it is surprising to find the Board arguing, in
effect, that past injustices to unions should now be matched by corresponding injustices to
employers.” 268 They pointed to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Senn v. Tile Layers
Protective Union, the first in an unfolding line of cases reversing the earlier judicial
understanding. Earlier courts had resisted legislative efforts to protect labor speech, enjoining
pickets and boycotts and trampling on the First Amendment in the process. Now, Ford was
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asking the court to undercut legislative protection for labor once again, only this time by
invoking free speech.
The irony must have been as distressing and confusing to labor advocates as it was to the
ACLU. The reversal of opinions in these cases is, of course, standard fare for legal argument. It
is a neat corollary to the ACLU’s own appropriation of constitutional language at the outset of
World War I, at a time when individual rights and personal liberty were watchwords of labor’s
oppression. In the Ford case, however, the shift in positions indicated something more than the
malleability of lawyers. It reflected a fundamental realignment in the relationship of various
American constituencies to the courts, the Constitution, and the state.

The Communist Purge
In its statement on the NLRB’s revised order in the Ford case, the ACLU had only
forestalled the inevitable. Within a matter of months, the temporary calm within the organization
erupted into full-fledged crisis, culminating in the expulsion of Communists from the ACLU’s
board of directors and the resignations of Harry Ward and many other longstanding leaders and
members of the ACLU.
The controversy over employer free speech was crucial to the conflict, though it was not
the only source. The Soviet-Nazi pact, and the corresponding deterioration in relations between
American Communists and their liberal allies, was a crushing blow to many Soviet sympathizers,
including Roger Baldwin. In the wake of the agreement, the board’s centrists became
increasingly suspicious of Communist influence. 269 In addition, the board divided over the
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House Committee Investigating Un-American Activities, chaired by Representative Martin Dies,
Jr., a Texas Democrat. The Dies Committee was directed toward foreign subversive activity in
the United States, including Nazi propaganda, but in practice it focused on alleged Communist
collaboration (including the CIO’s and the NLRB’s), prompting a wave of anti-Communist
hysteria and passage of the Smith Act, the nation’s first peacetime sedition law. The Dies
Committee was in the process of scrutinizing many members of the ACLU board, along with the
Popular Front organizations to which they belonged. The most notable victim was Harry Ward,
who was serving concurrently as chair of the American League of Peace and Democracy; after
he testified before the Dies Committee on behalf of the American League, many members of the
ACLU’s leadership demanded his resignation. Among them was Norman Thomas, who charged
in The Call that Ward was one of “six or seven Communists or fellow travelers” on the ACLU
board and cautioned that “men and women of ordinary common sense should not entrust the
defense of civil liberties in America to those who condone or fail to denounce Stalin’s purges
and his crimes against decency and humanity.” 270
On the other side, the leftists accused Morris Ernst and Arthur Garfield Hays, among
others, of striking a deal with Martin Dies to forestall an investigation of the ACLU (and, in
Ernst’s case, the National Lawyers Guild as well). 271 In October, Dies publicly absolved the
Fascism”—since the Soviet-Nazi pact). Critics responded that the Soviet Union’s policy toward civil liberties had
not changed—that it was just as bad before the Nazi-Soviet pact as after. Open letter to Roger Baldwin, 16 March
1940, ACLU Papers, box 74, folder 11. During her expulsion proceedings, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn claimed that the
Communist Party had not altered its position on civil liberties in America since the pact, and had in fact been
compelled to fight all the harder for civil liberties.” Expulsion Proceedings, 127, May 1940, ACLU Papers, box 74,
folder 2. Baldwin, however, believed that “after the Nazi-Soviet pact Communist policy underwent a sharp change
internationally, and here—in abandoning the united front for democracy, the fight against Fascism, and in launching
a crusade against ‘the enemies in London, Paris and Washington.’” Roger Baldwin to John Frank, University of
Wisconsin Law School, 10 June 1940, ACLU Papers, box 75, folder 8. He added, “All of us became uneasy over
what the shifts in policy under Soviet dictation might do—and no Communist on our Board would have been free or
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ACLU of Communist collaboration; whether he received anything in turn was the subject of
intense speculation for decades. 272 Certainly, the ACLU board’s official criticism of the Dies
Committee was half-hearted and equivocal. What the moderates considered “pragmatic
liberalism” or “political realism,” the radicals denounced as hypocrisy. 273
After months of mounting tension at ACLU board meetings—depending on who was
present, slim majorities would alternately pass and rescind anti-Communist statements 274—the
board passed (and the National Committee approved) its notorious “1940 Resolution” in
February. 275 The resolution affirmed that the ACLU would “defend[] the right to hold and utter
any opinions” and would not disqualify general members on the basis of “political or economic
questions.” 276 For the governing committees and staff, however, it established a “test of
consistency in the defense of civil liberties in all aspects and all places,” and it presumed that the
requisite consistency was “inevitably comprised by persons who . . . justify or tolerate the denial
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Ernst, 29 December 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, President’s Personal File 2841,
Ernest [sic], Morris L., 1935–1941 (“Even though I have seen you since the election, I still want to send you this
little note to tell you again how grateful I am to you and Mrs. Ernst for all that you did during the campaign. I
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job.”); John Haynes Holmes to Eleanor Roosevelt, 21 February 1950, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, 1942–1952,
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., Amer.
Assoc–Amer. Heritage, Box 1522. Ernst reported on political rumors and important developments in the United
States and abroad (for example, he may have been the first person to make Roosevelt aware of the Beveridge
report). He also recommended proposals of his own, ranging from mandatory reporting of union financial
operations to annual employment contracts. The President routinely considered and occasionally acted on Ernst’s
suggestions. Grace G. Tully, Private Secretary, to Morris Ernst, 12 December 1942, Ernst Papers, box 97, folder 2
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of civil liberties by dictatorship abroad.” It therefore excluded from leadership positions any
member of a political organization “which supports totalitarian dictatorship in any country” or
any person who publicly indicated “support of such a principle.” 277 In justifying the new
measure, the board cited internal criticism of Communist influence, which had prompted several
resignations during the fall of 1939. 278 The resolution was an effort to “create greater harmony”
by clarifying existing ACLU policy. 279
Despite the board’s ambition, the members and supporters of the ACLU immediately
erupted into bitter debate. In a move welcomed by the resolution’s authors, Harry Ward—
lamenting that “the Civil Liberties Union which did this is not the Civil Liberties Union with
which I have been glad to work for twenty years”—resigned as chair. 280 Seventeen prominent
liberals, eight of whom were not members of the organization, demanded in an open letter that
ACLU “restore civil liberties” by rescinding the resolution. 281 More than thirty members
resigned, while others joined or made contributions. The most active local committees
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condemned the resolution or considered it unnecessary; only one approved. 282 As for the
ACLU’s broader audience, the Union insisted that the decision was not a concession to outside
pressure. There was not, it claimed, “the slightest desire to become ‘respectable’ to
conservatives.” 283 Still, there was “no question but that the Union ha[d] been greatly
strengthened in public opinion by this action,” as the “unanimous and strongly worded approval
of newspapers in editorial comment throughout the country” (the radical press excepted) had
clearly revealed. 284 Opponents of the resolution could not help but notice an April memorandum
from the chair of the ACLU’s Membership Advisory Committee: “This seems the ideal time to
promote our old plan to increase the membership of the Union. The organization has never been
more highly regarded by the press and public than now, and a determined effort will bring us
declared adherents in larger numbers and contributions in larger volume than at any period in our
twenty years.” 285
If the February resolution was contentious, the board’s enforcement of its terms—its
expulsion of its one openly Communist member—was a declaration of war. 286 Elizabeth Gurley
Flynn was a founding member of the ACLU. As she angrily reminded the board, she had been a
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“consistent military fighter” for civil liberties ever since her IWW days and the Spokane free
speech fight. For almost three decades, she had argued unflinchingly for the rights of dissenters;
during that period, the organization’s conservatives had never once “been in jail for free
speech.” 287
Until the mid-1930s, Flynn had difficulty finding a political home. She had belonged
briefly to the Socialist Party and to the Workers Party, but she professed quarrels with their
platforms. In 1934, when asked what party “most clearly represent[d her] political and economic
beliefs,” she gave two answers: the I.W.W. and the American Communist Party, “not controlled
by Stalin.” 288 Despite her reservations about a policy dictated by Moscow, she joined the
Communist Party in February 1937, and in the summer of 1938, she became a member of its
National Committee. 289 She was nonetheless reelected to the ACLU board in 1939, after
inquiring whether there was any objection to her membership in the Communist Party.
According to the board, those were different times.
Flynn was vehemently opposed to the board’s new policy, and after its passage, she
refused to resign. In the New Masses, she echoed Ward’s view that the ACLU had changed. She
described a “steady infiltration of new elements”—including lawyers, businessmen, and
ministers, “but not a single representative of organized labor”—“wealthy people” who were
“actually out of sympathy with the traditional position of the ACLU.” Flynn thought the attack
on the Communists was symptomatic of an “anti-labor, anti-union attitude.” It was entirely in
keeping with “the Union’s constant sniping at the labor Relations Board,” its opposition to the
sit-down strike, and “its persistent and unsolicited defense of Henry Ford’s ‘right of free
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speech.’” 290 Flynn dismissed as “metaphysic[al]” her critics’ contention that she believed in civil
liberties not “in a vacuum of pristine purity, but as a means to an end.” In Flynn’s view, it was
precisely those members who were “must pure in their own estimation on the abstractions” who
were most willing to compromise on the “practical issues, especially where labor is
concerned.” 291
On May 7, 1940 (the proceeding was postponed several weeks in light of the death of
Flynn’s only son), the ACLU’s board of directors convened proceedings to expel Flynn from its
governing body. The controversy, the anti-Communists openly conceded, was not about Flynn.
No one questioned her personal loyalty to the civil liberties cause. Rather, she was a “symbol”
of a struggle to define the Union’s “whole attitude toward collaboration with Communists in
defense of civil liberties, both inside and outside the Union.” 292 At 2:20 in the morning, after
hours of debate over procedural matters, organizational politics, and the principles of free
speech, the board voted. Nine members (including Morris Ernst, Elmer Rice, and R. W. Riis)
favored expulsion; nine members (including Osmond Fraenkel and Arthur Garfield Hays, in
addition to the committed leftists) opposed. 293 John Haynes Holmes, as chair, broke the tie in
favor of removal. 294
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Much has been made of the intemperance of the ACLU’s purge—its inexplicable
curtailment of dissent and presumed capitulation to popular pressures in a period when
Communists were most in need of the organization’s support. In fact, Flynn’s expulsion was
regarded as such a black mark in ACLU history that in 1976 the organization posthumously
restored her membership. Baldwin, however, consistently defended the board’s decision.
Throughout his life, he argued that decisive action had been necessary to prevent the
Communists and fellow travelers within the board from standing in the way of the ACLU’s
commitment to free speech. He claimed in public statements and private letters that the new
policy was merely an affirmation of the organization’s commitment to civil liberties as an
independent principle rather than a tool.
Historians and ACLU insiders have long assumed that Baldwin’s defense was
disingenuous—that he was in fact concerned with the organization’s appearances, the Dies
Committee, fundraising efforts, the investigations and aspersions of red baiters, and other
seemingly petty concerns. However valid such criticisms may be, the crisis within the board
needs to be understood against the backdrop of conflict over employer free speech and the
NLRB. In correspondence with Alexander Meiklejohn, who staunchly opposed the resolution
and considered resigning over it, Baldwin explained that the board was at an impasse; expressly
excluding Communists was “an unhappy way out of a bad mess.” 295 John Haynes Holmes was
even more adamant. The board had been paralyzed for months by a “militant minority,” he
explained. The resolution was painful; it was difficult to “live[] up to the full dictates of the civil
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liberties principle” at the expense of “good friends.” Circumstances, however, had left the board
with no choice. 296 “For the first time in our history, we discover those among us no longer
believing in full civil liberties,” he complained. “They have themselves become so hysterical that
they are actually insisting that they can and should remain associated with us when they are no
longer primarily interested in our work—nay worse, are moved consciously or unconsciously to
oppose it, to block it, and to defeat it from within.” 297
The conventional understanding of the 1940 events is based on the modern understanding
of civil liberties as the freedom from state curtailment of expression. Historians immersed in
modern liberal culture have interpreted the board’s action as a prelude to McCarthyism, an
abandonment of the ideal of protection for all expression, no matter how distasteful. 298 They
have rejected Baldwin’s explanation that the move was primarily organizational and that the
ACLU remained fully committed to the defense of Communist speech. They have presumed, in
short, that it was the conservatives on the board who rejected a robust construction of free
speech.
Ford v. NLRB is an important corrective to this well-worn story. Above all, the expulsion
of communists needs to be understood as a fundamental shift in the underlying objectives of the
ACLU—not from the defense of all to the defense of some, as critics have long charged, but
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from the complicated calculus of the “right of agitation” to a streamlined civil libertarianism that
was blind to inequalities in the marketplace of ideas. The ACLU retained its hostility toward
state overreaching, even as the New Deal demonstrated that industrial interests were separable
from state power.
Significantly, opponents of the resolution emphasized only its tendency to curtail
debate—to exclude minority opinions that might have enriched the ACLU’s policy agenda.
Labor equality had become a viewpoint, not an objective. In broader context, such vocal critics
as Alexander Meiklejohn were not so far away from the majority as they now seem. In fact, the
only member of the board who acknowledged the ACLU’s departure from its founding
principles was Elizabeth Gurley Flynn. During the proceedings, she expressed her belief that
some of the board’s members were “in blissful ignorance of what the ACLU really stands for,”
and she blamed the veterans for failing to educate them properly. Flynn charged that those
members who were “abandoning . . . the fight for labor’s rights” did not belong on the board. 299
But by 1940, it was Flynn who no longer belonged.
Unsurprisingly, the reconfiguration of the ACLU board prompted a reevaluation of the
organization’s position on employer free speech. In January, the board rejected a
recommendation of the Committee on Civil Rights in Labor Relations and voted to protest the
NLRB’s failure to protect employer speech in a case involving anti-union communications by
the Adams Brothers Manifold Printing Company. 300 That same month, the NLRB issued an
order in conjunction with a Massachusetts case against the Ford Motor Company, in which it
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said that free speech was a “qualified” rather than absolute right. 301 John Haynes Holmes wrote
to Baldwin, “If we don’t get into this fight and carry it through to a finish, we no longer have any
mission as a civil liberties organization.” He added that it would be “be interesting to see the
reasons which our fellow-travelers cook up for supporting the NLRB.” 302 The order in the
Massachusetts case was precisely the same as in the Detroit case, but the sole basis for finding
unfair labor practices was anti-union expression by chief inspectors and supervisory officials and
surveillance by supervisory foremen. 303 There were no violent assaults, no proven attempts to
organize a company union, no discharges or demotions because of union membership. Though it
was still in the midst of internal battle, the ACLU board voted to protest the NLRB order. 304
Hays wrote to the NLRB to convey the organization’s position: “You have held in effect that the
distribution of literature to employees as such, violates their rights under the Act. In the absence
of discharges, threats of discharge or other acts of coercion, it seems to me that your Board has
construed mere language in print as coercive.” 305 That was a position that the ACLU could not
condone, and in a February press release, the ACLU announced its “strong objections” to the
NLRB’s order. 306
Despite its new vigilance in employer speech cases, there were never more than a few
conservatives in the ACLU ranks. John Haynes Holmes was a socialist. Arthur Garfield Hays
had proved his mettle in many labor battles, and he personally favored the CIO. These longtime
veterans defended anti-union speech by employers because they believed that doing so, in the
long run, would better serve to defend the rights of labor. It is therefore unsurprising that when
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the NLRA was deeply threatened, the ACLU rallied to its defense. In the summer of 1939,
Virginia Representative Howard Smith had called for a House committee investigation of the
NLRB. Public hearings commenced in December and lasted two months. The unmistakable
agenda of the hearings was to convince the American public that the CIO and NLRB were
dominated by communists. The committee’s intermediate report, issued in March 1940, alleged
that the NLRB had forced employers to sign contracts in violation of the NLRA and had acted
unconstitutionally on a regular basis. It then proposed twenty-one amendments to the Wagner
Act, ranging from the exclusion of workers in agricultural industries to procedural reforms.
Among them was the protection of employer free speech. The ACLU opposed the free speech
amendment, along with the others. It reaffirmed its commitment to defending employers’ rights,
but it declared that they were adequately protected by the Constitution and needed no additional
support in law; 307 existing mechanisms for judicial review were an adequate check on
administrative discretion. In its statement, the ACLU said that nothing in the NLRA curtailed
free speech and that “despite all the controversy there has as yet been no actual interference with
employers’ right of free speech by the NLRB.” The ACLU wanted to ensure that employers
received as much protection as the Constitution guaranteed, but no more. The amendment, by
contrast, might be construed to “giv[e] employers’ speech more protection than the speech of
others.” 308
The Smith bill never made it out of committee in the Senate, and for the time being, the
Wagner Act was spared aggressive legislative overhaul. The NLRB, however, understood that it
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would need to moderate its approach. When Madden’s term as chair expired in August 1940,
Roosevelt appointed a more conciliatory replacement, and the NLRB significantly revised its
policies and procedures to accommodate complaints by the AFL, employers, and the general
public.
Two months later, the Sixth Circuit finally issued its decision in Ford v. NLRB. 309 In its
opinion, the court took judicial notice of the wave of sit-down strikes that had swept through
Michigan between December 1936 and March 1937. It condemned the seizure of property as
illegal and noted that it had been recognized as such by the Supreme Court. 310 It accepted thenGovernor Frank Murphy’s description of the events as “the greatest industrial conflict of all
times.” And it claimed that “no one who lived through the period can ignore the terror which this
lawless labor technique imposed not only upon the automobile industry and its non-union
employees fearing loss of their jobs, but upon all employers of labor in Michigan, including
manufacturers, retail establishments, hotels, public utilities and others.” The court
acknowledged that legal remedies had been unavailable to the owners of property. Under those
circumstances, it considered Ford’s increased security to be a reasonable precaution. It
nonetheless concluded that the company’s lawful preparations were “more than adequate to repel
an attempted seizure which the approach of 50 to 75 union organizers, mostly women, might
signify even to the most fearful, as imminent.” Everett Moore, chief of Ford Service
Department, had known that a literature distribution was planned, and he told the press that while
company employees would keep their hands clean, he expected violence to occur. The opinion
did not dwell long on the “Vote of Confidence” engineered by plant supervisors as evidence of
internal opposition to the UAW. It accepted the Board’s findings that foremen had taken the
309
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badge numbers of those employees who refused to sign. On those facts, the Board was justified
in finding interference with employees’ rights under Section 7 of the NLRA.
With these preliminary matters out of the way, the court turned to “the major issue, at
least from the point of view of the public interest.” 311 Ford expected its lawyers to “win on this
point, if no other,” and it was not disappointed. 312 The court declared that “the right of
employees to organize for collective bargaining, to select representatives of their own choosing,
and to unite for concerted action in other respects, is now so clearly recognized as a fundamental
right that citation is superfluous.” But according to the court, “the right to hold views upon any
and all controversial questions, to express such views, and to disseminate them to persons who
may be interested, has even more venerable sanction.” Citing Lovell v. Griffin, the court
emphasized that the circulation of pamphlets was an important American tradition and one that
had proven effective in the dissemination of opinion. Ford Motor Company’s communications
expressed disapproval of unions, to be sure. But according to the court, they did not threaten
discharge and were therefore constitutionally protected speech.
Ironically, by securing statutory rights to employees in contravention of the common law,
the NLRA had made the NLRB’s claim about the coercive effect of employer speech untenable.
In the past, the court acknowledged, the power relations between employer and employee,
namely that of master over servant, might have given an employer’s statement disproportionate
influence. But the NLRA—upheld as constitutionally valid, strictly enforced by the NLRB, and
311
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liberally construed by the courts “so as best to effectuate its great social and economic
purpose”—belied any argument about inherent coercion in labor relations. 313 “The servant,”
declared the court, “no longer has occasion to fear the master’s frown of authority or threats of
discrimination for union activities, express or implied.” 314
The court concluded with a paean to freedom of speech. The right to speak, it insisted,
was the basis for the rights secured by the NLRA. And as such, it was protected by the First
Amendment. Invoking the Supreme Court’s decision in Hague v. CIO, it declared that “the
dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within
that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution.” 315 The court entered a decree
enforcing the Board’s order in every other important respect, 316 but it pronounced the Ford
Motor Company free to circularize its employees.

Conclusion
On June 20, 1941—four years after the Battle of the Overpass—the Ford Motor
Company signed a contract with the UAW-CIO covering 123,000 employees. Union recognition
was a condition of Ford’s settlement of all pending cases involving the UAW-CIO. 317 In the
wake of the Detroit Ford case, Ford’s attorneys had advised the company that it had won the
most that it could hope for from the courts: “The free speech point—in some ways the most
313
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important point in the case—has been decided in our favor in an opinion which leaves nothing to
be desired.” 318
If the Battle of the Overpass was a seminal turning point in the organization of the Ford
Motor Company, Ford v. NLRB was a flashpoint in the larger war over administrative authority,
New Deal labor policy, and constitutional interpretation. Dayton, Ohio’s News Week called Ford
“one of the most controversial decisions ever handed down by the National Labor Relations
Board.” 319 The New York Times reprinted the Sixth Circuit’s decision practically in full. 320
Dozens of bar journal and law review articles gave detailed consideration to Ford and the issue
of employer free speech. 321 Dean James M. Landis of Harvard Law School considered the issues
so novel and significant that he designed an Ames moot course based on the case. 322
In the summer of 1940, the ABA’s first issue of its Bill of Rights Review devoted an
article to the “The Labor Board and Free Speech.” 323 It reported that the new Committee on the
Bill of Rights had voted to file an amicus brief in an appropriate Supreme Court test case
concerning employer free speech. It explained that the NLRB’s infringement on the right of
employers to express anti-union views had “handicapped the attainment of harmonious relations”
and threatened equal protection, in addition to violating the First Amendment. “The decision of
the first test case by the Supreme Court may well establish a landmark in the history of the Bill
318
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of Rights,” the article predicted, “and it seems proper that the appropriate Committee of the
American Bar Association should express its views.” 324 A few months later, the Sixth Circuit’s
decision in the Ford case rendered ABA involvement unnecessary. The Review’s second issue
described the case in detail. “The import of the decision,” it concluded, was “to place upon the
Board the burden of proving that the employer’s expression of opinion would in fact operate as
coercion.” That rule, according to the ABA, “seem[ed] to be a justifiable one.” 325
The NLRB, with the guidance of the Supreme Court, soon adopted a policy that was
almost indistinguishable from the ACLU’s stated position. 326 It seems fitting that the Supreme
Court’s first opinion on the issue was written by Frank Murphy, who in the span of a decade had
served as (among other roles) mayor of Detroit, governor of Michigan, Attorney General of the
United States, and finally as an associate justice of the United States Supreme Court. Murphy
had corresponded regularly with the ACLU in each of those capacities—especially in
conjunction with his creation of the Civil Liberties Unit within the Department of Justice—and
he was deeply sympathetic to the organization’s views.
In his 1941 opinion in NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Company, 327 Justice Murphy
clarified that the Board, in considering whether an employer had “interfered with, restrained, and
coerced” its employees under the NLRA, was permitted to inquire into “what the Company has
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said, as well as what it has done.” He concluded, however, that language must be actually
coercive or part of a coercive course of conduct to justify curtailment by the NLRB. In the case
under consideration, the employer had conveyed orally and in writing the opinion that unions
were ineffective and divisive, but it had specifically stated that employees were free to join
without retaliation from the company. The Board had considered this expression of views to be
unlawful without situating it in a broader complex of unlawful activities. 328 Murphy was careful
to emphasize that the Supreme Court could not substitute its own interpretation of the facts for
that of the NLRB, and he left ample room on remand for the Board to buttress its order with
concrete findings (“perhaps,” he wrote, “the purport of these utterances may be altered by
imponderable subtleties at work which it is not our function to appraise”). On their own terms,
however, the employer’s views did not rise to the level of constitutionally regulable coercion.
Murphy’s opinion for the Court, its formal protection of free speech coupled with broad
interpretative deference to the NLRB, set the stage for the Board’s decision for the next five
years. The Board’s interpretation of “coercion” was predictably broad, and employers continued
to complain about interference with their First Amendment rights. 329 For its part, the ACLU
never again wavered in its commitment to employer free speech. The December 1945 edition of
the statement defining its position on civil liberties contained a section on “labor’s rights.” In it,
the ACLU underscored the right of workers to organize, and it called for vigilant enforcement of
the provisions of state and national labor relations acts preventing employer coercion. But it
insisted that the police should protect the civil rights of all “portion[s] of the community,” a
principle which called “for the protection not only of organized workers but of non-union
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workers and managers in their right of access to places of employment.” Moreover, it called for
the defense of minority rights against labor union discrimination “on account of race, religion,
sex, nationality or political views,” and where unions “unreasonably restrict[ed] membership,” it
opposed the closed shop.” Finally, it insisted that the “administration” of labor legislation,
where employer communications regarding unions were not coercive, “should be so guarded as
not to infringe upon employers’ rights of free speech.” 330
In 1947, with the voice of industry behind them, congressional conservatives at last
succeeded in crippling the NLRB. That June, the Taft-Hartley Act was enacted over the veto of
President Harry S. Truman. On many issues, it adopted the very proposals that the ACLU had
come together to oppose in the spring of 1940, at a time when it was otherwise so thoroughly
divided. But on the issue of employer free speech, Taft-Hartley instituted precisely the rule that
the absolutists on the ACLU board had championed in the Ford case. The act ensured that “the
expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written,
printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of unfair labor practice under
any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force
or promise of benefit.” 331
The ACLU denounced Taft-Hartley as a “direct violation of labor’s rights.” It cautioned
that the act’s provisions were “fraught with peril to the maintenance of civil liberties in labor
330
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disputes.” 332 Its next annual report jettisoned the optimistic outlook of the late 1930s and 1940s.
Citing Taft-Hartley, among other setbacks, it expressed “justified skepticism concerning the
immediate future of our democratic liberties as instruments of progress.” It described the
popular desire, expressed in the 1946 elections, to break free of the “irritating shackles” of state
control and to reinstate “the presumably sound leadership of private business.” The new
skepticism toward state economic regulation had “produced an atmosphere increasingly hostile
to the liberties of organized labor, the political left and many minorities.” 333
The ACLU’s protest came too late. By 1947, employers and their allies had come to
believe, however much the ACLU willed it to be otherwise, that free speech and “economic
liberty” were inextricably linked—not as a matter of constitutional law, but of political will and
sound public policy. 334
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EPILOGUE

On the eve of the Second World War, President Franklin D. Roosevelt counted “freedom
of speech” and “freedom from want” among America’s most fundamental values. 1 Military
necessity, he promised, would not serve as a license for repression, as it had during World War I.
“No matter what comes we must preserve our national birthright,” he told the nation: “liberty of
conscience and of education, of the press and of free assembly, and equal justice to all under the
law.” 2 In Roosevelt’s vision, democracy entailed both economic security and the liberty to
demand it. Although both would yield significantly to wartime pressures, the President’s rhetoric
was a symbol of how far the country had come. 3
And yet, despite Roosevelt’s enthusiastic endorsement of both freedoms, there was a
significant distance between the two. Economic rights were a matter of government policy,
conditioned on democratic deliberation. By contrast, free speech was a “civil liberty,” and thus
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grounded in the Bill of Rights. 4 An adequate standard of living was affirmative, but aspirational;
expressive freedom, though subject to balancing against important governmental interests, was a
negative guarantee, asserted against the state.
During the 1920s and 1930s, industry, labor, government officials, and the ACLU all had
experimented with alternative understandings of civil liberties. Especially after enactment of the
NLRA, they had grappled with a novel and untested allegiance between organized labor and
state power. For the NLRB, collective bargaining was just as much a “right” as free speech. In a
1938 address, Edwin Smith declared that union organization was the only means of preserving
democracy, and that to survive it must receive from the government firm protection against those
who have the power and will to destroy it.” 5 Indeed, to Warren Madden, the workers were
entitled to state protection by a new and fundamental right—for “a liberty to emerge from a
condition of economic helplessness, and dependence upon the will of another, to a status of
having one’s chosen representative received as an equal at the bargaining conference table, must
be recognized as fundamental.” 6 This liberty was antecedent to the rights of speech, press, and
assembly, which working people could not enjoy until their right to collective bargaining was
met. Labor leaders made the same point more bluntly. Joseph Schlosberg, speaking at a mass
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meeting of Ford Workers, recounted that twenty-five years earlier “the employers refused to
speak to us because we were just that many nobodies, men and women without rights.” 7
Although union organizers continued to stress direct action, they grew increasingly
reliant on state assistance even while they remained skeptical of judicial review. Nathan
Greene—writing not for the ACLU but for the International Juridical Association, a Popular
Front civil liberties group—stressed the malleability of terms like liberty, which for so long had
been invoked on employers’ behalf. 8 Echoing a younger Roger Baldwin, Greene declared that
“liberty in action draws its true meaning from the power by which it is impelled” and that “the
only defensible concept of liberty is one that makes some room, at least, for the concept of
equality.” For Greene, “liberty” was a dangerous abstraction, and economic power was a
prerequisite for free speech. His explanation neatly captures the insurmountable distance
between Greene and the ACLU: “I have heard an important person in this City defend what he
called Henry Ford’s right of free speech in the cases I have discussed, in this way. He said, ‘I am
for free speech though the universe shall smash.’ Forgive the I.J.A. We are for free speech in an
unsmashed universe, or to narrow the figure just a little, in an unsmashed world. We believe
speech and the other civil liberties are meaningful only to men who dare to use them. And that
before ‘daring’ come bread and water, come roots in the community, comes respite from fear.
Only a reasonably whole world, not a ‘smashed’ world, will ever tolerate free speech.” 9
If the labor movement and its allies were increasingly skeptical of free speech, the legal
establishment had fully endorsed its elevation by the ACLU to the top of the constitutional
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hierarchy. In the Bill of Rights Review, the ABA heralded the emergence of “civil liberties” as a
“distinct field of law.” It noted that a law school “would be abreast of the times” in offering a
class devoted solely to civil liberties or the Bill of Rights. 10 It also urged the adoption of an
annual Bill of Rights Week throughout the United States, and it recommended “that study of the
Bill of Rights be made a permanent, daily part of the curriculum in all American schools.” 11
On economic issues, the conservative bar retained its longstanding aversion to
administrative authority, but it shifted its efforts to procedural reform rather than congressional
authority. The Administrative Procedure Act, enacted in 1946 after years of lobbying by the
ABA, subjected administrative decision-making to judicial review in a manner reminiscent of the
ACLU-sponsored Cutting Bill in the realm of customs censorship. Roscoe Pound, as chair of the
ABA’s committee on administrative procedure, argued that judicial oversight would preserve
constitutional democracy and prevent America from becoming “an avowed dictatorship.” 12 It is
telling that his growing preference for the judiciary coincided with a new sympathy for free
speech. 13
When it came to the Bill of Rights, the ABA believed that the courts had a crucial role to
play. It was their task to ensure equal treatment for all Americans, including beleaguered
employers. Like “the press, the commentator, the employee and the general public,” employers
deserved the freedom to exercise “the rights of free expression” that the Constitution provided. 14
Freedom, of course, had its limits. As America readied for war, it necessarily imposed more
10
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onerous duties on its citizens, and the balance between liberty and responsibility shifted toward
the latter. This “principle of relativity” subjected such “privileges” as the “so-called ‘right to
strike’” to moderation, “in the field of labor relations as in others.” Still, said Grenville Clark, to
the extent they were compatible with national security, the government was bound to respect
people’s rights. 15
More than any other body, it was the ACLU that anticipated and in significant ways
produced the constitutional compromise of the post-New Deal era. By investing in the Bill of
Rights, the ACLU produced its most important victories: the Supreme Court decisions of the
1930s, which protected the rights of radicals to articulate their views without interference by the
state. Well after 1937, legal academics and practitioners remained wary of judicial review. The
new vision of court-based constitutionalism would take years to find a firm hold among liberal
activists. Whatever their hesitation about constitutional interpretation, however, liberal lawyers
had come to regard the courts as a friendly forum for resolving disputes, whether among
individuals or between individuals and the state. By 1940, former progressives who were
sympathetic to free speech routinely decried administrative censorship but “[took] comfort in
evidences of an enlightened judiciary.” 16
Seizing on the conservative rhetoric of time-honored individual rights, the ACLU had
attracted supporters within and outside the courts. The threat of totalitarianism, which the ACLU
had invoked to such great effect in Hague v. CIO, buttressed the appeal of state restraint. An
estimated two thousand people attended the ACLU’s National Conference on Civil Liberties in
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October 1939, representing a broad range of political and economic views. 17 By the end of the
decade, free speech was an undeniable American value.
But the constitutional strategy also came at a cost. The majority within the ACLU had
convinced themselves, employers, and the ABA that freedom of speech meant freedom from
government censorship. It was a right held by all equally, worker and employer alike. In 1940,
the labor press accused the ACLU of “turning against labor,” 18 citing a long list of changes in
ACLU policy, including its position in the Ford case. That year’s edition of the organization’s
pamphlet on civil liberties professed a commitment to the legal protection of strikebreakers in
“their right of access to places of employment.” 19 Several members of the ACLU had denounced
the closed shop as a threat to civil liberties. Some had commended the Dies Committee for its
investigation of “destructive” trade union activity. 20 Subsequent annual reports expressed
support for the “democratic rights” of workers to be free of union discrimination based not only
on race (as in earlier years) but also on “political views or opposition to union administration.” 21
The board created a Committee on Trade Union Democracy to monitor union compliance with
its principles.
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Almost alone among progressives and liberals, the ACLU never was fully seduced by the
New Deal. To be sure, official ACLU statements after 1935 lavished high praise on the NLRA.
But the ACLU’s mature vision of civil liberties was not the NLRB’s. In March 1939, the ACLU
rallied behind Senator La Follette’s bill “to eliminate certain oppressive labor practices affecting
interstate and foreign commerce.” Had it passed, it would have made espionage, munitions,
private police, and strikebreaking punishable by fine or imprisonment. William Green and John
L. Lewis both supported the bill. 22 So, “heartily,” did Attorney General Murphy, who believed
“that the Federal Government has a definite role to play in the preservation of civil liberties.” 23
For the ACLU leadership, as for Murphy, the La Follette bill was a quintessential civil liberties
measure. Preserving civil liberties meant promoting and protecting speech, not controlling it. It
meant ensuring that employers would counter the speech of their workers not with force, but
with words. 24
The ACLU proved consistent in enforcement of that principle. It continued to criticize
violent interference with the right to organize and strike. 25 But it held labor to the same
standard. It admonished pickets to “keep traffic open for pedestrians and vehicles, to insure

22

Debate on the bill centered on the supposed Communist threat to American industry. Amendments proposed by
North Carolina Senator Robert R. Reynolds prohibited all companies from hiring aliens in excess of 10 percent of
their workforces or from employing “any Communist or member of any Nazi Bund organization.” The Senate bill,
thus amended, passed by a vote of 47 to 20. The House version was buried in committee. Auerbach, “La Follette
Committee,” 454.
23
Statement of Attorney General Murphy before the Senate Committee of Education and Labor, re: Bill S. 1970,
Attorney General Papers, box 6, entry 132.
24
Robert Jackson, Murphy’s successor as Attorney General (and his future colleague on the Supreme Court), was
even more skeptical of a state-centered approach. “Compared with [the] rather narrow powers to advance civil
rights the possibilities that the Department of Justice by misuse of power will invade civil rights really gives me
more concern,” he wrote in the Bill of Rights Review. Robert Jackson, “Messages on the Launching of the ‘Bill of
Rights Review,’” Bill of Rights Review 1 (Summer 1940): 35. By then, the ACLU had reason to agree. It noted in
its 1940 Annual Report that Murphy had undertaken “numerous prosecutions . . . which struck at minority political
groups.” It considered Jackson’s record slightly better. American Civil Liberties Union, In the Shadow of War: The
Story of Civil Liberty, 1939–1940 (New York: American Civil Liberties Union), 17.
25
American Civil Liberties Union, Liberty’s National Emergency: The Story of Civil Liberty in the Crisis Year
1940–1941 (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1941), 4.
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access to places picketed, to prevent the use of fraudulent signs, and to maintain order.” 26 In
place of the right of agitation, the ACLU touted the marketplace of ideas. Workers were free to
express their discontent. They could reason with strike-breakers. But union “coercion,” like its
employer counterpart, fell squarely outside the realm of civil liberties.
The same general principle applied outside the labor context. The ACLU’s ambition was
robust discussion on all public issues, broadly defined. In the 1940s, the organization
acknowledged that free speech could not flourish without a platform. As Morris Ernst put it,
“our market place in thought only has vitality and a chance of serving as an arena in which
thought can win out if as many diverse currents of thought flow into the market place as is
mechanically and physically possible.” 27 Toward that end, the ACLU encouraged the
government to promote conversation, first by creating “Hyde Parks” and other public forums,
and increasingly by more creative means. Ernst persuaded President Roosevelt to introduce a
discounted postage rate to facilitate the circulation of printed matter. 28 He also advocated ACLU

26

“Pickets Criticized by Liberties Union,” New York Times, 21 January 1946. The ACLU urged the leaders of
organized labor, including CIO president Phillip Murray and AFL president William Green, to curtail “violence” by
pickets. The pickets in question had excluded maintenance crews, clerical workers, and executive officers. In the
ACLU’s view, “the two rights—of picketing and of access to places picketed—[were] not conflicting.”
27
Memorandum by Morris Ernst Prepared at the Request of the [ACLU] Board of Directors at the Special Meeting,
9 October 1941, Lowell Mellett Papers, 1938–1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Franklin D.
Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., Gr. 60, box 11, folder Morris Ernst (hereafter “Ernst,
Memorandum for Special Meeting”).
28
See Fred Rodell, “Morris Ernst, New York’s Unlawyerlike Liberal Lawyer is the Censor’s Enemy, The
President’s Friend,” Life, 21 February 1944. The measure was justified on the basis that “in this democracy of ours,
unlike the dictatorship lands, we are dedicated to the ever increasing extension of a free market in thought as a
means to the perpetuation of our national ideals. As they burn books abroad, we extend their distribution.”
Announcement by National Committee to Abolish Postal Discrimination Against Books, Oscar Cox Papers,
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., Alphabetical File, Douglas-Ernst, box 9, folder Ernst,
Morris. Ernst reported to the board of directors: “[Book rate postage] made possible books such as Pocket Books,
impossible without it. But it also permitted a flow into the market place of great additional diversity of points of
view, and exciting evidence now shows that this single proclamation of the President has actually increased the flow
of the printed word in increased volume between libraries of the country, between individuals and libraries, not to
mention the great effect on the literature used in the schools of the land.” Ernst, “Memorandum for Special
Meeting,” 5–6.
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legal action against newspaper owners for “restraint of trade.” 29 Although the ACLU did not
follow Ernst quite that far, it met him partway. In 1945, the board formally adopted a new policy
extending its “traditional principles” to contexts in which “private agencies rather than public
authorities” restricted freedom of speech. It demanded from government “not only forbearance
from interfering with the liberties of its citizens but also restraints on interference with those
liberties by private agencies.” 30 It opposed restraints on expression by motion picture
distributors, for example. Over time, it would add company towns and, eventually, shopping
malls.
More contentiously, it also adopted Ernst’s longstanding position on broadcast radio,
dating back to his Dill Bill days. 31 In 1946, it endorsed the FCC’s new standards for granting
and renewing radio licenses, which required stations to allocate time for the discussion of
“important public questions” and to cover all sides of controversial issues. The radio industry
denounced the measures as censorship, but the ACLU disagreed. It explained in a statement that
the limited number of radio channels made some form of intervention necessary. “The ACLU
position does not favor the principle of government regulation, but accepts it as a practical
necessity,” it claimed. Importantly, if the government sought to withhold radio licenses based on
its assessment of the content of programming, the station owners had recourse to the courts.
29

Acknowledging that the program would involve the ACLU in issues of economics, he said, “I see nothing to the
arguments that if we go into a consideration of the monopoly of the AP, or a radio chain that it means that we have
to go into the monopoly of the chain grocery store. We should stick to ideas and not go in for broccoli.” Ibid.
30
American Civil Liberties Union, Liberty on the Home Front: In the Fourth Year of War (New York: American
Civil Liberties Union, 1945), 60.
31
The government and labor both shared Ernst’s view of media consolidation, to varying degrees. E.g., “Little
Americanism,” Address by Robert H. Jackson for New York Press Association, 28 January 1938, Attorney General
Papers, box 6, folder Jackson (“Every newspaper man and every newspaper owner is acutely aware that the
freedom of the press is something different today from what it was in the years before its ownership began to get
concentrated.”); “For the Freedom of the Press,” Buffalo Daily Law Journal, 23 September 1938 (reporting
statement by the state convention of CIO-affiliated unions, sponsored by the American Newspaper Guild, voicing
equal opposition to state censorship and to “distortion of the news by newspaper owners who may through whim,
caprice or malice select for publication such items as please them, alter other items to suit their fancy, and omit such
news as displeases them”).
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“Freedom of speech is not abridged,” the statement reasoned. “The standards fixed provide for
more speech, not less.” 32
Some within the ACLU wanted the government to increase the value of speech in
addition to its volume. Alexander Meiklejohn, voicing the standard progressive line, thought
that government ownership of the airwaves would serve the “public interest” and enrich the
quality of radio programming. On that point, however, the board of directors staunchly
disagreed. John Haynes Holmes decried public ownership as “the first step in the direction of
totalitarianism” and an “invasion of what we have called ‘the free market in thought.’” Holmes
acknowledged the need for government regulation of public utilities, but he insisted that “such
regulation should not touch the distribution of opinion.” 33 Morris Ernst concurred with Holmes.
He warned that recent proposals for government-run newspapers and radio stations posed the
“greatest peril” to free thought and counseled, “This we should crack and crack hard.” 34 An
ACLU pamphlet expressed the organization’s position: “The evils of big business ultimately
invite government correction, a cure as bad as the disease. Once the government enters to
correct, it will remain to control. And government domination of the public mind cannot be
reconciled with democracy.” 35
The ACLU approved efforts to multiply speech, but never to curtail it. It countenanced
no consideration for the relative worth of speech, however provocative, hateful or abusive. It
even condemned distinctions between commercial and non-commercial speech. 36 So too in the
32

American Civil Liberties Union, Radio Programs in the Public Interest (New York: American Civil Liberties
Union, July 1946). Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
33
John Haynes Holmes to Alexander Meiklejohn, 27 January 1942, Meiklejohn Papers, box 16, folder 37.
34
Ernst, “Memorandum for Special Meeting,” 6–7.
35
ACLU, Are You Free. It continued, “Let us use the Bill of Rights as more than just a shield to protect freedom of
expression from attack. It must also be a sword cutting through private restraints on the market-place of thought.”
36
ACLU, Liberties in War-Time, 17 (citing a commercial handbill decision, presumably Valentine v. Chrestensen,
316 U.S. 52 (1942)). It did except private libel and, for the time being, though to a lesser degree, frank obscenity.
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context of labor. As Baldwin told Alexander Meiklejohn, the ACLU advocated complete
freedom of expression for both unions and employers. Restricting both sides was no solution to
disparities in bargaining power, he advised. “You know we are of course opposed to restraints on
either.” 37
By the early 1940s, civil liberties were no longer radical. On the contrary, they served as
industry’s most potent weapon against state control. Employers quickly embraced the rhetoric of
free speech, within and outside the courts. In the Ford case and many others, they seized upon
the language of recent pro-labor decisions and earlier pro-labor dissents to justify their own
prerogatives. Such is the standard course in a legal system built on precedent; corporations hired
the most skilled and best trained of lawyers, and it would have been surprising had they not
availed themselves of every argument in their arsenal.
And yet, their embrace of free speech was not simply a fallback to the least bad
alternative. Rather, employers quickly understood that free speech was a powerful industrial
tool. 38 The ACLU had naively hoped, in an era when revolution seemed possible, that a mere
right to agitate would pave the way to substantive change. Implicit in their position was the
confidence that radicalism was truth—that it would win out in the marketplace of ideas. By the
1940s, employers understood that no free exchange in ideas existed. They understood that a

37

Roger Baldwin to Alexander Meiklejohn, 8 December 1941, Meiklejohn Papers, box 4, folder 4.
Apparently, Ford’s attorneys had not yet anticipated the application of free speech doctrine to advertising and
other commercial applications. One attorney wrote: “There is a very clear line of authority, both with regard to the
equity injunctions and with regard to Federal Trade Commission cease and desist orders, that the making of
statements in good faith with regard to a competitor’s goods, or that the plaintiff’s patents are invalid, may not be
enjoined. . . . With regard to these cases generally, it seems to me to be a mistake to drag the free speech issue into
the field at all. The kind of statements which are made are very rarely expressions of any opinions concerning
matters of current public interest. The statement that X’s rifles do not shoot straight, if false, or, even if true, has
nothing to do with the political reasons for free speech.” P. B., “Memorandum on Free Speech,” 11 June 1939, 56–
57, Ford Legal Papers, box 3, vol. 3.
38
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right to free speech would almost invariably favor those with superior resources. As Nathan
Greene put it, employer speech was “a protected commodity in a monopoly market.” 39
The constitutional revolution, as distilled in the famous footnote four of Carolene
Products, guaranteed Congress full reign over economic regulation, subject only to the
constraints of the most fundamental American liberties, including free speech. 40 Substantive due
process no longer was available as a defense against progressive legislation. During the Second
World War, when critics decried the “expanded war-time powers of government” as a bridge to
totalitarianism, the ACLU demurred. “[T]hese measures largely concern economic controls
which do not directly affect freedom of opinion and debate, nor the right of opposition or of
criticism,” it explained, and accordingly they raised no constitutional questions for the courts. 41
Like the ACLU leadership, the courts had come to accept state regulation of the economy
as a positive force that served the public interest. No longer would they regard freedom of
contract or the rights of property as a trump on social progress. But they would demand, lest
America slide into dictatorship, that the state remain neutral in the realm of thought. In short,
industry was free to dominate the marketplace of ideas. It could marshal all of its economic
might to lobby government and to disseminate its views in the workplace and the public forum.
And the First Amendment would ensure that no one would stand in its way.

39

“Civil Liberties and the NLRB,” International Juridical Association, reprinted from speech by Nathan Greene, 8
March 1940, 5 (emphasis in original), Sugar Papers, folder 54:17.
40
In the 1938 decision, Justice Stone repudiated Lochner-era judicial activism—the case itself rejected a due process
challenge to a federal law prohibiting the interstate shipment of filled milk—but intimated that legislation impinging
on the Bill of Rights (as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment), as well as “legislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,”
would be subject to greater judicial oversight than ordinary acts of Congress. United States v. Carolene Products
Company, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). Footnote 4, which provided the basis for the most familiar civil-rights
victories of the twentieth century, was initially invoked far more frequently in First Amendment cases than in race
cases. Indeed, the languages of civil rights and civil liberties remained hopelessly ambiguous and intertwined for
decades. Goluboff, Lost Promise, 24–25.
41
ACLU, Freedom in Wartime, 6.
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Roger Baldwin consistently denied the charges that the ACLU had gone conservative.
When pressed by former friends and colleagues, he fell back on his pre-Wagner Act belief that
the best protection for workers was a strong union, not the state. He reasserted his distrust of
state power, which had always operated before to trample the rights of the least empowered.
Such arguments, however, were quickly fading into the background; the ACLU’s
emerging program emphasized other ideas. In the 1940s, “the issue of race relations . . .
occup[ied] first place in the struggle for civil liberties.” 42 Also central were “religious liberty,”
“aliens’ liberties,” and the “rights of women.” In securing these rights the ACLU stressed its
“complete impartiality.” The organization, it claimed, had no “‘isms’ or other objects to
serve.’” 43 It defended the freedoms to speak, worship, and assemble as essential to “political
democracy.” 44 The right to picket was an application of a general commitment to free speech.
“We are neither anti-labor nor pro-labor,” Baldwin insisted in 1940. “With us it is just a question
of going wherever the Bill of Rights leads us.” 45

42

American Civil Liberties Union, In Defense of Our Liberties: A Report of the American Civil Liberties Union in
the Third Year of the War (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1944), 23.
43
ACLU, Are you Free, 8.
44
ACLU, Presenting (1947), 2–3.
45
Alexander Crosby, “Baldwin Denies Civil Liberties Union Is Turning Against Labor,” 7 March 1940, Jackson
Papers, General Correspondence, cont. 3. See also ACLU Outline, “Democracy in Trade Unions,” September 1941,
Jackson Papers, General Correspondence, cont. 3 (listing various “discriminatory practices” by unions, including
exclusion on account of race, sex, political affiliations, and vocational training, as well as high initiation and dues
and “closed” membership).
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